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Purpose and Scope The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
of the Studjr* validity and importance of the moral argument for
*>od In the ligftt of a number of recent reformula­ 
tions of the argument*
Its scope Itas been definitely limited, and 
those limits are indicated in the I;! tie* The body 
of the paper consists of a comparative appraisal 
of the thelstio positions of four contemporary 
British thinkers. The enquiry has been confined,in 
tne first place, to living writers (Professor 
Pringle-Pattlson*s death has occurred since the 
study was begun)5 there has thus been excluded from 
It the thought of Professor James Ward, Sir Henry 
Jones and a number of other recent philosophers who 
might well have found a place in a wider survey of 
recent literature* And it has been confined to theisms 
which make the significance of moral experience the 
center of their Interest, thus excluding the contri­ 
butions of Professor da&n,Dr»Tennant and several other 
contemporaries which could scarcely te classified as 
'restatements of the moral argument 1 . Finally, the 
enquiry has been confined to British thinkers, thus 
eliminating from consideration irofessor Titius of 
Berlin, Professor Hooking of Harvard and other living 
continental and American philosophers whose outlook
ir
bears upon the topics of our discussion at a number of 
important points.
II.
Synopsis. It is ou* aim to bring the study as far as pos­ 
sible into relation with living issues in the lives of 
contemporary Christians. For that reason,the enquiry 
opens with an attempt to discover the f working* concep­ 
tion of God as it is likely to be held by a quite 
typical Christian layman of today. It is pointed out 
that that conception is likely to be unsatisfactory to 
its holder, inadequate for the richer experiences of 
personal religion, and untrue to historic Christian 
theism* It is suggested that the heart of the problem 
may be discovered in the fact that the f plain loan1 no 
longer has the conviction of God f s active and vital 
relationship to his life* A search for the causes of 
this Inadequacy of contemporary theism traces it to 
the united impact of two Influences—the one theoretical,
the other practical—the mounting authority of science's
i interpretation of phenomenal experience and gien's In*
creasing scepticism of theories of ultimate reality t on 
the one hand; and*the practical effect of the rise of 
modem science upon the layman's life.on the other hand. 
In so far as our religious difficulties have a theoreti­ 
cal source, it sprang from the mlagulded severance of 
phenomenal and noumenal, 'facts 9 and 'values' t which Kant 
bequeathed to the modern .forId. It is agreed to make the
thoistio developments which followed from him the 
ognter of rafersacs of the ensuing study. (Chapter On*) 
Thsrs follows an investigation of Kant*s thought 
in its bearing upon theological advance. Jertain basic 
inadequacies in his theory of knowledge and in his 
f iaoral argument* for Ctod are pointed out. And it is 
suggosted that, in the problem as it emerged from Kant's 
hands and presented itself to his successors , there are 
to bo discovered four iiiain issues which may well serve 
as convenient conuocting threads for tho critical ap­ 
praisals to follow. Those are;-
objectivity of values. 
2.Tho relation of the 'realm of values 1 to the f realm
of Nature 1 . 
3* The relations of moral values and other values; and
their relative bearing upon the idea of ^od. 
4. The problem of evil.
(Chapter Two)
An analysis of eight alternative forms in which 
the evidence for God from moral experience has been for- 
mulcted since Kant's day concludes the introductory 
section and provides a transition to the body of the 
paper. (Chapter Three)
The theiatio statements of Professors w.H.sorley, 
A.E.TaJrlor, John Baillie and A.S.Prlngle-Pattison are 
then examined in succession, tehile there is no attempt 
at rigid uniformity in treatment, each critique follows 
four steps: -
1.A brief introduction by way of orientation.
2.An outline paraphrase of the most important theistic 
work of the writer.
Ti
3.A somewhat longer expository section, further 
developing the author's position, usually in 
the light of the four normative questions and 
with feirly extensive quotations from the author's 
writings.
4.<i brief concluding estimate.
(Chapters Four Seven)
The paper concludes with an outline of a con- 
structive theistic argument in which the points of 
contact with the four positions previously appraised 
are indicated; and rith a statement cf certain impli- 
cations of the idea of God developed in the conclu- 
sion. (Chapter Eight)
III.
Bibliography. The bibliography has been distributed through the 
e.to. thesis, the references for each chapter appearing at
the end of the chapter. It has been carefully restricted 
to works actually used in the preparation of the paper.
The skeleton of the paper is so simple and obvious 
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PART ONE
THE BACKGROUND OF CONTEMPORARY THEISM
CHAFPER ONE
THE SETTING OF THE 2N.JJIRY.
The passing of
Humanism*
Clearly the major problems of contemporary religion 
center u^on men's thought of God. ^nd the heart of the 
matter t one is increasingly inclined to believe,concerns 
not the fact of God but the nature of God—not whether 
the modern man has a right to believe in God's existence, 
but what he may believe concerning God. More particularly, 
the focus of his difficulties concerns what we may name 
the " activity of God "~i.e. hov; he may think of God as 
actively and vitally related to our work-a-day life.
This statement may seem strange indeed in the face 
of the powerful vogue of the movement known as non-theistJ 
Humanism; but it is made with the importance of that move­ 
ment fully in view. For there are reasons to believe that 
Humanism as a serious intellectual challenge to theistic 
religion has already passed the peak of its influence.
The evidence of its waning strength and the re- sons for it
1
need not detain us here ; suffice it to say that it be­ 
comes increasingly clear that Humanism was a distinctive 
feature of the abnormal years of the post-war decade. It 
now appears to have been a quite temporary though turbu­ 
lent by-current in the main stream of theological develop­ 
ment. Forces in the life of the times as well as a 
healthy recoil from the extreme religious scepticism of 
the period Just closing are uniting to draw less elemen-
l.See "Trends in Contemporay Theism," in Religion in Lifo 
Spring Number, 1932. ——— — — ———
2.
tary and more vital is cues to the center of attention. 
If religious discussions of the past half dozen years 
have turned on the issue, "Is there a God?" ,it is our 
suggestion that the heart of controversy in the coning 
period will be directed to the quest! on ,">7hat is God 
like?"
II. 
The Plain Man'g In this study, we shall necessarily be primarily
concerned with the idea of God as it is met in the thought 
of philosophers and theologians— discussions quite beyond 
the reach if not beyond the interest of the average church- 
going Christian. But it is our purpose to keep the enquiry 
as far as possible in touch with the issues which are 
vital for the layman,and to test contemporary theistic 
statements from that perspective, i.e. in terms of their 
adequacy to meet the religious needs of the great body of 
Christians. For that reason it may be well, be fore set­ 
ting forth on the main enquiry, to remind ourselves of 
the difficulties for belief in God as ttey are likely
to present themselves to the quite typical layman, the
2 
"plain ran" of our churches.
Our first suGG$stion is that tne 
major difficulty is not to be rvtrc that &e has a right
to believe in God, but to have clear conviction what he 
may believe about the God whose existence he vaguely 
acknowledges. His quarrel with so-called modern
2. The analysis which follows can purport to be no more 
than a reflection of the attitude of the laity in 
America; but I have the impression that it Is perhaps 
a truer characterization of the be ief of many 
in Britain than has been widely recognized.
3.
is not that it forbids belief in God,but that the Deity 
whom modern thought presents for our worship is quite 
inadequate for purposes of personal religion*
Let us turn our thought back half a century. Let 
us reflect upon the God in whom our fathers believed,the 
Deity made familiar to many of us in the faith of our 
parents and our childhood religious environment. He was 
a very definite and picturable Deity—one who could con- 
fid ently, perhaps somewhat familiarly,be addressed as 
"Father", very much as one might ask counsel of a pro­ 
foundly revered older advisor 9above all one who he?.rd per­ 
sonal petition and could be depended upon to answer it 
specifically and clearly. It was not expected that he would 
always change the course of Nature at one's behest. But he 
might certainly be expected to influence the health or 
thought of a friend. And,in every instance,he would give 
a definite reply which could be recognized as the V7111 of 
God in those circumstances.
Now turn to the plain man of today. Interrogate a 
typical layman about his working religious belief. Am I 
right that his replies to your inquiries,if quite honest, 
would run somewhat in this wise? Ask him whether ho 
believes in God; he is quite likely to answer "Yes",though 
perhaps a trifle hesitantly,possibly supporting his affir­ 
mative .reply with references to recent statements of
eminent scientists of which he has heard at second hand 
and rather vaguely. Press your inquiry further and ask 
where h© discovers God and what about God he knows with
4.
certainty; almost surely he will speak of the liklihood 
of some ultimate power behind Nature; he will sry that he 
sees God working through "natural law",<nd he may add a 
rather vague reference to "spiritual law" as well* But, 
on examination,"spiritual law" is conceived as operating 
after the impersonal and mechanical manner of physical law. 
inquire whether he prays,what he believes about prayer. I 
hesitate to predict his reply. Perhaps falteringly he will 
admit that he sometimes prays. But if asked to develop his 
definite working convictions about prayer,its nature and 
power,is he not likely to be rather inarticulate? And,let 
it be remembered, men's working belief in prayer is,
generally speaking,the most sensitive touchstone of vital
3 
personal religion. One is reminded of the candid elder
who when asked to describe hie idea of God replied that 
God was to him a"vague oblong blur." For thousands and 
thousands of our laymen today God,if more than a "vague 
oblong blur",is at most a Principle of Order and Reason 
behind the world of Nature end the course of evolution. 
Here,as at so many points, Mr.'waiter Lippmann has voiced 
the inarticulate view of a great body of the educated 
laity: —
"I do not mean that modern men have ceased 
to believe in God. I do mean tbrt they no longer 
believe in him simply ana 3**eral$y. I moan that 
they have defined and refinuu -Loir ideas of him until 
they c n no longer honestly sty that, he exists as 
they would say that their neighbor exists. Search 
the writings of the liberal churchmen, and when you 
come to the crucial passages which are intended
. The God to whom men will not pn y is only the ghost of 





to express thoir belief in God, you will find,I think,that at Just this point their uncertainty 
is most evident." 4
Here the important point is not whether Mr.^lppmnn 1 s 
position is well or ill taken, it is that he is ^peeking 
for a very considerable proportion of his fellow laymen*
III.
We may find further evidence of the inadequacy of 
widely prevalent thought about God if we turn to the teach­ 
ing of the liberal churches—the teaching from which the 
plain man is expected to form his religious ideas* By 
Liberalism is meant the progressive schools of thought 
which have sought to mediate between extreme Modernism on 
the one hand and Traditionalism verging on Fundamentalism 
on the other hand* Its central concern has been to bring
theology thoroughly into harmony with the findings and 
spirit of modern science but without sacrifice of per­ 
sonal religious vitality and evangelical fervour. Its 
great crusade centered on winning acceptance for the 
modern view of the Bible and the scientific interpretation 
of the Universe. Its watchword has been the preservation 
of "abiding experiences in changing categories." *t has 
been the interpretation of Christianity generally advanced 
in the universities and in the larger metropolitan churches 
in both Great Britain and the United States during the 
first quarter of the Twentieth Century.
In passing it may be noted that there is no more 
significant feature of the contemporary religious mood 
4. Walter Lippmann, A Preface to I .orals.D. 21-
6.
than the growing dissatisfaction with liberal theology. 
This would seem to be the negative parallel to the growing 
interest in the Theology of Crisis and other forms of 
"super-naturalism" on the other hand, wherever ministers 
meet together there are references to the sickness of 
Liberalism, its failure to stem the ebbing tide of re­ 
ligious loyalty among educated people, its patent inade­ 
quacy for a moment like the present. There is increasing 
agreement that Liberalism has served its mission but is 
now outmoded.
The most serious charge against the theology of the 
liberal churches in the past quarter century is that, with 
sincere motives, it has betrayed the cause of true re­ 
ligion. In seeking to save religious belief from anni­ 
hilation by the accepted thought-forms of the secular 
world, it has itself become a paliti reflection of the 
secular philosophy. It has tacitly accepted for religion 
the status of one of the incidental concerns of life. 
"Religion has become an elective in the university of life. 1 
It has more and more preached what might be called a 
"minimum interpretation of religion'.' Increasingly it has 
spoken of "religion" rather than Christianity; of religion 
without explicit reference to the necessity and certainty 
of God, but rather as a "way of life" or "philosophy of 
life"; of Jesus as the best of men; of prayer as synon­ 
ymous v.ith worship or aspiration. In its solicitude to
7.
domesticate religion within the fabric of modern thought, 
religion haa become hardly distinguishable from ethics, 
worship from aesthetic experience, the religious life 
from the noblest secular life.
Of even more serious consequence has been the 
favorite logic of liberal apologetic. Taking its method 
from what it understood to be accepted scientific pro­ 
cedure, its approach to the idea of God has been by way 
of tedious and methodical inductive argument. Its effort 
has been to free the mind from all prior convictions and 
biases, assemble all available data, and erect a logical 
proof for God. This method has several serious weaknesses. 
For one thing, the average lay thinker seldom has either 
the equipment or the perseverance to pursue his quest to 
its goal. Fore serious, even in the hands of a skilled 
apologist, it seldom leads to the God of religion; it 
usually yields at best a tentative intellectual postulate 
of the probable existence of God. But its greatest weak­ 
ness is not that an argument for God cannot be success­ 
fully developed by that procedure; quite probably it 
can. Its most serious shortcoming is that it sets the 
whole enterprise of apologetic in a false perspective. 
It puts the cart before the horse. God becomes the last 
term of an arduous and technical intellectual inquiry in­ 
stead of the first fact of a vital religious experience.
8.
IV.
The God of The heart of the matter is that the average layman 
Liberal Theolon-v. of today has no clear conception of the activity of God,
no thought of how God makes personal contact with men one 
by one, no conviction of a truly living God. Let us pur­ 
sue this point a trifle more thoroughly. For living re­ 
ligion is primarily concerned with the matter of God's 
vital relation to the individual human spirit and human 
interests. Its primary query is not so much, "..hat is 
God like?" as "tfhat does God do?" And of all the questions 
to which current liberal theism returns an inconclusive 
answer, this is at once the most important in the asking 
and the most foggy in the reply given.
Take the conception of revelation. Men talk much of
God "revealing himself" through the processes of Nature, 
through evolution, through moral law, through conscience, 
tfhat is really meant is that "God is revealed" in these 
ways. At first he; ring the distinction sounds like a 
verbal quibble, but there is a long mile of practical 
difference for religious experience between these two 
conceptions. That there are evidences of Deity behind 
much of the phenomena of Nature and the evolution of the 
moral consciousness is certain enough. i3ut that is 
essentially a passive conception of revelation; it refers 
to a discovery by man, a discovery made as he might dis­ 
cover a new star or a beautiful view or an eternal but
9-
hitherto unknown physical law. That we can say with 
assurance that God actively and purposefully reveala 
himself through these same phenomena is quite another 
matter. That is an active conception, ^nd that is the 
heart of what the church historically has meant by re­ 
velation. It is one thing to view a canvass or a oust 
and exclaim, "Ah, I see the indications of artistic genius; 
there is indeed the revelation of a true artist." It is 
quite another thing to stand with hushed spirit while 
one watches a great artist at the creation of a master­ 
piece. It is one thing to see the portrait of a hero of 
the past and to know that one is looking at the face of 
great character. It is quite different to feel a strong 
hand upon one's shoulder, to hear a reassuring voice in 
one's ear, to feel another's breath upon one's face, to 
know the person as comrade and friend.
The story is told of a young man who recently re­ 
turned home after a somewhat long absence. ^B his key 
turned the latch ana he entered the front door, he was 
greeted by silence. He climbed slowly to the second floor 
room where, day by day and year by year, he had been 
accustomed to oe met by a f»imiliar figure and a familiar 
voice in greeting. Everything in that room was precisely 
as he had expected to find it. There on the table were 
the books and magazineb piled in a distinctive and 
familiar fashion. On the desk was a vase of flowers,
10.
its arrangement suggesting fingers with a peculiarly 
artistic touch. I^ach chair :.nd ornament was in its ac­ 
customed place. There %T.S almost ^ distinctive aroma 
in the room. In one corner was the familiar great arm­ 
chair where the familiar figure habitually sat, and beside 
it some needlework as thovgh just laid cown. It was all
l£verythin,T in the room j?as a •revel^-Mon' nf>as he haa expected. [ Jut--"cne caair we.s empt^rj ——
there was no hearty voice in greeting; the figure was 
not there. Something like that is the contrast between 
a God "revealed" through Nature and conscience, and a 
God who wills to reveal himself to individuals, speaking 
to men one by one.
Again, consider present- ; ay interpretations of the 
Holy Spirit. There was a period in the years immediately 
before the V/ar when one seldom heard sermons upon the 
Holy Spirit. Once again it has become quite the fashion
to speak freely of the Spirit — the inawelling Monitor, 
the voice of God in the heart of every man. Contemporary 
rendering of the Holy Spirit tends to mean little more 
than a pious designation for what men have always known 
as conscience. That is a far remove from the Holy Spirit 
as apostolic Christianity knew Him ana as He haa been 
experienced in periods of the church's greatest spiritual 
vitality. The Holy Spirit of today is simply God immanent 
in every human heart, "a bit of the being of the Divine 
lodged in our natures from all eternity." But the Holy
11.
Spirit of the early church was less truly thought of as 
Cod immanent than at 3od trance er.dent. It was not a 
spark of the Divine implanted in human nature from 
creation; but rather a specif*! arid direct message from 
Cod at particular times to particular individual be­ 
lievers. It was a "gift from en high*" The Holy Spirit 
of today has oeeri not unfairly describee, as a "hazy human­ 
ized evidence of a God whose activity ie seen vaguely 
everywhere "but clct.rly nowhere"; the Holy Spirit of the 
ages was the unmiatakeably direct impact of a God whose 
initiative was the most vital factor in Christian ex­ 
perience. And 30 it is small wonder that men no longer 
feel the certainty of God's love and power and guidance 
ir their lives.
Once more, v.ith this change in men's thoughts of 
revelation and inspiration has come a modification in 
their conception of the •Vill of God for their lives. 
The v/ill of God to our fathers was the personal, direct, 
individual purpose of a Loving Father for each child, 
personally made known and personally appropriated. Today 
the .'/ill of God tends to mean to the average layman that 
general answer to a particular situation which, all things 
considered, best fits the circumstances. It is man's 
judgment of the beat thing to do, slightly sanctified 
by pious reference to Deity.
.Finally, consider the matter of prayer. And we
12.
remind ourselves again that a people's prayer-life is 
usually the most accurate thermometer of the reality of 
their religion. It needs no proof that men have largely 
lost the traditional Christian faith in prayer, and have 
largely given over the traditional C iristian practice 
of personal prayer. To be sure they still believe it 
a good thing to pray. It puts them into touch with the 
great spiritual forces of the Universe. It quiets and 
steadies their lives. It opens their minds to the direc­ 
tion of the divine spirit—that spirit making itself 
felt through the accumulated spiritual heritage of the 
race and through conscience. 13ut if they are asked 
vvhat specifically prayer may be expected to accomplish 
beyond their own lives, or whence comes its beneficent 
influence other than through impersonal natural forces, 
they do not know. Prayer is no longer the intimate com­ 
merce of two personal spirits through which the world's 
most potent work is done.
V.
The Core of //e have put the matter bluntly, and rather extreme- 
the Proble^i. ly. <iuite probably we have overstated the case. More­ 
over there were aspects of traditional Christian belief 
strongly tainted with superstition which are good 
riddance. And we have drawn the contrast as though the 
new represented wholly loss; in reality it has brought 
much decided gain. The main purpose has been to face
13-
the working beliefs of the plain man of our day. 
the burden of the contrast—the inadequacy of the idea 
of God as it is actually held by great numbers of our 
laymen (as well as its sharp divergence from the richest 
convictions of Christian theism)—would seem to hold. 
The plain truth is that we are less sure of the activity 
of God than of that of our nearest neighbour. Practically, 
we ascribe less individuality, less initiative, less 
creative purposeful action to God than to our bootblack 
or the postman on our route. It is tr^e that many are 
inclined to believe that God does act beyond the fixed 
predetermined order of Nature. .But where, when, how? 
do not know. Many are inclined to think that prayer 
accomplishes more than helpful subjective inspiration 
for those who pray. J3ut when, what, how? They are not 
sure. God being everywhere in general is thought of as 
nowhere in particular* Men, feeling the threat of im­ 
prisonment within the shackles of deterministic psycho­ 
logy have shaken loose from that bondage, refused to 
acknowledge that concepts of law could adequately account 
for personality, and have demanded the reality of human 
freedom. .Jhat they have demanded for themselves they 
have not demanded for their God. They profess belief 
in a God who is free, who acts. But they cannot suggest 
where or how he acts. And, not knowing where he acts, 
they might almost as well disbelieve in his activity
altogether. A machine which is built to run but remains 
ever idle soon becomes unfit to run. How much more, a 
God who is claimed to exercise personal activity but is 
never known to do so cannot long remain as a vital reality 
in men's lives, the living God of the Christian faith. This 
would seem to be the pith of the warning in the predicament 
of contemporary liberal religion—unless it can recover a 
reasoned conviction of the dynamic agency of God in indivi­ 
dual experience, God as a power in human faith will disap­
pear.
VI.
The Roots of An adequate account of the sources of the situation 
the Plain Lian's just sketched would demand a survey of the thought and life 
Difficulties, of the past two centuries and carry us far beyond the proper
limits of this paper. The factors which have influenced the 
determination of modern thought are legion; their inter­ 
relation and mutual fructification constitute an enigma for
5 
the most acute historical criticism. But of these formative
influences,two are so much the most important as to warrant 
special classification,and it is to these two that our at­ 
tention must be confined. Indeed it is fair to say that most 
of the other important factors are directly or indirectly 
traceable to them.
On the whole these two forces took their rise in 
quite different sources* But they have converged to exert 
a single impact upon modern thinking. Indeed they have 
proven to be extraordinarily effective teammates; they 
5.See, for example, J.H.Randall Jr.. The Making of the I
The Impact of 
Science upon 
the Plain Man's 
Thought,
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have played into each otner's hands like trained acrobats. 
The one factor was largely theoretical; it began as a 
temper of mind. The other was predominantly practical; it 
came as a temper of life, The first is the critical, scep­ 
tical philosophy which was born of the thought of Immanuel 
Kant, was furthered by the rise of a scientific philosophy, 
and has dominated increasingly the serious reflection of 
the Nineteenth Century, The other is the character of 
modern life, the actual mechanised fabric of daily living 
as modern science has made it possible for us. The first 
has won a growing ascendency over men's thinking; the other 
has increasingly determined men's living. The roots of our 
present situation are,then,mainly two—the one theoretical, 
the other practical; the one in the dominant thought- 
currents of the past century, the other in the kind of 
civilization which modern man has built for himself.
The purpose of the present enquiry is to examine 
the first of these factors in some detail. But before 
undertaking it in earnest, it will be worth while to turn 
aside for a brief moment to scrutinize the actual effects of 
its companion influence,modern science,upon the plain man.
VII.
The early findings of modern science and the earliest 
notable "scientific philosophy" in the writings of Newton 
were among the three or four most important influences
which awoke Kant from his "dogmatic slumber" and set his
6 
energies to the development of the "critical philosophy".
6. See below, p,29.
16.
Its unhappy results in this particular will concern us not
a little in the sequel and we shall venture to propose the
7 
most hopeful method of their correction. But it is not the
impact of scientific theory upon the speculation of the period 
which interests us at the moment, but the far more immediate 
and direct effect of scientific ideas and scientific achieve­ 
ments upon the religious outlook of the ordinary citizen. That 
influence was exerted,again,in two ways—upon his work-a-day 
attitudes and upon his work-a-day practice; and by both avenues 
it made its entrance into his life very largely without his 
conscious awareness of what was happening to him.
It is a commonplace among serious students of the
history of thought that modern science introduced almost no
I 
start^Lngly new problems for religion, problems which had not
been recognised and acutely sensed by the wisest of the Greeks 
or made the object of philosophical reflection through the 
centuries. No, the immense influence of science in the Nine­ 
teenth Century was due to the fact that then,for the first 
time in human history, the "scientific outlook" became the 
possess ion, one mi{.;ht almost say the instinctive assumption, 
of the common man. As Whitehead so clearly points out, there 
have been men in every age of civilized thought who have been 
characterised by the scientific outlook—the passion for facts 
linked to a suspicion of metaphysical speculation which mark 
the scientific temper of mind. But they have been solitary 
figures, confined to the cloistered chambers of academic 
privilege, for the most part, .and their influence, although 
7. dee below,pp. 358ff.
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ultimately far-reaching,has been largely indirect. The 
average citizen has gone his habitual way,accepting his 
world and his religion uncritically, with naive faith. In 
the Nineteenth Century all this was changed. The fundamental; 
"temper of mind" which heretofore had been the prerogative
of the few now became the characteristic of the many. WA
8 
new mentality was disclosed."
It is not always realised precisely how the gradual 
and largely unconscious induction of the common man into 
the "scientific outlook" has affected his work-a-day think­ 
ing. I would suggest that it has made its impact primarily 
at six point s:-
1. Through the new universe opened to the contemplation 
of the plain man by modern science—i.e. through the actual 
facts of scientific discovery. To be sure, as has so often 
been pointed out,science has merely 'pushed back 1 frontiers 
which to the mind of pre-scientific thinkers were already 
pictured in terms of quite incredible magnitudes. Indeed, 
it is quite probable that the universe as Sir James Jeans 
describes it to us in which our planet is a minor satellite 
of one of the smaller stars which,itself,is as one grain 
of sand ai.ong all the sands on all the seashores of the 
world,it is quite probable that that universe is no more 
overpowering in its immensities,no more inconceivable in 
its intricacies, than was the heaven of Orion and the 
Pleiades which stirred the Hebrew psalmist to awe if we
bear in mind the comparative maturity and intellectual••«•«•«•
8t A.N.VYliibehead, ooienoo and the Liodern V/orld.p.
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comprehension of the educated minds of the two periods. 
But,again,it is now the common man who is introduced to 
the findings of the learned and feels his lulnd aghast 
before his world as science portrays it. The resuit,unde­ 
niably, is a tendency toward mental confusion and baffle­ 
ment. At the least,an impassable gulf seems fixed between 
whatever Power may control so vast a cosmos and his puny 
life and petty concerns. At the worst, he discovers his 
mind taking refuge in a humble and settled agnosticism. 
We are not here concerned to admit that this outcome 
represents a superficial analysis on the plain man's part. 
We are concerned to point out that this is the outcome.
2, Through the tendency of the scientific point-of-viev; 
to interpret everything as in the process of becoming, More 
specifically,through the scientific concept of evolution, 
Evolution has had a twofold and strangely paradoxical effect 
upon ordinary thought. It has created the impression of an 
'unfinished universe 1 ,of the world as still somehow f in the 
making 1 ; in this aspect it has fixed men's anticipations 
upon the future which is yet to become,has raised the most i 
important single difficulty for the traditional Christian 
interpretation of the significance of Jesus,and has encour­ 
aged the speculation that God himself may also be somehow
9 
still 'in the making'. In an unfinished universe where almost
anything may yet happen,the common man finds the conception 
of an Eternal and Unchanging dod both difficult and undesi­ 
rable. On the other hand, evolution has also stressed the all-
«•«»•»•»••
9.This strange view has,of course,had serious support from Professor.Alexander.and,apparently,from Professor Bergson in some of his writings; *
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controlling influence of origins; in this aspect, it has 
fixed men's attention upon the past, has tended to falsify 
historic perspective, and has encouraged the effort to 
explain mature phenomena wholly by reference to their crude 
beginnings. It is sufficient commentary upon the confused 
state of the comon roan's thought to note that these two 
tendencies proceeding from a single source are antipodal 
and quite irreconcilable, but they will not infrequently 
be discovered comfortably domesticated within one mind's 
working philosophy.
3. Through the favorite Scientific rubric of interpre­ 
tation-* the concept of law e Science's supreme objective has 
been the unification of all reality by inclusion within a 
single all-embracing system, the uniform interpretation of 
all reality in terms of a single all-sufficient principle 
of explanation—tho principal of universal law. How absurd 
have been the consequent distortions of the facts of reality 
may be indicated in a single illustration. In opening his 
admirable discussion of The New Psychology. Mr. A.G.Tansley 
points out that >if hu. ic to develop a 'science of inind', it 
is absolutely necessary for him to assume the reality of 
psychological determinism, ^jod he gladly accepts the assump­ 
tion and builds his account of mind upon it. Further,he sug­ 
gests that this ie the invariable procedure in sound psy­ 
chology. In other words, a science which by definition
f
should be a systematic account of facts finds it necessary 
to read into its premisses a theory which t as science,it is
•
its duty to weigh and pass judgment upon. ^nd,in the case in
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point, a theory which lisppona to be decisively negatived 
by the testimony of naive experience and by any unforced 
reading of the facts to be interpreted. To be sure, this 
is the surrender of a sound ideal of science, but it has 
been prevalent scientific procedure, ^nd it has made its 
imprint upon the plain man's thought. It has overstressed 
continuity of development to the neglect of novelty, change 
and advance; it has exaggerated uniformities and slighted 
originality and individuality; most important, it has led 
men to conceive of the operation of one type of reality in 
its relations with another entirely in torms of law, i.e. 
in an analogy borrowed froia tho impersonal and formal pro­ 
cedure of human justice or, more appropriately, from the 
mechanical and sterile behavior of the inanimate world. 
In religion, the result has been the depersonalisation and
devitalisatiou of men's working thought of Ood which we
10 
have already deprecated. And we shall have occasion to
suggest later that the initial step toward -che recovery of 
an experience of a living God is to free the mind from the 
influences of this false assumption of unifor-
11
inity.
4. Closely parallel, through the premium which science 
has tended to place upon a certain class of truths arrived 
at in a certain way. This is the 'scientific method* in 
the strict sense. The method is that of analysis, descrip­ 
tion, classification, generalisation — the familiar technique 
of laboratory science. The kind of truth supremely prized
10. oee above, pp. 4: ff.
11. riee below, pp. 377ff .
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is that which can be caught within the meshes of this 
particular net—those facts which admit cf complete analysis 
and description and which submit to adequate classification 
as instances of a generalised type. Indeed,so authoritative 
have become these scientific norne that the Qommon man 
tends to accept as proven 'truth* only those facts which 
satisfy their standards. It has not been sufficiently noted 
that f by these tests , there are excluded from the province 
of 'truth 1 not merely the i.iore profound convictions of reli­ 
gion but,equally, the loost cherished insights and concerns 
of the art let and the poet. In i^.s century-long battle 
againet this particular presupposition of the scientific 
outlook, religion has not fought alone; its interests in 
the matter have been no lesb the interests of the poets, 
the artists,the lovers, and the devotees of 3very other area
of humn experience where supreme value attaches to rich*i r>
JLw
ne-ss and depth,to originality and individuality.
5. Through the scientific standards of truth. Here we 
meet the positive and invaluable contribution of modern 
soienoe to the common man's outlook. And it embodies a 
challenge to religion T.vhich religion has been altogether 
too slow to acknowledge and meet. Ask the average younger 
'plain man 1 of today what it is which most attracts him in 
the great non-religions or anti-religious popular philo­ 
sophies of the moment ; he will reply it is their dogged 
determination to face facts, their unswerving loyalty to 
truth at whatever cost to wish or hope or dream, the
12. Gee Prof. V/hitchead's vigorous and illuminating develop­ 
ment of this point in iJciGRce and the ...Quern ,»orld, Cht.X- "
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modesty of their claims to knowledge, their preference fop 
understatement rather than overstatement. Ask the same fair- 
minded critic of religion the heart of his criticism; if 
quite honest,his reply will run somewhat as follows:- The 
principal vice of religion is its subtle intellectaal dis­ 
honesty and practical self-deception; it mistakes probabi­ 
lities for certainties, beautiful hopes for stern realities, 
noble Intentions for actual achievements; it thinks that it 
has accomplished great results simply because it has the 
emotional feeling of great strength; it cifcims to be on the 
path to high achievement simply because it makes profession 
of lofty goals; it is sincere but pitifully self-dedeived, 
earnest but rather futile. It must be a self-assured reli­ 
gious apologist,indeed, who can stand up under such a pene­ 
trating indictment without a sense of shame and earnest 
searching of heart. Possibly the most valuable single gift 
of modern science to our thought-life is a merciless insis­ 
tence upon thorough-going intellectual honesty,and 'the 
agnosticism of a healthy humility1 .
6. Through its instrumental function in the creation of 
the modern worid,i.e. through scientific civilization. Here 
we pass to the other aspect of the matter—the influence of 
science upon the common man's work-a-day practice.
VIII.
The Impact of It is not at all in the realm of his conscious philo- 
Scienoe upon the sophy that we confront the most disastrous as it is also 
Plain Man's Life.the most far-reaching effect of the rise of modern science
upon the common man's religious faith; but in the area
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of his most familiar daily experience, through the 
fabric of modern industrial civilization. The conse­ 
quences for the life of religion should be fully grasped 
and felt by anyone who would adequately deal with the 
religious problem of our day.
Modern scientific civilization has tended to shut 
men off from living contact with his natural parent,the 
world of Nature—its immensities,its grandeurs, its austere 
indifference to him and his petty achievements, its beauties, 
its benefactions,its facination. Ho longer can the • starry 
heavens above 1 give their message to him. It has walled 
him within the artificial confines of his machine-dominated 
life,and fostered in him an illusory security. It has herded 
him into vast impersonal and inhuman aggregates of swarming
humanity where he is debarred not merely from contact with
[the | 
Nature but fronTJnorraal amenities of friendly association
with his fellow-men. It has concentrated his attention upon 
the amassing of things, the multiplication of accouterments, 
the perfecting of appliances and conveniences. It has per­ 
suaded him that plumbing is more important than poetry, 
facts than understanding> the latest than the best, standard­ 
ization than individuality, quantity than creativity, success 
than life. Its net result has been very largely to dull the 
spirit of modern man to sensitivity to religious reality,
and to dissolve from his life the sense of need for religious
13 
certainty.
13. For a masterly discussion of the practical effects of 
modern civilization upon the cause of religion,see, 
especially, Reinhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? ————————————
24.
IX.
Summary. We have said that the predicament of contemporary
theism is to be traced principally to the Joint impact 
of two forces— the dominant philosophical outlook of the 
past century and a half, and the practical consequences 
of the ascendency of science. In origin, these two movements 
were partly akin, partly different. In their development, 
they have pursued widely divergent courses, though from the 
outset their mutual interpenetration has been very great. 
In their final influence upon the religious life of our 
day,they were one; that influence has been toward the 
discrediting of the knowability of ultimate reality, and 
the rigid restriction of philosophy's and theology's proper 
materials to the unohallengable data of obvious experience. 
Contemporary uncertainty in religion was born of the 
critical,sceptical philosophy which Kant thrust onto the 
modern world; it has been suckled in the ease and worldli- 
ness of modern life. Men's minds were already tinged with 
scepticism about the validity of metaphysical speculation; 
now they found their energies and interests drawn irresis­ 
tibly into practical concerns where speculation seemed 
irrelevant and unreal. Increasingly considerations of 
'ultimate reality' became foreigfc to their normal habits 
of thought which were intensely preoccupied with the 
manipulation of immediate reality—the stuff of this world 
and the march of passing events,concerning which it was 
superfluous to speculate. Did they not have all needed
25.
material for their philosophy within their immediate 
grasp? iiodern scepticism began in theoretical uncertainty; 
it has been furthered by a practical non-concern.
The scope of this study require a us to Unit our 
attention rigorously to the first of these two great 
formative influences; and i;o that enquiry we must no?/ 
turn. Buv we shall view our problem in an utterly false 
perspective and miss altogether the larger significance 
of the modern scene unless we have clearly in view that 
other and companion factor which paralleled and so largely 
stimulated the developaent of thought. For in the larger 
view, it is very doubtful which of the two has actually 
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CHAPTER TWO
K/LMT f S STATEMENT OF TIIE r.ORAL
£h£ In >ortance It is a truism that any discussion of modern 
Df Kant. thought, whether philosophical or theological, must make
its start with Kant. Not merely does the Critique of 
Pure Reason stand without parallel in the literature 
of modern philosophy — indeed, be yond challenge § the 
most important work in tiie realm of thought since 
Aristotle. The main outlines of his position, for good 
or for ill or for both § have provided the issues for the 
intellectual battles since his day and determined the 
limits within which those battles have been fought. To 
understand the mind of Kant is to begin to feel at home 
among the intellectual struggles of the Nineteenth Cen­ 
tury.
For the purposes of this paper, there is no need 
to enter into a description of the strange little German 
scholar whose travels in a long life of eighty years 
never carried him more than fifty miles frcro his native 
town of Konigsberg, whose mechanically ordered life was so 
methodical that his f ellow-oitizens were said to set their 
watches as he passed on his daily afternoon stroll, whose 
sole intimate companion was the faithful servant Lampe 
who, in Heine's overworked description, used to follow him
on rainy days with an umbrella n like a figure of Providence 
Nor can we pause to outline the immediate background of 
the Kantian philosophy — the forces which seem to have been
27,
majorly instrumental in moulding his thought—though they 
are f in the view of the present writer,even more important 
than in the cases of most philosophers and considerably 
more important than many Kantian commentators have recog­ 
nized • Suffice it to say that those conditioning; factors 
were mainly four: —
a.Kant's home,with its simple,intense,highly 
emotional pietism,. Its final influence upon him ap­ 
pears to have been twofold:—a deep-rooted distrust 
of emotion in religion and a rather parochial indif­ 
ference to the importance of religious institutions 
on the one hand; a profound ethical consciousness and 
sense for true personal character on the other hand*
b.The Rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff—the 
immediate training ground of Kant's philosophical views 
c.The Joint impact of the scepticism of Hume and 
the scientific principles of Newton, Despite their 
contrast, these two forces are mentioned together;for 
the former shattered Kant's confidence in the validity 
of the philosophical tradition in which he had boon 
schooled while the latter attracted him as a dependable 
substitute, Hume cast doubt upon the whole Rationalis­ 
tic approach; the thought of Newton suggested,as an 
alternative to Rationalism, the method of science as the 
most valid road to truth,
d,Rousseau, While Rousseau's influence wat of 
distinctly subordinate importance for our enquiry, it 





Again we cannot attenpt a detailed account of Kant's 
philosophy , especially those very important features of 
it which occupy the greater part of the Critique of 
Pure H-jaso.ri»'«ve must confine attention strictly to thosd 
elements of the teaching which have most influenced the 
development of theistic thought since Kant's day. Of
these two are of primary importance—Kant's familiaro
dichotomy,foundational for the critical philosphy,between 
the realm of the noumanal and the realm of the phenomenal 
and Kant's positive argument for God ,the so-called moral 
argument.
II.
As already suggested,Kant' s hardline of the problem, 
of knowledge was determined by on extension of the Humian 
scepticism on the one hand, and by an acceptance of the 
Newtonian norms of scientific knov/ledce on the other hand, 
It was developed through a more acute analysis of the 
process of knowing and of the nature or consciousness thai 
Kume had undertaken. Its outcome was to limit the province 
of possible "knowledge" strictly to appearances; and to set 
over agAinst the domain of knowledge the whole of ultiraate 
reality as intrinsically and finally unknowable. The 
argument is,of course, an involved and at points exceedingly 
difficult one. It may be briefly summarized as follows, 
having in view primarily its bearing on the problem of 
theism.
Tho starting-point is the comiion-sense recognition 
that reality comes to consciousness only through the screen 
of our mental apparatus; it is understood only in the
29,
framework ;ind under the terras set by that apparatus ; such 
knowledge as we may possess of it is forever colored, we 
might say tainted tby the constitution of our minds. Huzne 
had cast doubt upon the validity of the causal axiom. But 
Kant,roused from his "dogmatic (i.e. Rationalistic) slum­ 
ber" by Hume's inquiries,saw clearly that the questions 
his predecessor had raised with regard to the limited 
problem of causality should be pressed with equal force 
against the whole process by which the mind acquires what 
it regards as knowledge* Tfie principles of knowledge , the 
conditions in terms of which reality invariably presents 
itself Tor our study, are discovered to be principles 
within the mind. Of their existence aport from the knowing 
mind, i.e. in reality itself,v;o may never have certitude. 
Of the true character of thkt reality,our understanding 
IGU&U always be inferential; it may never possess the 
authority of "knowledge" as such. In Brofensor Keiap Smith's 
putting of the point;—"The principles which lie at the 
basis of our knowledge are..,,.conditions of sense-exper- 
ience^and that means of our knowledge of appearances,never 
legitimately applicable to the deciphering of ultimate 
reality. They are valid within the realm of experience,
useless for the construction of a metaphysical theory of
£ 
things in themselves." "Knowledge" of a kind we do have,
It is the mind's organization of vhe great wealth of 
material presented for its contemplation anfl analysis, the 
whole body of appearances. Such knowledge sconce aims to
2, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Hoason.p.xxxv,
so.
provide. (It should be born in mind , of course,that Kant 
restricts the legitimate province of ccientific inquiry 
even nore severely, ,ot only does science deal merely 
with appaarances. Properly, it deals with the material of 
sense-experience only;indeed,only with that part of sense- 
experience which submits to handling by mathematical- 
physical categories. For that was the only science which
3 
Kant could recognize as valid. Here we meet the most
serious limitation imposed upon his thought by an uncriti­ 
cal acceptance of the Newtonian norms of proper scientific 
procedure—a limitation with important consequences not 
merely for his own theory but also for the stream of 
thought which flowed from the critical philosophy.)
The final corollary of the distinction between 
the nouiiienal and the phenomenal carries us into Kant's 
constructive position. Since we are forever debarred 
from "knowledge" of ultimate reality,our working rela­ 
tionship to reality must be in terms of some other attitude 
than that of "knowledge." Kant defines that attitude as 
"faith." There is probably no more fecund source of mis­ 
conception in the whole critical philosophy than Kant's 
employment of the two contrasted tenas, knowledge and 
faith. To neither does he give the meaning which our 
familiar parlance attaches to them. As already noted, 
knowledge is confined in Kant's usage to the interpreta­ 
tion of a limited kind of sense experience »such sense 
experience as can be handled by scientific methods;yes, 
3. Keiap 3rrdth,Commentary, p.lv develops the same point.
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euoh sanse-experience as can be handled by H particular 
type of science—-the mathematical-physical sciences. 
From the scope of knowledge there is thus excluded by 
definition all aesthetic, all religious, all distinctively 
personal and individual experiences, even all the data 
of the organic realm; in brief,the iiajor part of what consti­ 
tutes significant human living. *ifter the same fashion,faith 
is employed by Kant with a far wider range of meaning than in 
colloquial speech. It is a far remove from the Sunday-school 
lad's definition of faith as "believing v/hat you know aint 
true". Nor is it synonymous with what the New Testament fre­ 
quently means by faith—the willingness of the human spirit
to hazard itself on beliefs fait to be true though never
4 
fully proven true, Kant's own definition is not clear:*
"Belief in Matters of faith is a belief in a 
pure practical point of view, i.e. a moral faith, 
which proves nothing for the theoretical,pure, 
rational cognition,but only for that which is 
practical and directed to the fulfillment of its 
duties.....
"It is a trust in the promise of the moral 
law; not,however, such as is contained in it, but 
such as I put into it,and that on morally adequate 
grounds." 5
It would be a somewhat free but perhaps not unfair ren­ 
dering of his meaning to suggest that to Kant faith is my 
practical work-a-day relationship to things and people which 
validates itself in experience but which can never be veri­ 
fied with mathematical finality. Since I am forever debarred 
from knowledge not merely of transcendental reality but 
also of all distinctively human experiences,these latter
4. Cp.Hebrews ll:8;13;etc.
5. Critique of Judgment.W.v.pp.569-72; Bernard's transla­ 
tion, pp. 407-10; quoted in Kemp Smith.Commentary.D.576.
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must also be included rithin the operation of fMlth. With 
regard to character, for instance, I can have no knowledge 
strictly speaking but must act on faith. That a person is, 
I may feel surejbut what he is I can never know. Faith the 
embraces the working assumptions I employ every tine I 
have a relationship to a value-consideration. Tfcus all 
the really important considerations of practical life fall 
within its province tmy certainty of my own freedom as well 
as my assurance of God. Of the truth of faith's content I 
msy have verification in experience tbut ruoh a pragmatic 
test can never be employed for its theoretical establish­ 
ment.
With a critique of Kant's f ur; daiaantal premise— the 
dichotomy 01* appearance and reality— we are not here con­ 
cerned. Such a critique t in addition to its main tack of 
ex'junining the epistemolo >ical and metaphysical validity 
of the position, should aim to display vividly some of the 
misconceptions of Kant's doctrine which have been widely 
held in the Dopular mind and which have done much to curse 
thou.-^ht in the period since. For example , the distinction
between Kant'c Phenomenalism and Subjectivism should be
6 
clearly developed, ^ueh knowledge e.s I have is in no sense
to be interpreted merely as subjective impressions or 
in my own mind. You and I live in t,he same phenomenal 
whe.t may be called the public world of phenomenal experience. 
It is of this public phenonemil ??orld that science furnish^* 
an interpretation. Further, the meaning wh^ch Kant habitu­ 
ally gives to the two key words, knowledge and faithfJand 
6. In this connection see Kemp Smith •Commentary. pp. xlv ff.
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the discrepancy between that meaning tnd our familiar 
usage should be pointed out as we have tried to do above. 
Finally It should be emphasized that Kant'r> restriction 
of "Jmowlodge" to appearances is not as serious a stricture 
as ui-jht at first be supposed,since it is precisely in 
the world of phenomena that we actually live—the world 
which science is equipped to interpret.
More important frcra the point of view of our study 
is the general effect which this baslj premiss of the 
critical philosophy has had upon the development of theo­ 
logical thouisht. Kant's phrasing of it has suffered
serious reformulation since his day,and,as we shall try to
7 
show in the sequel ,wlth consequences which might have
been abhorent to hin own mind, -^t has traced a development 
which he little anticipated anfl f quite? probably,would have 
deplored. We recall that Kant's professed purpose in de­ 
veloping the critical philosophy was "to abolish knowledge
8 
in order to make room for faith." The outcome has been f l
believe,almost exactly the reverse of Kant's intention. 
T^at part of human thought to which he gave the hich word 
"knowledge"—the elements in experience fit for scientific 
treatment—has won increasing reverence as the only proper 
material of philosophical speculation;and its interpreter, 
science,has received increasing recognition as the alone 
safe suido to truth. While that port of experience to which, 
in Kant's vie^, faith alone could Give entrance has been 
accorded diminishing rietaphysicnl significance;and our
Cuiflg thereto,fftithjhas become increasingly suspect,tainted
7.See,below,p. 66.
8.Critique of Pure Reason«B xxx.
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with the opprobrium of "wishful thinking," At least, this 
has been the outcome in wide circles of thought,especially
o8>
among those untrained philosophically. For the net deposit 
from Kant's dichotomy seems to h ave been twofold:— the 
conviction that the nature of ultimate reality is forever 
unknowable; the impression that it IB to science that we 
are to look for such dependable knowledge as it lies within. 
man's power to attain,
III.
Kant's Idea It is no easy tuak to furnisn an adequate outline 
of God, of Kant's views on the problem of ;/od in briof compass.
And for the very good reason that the quest ion, "'.?hat did 
Kant believe about God?" must always depend for its answer 
upon the reply to a prior question, <fAt v/hat period do you 
moan?" There is probably no sint^la problem in his v;hole 
philosophy on which he wry Liore inc one is tout, Throughout 
the long period of fifty years of speculative writing,his 
views wero constantly changing and not in one fixed direc­ 
tion. Indeed quite contradictory opinions on theistic 
Issues are to be found not merely as between the writings 
of different periods but among works of practically the 
sazae stage of thou^t t indeed within the same book. It has 
lone been recognized that Kant's greatest work t the first 
Critique,presents a problem of discntejigling various 
strata of thought not unlike tha^ of the criticisn of the 
Pentateuch, Tho student of his icier of ''Od faces similar 
difficulties. 
.____Indded,! am inclined to think that t by a Judicious
8a, Cp,the almost identical judgment of Pringle-Pattison in The Idea of God.pp.47ff-"r-—- - **
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selection of individual passages,a case could be mede
for Kant's support of almost every type of theistic
idea. His early concern was to preserve the unquestioned
transcendence of God,in sympathy with the prevalent Deism
9 
of the time; elements in his later thought are hardly to1 10 bo distinguished from pantheism . Certainly the stress
ftills almost wholly on Ood's inmanence , In nost of his 
writings there can be no question of his certainty of the 
objectivity of Cod; but there arc passages, not one but 
several,which seen to imply thnt God if? nothing more than 
a thought vdthin my own mind or an aspect of riy own ex­ 
perience—passages frora which the ^hole subjectlvist-
12 humanist trend r.lght v.cll clain parentp.se • An early
treatise bore the titlew7he Only Possible Proof of the
13 
3einc of Cod" ; one of the noct vehement sections of the
firct Critique purposes to dismis: that "proof" finally —————— 14
as without stand in/: ground in the court of reason •
9*See , for example,Critique of Pure Reason,A. 613-B 641:—-"We cannot put aside, and yet also cannot endure the thought,that a be-ing,TChich w e represent to our­ selves as supreme amongst all possible beings,should, as it were,say to itnfelf, 1 ! an fron eternity to eternity,and outsida me there is nothing save what is through my will;but whence am I? *.«« •The transcenden­ tal object lying at the base of appearances ..is and remains for us inscrutable." 
Also citations in lebb.Kant's Philosophy of Religion.p.49f10. Opus Pogt-unp^ed.Adickes) f p.919 etc ."Cod is not a T3eing outside of iiie,but merely a thought v;ithin me.. One God, in EW,around me,and above IJG."
Al so VGri t i QUO of Pure Reason.A 699-3 727: —"It y.ust be a matter of complete indifference- to us««whfjt!ier 've say that God in his wfcsdom has willed it to be so,or that nature has wisely arranged it thus,"
11. Op.cit.
12. Opus Postumum.7>P«619 . 824 P etc .: —"There is a Eeiug withi: me .....; and I as man am nyself this bein6i-^cL it is no substonce external to ne." "God is thus no substance discoverable outside of me but merely a moral relation within me. n (p.826).
13. Published 1763. 14, A 592-B 620 ff.
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It is well known that the evidence of design in Nature
early gripped his imagination t nd that his luind never
15
completely freed itself from the ower of this evidence ; 
but that he rejected the teleolo ;ical argument alonn with
the cntological and cosmological arguments in his most
16. 
critical writings . Indeed the patent inconsistency on
thn significance of order in Mature is perhaps the nost 
familiar instance of contradictions within the fabric of 
the first Critique. Again, with regard to the personality 
of God, "in Kant's own earlier writings we shall look in
vain for an ascription of Personality to God; but in the
17 
Opus Postumum it constantly recurs." Professor »Vebb has
suggested that this is all the more noteworthy because of 
the very rare use of "person" and "personality" in refer-
ins to God until well toward the close of the Eighteenth
18
Century . That Kant did § in his later years , steadily con-
ceive of Uod as a Person cannot be doubted although it 
is by no means so clear that he posits that Person as more
15. See. for example •Th.e General Natural History and Theory 
of tli e Heavens » publish^ d in 17C35. 
Critique of Pure Reason. A 623-B 651, etc.
16. GriUiiue of Pure Reason. A 621- 13 649 ff.
See also the passages of the CPUS Postumum cited by 
a rofessor web'b in his discussion of this point, 
Kant's Philosophy of Roli^ion. pp. 186-194. I'here is 
strong evidence that in t.iese latest writing K.ont 
again recoiled from linking God in any way with Nature, 
*vebb soeiLs to mo to underrate tha significance of 
those passages. They seen to me further evidence of 
Kant's tendency to identify ^od f in liit final thought, 
with elements vdthin con^cien'5^ only.
17. .Veb'D. Kant's Philosophy or .-.eli^on.p«18& a
18. ..ebb, GQ d and Personal 1 ty, p. 62 f.
19. Oijus 1 o J tui.-Acii, p ,'T7 o : — ''I'lie thou^it of God is at the 
same tine belief in him and in his personality." 
Op.cit. t p.32G: — "God is a power ooaiLianu.1::. .: us through 
a G&tegorioal Imperative without reference to our 
happiness;?, real Person, but certainly not one peroep- 
tiblo as an object of the senses."
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than an element within the individual human consciousness, 
And even on this point his mind wavered according to
.tidickes who says that in one place at least he seems to
20 
expressly deny that personality may be attributed to Cod
Finally,on the most important question of all— 
whether Kant really believed in the existence of an ob­ 
jective cosmic Deityf existent in his own right and v/holly 
apart from human concepts of him— the student is left in 
not a little uncertainty. There is possibly sufficient 
evidence to support the contention of most of his recent 
interpreters (notably Prof es. or Webb and Dr. England ) that 
to the close of his long life Kunt held firmly to the con­ 
viction which was certainly a corner-stone of his earlier 
thinking, the objective reality of God. Passages in the 
earlicBr works , even including the three Critiques* which 
teem to render any other interpretation impossible are too 
numerous to permit citation. But oven in them and, far 
more vividly in the Opus Pjstumum. there are enough 6ug- 
gestions of the contrary conviction to lend a semblance 
of credibility to Heine's famous jibe that Xanc had re-
introduced aod after effectually 'banishing him from roe-
21 
sonable philosophy merely to comfort the distraught Lampe
Or § Vaihinger's more serious contention that "for Kant no 
leso then for Nietzsche the Idea of ^oti was a laero heuris-
00
t -fj
tic fiction* • Critics who are concerned to claim Kant'* 
support Tor the theistic -position divide sharply in their 
estimate of -he importance of the I'pus ?o.i,."-;-n:m« ,some t
*0..r.8£2 f cltGd by U'ebl^KrnVg fhilo. -..ophy of Ralinlon.T3.197. 
21.uerke.ed«Laohmann.iiT HUf« —————— ——
22. quoted in England.Kant's Conception of ^
38,
impressed by its pantheistic f-n..?. subJR.?t-l^istic ten­ 
dencies as well ?3 by the evidently f^illn,^ powers of 
the author t nre inclined to dismiss it as the feeble
meditations of a mind long past the height of its
\ablel 
strength find no lon^erj to hold the several elements
in its philosophy in consistent harmony. Others t not ing 
the morked preoccupation of Kant's oind during this 
latter period with distinctively theistic questions and 
the stress upon the personal rother than the transdenden- 
tal attributes of Deity, regard these fragments as of 
first importance f indicfttin'.; the final culmination of e
lifctiias t s thought* If we take the CTMIS Postureum et 
all seriously, 'vhe marted subjeotlvir.t coloring can 
hardly escape notice* e have already referred to a 
nu:.bor of tiie passages in question; but the Issuo sooms
" vit ! 1 to rrarrant aso'3iablln;5 then together: —
is ~od? Is there r 7od? In the world 
considered as a totality of rational beings, there is also a totality of riorrJLly practical Reason, and 
consequently of an imperative Right and therewith also a God." 2.5.
"The thought of ('Od is at the sine time belief in him rjoci in hie Personality." 24.
"There is a God, for there is a Categorical Imperative." 35.
1T God is not Q Doing outcide of me, but merely a thought within me. God is the morally practical 
Reason civiny laws to itr,n3.f . Cno Ood,in me, and around me, and above me,"
"The proposition,131 ere is a tiod,means no more 
than: There IP in hum? n rennon,detam..ninr: it self 
according to morality,a supreme Principle which 
perceives itself determined and nscecr.itnted to act 
without cessation in accordance v.ith sucii a Principle
rostumum.p.776. 24. Ibid. 25. p. 778. 
26.p.619. 27. Ibid.
"God must only be sought within us." 28.
"There is Q God,...without our having to sup­ pose a substance which represents this 3ein^ to the 
senses." 29,
"In the idea of ^od as a moral Be ing, we live and 
nove anJ have our being, impelled by the recognition of our duties as divine commands. i?he conception of God is the idea of a moral Being which,parsing judgement in accordance with mor 1 principles,exercises univer­ sal authority. This is ,ot a hypothetical thing,but the pure practical Reason itself in its personality, and with executive powers in relation to the system of the world and its forces." 30.
"There is a Being in me,distinguished from my­ self as the cause of an effect wrought u:)on me f which freely—that is without being dependent on laws of nature in space and time—judges me within,Justify­ ing or condemning me;and I as man am myself this being, and it is no substance external to me,and--what is most surprising of all—its causality is no natural necessity but a determination 6£ me to a free act. 11 31
"God is thus no substance discoverable outside of me but merely a noral relation within me." 32.
"God is a power commanding us through a Cate­ gorical Imperative without reference to our happiness; a real Person, but certainly not one Perceptible as an object of the senses." S3.
i'rom a careful study of these and oihers of the fragments, 
Professor -febb is led to a picture of Kant in his old age 
as " as little disposed as over to a merely naturalistic 
immanentism,but less reluctant to express his profound 
reverence for the ^ral Law in religious language, as 
reverence for the Presence of <>od therein immediately 
revealed;unc f finally, attrac ted by the thought that ,aftor 
all, in such a reveletion God was more truly revealed as 
personal than when imaglnntLvely represented as external 
to our own inner and essential life...Here is.. a Presence
28. OD.US pos turnup!. P.819 . 29.p.6^0. 30.p.821.
31. p.823. 32. p.824. 33. p.828.All quotations from t!ie Opus .'ostunuin are from Professorftebb's translation in Kant's liilosophy of elision.
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'closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and 
feet f t one with our nature at its hir^iest and at its 
best." Again he says," The Opus Postunum then,if I am
right,certainly does not suggest that Kant in his last
34. 
days abandoned his faith in God as a real Being•"
Doubtless Professor Webb is correct, Suffice it to say 
by v;ord of cosiaent that there is nothing in the ijuota- 
tions cited above which an ardent advocate of the sub- 
jectivist school (Professor Ames f for example twho has 
defined God as the personification of our highest moral 
ideals) would not find thoroughly acceptable and recon­ 
cilable with his fundamental position* If Kant did not 
himself give over belief in the objective reality of Bed, 
he opened ~ide the doors for the more sceptically minded 
who followed him,
v<e have dwelt at perhaps too great length on the 
contradictory strands in Kant'c thought of God and the 
consequent difficulties for a clear impression of his 
convictions. At various periods of hie thought there 
were three Train arguments for God which gripped his 
reason. The first,which was his earliest favorite and 
which at one time he regarded as alone convincingthe gave 
ever completely in the height of his preoccupation with 
criticism and apparently never returned to it. The second 
never ceased to haunt his imagination though he never 
advanced it as adequate ground for belief after the first 
Critique, The third won an Increasing hold upon his con­ 
viction and loyalty,and it is probably quite proper that 
34, Kant's Philosophy of Religion* -DT>«199ff -
his constructive position should havo become identified 
almost exclusively v;ith this,the moral argument. v»e 
shall attempt a brief reference to the earlier proofs, 
then a sonewhat fuller statement of the moral argument, 
and conclude with a brief critique of the whole impact 
of Kant's thcuGht upon the development of theistic thought.
IV.
The Argument Until 1770 or a little later,Kant seems to have 
for a entertained no serious doubt of the mind's capacity to 
Necessary Bein^ prove tho existence of God on purely speculative grounds •
In all his earlier metaphysical writings, he advanced v/ith 
confidence an argument from the dependence of the world 
upon a necessarily existing being, His contention has been
variously described as his own particular form of the
35 Ontological Argument (by Professor V/ebb ) and of the
56 Cosmological Argument (by Professor Taylor ) • Ao a matter
of fact,as Dr.England clearly points out,in its fullest
development it is a quite irreconcilable fusion of modified
37 forms of each argument and was so defined by Kant himself
It is precisely the argument which,in the First Critique,
Kant vehemently sought to demolish in his exposure of the38 
Cosmological Proof • T^e first detailed exposition of
Kant's convictions in the matter is to be found in the
39 thesis for his degree,published in 1755 . There he was
occupied by the problem of the relation between the prin-•>«•«»••»
35* V.'ebb,Kant's Philosophy of Religion. p«50.36. A»3«Taylor t article "Theism" .in in?.R.7:..Vcl«12.p«275«37 «F•E• England .Kant's Conception of (>od.p.53 .58. Critique of Pure Re&son fA 60,>-B 631 ff.
39. Principioruri primorum cognitionis aetaphysiORe. Nova
ciple of sufficient reason and the principle of contra­ 
diction; and at the heart of the argument is his contention 
that" there is u be in;; whose existence is prior to the 
possibility of itself and of all things; this being la
therefore said to exist absolutely necesrarily. He is
40 
called God." More simply put, it is the argument from
t;.e possibility of eny thins to an antecedent ground of 
any r.nd all possibilities. In Kant'o own words, "nothing 
can be conceived as possible unlesr> thnt which is roal
in every possible notion ezists .and t indeed f exists with
41 
absolute necessity." Otherwise nothinc would be possible 5
everything would be impossible. God therefore is not merely 
the ground of over y thing which is pos3iblejhe is also the 
ground of everything which is real. Kant goes forward to
shOT? that such n being mi«+. be single -infinite, imrautable,
4£ 
eternal, perfeat ind finalxy spirit . Substantially the
sane argument is advanced in the esaay published
God, But here Kant's version 01* the "ontolOGical" ar- 
gunsnt is supplemented tjy a form of the "cosmolosical* 
proof— the argument from the existence of contingent 
things to the necessity of soire non-cont indent reality, 
But Kant is not fully convinced of tha validity of this 
position for it is really an argument from the dependent 
character of the phenomenal world to an uncaused First 
Cause; and this reasoning nuns on the principle of
« Prinoipiorum.Berlin edition 1,395 ( England. p. 49 )
41. Op.cit.,396.
42. Taylor t fTTholsmn § p.275.
43.
sufficient reason which could net be employed because 
it would, not receive general acceptance. The same 
General proof , again slightly notified, was contained in 
Kant's inaugural lecture in 1770 , although here we note 
a restiveness and uncertainty which indicate.- that his 
mind is already moving toward the full critical posi­ 
tion.
The core of the argument hao been well summarized 
by Professor Taylor:-
"The argument on which ho relies in nil those 
essays is one and the same.. and rests on the assump­ 
tion that the world ac given is an object for which 
we are bound by the principle of causality to seek 
an explanation... ..The existence of t.n actual 
extra-riundane being once established as a pre-condi- 
fcion of fch« difference in intro-nundnne things 
between what is possible and v;hat is impossible, the 
internal unityf simplicity and perfection of the 
necessary being are then deduced as consequences of 
its necessary existence." 43.
Professor Taylor In this sunrrary perhaps fails somewhat 
to dia tinguiah with sufficient olarity the distinction 
between the two forns of the argument-- the argument from 
causality and the argument fron possibility. It was the 
In "it or to which Kant himself attached tho greater signi­ 
ficance. Indeed it V7r:s tlte confusion of these two
points within as ingle argumcat which constituted the most 
serious logic; 1 ! wealcnoss in Kant's early theism. For t 
as Dr.Sn^lavid well shows, they presuppose two quite 
different conceptions of the relation of "od to the world. 
On the one hand,God la thought of as "the systematic unity 
of that reality which is the material of •::!! possible , non- 
eon t radio tory notlonfi... toe all-eiub racing essence, the 
43. Taylor, "Theism", 0.273.
The Argument 
frora Design*
ultimate (ground from which all consequents follow. 1 On
the other handled is conceived as creator,Tihe Uncaused
44Cause. Once this apparent contradiction has been re­ 
solved,' owever, the basic position can be restated with'ib 
great if not compelling persuasiveness. Its rejection
by Kant himself in the first Critique was unnecessary 
and ill-advised;indeed his case against the position which 
had once be?n the very corner-stone of his system is less 
convincing than the original advocacy of the positive 
position itself. It is important to note that Kant's 
mind was greatly occupied with the significance of 
contingency even after he no longer believed it valid 
ac a their.fcio proof. Indeed, it occupies his attention 
in a considerable part of the first Critique and his 
final Judgment is that It, like all purely speculative 
arguments, may be accepted as a "regulative" concept 
but not as evidence of noumenal reality. In brief t It 
helps us to order our interpretation of the phenomenal
world r.nd is thus far forth useful;but we cannot accept46 
it as ontelogical proof. Kant's rejection of the
ontological-coBjnological argument. was f of course t on 
grounds quite different from the queries raised by
England; he regarded it as inevitably following from
47 
the vrhole critical position.
Kant's riind rcns early gripped by the reasonable­ 
ness of the argunont from possibility find causality;but 
SOIBC thine in hirc far deeper than intelligence was laid
44.Fnftland,Kant's Conception of ^.od a p«56ff » 45»ttee, especially,Te.ylor, " Theism' f p.275-76» 46«see England. 1C--n^'s Conception of Crod»Cht«VH» 4?«criti me of Pure Heason.n GOS-B G51.
hold of by tho feature of Nature's orderliness and op- 
parent design. .Then he suronarily rejected the evidence 
from possibility -md causality,he never returned to it 
with favorable attention; tho evidence from Nature con­ 
tinued to haunt his in: sination and stiirnlite specula­ 
tion to the end. It is no chance that "the starry 
heavens" appear in his no at frjaotic say ins linked with 
the moral Imperative as the sources of awe and reverence. 
In the siiiio yo-ir as the publication of his thesis for 
his degree,there appeared The General ?Ia>tura.l History and 
Theory of the Heavens* His final attitude on the value 
of the indications of design in Nature is already fore­ 
shadowed—a pious recognition of a divine hand behind the 
harmony of the Universe,but the Insistence that the actual 
arrangement of Nature mijht; well be accounted for in terms
of factors \vithin the syoteii: mid without recourse to the
48 hypothesis of an oxtcrnal creator or desifjner* In
general,this was his estimate of tlio so-called tcleologieal 
argument (in Kant's terminology,the Physico-Theological 
Proof) thAjU£hout liis life. In the destruction of the 
Sraultionul proofs in the first Critique.the tclooloclcal 
ar^uiaont roceivos kirtdlier troatuont thvn the other two. 
"This proof always deserves to be mentioned with renpect* 
It it? the oldest,the clearest,and the best suited to 
ordinary huiuun roa,<>on." P/ut ' T we still cannot approve the
claiios hi oh this ioode of ar^unent would fain advancec 49 
to apode^tiu certainty» rt For the evidence from design
48. See v/ebb.KanVs Philosophy of rv
49. Critique of rurV Ueacon.A
4C.
points at most to an architect, not to a creator; to 
u wise but not necessarily omniscient architect; and 
to one but not necessarily the only transHDiu 
power behind Nature, further, in Kant's view, the 
physico- theological proof, on ca.roful surufciii 
seon to.oe resolvable into the coemolo^j.cal ^nu that
in turn into the ont clerical; with them therefore it
50 
must be rejected*
It is a matter of ifct cresting speculation whether, 
as Adickos holds, in hi& la tor life Ilanii tended to regard 
the natural world as originating in a iion-i::oral or even
immoral intelligence. There is certainly evidence in
51 
this direction among tiie writings o£ lihe CPUS ?o stuiiiuru
Such c. dualism betv/uen the v^orld of Mature and the moral 
life is not denied by any of the later s; yin&s which I have 
seen. In that case, Kant's pessimism about the evidence 
for '^od in ^ature would bo uhe negative counterpart of his
o stress upon the lior.x.nence of God within the
58 
moral consciousness. ',,'e have llreaay su^c^eted that the
contr' 1 philosorjiiioal problem of the century which fol­
lowed hiiu way precisely at this point — She apparent dualism
55 
between tho realm of liaturo and tliu realm of values.
^ liiule later we shall ttfy to show that that unhappy
problem was the direct, indeed the inevitiible, fruit of
54 
Kant's furdmaentca teaching. if ..dickes is right, the
problem did not emerge from the Kantian philosophy contrary 
to the founder's thou^ht;it \?as explicit not merely implici
iQUQ oi /u^e Reaaon.A 6;;>5-3 6bV-ff .
' s P.iiToroT>h:r of Religion r pp. 106ff.
54.See,below,p.65 0
47.
in his or n filial meditations on tfio natter f But whether
Adickes has read the mind of the aged Xant correctly on 
this point i3 a question vTiiich would carry uc. beyond the 
scope of this
V.
£he froral Kant was not the first to approach the iden of God
through the facts of the moral life. Almost the central 
metaphysical conviction of the Platonic philosophy sought 
to identify the perfectly good with the ultimately real. 
Indeed in Plato's roost mature thought we find the argument 
from values to God suggested in far sounder and more per­ 
suasive form than the Kind of Kant ever envisaged; and 
Plato's discussion hnp the added roerit of linking the ar­ 
gument from value and the argument from design hermonlously,
The self -moving mover of the heavenly spheres, the ''mind
Eli 56 
which is the ground of the rhole", is also "the best soul".
57 
the ground of the Good. Had the thought of the Nineteenth
Century found its inspiration in Greece rather than in 
Konigsberg,what happy consequences for the intellectual 
stru^'tles of the period might have followed* For there is 
probably no riore promising starting-point for the solution 
of the trouble some relationship of Nature and values than 
the later Platonic dialogues. Plato supplies nost of the
5 5 • Ph 11 obus , 50d . C p » Phaedo 97c.
56 .Lows &ij6e ff • Gp.Li.lso La vis 39 6e ff.
57. Sec f especially, the exceedingly fresh and convincing de- 
veloprount of Plato 1 s theism in an article by Professor 
Robert L.Galhoun," Plato as Religious Realist", In 
Religious lyCaliaiu.od.by D.G.I,iacintosh,espoc.pp.239ff .
48.
needed corrv;ttive for Kant's onesidedneso and limitations. 
But he had becoios knor/n in the history of thought as the 
author of the argument from design, hor is Aristotle 
wholly to blame for this partial appreciation of his 
greater teacher, £'or, although the conviction that the 
author of Mature is also the ground of the Good seems to 
have strongly impregnated Plato's idLnd i he nowhere attempts 
an adequate development of an argument frco value. ^nd f in 
his final systematic work.the Lgws.it is an elaborate
rendering of the teleological argument which furnishes the
58 
oap-stone of his philosophy. Aristotle lifted this section
of the tenth book of the Laws.riade its thesis his own, 
presented it in even more arid and strictly speculative 
fona,and thereby determined that the theintic discussion 
of the succeeding centuries should be, for the most part, 
abstract and lifeless in character, i'rofeseor Baillle 
is probably justified in his contention that "much of 
the deeper meaning \oi' the Platonic view) became lost 
to the later philosophical tradition.... .To us it- now 
reappears as a character is ticai:iy modern insight and as
finding its first fully argued expression in the Critical59 
Philosophy of Kant. tr
Kant approached the moral argument over the ruins 
of the so-called speculative arguments. Vhe suggestion 
that his positive proof represented an afterthought,ad­ 
vanced to safeguard the interests of morality or to 
vindicate his personal pie^ or to GQVe the totteplnc
50.But Professor Calhoun has shoivn that tho self-moving
mover of La^s X i£ c living spirit .Op.cit t p.2-12 n.134. 59.John Baillie.The Interpretation of Holir;ion.p.259f .
4:9 «
faith of poor Lnmpe or for any other secondary motive, and
that the negative conclusions of the critique of the
CO
traditional arguments represent Kant's real convictions ~ 
this sugeTsstion may be dismissed as soundless. There are 
hints of Kant's attraction to a theiotic ar.^ument grounded 
in morality in the pre»critical writings. The intent of 
the first Cr^ltlguQ — to clear the ground of fad.se estimates 
of the value of scientific speculation in order that the 
way may be clear for a sounder approach to ultimate quos- 
bionc— and the character of thet sounder e.ppronch, i.e. 
through a lo^ic of nor\':lity,arc clearly indicated in the
preface to tho second edition of the critique of Pure
61 
Reason, T'he destruction of the traditional proofs in
the bod^r of the Criti-ma is immediately followed by an
anticipation in brief of the fuller development of the
62 moral argument which is to occupy She second Critique.
60* See » espec «, t ?Ioine , '.?erke »od . Lachmann , i ii 80f.,and the moru serious charge or Vaihiiuser quoted above, p. 37. Also Bosanquet' r*. fnnous chr rf;e thnt Kant's theism is 
an "unfcsbentiul survival" of cuperfifcition,in Essays n Ji d A d (ijro s_se fl , p . 1<* 9 .
61. Critique of > lire iioason.B xxv ff .
62. In thc^ "Critique of all 'P>ieolo£7rt ,eepec. A 65l'-B 661ff. t from which these passages are ; elected:*
n Mow aince there arc prricticr.l laws ??hich are absolutely necessfiry,that is, the moral laws, it must fo31ow that if these necessarily presuppose the existence of uny bein^ GS the condition of the possibility of their oblifirtqry r>ower,this existence mubt be postulated; and tnis for the sufficient reason that the conditioned from which the inference is drawn to bliis determinate condition, is itrelf knov;n a priori to be absolutely necesr-ary. ^t some future tiiae we shall show that the moral laws do not merely jrresuTv^pe the existence of a supreme beinc, but also ,a,s thema^lvos in a different connection
absolu^oly necessary, justify us in postulatinc it tt?aou^ t Indeed ,only from a practical point of view.
For tno pwBaatpho^o-ver^c are leaving this node of
argument aside. w (A6^4-£ 662)
Toward the close of the first Critique ho returns to an
oven nore satisfactory anticipation of the later con-
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s tractive tirsunior.t • The Fundament".! Principles of the
of .or ale .nldway bet\7e n the first and second
Critiques, develops the essential e'jnicr.l doctrine of the 
C r i t i -uie of Pra c t i c*\ I KCQ son though not its full meta­ 
physical ~>oj;ition. - ?ron the out set, it was clear that 
Kant intended the first Critique as merely the first 
terra of o. series which finally developed ?>s a trilogy and, 
therefore, as primarily occupied vrith prole ;omena, To the 
end of his life, the fi:fcs of morul experience seemed to 
him indissolubly linked with the idea of Ood; Indeed,
toward tho close, their mutual interdeponconce appealed to
64 
ar inoro rather than less intlnrite, From the con­
fluonce of these many evidonces,v?e may talcc it as finally 
established that,from the first Critique onward,Kant 
re^-'.rded tlio mojal argument as tho alone convincing 
itio proof. 'Ve iaay accept at ibc faco reading the 
in:? sayln/-; in the preface to tiio r.ocond edition that 
" 1 h<iv3 oli^rcrore found it rt cecsary to deny laiov/ledge
(of noci,fro.;do}Ti and iiarQortality) in order to make room
65
for faith (or T)olief]«"
C^.r.ritlouo of Pure .'.'ioaaon.^ 80S-B 332 ff .
"It was the moral ideas that gave rise to thufc conoopt of the Divine Dclnc \7hioh we now hold 
to be correct— and we so regard it not because spoculr-itlvo r^tt, on convinces ua of its correctness, 
but because it completely harm&nizes with the moral principles of reason." A 818-3 S/.g,
e^.V/ebb.Kant/s I'hilosophy of ^elir.ionypp 190 ff.and quotations ijiv^h ^. bove , p. 08 .
65. Critique of I'ure Reason. B xxx«
51.
But the time has come to confront the noral 
argument itself. It may be briefly summarized as follows:-
One of the indisputable facts of human exper­ 
ience is the presence of the sense of moral obligation 
within my consciousness, the claim of the moral lav? (the 
categorical imperative) upon my will. It directs that I 
shall always do the right irrespective of the outcome of 
my fidelity—either the success of my good efforts or 
the happiness which may or may not accrue to me. This 
moral imperative is a "given " fact of life; it is not 
dodikcible from any other fact nor from reason . It is a 
unique datum of experience*
But upon more careful examination,the moral 
lav;, like sense-experience,discloses certain inherent
conditions or principles (" a systematic unity of pre-
66 
supposed conditions" ).These must hold, i.e. muet
possess noumenal reality,i,f the moral law is to be 
vindicated as reasonable, i.e. if the moral law is to 
be regarded as what it lias already shown itself to be~- 
a noumenal fact. In the firs I, place, the claims of the 
moral law aro not onl^ absolute,they are universal ?tha 
realization that I should always do the right ^ivas 
place to the more precise and inclusive maxim that I 
should always "so act that my action might become a 
universal principle of action." Further, if the claims 
of morality upon my allegiance arc to be reasonable 
and not a dastardly deception,! must be genuinely free
to accept or reject those claims; the noral law requires 
6G. Kema amith.Commentary. p. 571 .
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the postulate of freedom* But,further and nore im­ 
portant fj£ the moral law is to be reasonable, then 
clearly those human wills which respond to it and 
are completely devoted to its commands should achieve 
their goals* the purposes which the lav; directs them 
to serve should actually be realized. Otherwise,from 
this an-la as well,the claims of morality would be a 
dastardly deception; I could never respect a rule 
which ordered me to a certain action and then did not 
support Jt£ order by aisrjuring the success of the 
effort, Moreover, in a thoroughly rational world, the 
actual realization of the ends of morality should be 
precisely in ratio to the extent of devotion to those 
ends. Clearly no such exact reward of Good effort by 
successful achieveirent occurs in this life;therefore 
the moral law must postulate immortality. Finally, 
it would not be satisfactory(even if it were possible) 
if this precise award of achievement in pcoportion to 
virtue occured through some kind of "natural tendency" 
in things. It must be the gift of an intelligent and 
absolutely righteous will; therefore the moral law 
requires the postulate of dpd.
V/e h*"*"0 taken the liberty of making a rather free 
rendering of Kant's thought. Let us now hear the same 
argument in his own words: —
"Only a rational bein;- has the faculty of acting 
in conformity with the idea of law, or from principles; 
only a rational being,in other words,has a will. The
53.
determination of such a will according to objective 
laws is therefore called obligation. ••.The idea that 
a certain principle is objective,and binding upon the 
will, is a command of reason,and the statement of the 
command in a formula is an imperative. .. .Now all im­ 
peratives com- .and either hypo the tically or categori­ 
cally. ..The categorical imperative declares that an 
act is in itself or objectively necessary,without any 
reference to another end....*t has to do,not with the 
matter of an action and the result expected to follow 
from it^but simply with the form and principle from 
which the action itself proceeds. The action is essen­ 
tially good if the motive of the agent is good,let the
consequences be whr.t they may. This imperative may be"67 
called the imperative of morality. nThe moral law
is given as a fact of pure reason of which we are 
a. priori conscious,and which is apodicticolly certain, 
though it be granted that in experience no example of 
its exact fulfillment can be found. Hence the objective 
reality of the moral law cannot be proved by any deduc­ 
tion by any efforts of the theoretical reason,whether
speculatively or empirically supported...and yet it is
68 
firmly established of itself."
"There is therefore but one categorical impera­ 
tive, which may be stated thus j -Act in confoniity v;ith
that maxim.and that maxim only, which you can at the
69 
same time will to be a universal law."
67. The Lletaphysic of morality-P26Q—264-
68.Critique of Practic- 1 Heason.Rosenkran7. r VTTT-pn.l65 f. 
09. T7»e flet^h^rte of fforalifry, p.30?.
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nWill is conceived of as a faculty of determining
itself in action in accordance with the idea of certain 
laws •••.•The will is the causality of living beings 
in so far as they are rational. Freedom is that causality 
in so far as it can be regarded as efficient without 
being detemined to activity by any other cause than 
itsolf.....A free will is the same thing as a will 
that conforms to moral laws....The will of a rational 
being,in other words,can be his own will only if he 
acts under the idea of freedom,and therefore this idea 
must in the practical sphere be ascribed to all rational 
beings.... Phis v however does not prove that man is 
actually free, bit only that,without presupposing 
freedom,we cannot conceive of ourselves as rational 
beings,who are conscious of causality with respect 
to our actions,that is, as endowed with will.....The 
explanation of the possibility of categorical impera­ 
tives, then, is, that the idea of freedom makes me a
70 
member of the intelligible world." "Independence of
natural law is freedom. in the strictest or transcen­ 
dental sense of the word. Therefore a will for which 
only the mere form of universal law can serve as the 
form of its iaaxim,must be a free will....The conscious­ 
ness of the moral law, therefore,leads inevitably to the
71 
conception of freedom."
"The conception highest contains tv/o distinct
70. The letaphysio of Iiorality. PP.275:294-302-
71. Critique pf Practical Reason. pp.SOff.
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ideas,which must be careful^distinguished,if we are 
to avoid needless perplexities. The hipfrest may mean 
either the supreme ( supremum) or the complete (consun- 
matum) . The supreme is a condition which in itself 
unconditioned and is not subordinate to anything else 
(ori^inarium). The complete •again » is a whole which *s 
not part of a larger whole of the ssme kind (perfectis- 
simum) • Now virtue,or the worthiness to be happ>f »... 
is therefore the supreme Good. But it is not the whole 
or complete good which finite rational beings desire 
to obtain. The complete good includes happiness...The 
highest good of a possible world must therefore consict 
in the union of virtue and happiness in the same person, 
that is f in happiness exactly proportioned to morality. 
...Perfect harmony of the will with the moral law is 
holiness. a perfection of which no rational being 
existing in the world of sense is capable at any moment 
of his life. Yet holiness is demanded as practically 
neoessary,and it onn be found only in n infinite 
progress towards perfect harmony with the moral law.... 
Now this infinite progress is possible only if we 
presuppose that the existence of a rational being is 
prolonged to infinity,and that he retains his person­ 
ality for all time. This is what we mean by the immor­ 
tality of the soul. Thts imnortality is inseparably 
bound up with the moral law. It is a postulate of pure 
practical reason,that is a proposition that cannot be 
proved theoretically,but depends upon an a priori
56. 72 
practical law of unconditioned necessity."
"The moral law leads us to postulate not only the 
immortality of the soul but the existence of God....This 
second postulate of the existence of God rests upon the 
necessity of presupposing the existence of a cause 
adequate to the effect which hr.s to be explained..... 
A rational being existing in the world ...ou^ht to 
seek to promote the highest good,and therefore the 
highest good must be possible. He must therefore 
postulate the existence of a cause of nature as a whole, 
which is dintinot fron nature,end ™hich is able to 
connect happiness and morality in exact harmony with 
each other..... The highest good is thus capable of 
being realized in the world,only if there exists a 
supreme cause of nature whoe^ causality is in harmony 
with thu moral character of tiis ugant. Now,a being 
that is capable of acting from the consciousness of 
law is a rational being,an intelligence,and the 
causality of that being,proceeding as it does from the 
consciousness of law, is a will.,If therefore we are 
entitled to postulate the highest derivative good,or 
the best world, we must also postulate the actual 
existence of the highest original good,that is t the 
existence of Ood. Now it is our duty to pronote the 
highest good, and hence it is not only allowable,but 
it is necessarily bound up with the very idea of duty, 
that we should presuppose the possibility of that 
highest good. And as this possibility can be established 
72.Critique of Practic 1 Reason.pp*116*117i!26-150.
57 only under condition that God exists,the presuppositic
of the highest good is inseparably connected with duty
or. in other words,it is morally necessary to hold the* 73. 
existence of God."
VI.
The Moral Arr.umont One or two comments will serve both to clarify 
Examined. somewhat Kant's thought and to reveal some of its more
serious inadequacies*
a.It is absolutely fundamental to his ethics that 
the obligation to right action,the claims of duty,do not 
depend upon the rationality of the world, the existence 
of God,the hope of immortality,or any other metaphysical 
assumption. They are regnant and absolute in their own 
right. "Right id right and duty duty though the heavens 
fall." Kant himself could not be too emphatic on this
point*
"It seems more in accordance with human nature and with the purity of uorals to base the expectation of a future world on the sentiments of a well-behaved soul than contrariwise to base its good behavior on the hope of another world." 74
And,again:—
"So far,then,as practical reason has the ri-'iht to serve as our guide,we shall not look upon actions as obligatory becaase they are the commands of God,but shall regard them as divine commands because ??e have an inward obligation to them." 75
And,once more;
WA good will is good not because of what it performs or accomplishes,not by its aptness for the attainnent of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of its volition,that is, it is good in itself. Sven if it should happen that owing to special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision of
73. Critique of Practical Reason*pp 130-131.74. Traume eines Geistersehers.quotod in Baillie.op.cit.26376. uncique or ^urc Reason,-*. o!9 v c»-17.
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a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack 
power to accomplish its purpose,...it would still 
shine like a Jewel by its own li :ht,ns something 
which has its whole value in itself." 76
The same insistence characterizes the Iietaphysic of > iorals
throughout and frequent passages in the second Critique,
77 
some of which we have quoted above.
As a mett^r ox fact Kant himself was not completely 
successful in maintaining his certainty that duty could 
be devotedly served irrespective *f duty's outcome and 
its metaphysical sanctions. As Professor Pringle_Pattison 
has so cle rly shown in his admirable discussion of this 
very point,Kant does not really believe that the rational 
man will continue absolutely faithful in his loyalty to 
the moral law unless he is assured of his vindication in
a future life and the vindication of his principles by a 78
divine Being. Kor example,what are we to make of the 
contrast between the passage Just quoted from the Iietaphy­ 
sic of Morals and the following selection from the Critique 
of Judgment published five yeurs later? He is discussing 
the predicament of a "well-disposed man such as Spinoza" 
who holds firmly to the conanands of duty even though he 
is convinced that there is no God and no future life—a 
man who would seom in admirable degree to meet Kant's own 
standard of the thoroughly virtuous man as far as ethical 
attitudes are concerned. (The writing is intricate,but the 
meaning is clearf—•
r»T'iThus the end which this well-disposed man 
had,and was bound to have,before his eyes in following
70. ^etaphysic of florals 'Abbott's trans.,pp.9-10) quoted
by Pringle-Pattison.Idea of God in Recent hilosophy,pS 
77- see,abovtf,ir.53,r 78.0p.cit.,Cht.2.
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the laws of morality, he must assuredly Give up as 
impossible of attainment; or else, if we wishes to 
remain still faithful to the mor^l vocation whereof 
he is inwardly conscious, and not to suffer the 
feeling of reverence, inspired in him directly by the 
Moral Law and urging him to obey it, to be weakened 
by disbelief in the reeJ.it/ of the only ideal end 
adequate to its sublime demands— a weakening which 
cannot but involve donate to She moral sentiment— 
he musttas he quite well can, since there is nothing 
essentially contradictory in the assumption, assume, 
from a practical point of view, that is to say, in 
order to forr.i for himself at least a conception of 
the end presented to him as a moral duty, the 
existence of a Moral ^uthor of the world, that is, 
of God. " 79
Further, the requirement that happiness (even in the very 
hi^h meaning which is always Kant s usage) shall be in-
#*
variably linked with virtue and in exact ratio inevitably 
introduces a hedonistic tinge into his ethics and a util­ 
itarian strain into his theology. God is presented in an
instrument;! li ;;ht— to effect the equation between virtue
80 
and happinpst;. And no really good man wishes meticulous
rewards foi performance of duty at; Kant proposes. The 
history of heroism stamps his suggestion as cheap and un­ 
true to man's capacity for truly disinterested devotion, 
Koone reading Professor Pringle Pattison's own moving 
doliniation of the attitude of tho truly virtuous man and 
the instances he adduces will longer question the dis­ 
tinctly inferior merit both of Kant's reasoning at this 
point and of his underlying position,
The truth is that a clear choice must be made of 
one of two alternatives ;Kant, in the old phrase, senks to 
eet his ccJco and hove it too. Either duty is.ac he claims 
absolute in its grip upon the virtuous man and he desires
• Critique of Judgment ,T).456 r q 
80. i-ringie
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no metaphysical assurances in support of it; in which 
case, the whole problem of Ood becomes (In the Kantian 
philosophy) a purely theoretical and speculative interest 
with no vital bearing upon practical life. Or , the meta­ 
physical issues are vital to the virtuous man in his 
practical life; in which case, the moral will is not as 
completely disinterested as Kant maintained. Professor 
Taylor has made a valiant attempt to save the strength 
of Kant's position;but f es I think f with only partial suc­ 
cess. Indeed his own putting of the matter will reveal the 
inherent weakness of Kant's contention: —
"One and the same conviction of the absolute­ 
ness of moral values... compels us to pronounce the 
world evil and our 0*71 nornl r driving a vain show 
if the highest good is not realized or realizable. 
• ••••We aro confronted by i dllen&oa: either the order 
of things rightly under stood... is a moral order and 
realizes the highest good or the highest good is not 
realized and all moral effort is senseless and fore­ 
doomed to failure, in which case the conviction of 
the absolute value of the good, on which morality is
is a mere illusion*" 81
If Professor Taylor has stated the issue as well as Is 
possible (os I think he has), then we seem to be driven to 
the second of the alternatives suggested above— i.e., the t 
the ^ood man's judgment about ult irate matters is o. vital 
factor in the quality of his ethical devotion. On either 
reading of the matter^ Professor Pr ingle-Pa tti son's rather 
severe stricture seems hardly exaggerated:- "Owin^ to the 
extraordinary hold which the individualism and external 
deism of his century had over him, God seems to be intro­ 
duced in Kant's moral theory as an after thought § and He is 
81. Taylor /'The ism", in II.E.R.::..Voi.i2.p.281.
connected .vith the law not as its inspir-sr or author,
82
but in the merely administrative capacity of
b« «\ second oomruont follows from dhe preceding 
consideration. On the alternative and stricter reading 
of Kant's de< per conviction— i.e., that the moral law 
claims adherence without metaphysical sanctions— the 
whole the is tic inquiry becomes academic, of theoretical 
interest only. If we accept Kant's moralistic criterion 
of the ^ood man as one whose will is fully dedicated to 
moral ends and if morality is completely autonomous , then 
the discovery of -Tod and the assurance of immortality 
will not strengthen by one iota tho will to goodness 
within him. Aa good man.he will be indifferent to the 
outcome of metaphysical speculation. £111 he, then, have 
any interest whatever in these questions? Possibly, but 
not as good man;rather as thinker. It tdll be not his 
moral will but his reason which vd.ll raise the queries 
and urge him on to their solution. In this perspective, 
the "moral argument" is not ut all cm argument in support 
of morality, it is an argument in satisfaction of reason. 
Its aim is one vindication not of the lioral law out of 
the rationality of the Universe. And that is, I think, 
precisely the valid employe nt or tho Meet! an proof, 
That that is the nore correct interpretation of Kant's 
position is clear froa a number of his own statements :-
"Though morality can subsist without theology 
as regards its rule, it cannot do so as regards the 
final purpose which this sauii.- rule imposes upon it, 
unless reasoq is to be deprived of what is necessary to it." 85 —————————————————— t
82. Pringle Pattison,op.clt.,p.35.
« Cr(trt9uc of Judgement. quoted by Balllie y op.cit. Jl p.263.
The same conclusion is inevitable from the interpretations 
of some of Kant's soundest commentators. For example, 
Professor Taylor's words are almost on echo of Kant's own 
statement:-
"••••unless there is to be a hopeless conflict 
between our ccrception of the highest good and the 
first principle of duty, such a Supreme Being must 
really exist nnd twhat i? Tr.ore tmw,st be spiritual," 82
In ofche.'? ?? or ds. unless the Universe is to be regarded as 
fundamentally irrational, we must jjosit God, In similar 
vein is Professor n/ebb f s defense of the argument:*
"I do not tfiinlc that there dan be denied to be 
a demand made yas it were, by the moral consciousness 
upon the ?<orld,.7hich Is quite distinct from a desire 
for personal happiness, apart from the hope of attaining 
which one would not count it rcrth .vhile to be good* "85
Tuat Is •unless the Universe is irrational, it must support 
the devotion of the noral will. It is this feature of the 
moral ar^umen 4, which ̂ ln spite of ICant'r. professed abhorance 
of sterile rationalism and his loyalty to the practical 
interests of morality, makes his argument hopelessly ration­ 
alistic, intellectualistlc, irrelevant to living issues, and 
consequently unimpressive, It haG a nore serious conse­ 
quence which T.V ,- must now note.
c. There is a third weakness in Kant's f emulation 
of the approach t>o God; it is the most serious, because it 
involves its locical validity.
It will be recalled that in our own free paraphrase
84 
of the moral argument § there oacured such phrases as:
"if tlie claims of morality are rarsonable..! nust be free"
82. Taylor, n :.'heisiu", in £^.1^.^01. 1C ,p.2GO. (Italics mine)
8i5 * Webb 'Kant V Philosophy of Rell?:ibn. p.65. 
84. Above, p. 51,
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"if the moral law is reasonaole..,huia?n v ills devoted 
to it should achieve their goals7'; ; in n thoroughly 
rational world»«.. happiness should be in exact ratio 
to virtue." Those are t i thiiiKj-iou unfair renderings of 
the logic of the argument. A moment's reflection upon 
thorn will reveal that Kant has read into his premiss 
precisely the conclusion he is concerned to establish. 
Let us 8t--..te the point afreshj-
rhe purpose of the moral argument is to vin­ 
dicate the reasonableness of belief in God. Belief 
in God would be reasonable if the world is essential­ 
ly rational. But the moral will requires that the 
worl.-i should be rational . lhorefore,it must be 
rational and there muse ba a G-od. 
Or,to put the mutter in sli,£itly Aifferont form: —
IT the iiioral J.av/ is reaeattubjU; there must be 
a Uod. If there is a ^ou. tho moral law must be 
reasonable.
It is cle -r th;ri at no pcins i«as ICisnw shown evidence 
either for the rationality of the nor: 1 lav? (in this 
metaphysical sense) or for the rationality of -she world. 
He has failed completely at just the. point wh'3re the 
modern mind is satisfied v/ith greatest difficulty—the 
harmony between man's moral consciousness and the ultimate 
reality behind H'aturo,
That this v*eaknesfc is inheruiit in the whole position 
is irado doubly clear by reference to the two statements of 
Kant's interpreters quoted on the preceding page. "Unless
64,
there is to be a hopeless uonf Hot , etc... . ', says Pro­ 
fessor Taylor. But that ic Just the point, '//hot assurance 
have we from Kant that there is not a hopeless conflict 
between the first principle of duty and the ultimate 
nature of the rorld? MThere is a demand nade by the moral 
consciousness upon the world,.., 1 argues Professor .Yebb. 
But what right has the moral consciousness to make demands 
upon the reality of which it itself is only one aspect? 
This is t of course, the main burden of Professor Caird's
Oj?exhaustive critique of the whole critical philosophy, 
I am interested to discover Professor Baillie coining to 
the recognition of the same Achilles* heel of Kant's 
argument:-
"Has Kant ever really ofrerod any demonstrationthr .-. j uur recognition of duty's claim upon us carries with J.t the belief that the uni verse 9 as noral envir- onr.':.nt,nvir'-;  be no loss ethically constituted than ourselves, is morel agents? ?l 06
Kant's failure at this point is crucial bedause it
occurs it the turning-point of the argument, t is all the 
more unhappy because a sligtit modification would have 
given him a sound and persuasive development of the argu­ 
ment from the facts of the moral life. He was estopped from 
its use by his prejudice against any appeal to the principle. 
of causality. Such a statement of tLe argument vrould make 
its progress not from what should be to what ^5 but from 
what is to what, in c once queno e . r ms t be . Its proposal would 
be not "if the moral consciousnesb is to be valid, the re 
should be a God"; but "because the moral consciousness is,
and is what it is, there must be a God."






It remains to add certain iiore general impress­ 
ions of Kant's influence upon the progress of theological 
thought in the century and a quarter since his death. 
If space permitted we would need to trace the development 
of conviction on the two positions which we have selected 
for special mention—the dionotomy of appearance and 
reality and the moral argument for God—during that period. 
It is hardly an overstatement that the speculation of thetr
nineteenth and first quarter of the Twer^eth Centuries is 
a comment itry on the problems as he formulated them. The 
distinction betv/eun phenomenal and noumenal is the single 
focal center with reference to which philosophy since may 
be oriented; nodern thought's great query has boon—what
is the relation of the world as we know it to the world
87 
of ultimate reality?—and it is inescapably with us still.
And many of the strongest theological minds have been pre­ 
occupied with the attempt to build a proof for God on the 
evidence from man's moral experience.
Cur indebtedness to the great little thinker of 
Konigsberg and to the influences which have sprung from 
him can hardly be exaggerated. But our major concern is 
with the difficulties which philosophical and theolocical 
developments in the modern period have created for the 
faith of the plain man of today. From that perspective it 
is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Kantian influence
has strangled and cursed the religious thought of our
~ Pringle P&ttison , Idea of • oc) t cht • 3ff. Also




times, and at loarst three points:-
1. The basic dichotomy of appearance and reality.
We hive already suggested that this problem has 
suffered serious reformulation since Kant t and that it has 
traced a dcvelopnent which he little anticipated and, 
quite probfibly t rould have deplored. Increasincly the dis­ 
tinction has been defined no longer as that of appearance 
and realityt but of facts nnd values. The realm of facts , 
T7o have been told,is the exclusive domain of science; 
philosophy and religion are concerned with values. But 
tho modification in Kant's treatment of the dichotomy has 
been r.oro far-reaching by far. To Plant it was the dis­ 
tinction between the world of phenomenal appearances of 
which we nsy have "scientific knowledge*1 but no ultimate 
or final certaintyt ancl the v/orld of ultimate reality of 
wliloh !?o roay have no scientific knowledge but such prnc- 
ticol certainty ac men my live by. Under the alchemy of 
znodern thought,we now face the contrast between the world 
of facts of which science gives us the only certain know­ 
ledge wo have^and the realm of values which possesses no 
validity beyond our own appreciations and feelings. What 
was to Kant only appearance and therefore of negligible 
metaphysical importance has become for us the only reality 
and the source of the only certainty we possess; what was 
for Kant the true end supremely important key to reality— 
the insights achieved through moral experience—has become 
for us the insecure realm of subjective valuations. The 
roles are reversed. Science,formerly merely the useful
67.
interpreter of phenomenal appearances,is now hailed as 
our sols Guide to truth; i7hile the moral consciousness, 
to Kant our one safe pnthfinder to God,now struggles to
establish its ri,:ht even to tell us what we ou^lit and
86 
our>ht not to do,
Dut the dichotomy stands condemned not only because 
of its consequences. At its face value it is fundanontally 
unsound. Human experience knovro nothing of facts divorced 
fron values or vtiluss unrelated to facts; nor of raere 
ep,?etirance£; or :aere reality, -hen we vie?/ a sunset we do 
not seo wave-loiioths or beauty ;v;e see a beautiful sunset, 
'Alien we ?neet great raen o.r acquaintance is not with gland 
enzynes ;r courage; but with couraceous people* Th.3 only 
facto m^ OV-JT know in the sro-t rich deep web of hurian 
exporionoo arc procnant witl? me-.nln^. Anl wo never confront 
values—of truth or beauty or character or love or what­ 
ever—save as they come to us inbedded in concrete facts 
and msdiftted t.o us through tho •'•oriel of facts. By the 
same token if f as Kant held §w> never succeod in pressing 
behind appearances to pure reality,they are always ap­ 
pearances of something real. And what reality would we 
wish to contact with unless it cane to us in the only 
medium thro i<$i which we could recognize it t the stuff of 
our phenomenal experiences? Facts divorced fron values 
are abstractions from the richness of actual experience,
useful for scientific purposes only. Values divorced from
•
fact'j aro abstractions from the conciseness of actual =3
experience f p.ttraotive to the iiaa^ination only. So synpathe-





tic an interpreter of Kunt as Professor ICemp STnith has
put it thus:-
""Bxirteno cr> anJ values do not constitute 
independent orders. They interpenetrate and neither 
can be adequately de^lt uith apart from conisldera- 
tions appropriate to the other." 89
2.Tho second disservice of the Kantian tradition 
was implicit in the first. It is the insistence upon 
building the argument for God on the basis of moral 
experience alone, and without reference pro or con to 
evidence from the external world of Nature*
Here the major blame must fall upon the theolo­
gians, notably Hitschl p.nd his school, who pressed this
90 
feature of ICant's thought to its ultimate. Moral exper­
ience became religious experience, .and all too often 
religious experience became the uncritlcized and unvcri- 
fiable omotional intuitions of the individual worshipper. 
"What doer, it matter what science may tell us nbout the 
world of nature; do we not meet God in our own hearts, and 
is that not quite enough?" Here is one of the most fecund 
sources of the Nineteenth Century's enmity of science and 
re lie; ion, and of th® discredit of the religious position 
in the thought of intelligent men and women.
Kant himself was too wise to completely embrace 
such an antithesis* His ovm deeper insight is revealed 
in the nost famous of his dicta: -"Two things induce the
soul to reverence— the starry heavens above AND the moral
91 
law within." His sense for the realities of experience
*•• — lvol«I. PP.55161 89.Kemp ^irdth,Cpj^ejijtarjf,lxl. Cp.Taylor. Faith of a £
90. Op. Hitschl f s statement to r, £> uud on u, quoted in ixorton t 
Theism and the Modern LpojL. p .96 : -" lla tural Theology1.
drf£&menof ^raotfcaif Reason. Rosenkran2 Vol. VIIl . 512
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overmastered his narrow logic* Man is and will always 
be led to belief in God not merely as a necessity of 
the noral consciousness or an inference from inner
experience, but by contemplation of the world of Mature,
92 
the province of scientific inquiry. v\irthormore the starry
heavens and the moral law are aspects of a single ultimate 
reality. The conclusions they sug^st arc not exactly 
alike but they are not unrelated. The two aspects of our 
experience of reality are intimately interrelated and 
interdependent. Any adequate idea of uod must satisfy our 
best interpretation of both realms of experience;it must 
include and harmonize them. Neither rain's mind nor his 
soul can rest satisfied until the former discovers that 
both Nature and values point him to '>>od;and the latter 
finds through TJature as well as through values a living 
experience of God. Cur study or the findings of science 
and our interpret; tion of khe experiences of values 
should both unmlstakaably point u& to God. And in general 
they should spa k of the sanw kinu of l-od. For all we 
wish to knov; about him we shall need every ray of light 
each study can offer. 
:.;oral and 5•There is a third weakness in the Kantian heritage
Other Values. which in its ultimate consequences may possibly be iuore
far-reaching for ill. livan If it bs conceded that the 
experience of values if not the only pathway to God is 
still the principal pathway, Kant v;as mistaken in inter­ 
preting values wholly in terms of morality.
92. The la tost- supporter of the TfvrJ.e-n—^entian attack upon 
iilie value of the cosmolo^ioal entf teleological argu­ 
ments ifi Professor Xenp ojLith in his interesting lecture 
"Is Divine Existence Credible?" I cannot agree with him. j
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Surely we do not noed to return to Plato for She 
reminder that there are ut leabt thro^a great types of 
ultimate value nn«J that no final priority can be assigned 
to any one of then. i'he deliveries of &he noral conscious­ 
ness are not our exclusive guide to reality; \ve require 
the ooiupleto experience of £.11 that, is lovely as well as 
all thai; Is >^ood. ^nd it is manifest thai;, through the 
response of the human spirit to beau ty, the divine spirit 
may spetk to issui in a. way utterly different from the voice 
of conscience, ^nd the insights into the naturo and 
purpose and ways of the divine conferee with ran which are
so gained nr& utterly different insights from those given
93 
through the deliveries of conscience.
??io indie tree nt to bo drawn n^ainot the m\rrowly 
noral ?.stic approach of tho ^rea'- T'rotoBtant Puritan
tradition \vhlch has followed fron ICant and. Pitsc-hl isin
morn cor^cl.1 in/; still* It faiis not rior -ly.that it is in- in /x
co:nplcto f but.th.ot it alr;ost n-?v?r loc.drj thro\v^ to its 
gcx^l (ao.ln^dodjit nevor did nltii 1^ nt himel?) — to a 
living experience of a living iodgthe r/cnT of religion, 
It pictures nan roachinrj u^ through ethicrl striving 
toward Cod. .Hut living religion always pictures God 
vitally active in read- ing out, towojv) rani. The certeinty 
of God is not a deduction fro^i one's ov/n moral effort; it 
is a response to e persuasive t in.?cllinj Presence tej'on'J, 
This .together with the predominnr.cc of ir.pcrccnal ccicn- 
tific ci tc^ories aiu tue reliu.nce upon a purely inductive,
93»Cp,the admirable development of this weakness in
thought in Barbour.Thc i'thical >';p;.)roach to Theisia,p*Clff
Pringle-J attfson,op.cit. ,p.bl.
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"scientific 17 apologetic , is,i be ̂ iev<3, largely responsible
for the sterility of She contemporary l^Tnan's religious 
experience,his IOSL. of the vital sonco of the presence of 
God. He is not certain of a living Cod because he has been 
misled as to whero and bo® iie ahfljuld expect to bocotx? avrare 
of God, This is noi; the com.p3.oto answer to our central 
problem,but it is no small part of it.
A closer attention to the rise of religion in 
primitive life might have saved us from this ftllacy. 
apparently religion begins in the history of the race
rather as an experience of the luminous,the Yfnolly Other,
95 
than as the recognition of Conscience,the Wholly Within.
But we need not instance primitive religion, v.'e need only 
recall from our own experience the birth of religion in 
the soul of a child. Am I not right (and this is of in­ 
calculable inportonce to us)—the religion of childhood 
does not begin in eoncciousnesu or duty;it is brought to 
birth by the gift of love,devoci on,sympathy,sacrifice, 
faith from another,from parent,nurse, friend? The God whom 
children know doos not cpeak through a voice within,but 
through a person v/ithout. And the child's sense of duty, 
if it is more than reluctant acquiescence in an external 
rule,is the glad return or tli« child's soul to the trust, 
the love, the high expectation of another. Religion begins 
then not in tho awakening to something within myself , but 
in the spontaneous response to soia&one outside myself.
94. oee above,p.4.7;15ff.
95. Op.Pudclph Qttc.gho Zf.^a of the T Ioly.
Also Keiap ^nith.l's Divine .ixistenoo Credible? »p.G.26f . 
Also the \vri tinge of the l^te !>&ron Vcn ilugel.
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I submit that what religion is at its first 
in the soul of the child, it continues to be in its final 
maturity. Always its focal reference is definitely beyond 
me. In terms of its impact upon me f it speaks not through 
the compulsion of obligation but through the persuasion of 
love, yes love even to sacrifice. And in terms of my re­ 
sponse, religion is not the doing of something because I 
ought but the gift of self because I must.
VIII. 
Transition. Our study of Kant has revealed certain basic Issues
which he bequeathed to his successors. They will be found to 
reappear or to be implicit in each of the long series of re* 
formulations of his position which the Nineteenth Century 
produced, and again in contemporary restatements of the 
moral argument. For this reason they may be borne in mind 
as we examine the theistic positions of four British think­ 
ers of our own day; and they may well furnish convenient 
connecting-threads for the critical discussion. They are:-
1. The Objectivity of Moral Values.
2. The Relation of the "Realm of Values" to the "Realm 
of Nature".
3. The Relations of Moral Values and Other Values; and 
Their Relative Bearing upon the Idea of God.
4. The Problem of Evil.
ftte major interest of this paper is confined to 
contemporary British thought; and considerations of space 
forbid the tracing of the progress of the Moral argument 
in the century and a quarter between the death of Kant and
73.
the opening of our main enquiry. Tfee names which would 
supply milestones for such an historical Journey would be t 
in succession,Fichte, Lotze, Ritschl, Herrmann fMariineau, 
and possibly James Ward. In Fichte,the subjectivist tendencl 
of the failing Kant appear in their logical outcome; God is 
the impersonal moral order and nothing more.
"It is not at all doubtful,but rather the most 
certain of all things,and indeed the ground of all 
other certainty,and the only absolute objective: truth, 
that there is a moral world-order. . ..This living and 
active moral order is itself God. - e need no other God, 
and we cun comprehend no other..,.The conception of 
God as a separate substance is impossible and contra­ 
dictory." 96
In Lotze,on the other hand, the more serious weaknesses of 
Kant's thought are largely made good. A "complete respect
for the physical sciences,for their developed method and
97
their intellectual force" holds him time to his high de­ 
termination to build his metaphysic upon all the data 
available to us,not merely that of moral experience. The 
outcome is a lofty theism, presenting us with the concep­ 
tion of an all-v, ft se, almighty and all-good personal spiritual 
Being (represented by Lotze's symbol "M") f the creating and 
sustaining ground of all that is, to be thought of as akin
to our human souls but without their imperfections and limi- 
98
tations. It is matter of regret that it was not the richer 
and more daring conception of Lotze rather than Kant's 
sterile theism which fructified subsequent reflection. v;ith 
Ritschl and his disciple Herrmann, the Kantian dichotomy of
96.Gesammelte V/erke.V. PP. 177-189 f quoted in Baillie, The
Interpretation of Religion.p.278.a .v. y"
97. quoted in Baillie. The Interpretation of Religion. p.280.
98.For an admirable very brief statement of Lotze 1 s position, 
see Tayior,"Theism" f p.281f. Cp. Baillie,op.cit.,pp.279ff.
73a. 
Nature and values, science and religion, is heightened
with that haughty disdain for 'natural theology* which
99 
we have nofced earlier ; theology is bidden to seek God
solely in the realm of 'value-Judgments' ,and there was 
discharged into theological circles a train of tragic con­ 
sequences which a half century of intelligent reconstruc-
100
tion will hardly overtake. Martineau brought the contri­ 
bution of a rich theism rooted in independent sources and 
developed along independent lines; it was fundamentally 
Kantian in placing the central emphasis upon the ethical 
life, but enriched and ennobled by an understanding of the
deeper meaning of religion which forever escaped Kant's
101 
comprehension. We s.hail meet not a few reflections
of James Ward's mind in the theism of Professor Sorley— 
the fruit of many years of intimate intellectual and spiri­ 
tual comradeship.
But Professor Taylor rightly holds that,with the
single exception of Lotze, Kant's iiamediate successors
102 
gave no fundamentally new turn to the theistic problem.
The advance of the following century may be less helpfully 
gathered from a historical survey than from a study of the 
variant forms which, in the passage of the years, the moral 
argument came to assume. With such a comparative analysis 
we may make our transition to the body of this paper.
99. 3ee above, p.68.
100.For an exactly opposite judgment,see Baillie, The Inter­ 
pretation of Religion.PP.282ff . ———————
101.bee , especially, Pringle-Pattison,"Ivlartineau' s Philosophy" 
in The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays.pp.76ff •
102. Taylor,"Theism" , op.c it.,p.281.
xil
CHAPTER T?yCH*rKAJn!V: : STAT^MSN? OF .Tiff. MOR-X ARGUMENT. 
Kan t"»-Pri n c i ml Ref ereno e s •
Kri tile d or re inoR,^Q^u^ t . 1761 and 1781. (Unleer otherwise noted, 
"reference" is to Tforniun iCeivp Uaith«I^ALiiucl Kant's Critique 
of Pure P.ea FOR, London 1929 •)
jgu.^ Meta-phygik der Sitten. 1755 . ( Unless otherwi se noted
reference TiTo Jolm . .at son gioou ions Iron i>ant;The l.^ 
p_f riorraity«Glt\sco^ , 18B8 .
^ jler . L Jgrj^sjghen^ ̂ TernunTt 1 1788 • (Unlacn otherwise no ted f
" ^o John '..irtson^^eloouiuiiG ^rom Kant! The Critique
Kr i t i k der Ur t he il F!CT aft . 17 90 • (Uulo^r, other?rir>c no ted, reference 
ia to J"olm . ti t i3 Q£ . ̂  ̂ Ic o U > u IJL: f r oiu i '.^11 1 ; V Ii c ^ r i u i q.u 6 of 
nt . Glasgow, 1989,)
Q-3U3 ^ogtitnira,^'^. dickes, 19.^0* (In '.vobb • Kant y s I'hilosobhy of l 
t "-» J o o u na.ux'y" Tlic?f eruii cofg> •
(feoference b- to a tranclation of cither K.-.nt3 Sanantliche >verke« 
3Cl,G.Ilartenav;oiii,Laipiii^ t1807-3; Or ^UL^ ^ojqimaelte ^ohriften, 
Berlin f lC'10ff, Ths edition anl trrnslc.Sor are UBiially indicated 
in tile footnotes,)
^atur^eschiohtu und Theorie _ u*.^ Hiittmo Is , 1755 • t Genera]
Natural .ii:-''::>r:.y and Phcjbr;/; or _ Jjlio ^leavonG"
1755, 'nesfci Tor iihc»
LV. co^nltioiiis _ rjetaphysica.e rioya dilucidatio,
Per oinzig mo^liolto rtewois^rund au cinor demonstration desDaseii
dott>7S,l?'5E, r-rvio ' Onlyr j'o_ssible . Trppf of tho. Scinr: of Ood,)
Traur.e cftnet-. Ceir.t3?_schercjprlnn1;crt durch Traune der I'.otaphysik.
i 01' a "
Dlssortatio de LiUiidi Gon^ibilia at in^Jlleaibilis forma atcue




Comment ariss and J&J)Q.gi* ions. of -Cant ,
Edward Caird^The Critical Iliilo^op:;/ o? Kmit.3 vole, Caac3OT,19C9. 
F ,E . Bnclaua . Kcait * c: C once - p j i.cn of •-."ir-d.ifey Vork , 19^0,
'••MMMVMMMMVMMWpMMV+^MV^lHW*' *^*** •** — • t»^BM^i*»t^»- ^»MH^HW^MM»




Taylor, article "The ism", in Hasting 1 s T ncyclopeiia of Religion
Ethlcs>Vcl.i;. (.^cction o.n ^.ant»)
Josiah Roycc.Tlic spirit of 'lodcrn . Phi lo^pphy^os ton, 1392 (Cht.I¥f 
Kant . )
James "./ard, A Study of Kant. Cambridge ,1922 . 
C.C.J.Webb, i:ant*s ^niiosophy oxKeli^ion, Oxford ,1986,
Other ReferonQcs»
John Baillic,:i':i'3 Intorprcu;. ̂lon ot'_ i^cli^ion^^c^ York, 1920, 
TaThc _-ithical ..p
Bernard 3^yark ::uu&, .J^:-:a.yt> c.nd ^d^rof-s.c;^, London, 1689 <
Robert L.Ccxlliour:, Vlato cio .:oliuicuc .;Q'LIIGO r .in uQli;;ious iiealisir 
od.D.C. Macintosh. New York, 1931,
Walter MJlorton.rheisri and the Kodorn Mood, New York, 1930, 
Norman Komp . Sml th m Is Divine t :xi stence C rodible? London, 1931,
Rudolph Otto .The Idea _of the Holy« t \——————————————— . / ;]ie Light of \
A.Seth Prin^le Pa tt is on, The Idea of Uod TniHocent Philosophy, New York, 1320. ~~* ———————————
W .H .Sorley ,1-^oral 'Mluoo and. th<; I^ca of CUxi, Carnbrid^G ,1021, 
A,3,Taylor,The Faith of a Mftralist.S vols, London, 1930, 
On the auccessors of Kant,
The above references,and:-
A,S •Prin^le*Pattison,The Philosophical Radicals and other Essays, Edinburgh, 1907, """" ~~~ ————
CHAPTER THREE
ALTEHNATIVS FORMS ££ THE MORAL
.Varieties of
Statement.
On no account should it bo inferred that Kant's 
was the e rliest or the only femulation of the argument 
from the moral aspects of human experience to the fact of 
Ood until recent restatements* We have already indicated 
that this line of reasoning was clearly anticipated in 
Plato, and in a form in at least two respects definitely 
superior to that which claimed Kant's allegiance* For 
with Plato,value is always recognised in its widest and 
truest reference;his thought moves eveer from the experience 
of the beautiful as well as from the commands of the good 
to the implications concerning the true. In particular, 
Beauty holds a position equal if not, In certain of his 
moods,superior to ethical velue as the highest of all 
realities and our best toy to the nature of Being* And, 
in the second place,in Platof B full view, the witness of 
values to Ood is always linked with anft harmonised with 
an argument fromJLesign based on mathonatioal and cosmolo- 
gioal considerations. Thus $!&$« had at his finger-tips, 
so to speak,all necessary material for a full and rich 
thelc.n of values* And such a philosophy of values was
clearly implicit in his most central p dnt of view. But he l*See,for examplo,A.E.Taylar, tfTheiBmrt ,in H.£*R.E..Vol»12.
pp*262ff*;A*S.Pringle~Pameon*The Philosophy of Helirion.pp.d9-99,etc*jR.L.Calhoun,in Religious Realism.PP.22Off*Also references to a oortion of the relevant sections ofShe dialoguea.8*van aSovo,p.,?;
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never g«re It systematic development. And because It 
was the teleologlc&l argmnent upon which his mind in its 
declining years relied for^proof" of the being of God 
(and because it was this approach and it alone which 
held any great interest for the more scientifically minded 
Aristotle), it was this later formal formulation of his
thought which directed theistlc steculation during the
2 
subsequent centuries.* For this reason students of the
subject arc practically unaniinous in beginning their con-
3 
siderations of the moral argument with Kant*
But his original reasoning has boen the object of 
a century end a half of rigorous considerationtboth critical 
and recons true t ire « With the resvJt that the "moral argument 
for God" as we rceet it la contemporary thought is a far more 
varied end richer philosophy fchaa Kant anticipated or would
have sanctioned. la his exceedingly acute ~nd valuable«
survey of the mtt.riol. Dr. 'Pennant points to seven quite dis-
4 tinct presentations of the cirguznent.^r, 'we shall note bolow,
Professor A.E.TQjricr lays stress upon *t least four or five 
quite distinct features of n tt& moral lifen teach one of
which seeos to either presupoose or point to an Ftcrnel
5 and Ultimate Ground which TSS crn only define as God.
these several ways of employing facts of 
morality In support of thoistic belieft &n initial class!* 
fication is possible depending upon whether a)the facts of 
conscience and moral experience arc rude the exclusive, or
jolly exclusive ̂ ground for belief in 
,Tennant f>i;
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of any possible supporting or complementary evidence from 
Nature, evolution, the analysis of mind, etc. ;or b) these 
facts (plus, possibly, indications of a moral order in the 
world) are regarded as elements in a larger philosophy , 
one set of data though perhaps the most important ariong
a number of relevant data in the construction of an
o 
inclusive philosophical view. Statements of the former
type roay be said to stand very definitely in the Kantian 
tradition; while arguments of the latter kind usually 
prove, on careful analysis, to belong isore properly to 
the class of oosnolo^ic 1 or teleologlcal proofs. Purtksr, 
it is of first importance to note that in almost all moral 
arguments of the former type, there is usually an unrecog­ 
nised assumption which falls outside the moral considera­ 
tions themselves and which gives the argument any signifi­ 
cant force ae a theistio proof • nr.Tonnant Is guilty of 
only aliiThtly too sweeping assertion when h© charges that 
"the plausibility of such arguments, great enough to have 
captive ted great minda t is due to furtive introduction of
existential knowledge into & premiss purporting to be
7
purely moral." The introduction of considerations not
properly belonging to a strictly more;l proof will usually 
b« of one of the following kinds: ~
l)It is held that the idea of "conscience" or of 
"moral law" is itself of such a unique and supreme 
validity that it oust carry the reality of its
and tiw coalitions wiiloli are necossary i'or
Tailura of theologians to mark thio basic distinction
See, Flint ,Thei8m,p.210ff.
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its fulfillment with it. (The arKUiufcat in its 
strict Kantian faririulatlon^. It it* thus seen to be 
in reality a farm of the ontological argument.
2)3Cf the Universe is reasonable,it must support the 
moral imperative in its demands upon conscience, 
and guarantee that the good will achieves its end&t 
It is assumed that the Universe is reasonable in this 
sense* The evidence from morality is thus seen to 
rest upon a prior unproven assumption;if this assuuif- 
tion is established,it will be from oosmologioal 
or other considerations.
3)"Conscience" is a fact. It must have an adequate 
cause. Only a completely perfect moral Will could 
constitute an adequate source of human conscience. 
Such a Will is God. Here the reasoning is cosinologi- 
oal in form,from a known effect in the world of 
experience to an adequate cause in ultimate reality*
4)The final proof of the validity of the moral la* and 
the rootage of mor?1 values in the world of ultimate 
reality is to be discovered in the lives of those who 
accept the moral law and lire as though it were the 
command of God to then»»~i«e.,in what life does to 
those who obey the moral law. This, of course, is a 
pragma tic test pure \nd simple.
Any argument from the existence of a "moral order" as 
evidenced by the course of history,the discipline of 
wrong-doing, the moral progress of the race,etc., is on
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the face of it Barely a particular aspect of the oosmolo- 
g^ca^ or the teloQlofslcal urgunent^-an inference from cer­ 
tain disocTOrable features of trie empirical world to their
true cause, or from the semblance of design in human history
6 a
to the Divine Governor of history. There is way of regard­ 
ing the facts of moral experience which makes no use,direct 
or unconscious,of other types of argument. But It also 
should make no claim to grove the existence of God. In 
essence this attitude is—the demands of conscience and of 
the moral law are among the most indisputable and surely 
the most important facts with which life confronts us| we 
believe that they are rooted in the very heart of ultimate 
reality and come to us as from the voice of God himself; 
in that confidence wo shall answer tnelr call and trust our 
lives fully on our faith; but we cannot establish che 
validity of our assumption and we shall not seek vo vindi­ 
cate in by appeal to cosno logical, pragma tic or other avi* 
denoe. It is the attitude of FAITH—of trust in convictions 
believed to be true but never fully proven true,of courage 
to live lif a in devotion to ideals believed to be realizable 
but never fully achieved. But such an attitude is not an 
"argument" for God or a "proof" of 3od. It is a call to 
adventure, to action,to faith.
II*
rypes of the Searing in mirrt tho forgoing considerations and
./ thw basic classification into arguments which
8.It is at tiiis point iAut rroroi,. or Flint,typical of most
A___ * _ _ _^, ^fe • » „. W " ^fstudents of the moral argument, is guilty of exceedingly 
eu^erficivU. analysis. lie links the fact of conscience with the evidence of an objective morul order.Theism.Cht.VII.
place thsir full reliance upon the data of tnorel exper­ 
ience and those which £.o not, the various statements will be 
aeon to fall into the following typos :•
I.The Kantian I»"The consciousness of the categorical imperative, 
gorjnu the moral law, is one of the most indisputable "given" facts
of human experience* If that lav. is to be thoroughly reason­ 
able 9 it roust have the support of the ultimate power behind 
reality itself • Therefore, it is necessary for the moral 
consciousness to postulate the existence of God as the
ground of the moral law, the source of the moral imperative,
9 and the guarantor of the final triumph of moral values. *
If the assumption of th* moral consciousness re&aina 
a postulate, a tenet of faith which always lacks full proof 
or pragmatic vindication, a conviction by which one is rill­ 
ing to live though never wholly established by reason—then, 
this attitude meets the tost proposed in the closing 
paragraph of the preceding section;it rests wholly upon 
evidence from norality,but it never amounts to u proof of 
God* On the othor hand, if through these considerations it 
is sought to establish the reality of God, the advance in 
reasoning is achieved by use of one of the other of these 
supplementary lines of argument:*
a«An appeal to the rationality of the world, "IF the 
claims of morality upon allegiance are to be reasonable and 
not a dastardly 4eception,thero fcOST BE vindication of
moral fidelity through an intelligent and absolutely risht*
10 . oous W<ll t i.e.0od»" -Be it ***« fully noted that the ^rind
9, For a .tuilor statement or this position, see 10• »^ee above,p^""*
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of ^rationality" which if* tor* roisvua&u is not merely that 
the uorH is *.» cosmos ^orerneti. by rtapeikUible law (such 
rationality as a thinks r of iir^Berfcrsuad Russell* s stamp 
of nind might find it quite possible to concede ?ith no 
theistic implications whatever) ,but that the world possesses 
the kind of rationality which lends oupport to moral ends. 
In brief it is not so much the "rationality*1 of the world 
as its "Moral ground" which is assured— 'the very faot the 
argument seeks to vindicate* If attempt is made to lift this 
feature of "ethical rationality' from an assumption to a 
proven or even a probable fact, it will be done tas we have 
noted above, by appeal to considerations which lie outside 
the original moral data; and the position be cone e a form
argunent.
b*An appeal to the regnant significance and validity of 
the morel law. It is pointed out that the facts of the moral 
consciousness are DO unique in character and so superlative­ 
ly important for a reasonable and risateous world that it 
is unthinkable that they should not be grounded in ultimate 
reality. If the moral law is claimed to bear the stamp of 
reality upon itc face so that noori should be able to miss 
the marks of its status, then the argument becomes an appeal 
t*° j^tuityon^it gives a species of subjective certainty 
like any mystical insight . But iffas is more usual, it is 
claimed that there is something rithin the idea of the moral 
law itself which guarantees its ontologic alls tatus, then the 
position has become a form of the ontolOF.ioal argument* 
summum bongn has its possibility of realisation
SO,
guaranteed by the concept J.ta^lf ,K'ant in principle employs






I have called this the Kantian fora of tiie moral 
argument,
II • Those who have held close to the thought of Kant 
bat have wished to strengthen its 00-391107 have sought to 
do so either by a more acute and illuninating analysis of 
tiie zaoral consciousness, or by an attempt to show values 
as grounded xn reality by overpassing the Kantian dichotomy 
between value and existence*
"Conscience is by no means She only feature of our 
moral experience which suggests metaphysical implications* 
Cur uoral aspiratione are forever pointing us beyond any 
goal achievable or even imaginable within human experience! 
they eeciin to be directed toward an iciaortal and eternal 
good* Indeed it ie a characteristic of the moral life that, 
iThile it develops, within the flux of temporal events, it 
is dependent for its realization upon a •good complete and 
whole' which is never to be fouM witMn the time Bequenoe* 
iioroovcr,a more oareful scrutiny of conscience itself 
shows on the one hand that it always involves a sense of 
obligation, not to a lav requiring obedience but to en 
absolute good worthy of worship, such isorship as could be 
given only to a personal spiritual ^ill;and on the other 
hand that we wouid feel no adequate motivation to serve 
that mar>J. law did it not speak to us as with the voice of
ai.
on? nhc is Rode oner &aa ^..o^ Airier as U&U us
An* thin f intent ic:a of the so.il 1 toward a Person rather 
than n law becomes nopt d^pa^-cnt in the consciousness of 
ncra? ff-ilure and guilt— precisely thoee characteristics 
of the r-oral ?.Ifo whioJi most ole (jj?ly distinguish. man froia 
tlva pub-human Icvelfc an£ r..urk him as nan, Finally we note 
the re s tie ̂  oner. s^lie unsatisfied idoalicBit the inlierent
for a Beyond* whici. choractcrise all elevated
positive feature of the loyalty to ri^ht which 
tnu positive obvorse of the sense of noral obligation. 
The inevitability of separation and the loss of all cartaiy 
goods through doath i^ only an ineecapaolo confirmation ->f
a sense deep1 within Tnirnan concciouonsas — the recognition
12
that our true and Tinal horn; is uot in tilus vrorld."
It 7^ill V; apparent that at several points this 
lins of though u carries us ovor Into onu or the other of 
the two follow iuc typos of iioitJ. ai-guracmt — from the i'act 
of cortn.in features -itliin our ccnscioi-vsnieyL' to an adequate 
ceusc for their presence ther"s t cr from the hani:erinc of our 
noblest spirits ;ifter u, transcendent good to the reality of 
the .^ood as a Ic^itteate satlofac&ioa of 'clieir Ions ins. 
(Ill c.ncl IV IK^IOW). But if taw lioo or thought reioains 
faithful to the Kantian £;odel fnoiuher of Ujeet^ furth**' 
typos of aT'saaeat ia ^eeiiou. rhu iajier nature of che moral 
cone c lour ncsc; i.s laid baro,not an a point, of departure for 
an intuitive- or causal ar^U£ieii\i f bu\; GiTiply ae an exposit 
of ffict— n ^roof not thft; GO£ is but iihat '".1 should be.
mv?> outlined the development; oy: tho %nuian 
Trr>rt« by A*E-^ylor, 3o^ bolow t p.l68-170;188-194. 






The conviction, that God is , remains a postulate of faith, 
If the transition is made from the n should be" to the 
"is", it is accomplished either through the employment of 
one of the supplementary assumptions outlined under "la" 
or f*Ib" above; or else, more properly, through an effort 
to establish the organic relation of values to reality, 
and consequently, the legitimacy of interpreting reality 
as a whole in terms of value. Under the latter view, the 
evidence from moral values takes its place as part of th6 
total data available for a larger world-view,and the 
argument falls within one of our three final classifica­ 
tions (VI,VII,VIII below). It is with this task of vindi- 
the objectivity of values as integral elements
within reality that the more important attempts at restate-
13 
ment have been preoccupied since Kant«
III* "The Moral Consciousness in its rich and manifold
i
nature has already been discovered to be one of the indis­ 
putable facts of life. As such, we must conceive it to have 
a cause adeq.ua te to its richest expression* On no account 
can the rise, the astounding development and the mature 
flowering of man's moral nature be explained in terms of 
•natural selection 1 or some other purely naturalistic 
Agency. We must hold it to have developed under the influence 
of a power not less but glwater than it self, an infinite 
moral Will— i.e., God.*
The argument in this form is briefly put by Dr. 
Tennant: — "Natural selection can only explain the emergence
13. For example, the theism of A.E*Taylor;see below, p.
We shall meet this supplementation of the Kantian argu­ 
ment more adequately putt by W.R.sorleytsee
83. 
and persistence of such moral conduct and principles as
possess survival-value for individuals or societies,between 
which the struggle for existence obtains;and survival value 
does not pertain to the higher morality ••••Inasmuch as 
natural selection cannot account for the origin of our
higher moral sentiments, re sort to a supernatural cause is
14 
necessary• " In this form the reasoning is from effect to
adequate cause and falls under the classification of a 
special example of cosmological proof* It readily merges 
into one of the more comprehensive types of argument* 
(VI fVH fVIII below*)
IV.From Moral IV."We naTe already had occasion to note that our 
Aspiration to moral aspirations forever point beyond empirical condi- 
Its Fulfill- tions for their realisation and their legitimate satis- 
ment. faction* They deserve a return of reward for virtue which
human life seldom bestows* Much more important .they are 
themselves marked by what we have called a •nostalgia for 
a Beyond f t an irrepressible but noble longing for full
expression in conditions more ample than this life can
no
provide.Now,there is.human desire which is at onoe basic t 
universal and persistent which does not have a correlative 
satisfaction existing in the nature of things* We may 
instance the need for food,the urge of sex,the desire for 
companionship,the creative impulses;in each case Nature has 
provided a fulfillment corresponding to the human need* 
Indeed we may regard the subjective desires themselves as 
rising correlative to an already existing objective fact,
14*F.R.TennantjOp.oit, t p.94. Dr.Tennant gives A.R.Wallace 
and the Earl of Balfour as examples of those who em­ 
ployed the moral argument in this form.
Y.The Idealistic 
Form.
VI •From the 
Moral Order.
84. 
Carrying this empirically discovered principle only
one step farther,we must assume that Nature has pro* 
vided adequate fulfillment for these,the most delicate 
and noble and climactic,yearnings which she has bred
within human life—including the well-nigh universal
15 
longing for immortality itself. 11
This type of argument,it will be seen,is a deduc­ 
tion from a discovery about the general character of 
reality achieved on empirical evidence from other sources*
V. "There is an absolute moral ideal:it ' exists9 * 
And 'to exist 9 means to be •in 1 some mind* The Ideal is 
not fully apprehended as to its content by any Individual; 
nor is it realised in any human life* There must therefore 
be a Divine Mind in which its 'existence 9 is to be located* 
Our moral experience Implies the 'existence 9 of an absolute
and perfect moral standard,and its 'existence 9 in turn
16 
Implies the existence of God**
Clearly the validity of this reasoning rests aipon 
prior acceptance of a particular variety of idealistic 
metaphysics,an idealism of the Berkeleian school*
VI."The facts of the individual moral consciousness, 
important as they are,are not the only data of a distinc­ 
tively moral kind which warrant metaphysical conclusions, 
We have at our disposal evidence of a far more objective 
and empirical character* Conscience believes itself com­ 
manded by an ultimate moral law. But that law finds concrete
embodiment in fact,in the structure of the world itself 
15*See a statement of this position by Principal Pirie of
M.!^FSr«?*T&ia^38lRi!wSJfiSiBS«SSHj.
85. 
which surrounis human life and forever reminds it of the
essentially moral framework within which it is set. 
•Virtue does not always meet with its due reward,nor vice 
with its due punishment in any obvious outward shape}if 
they did,earth would oease to be a scene of moral discipline| 
But internal moral laws of an essentially retributive nature 
are in incessant operation, and show not obscurely or doubt­ 
fully what is the judgment of God both on character and on 
conduct ....Virtue tends of its very nature to honour and 
life,vice to dishonor and death....Virtue may be followed 
by no external advantages,or may even involve the possessor 
of it in suffering;but Infallibly it ennobles and enriches 9 
elevates and purifies the soul itself ••..Vice my outwardly 
prosper and meet only with honour from men,but it cannot
be said to be passing wholly unpunished so long as it
17 weakens,poisons,and corrupts the spiritual constitution. 9
"History affords abundant confirmatory evidence of 
the objective reality of the morel law.»The welfare of 
society is dependent on a practical recognition of moral 
principles—the laws of morality are Jtim condition* of 
the progrese fand even of the existenoe t of society..\.«Th& 
general conditions of social life testify that God loves 
virtue and hates vice.Tfcen,if we examine history as a whole, 
we cannot but recognise that it has been in the main e 
process of moral progress t of moral growth,...Our raae does 
on the whole advance in the path towards good....The vices 
die— the virtues never die •••.What great good has ever been 
lost?..,.The testimony which moral progress involves as fco 
17 .Robert Flint. The i am.
86, 18 
the moral character of God le certain 1 n
Such a statement points to two indications of the 
objective character of the moral order—the chastening and 
moralising influence of the world upon personal character, 
and the evidence of moral progress in world history .Nature 
IB interpreted as an atmosphere or background appropriate 
for the fullest development of roral personalities and tha 
slow upward advance of mankind. "Are we justified in saying 
that the imperfect and puzzling world that surrounds us is
an unfit medium for the moral life—if by the moral life
19 we mean the triumph of the spirit?" In stressing the
Impact of the moral order upon individual life,this type 
of statement is appealing to the general character of the 
world;it is a oosmolo/'ical argument in the larger meaning 
of that term. In appealing to the progress of mankind, it 
discovers evidence of Godf s purpose working itself out 
through history;it is an example of teleologioal reasoning.
There remain two other and more comprehensive ways 
of interpreting the theistic significance of moral values. 
One aims bo validate the status of moral values in reality 
by an even more complete analysis of the nature of Morality, 
especially the troublesome Issue of the relation of the 
order of values to the order of Nature* The other places 
values in a wider setting,regarding them as one element 
among many among the data of metaphysics,and §eeks a more 
synoptic view of the Scheme of Things.




VII,"The experience of values ic a vital factor in 
human life.Since metaphysics must seak to explain man and 
his essential experiences as well as Nature,any adequate 
account of reality as a whole must find place for the facts 
of the moral life within its interpretation. Moral values
claim objectivity and thoir genuine objectivity is suggested 
in the facts a) that they pertain not to the opinion or 
feelings of the Judging person but to something believed 
to be true about an objective object or relation, b)that 
they are universal in authority, and c)that they invariably 
imply a moral order or Realm of Values. It is thus apparent 
that moral values are related to reality in two ways:- 
Dthey are vitally effective influences upon the actual 
lives of men and women who are themselves manifestations 
of reality within the time-process;and 2)they are not de- 
pendent for their validity upon residence within human 
minds but assume a Realm of Values which pertains not to 
the world as it actually is but rather to the world as it 
should bo. Values,therefore,are oonstitutive at once of 
reality as an existing system and of ultimate reality. 
Indeed they appear to be a point of contact between the 
world-process as we experience it and ultimate reality, 
They suggest a principle of interpretation for the relation 
between these two apparently disperate realms—the order 
of Nature and the order of Values, Such an interpretation 
can be vindicated as most adequately accounting for the 
whole of the data which metaphysics must try to explain.
The world can best be regarded as a medium for the reali­ 
zation of goodness by finite selvec. Reality as we know it 
is animated by a universal conscious purpose— the production 
and training of human souls who may freely realise goodness. 
The ethical neutrality and apparent injustice of Nature can
be Justified since 'an imperfect world is necessary for the
w 20 
growth and training of moral beings 1 • And the conception
of God which results is that of one whose will finds ex* 
press ion in the time-process in a twofold purpose— the 
perfecting of individual human per sonuli ties, and the gradual 
realisation on earth of a perfect Realm of Values ta Kingdom 
of God, He is one who stands at the door of human life and 
knocks •
11 In this form the moral argument becomes the cope- 
stone of a more comprehensive Cosxoological Argument— an
argument to an adequate cause or ground of the whole of
21 
reality as far as we can apprehend it."
VIII .An Inclusive VIII, "All of the fore-going argument is true and impor- 
Meta physical tant as far as it goes. But its scope is not quite suf- 
View« fioiently inclusive* The experience of values is only a
part, even if the most important part t of man's experience 
of reality. And moral values are only one, even if the 
most important, type of value. We must begin with the recog­ 
nition that reality comes to man through at least two, and 
possibly three, avenues. It coxae s to him through Nature, the 
realm of 'facts' with which the traditional sciences deal* 
And through the impact of values upon his life, (Possibly
go •V/.R«Sorley«*lural Values and the Idea of
fcl.Abbreviatad jCrom our fuller summary of Sorley's argument,
CO. 
reality nakec oontact with Ills life in a distinctively
third way—through definitely religious experience,) We 
must look to each of these typas of experience for what 
light it can cast upon an ultimate metaphysical view. 
From our study of **«tura we derive the conception of 
an 'order* or f structure 1 behind the space-time world as 
we know it; of the interplay of xmohanging 'laws* and 
over-changing brute 'stuff1 , by which alone our living, 
growing un&fcerse would be possible; and of a world- 
process occurring within time through which ever higher 
and higher types of products are emerging—the process 
we call evolution* nature thus points to a Being who is 
the ground of existence,a God of Order paid of Truth,but 
also one whose purpose can bo dimly discerned through the 
trends in the world's development* A studj of the 
experience of ^ "»" «*« snows that they are known to us in 
at least three ultimate forms (to the so,perhape, should be 
added the distinctively religious experience as a fourth 
classification) ; that all types of value are objective 
end G&nuine features of 'ultimate reality*5 that they 
come to man with an imperative claim upon his affection, 
his loyalty,hi* allegiance, to which all that marks him 
as can makes instinctive response; that,in their more 
delicate manifestations at least, they seem to speak to 
him as though ?rith the voice of a person—yep,a voice of 
Love; that the whole of reality as we know it—the order 
of Nature,the order of valuos,and their interrelation— 
can best be interpreted as & Reals; of Values* Valves thut 
point to a Being whose nature i& personal,whose purpose
90 .
is the will co good of mankind, , who cay be thought of 
as standing at the door of human life knocking, calling 
men to make the supreme values their concern and their 
delight,to take his purposes as their own and so to 
become fellow-creators with him of a Kingdom of Love, 
Finally a study of distinctively pallqiPUB •spop:Uno« 
suggests that here men have known in conscious personal 
ooimounion that Being whom their interpretation of reality 
has vindicated for their thought. Indeed it is now recog­ 
nised Ghat their persistent searching is in itself proof 
thau they have already in some measure found him,or been 
found of him. The hold which value in each of its forms 
takes upon our life, prompt ing us to seek to find it, to 
understand It*to create it,to possess it,to be fully 
possessed by it—this tgrlp* of value upon our deepest 
selves Is itself the touch of the Living God upon our 
lives. And that God—Ho to wi?om religious experience 
introduces us—is known as not merely the Author of our 
world and of our lives and of all that makos life most
worth while,but also Redeemer and Sanctifier and Comrade
22 
and Friend."
22. This type of statement is called by Dr.Tennant an
instance of the teleological argument. It is, in substance, 
the fona of argument of his Philosophical Theology .Vol.II. 
It is also the form of argument of A.E.Taylor in "The 
Vindication of Religion",in Essays Catholic and Critical. pp.29ff. ^ee below,p$.i65f?.————————————————— 
It is closely parallel to the arguinent of W.R.Matthews, 
God in Christian Thought and Experience« 
It is hardly necessary to state that it is the statement 
of the moral argument which seoms to us most satisfactory. 
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PART TWO
RESTATEMENTS OF THE MORAL ARGUMENT
IN RECKNT BRITISH THEISM
CHEPTER FOUR 
THE THEISM OF W.R.SORLEY
Th,e Significance We begin our study of contemporary restatements
of the moral argument with that of Professor W.R.Sorley. 
And for several reasons* In the first place as the title 
of Sorley's principal work.Moral Values and the Idea of 
God, indicates •his attention is fooussed at the very point 
of our own interest—the bearing of distinctively moral 
experience upon our thought of God. Unlike Professor 
Fringle- Pattison and Professor Baillie he does not attempt 
a survey of the whole field of the ism, arguing for the 
superiority of the ethical approach by setting it in 
contrast to others; the discussion is strictly confined to 
the problem of moral values* In the second place his meterla] 
is marshalled with quite extraordinary skill into clear 
and logical order. Unlike Professor Taylor he does not 
permit his mind to be lured from its main course along one 
and another fa-cinating but comparatively irrelevant bypath; 
the argument advances with precision and cumulative power 
from the first page to the last. For this reason his dis­ 
cussion is a sherY dellgfct to minds blessed (or cursed) 
with a concern for logical coherence. The critical student 
can readily set the entire argument into clear outline, 
folAow its progress step by step t and place his finger at 
the precise points which are crucial for its success of
failure and the points where its statement is least con* 
vine ing. Finally,granted the limitations within which 1fce 
author has elected to write and to which he has been rigor* 
ously faithful,his argument is perhaps the most convincing 
of any which we are to study* It therefore furnishes an 
especially useful background against which to set our later 
enquiries*
Professor Sorley confesses a preoccupation with 
problems of moral values during a long life of philoso­ 
phical reflection.
"The contribution which I have endeavored to 
make to philosophy is concerned mainly with the 
significance of ethical ideas. For the most part 
ethic s,and in general the whole region of values, have 
been treated by philosophers either simply for their 
own sake or with a view to practical issues,and their 
investigation has been regarded as supplementary to, 
rather than as an essential part of,the problem of 
knowledge and reality. On the other hand theories of 
reality have been constructed in exclusive dependence 
upon the data derived from sense-perception and the 
cognitive conditions required for understanding these 
data,without any account being taken of the facts of 
value and the appreciation of values." 1
Here,in the opening sentence of his philosophical confesslo 
fidei. the central concern of all of his constructive writings 
is clearly indicated—the bearing of moral experience upon 
the ultimate issues* Indeed, this more specific interest in 
the metaphysical Implications of ethic a furnishes a subor­ 
dinate motif to the main discussion in his earliest published 
work—a critique of Naturalism published in 1885 which had 
as its chief purpose "to arrive at an exact estimate of 
the ethical significance of the theory of evolution." And
1. "Values and Reality", in Contemporary British Philosophy. Vol.II,p.247. ———————————————————"•
94.
the convictions which represent his mature conclusions 
are there clearly foreshadowed. In an estimate of the 
significance of evolution for ethics there occurs this 
interesting sentence:-
"By the aid of the doctrine of evolution we 
cannot pass from "is" to "ought" , o* from efficient 
to final cause." 2
And in the course of extended quotations from ̂ uxley in 
which the latter had held to the conflict between the 
cosmic order and the moral order,Sorley says:*
"Huxley was compelled by his general theory 
to look upon morality as having arisen out of the 
very process which it sets itself to oppose. To use 
his own metaphor,it kicks down the ladder by which 
it climbed. The two orders arc thus strangely re* 
lated. 'The cosmic order has nothing to say to the 
moral order, except that,somehow or other,it h'-s 
given it birth; the moral order has nothing to say 
to the cosmic order, except that it is certainly badl" 3
Sorley here indicates the dilemma which furnishes the pivot 
for all his later the IB tic speculation—the apparent con* 
fliot between the order of morality and the order of Nature. 
The conclusion of his reflection on the whole matter of 
%turalism is:*
nThe claim that man must be interpreted as part 
of the universe involves the counterclaim that the 
nature of the universe cannot be understood apart from 
the distinctive features of man's activity...It cannot 
be entirely indifferent or antagonistic to morality, 
for the action of men,whlcn enters into the process, 
bears the Impress of moral ideas.
"These considerations are put forward not as 
proving the truth of the view that the process of 
evolution is the expression of a divine purpose. They 
prove only that purpose and intelligence are somewhere 
within the process,not that they are present every­ 
where, or that the whole course of Nature is the expres­ 
sion of one increasing purpose. But the facts leave 
room for this interpretation,if they do not demon­ 
strate it." 4




In the smaller work. Re cent Tendencies in Ethics * 
the same interest in the development of a "moral
theology" is again evident and the lines which it
6 
might well follow even more clearly hinted. And
the more popular little essay.The Moral Life and
Moral north,finds religious faith essential for the———————— 7
fullest stability and power in the life of morality.
But it is in the Gifford Lectures.^oral Values and
8 
the Idea of God, that Sorleyf s central conviction
obtains leisurely and adequate development;indeed, 
in their major import they are a detailed outworking of 
these earlier suggestions* Essentially the came argu­ 
ment is again sketched in the writer's personal con-
9 tribution to Contemporary British Philosophy: this
essay may be regarded as a summary outline of his 
larger work, since practically everything which Pro­ 
fessor Sorley has elsewhere written on the theistlc 
problem has been reproduced in amplified and more 
adequate treatment in his Clifford Lectures, our atten­ 
tion will be concentrated upon them with only occasional 
supplementary references to his other writings.
5.1904. bee. especially,pp.131,133,136. 
e.Reoent Tendencies in Ethips«pp.l31 f 134.136. 
7.The i^oral Life anc^ioral Worth* 1911.p. 133.etc. 
8.1913;2nd.ed.,1921.
9. "Value and -Reality". in Contemporary British Philosophy* Vol.II,pp.247ff. ——————————————
26.
II.
"Moral Values Of the logical and literary merit of this work 
and the Idea we have already spoken* The quality of Professor Sorley's 
jgf God." craftsmanship in this regard can hardly be better indi­ 
cated than in Professor Pringle- Pattison's well-deserved
tribute;*
w In style and method these lectures are a model of what a philosophical discourse ought to be. There is no obtrusion of technical dialect-***indeed, there is not a sentence the meaning of which is not transparently clear,and the leisurely and deliberate way in which the argument is built up ensures that the sequence of thought is equally plain* liile singularly freo from any merely rhetorical adornment, the style rises not infrequently to a sober eloquence, impressive by its very restraint. The book is the expression of strong personal conviction; but the author is the fairest of controversiallsts-never minimising the difficulties of his own position or attempting to snatch a specious advantage over an opponent* Nor does he seek to build upon any argument a superstructure net.vier than it will bear 9 or to present his conclusions as more certain than they are. In all these respects the philosophical temper of the volume is beyond praise,and the unity and coherence of its argument make it a notable contribution to recent theistic discussion." 10
The fundamental premiss which supplies Professor 
sorley his point of departure and which underlies the 
entire argument may be given in his own words:-
" It may be held that our final view of reality must be based upcn experience; that this experience must be taken in its whole runge, and must not be arbitrarily United to the data of perception which intelligence works up into science; that the apprecia­ tion of moral worth,or of value generally.is as true and immediate a part of our experience as the judgments of perception; and that it,ae well as they, forms a part of the data of metaphysics. Further, it may be contended that,Just as the data of sense-experience
10,A,S.Pringle-Pattison,Heview of Moral Values aqd the Idea of God, in Hibbert Journal.1919.p.535.
07.
are found to manifest certain regularities from which 
the 'laws of nature* f as they are ctilled tmay be in­ 
ferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law 
orlbrder can be discovered,with a claim to be regarded 
as objective,which may be compared with the similar 
claim made on behalf of natural law. If we take ex­ 
perience as a whole, and do not arbitrarily restrict 
ourselves to that portion of it with which the physical 
and natural sciences have to do 9 then our interpreta­ 
tion of it must have ethical data at its basis and 
ethical laws in its structure •" 11
From these presuppositions the argument advances by three 
fairly clearly dera.rked stages. The first,embracing Chapters 
II through VI1 9develops a theory of values; it aims to 
clarify the conception of value, to establish the genuine 
objectivity of moral value s tand to Indicate the essential 
dependence of values upon personality. The second section 
(Chapters VIII through XI) embodies Sorley's theory of 
knowledge; its purpose is to show that reality an a whole 
is of such a character that it can be apprehended only by 
something in the nature of a "synoptic" vision, and that 
from such an apprehension there should follow an interpre­ 
tation ^fhich would show the divisions of reality united 
under a single principle. The concluding portion (Chapters 
XII through XX) is more definitely metaphysical in charac­ 
ter and deals with theory of reality proper; by critical 
examination of the traditional "theistlo proofs" and of the 
more serious alternatives to theism, the way is cleared for 
a final defense of the author's own conclusion—that the 
world may best be interpreted as a training-ground for 
character,for which Nature is an appropriate though imper­ 
sonal and Indifferent medium,and upon which finite selves 
11. Moral Yalues and the Idea of God, p.7.
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as they make the divine purpose for the realization of 
values their own purpose may know communion with God and 
work out their own perfection* The outcome of the long and 
impressive argument may be given in the writer's own words:-




In the concluding chapter Professor Sorley has 
provided a brief recapitulation of his argument. And,
at; already pointed out,his essay in Contemporary British 13 ——— —— ——— ——————— 
Philosophy is in essence a fresh putting of the same case*
But neither of these briefer statements exactly follows 
the order of the argument in full;and,for our own purposes, 
we may be permitted to attempt a Bather free outline of 
those portions of the whole which bear especially upon
12. Moral Values.p.467.
13• "^alue and Heaiity", in °ontem.^orary British Philosophy. Vol.II,pp.247ff.
14. A somewhat fuller and more faithful summary in which the progress of the argument, chapter by chapter,™«v be fol­ 
lowed is given at the end of this chapter,pp. 133
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the issues with which this thesis is primarily 
con conned:*.
Our purpose is to discover the significance of 
ethical ideas and ethical experiences for an adequate 
view of reality as a whole. We shall begin with an 
enquiry into the nature of values; we shall conclude with 
the development of a conception of God. This is to reverse 
the more custoirary procedure In metr physic- 1 discussions. 
They usually propose a general metaphysical view derived 
from oosmologlcal or epiatemologioal cons!derations,and 
then attempt to deduce ethical principles from it. Such 
a procedure of whatever school must fail. Under no circum­ 
stances can ethical propositions be derived from non- 
ethical concepts; the data of the latter is inadequate to 
the task since it omits the facts of ethical experience 
and these are sui generis. The contrary procedure seeks 
to advance from a study of ethical Ideas to the formula­ 
tion of an inclusive metaphysioel view. The Justification 
of this method—the attempt to find in what ought to be 
light on what IB—la found in the fact that morality la 
a vital factor in all human experience. Man's initial 
experience is both perceptive and appreciative; only later 
are the attitude which issues in scientific generalisation 
and that which leads on to theory of values differentiated. 
Therefore,since the experience of values Is an important 
element in human life and metaphysics must seek to explain 




a whole must find plaoe for the facts of the moral life.
The theory of values reveals a number of interesting 
and puzzling problems—the difficulty of classifying values, 
of establishing the true relations of different types of 
value to one another,of discovering adequate criteria of 
moral values,of vindicating the objectivity of the ultimate 
values* Such a study discloses at least these characteris­ 
tics of mor il values: •»
!• The notion of value always pertains to something
which actually exists or ought to exist (in contrast, 
for example,to certain mathematical propositions 
which imply no necessary relation to existence). From 
this point of view Judgments of value are less ab­ 
stract than scientific judgments.
2. ^very moral Judgment claims objective validity inde­ 
pendent of the Judging subject. It always pertains 
not to a fueling or attitude of the subject,but to 
an actual fact about an object or an objective 
relationship.In that sense,they are also Impersonal. 
3.3y virtue of thair claim to objectivity,moral Judg­ 
ments also claim universality.
4. While valu* is found always in tha particular,the 
individual,it ?Iways implies a universal.
5. Moral values are found only in relation to persons. 
This would seem to be true of all intrinsic values, 
with the possible exception of natural beuuty. But 
regarding moral values there con be no question;
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f| It is only to persons that the uoral predicate
15 
can apply« n
6, Thore is an "absolute" factor in the moral life. 
It is not a set of specific precepts but rather a 
single principle or spirit in moral action which 
is no less cortuin because it eludes precise descrip­ 
tion. It is "the will to good." This it is which 
furnishes unity in the variety of moral situations* 
7.lAoral judgment; a always imply a system of order of 
moral values. This important fact is apparent from 
a number of considerations. In the first place , 
moral judgments seek coherence and freedom from 
contradiction with one another;and therefore they 
are appropriate for syst«matization» Further every 
sound rnor.l judgment must demonstrate its compre­ 
hensiveness by its c-paoity to take up within itself 
apparently contradictory judgments and show their 
place within a larger whole ;here again a system is 
implied. Indeed when the attempt is made to dis­ 
tinguish higher from lower values,we confront the 
inadeqgacy of any merely empirical or quantitative 
basis of comparison;and the nec£ for discovering an 
order in relation to which each value may be placed.
The Objectivity Of these characteristics,one in particular has been 
of Values. the subject of special attack—the claim of the moral judg­ 
ment to objective validity. The objectivity of values has 
been denied on a number of scores,perhaps principally two— 
on the ground of their reputed origin,or because of their
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apparent relativity. »lth regard to origin,it is said that 
moral judgments originate in the purely subjective feeling 
of pleasure or desire f or that they represent merely the 
reflexion of social mores.Neither suggestion can be sus* 
tained. While the sense of values may arise within feeling 
or be stimulated by desire, the moral consciousness always 
distinguishes good from bad feelings,high from low desires; 
it is therefore a criticism of mere fooling or desire.And, 
as already noted,its reference is always not to an attitude 
or reaction of the subject but a fact believed to inhere 
in an object* By the same token,while moral judgments 
arise within society they always represent a criticism of 
prevailing mores ,else there would be no advance beyond 
the average standard, with regard to their apparent re* 
lativitytmoral judgments are relative to factors in the 
objective situation and change as those factors change, 
they are not relative to the subject who pronounces Judg~ 
ment. None of these considerations qualifies their essential 
objectivity.
Positive evidence for the objectivity fcf moral values 
may be discovered along at least three lines:*
a. ^oral judgments intend objectivity. They do not pertain 
to a state of a person judging but to a fact believed 
to be true of tne object or relation judged (as above).
b. Moral judgments are universal;and in two respects:-
1) "all who Judge correctly nust find the sume moral
16 
value in any given situation1* t and 2) In every moral





which nay be vaguely identified a£ a "common spirit 
or purpose***
c,No single good can be confidently determined except 
with reference to a Chief Good,an organic system of 
values,a realm of ends which shall embrace both general 
principles and concrete experiences,both the actual 
order and the ruor- 1 order,and unite* them in a harmon­ 
ious whole* Therefore every nort-1 judgment 3arries 
reference to a Realm of Values which obviously does 
not possess full existence within the world as we 
know it and nay never do so. It ie an appeal to an 
assumed system of values. Jhie is the Absolute.
But what c, n be affirmed of the actual status of 
values in reality?
An analysis of reality as we know it would reveal 
those divisions of reality:-
1.fcxiEtcnts; which in turn can be subdivided into:- 
a. Solves,i.o persons, 
b. Similar but lest complex unities on an inferior
level of the organic world. 
o. Things, i.e.inorganic objects.
2.Relations, which are found only in rebus.
3.Values,whioh are found only in persona •
But our whole study emphasises tho underlying __ , .connectconeSB
of these different types of reality. Things are not found 
without relations,nor relations except between things. 
Values pertain only to persons,but persons realise themselves
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only through values, v/e are driven to a search for a 
view of the whole. ^ow,for such an inclusive view, the 
scientific procedure of analysis plus synthesis is 
quite inadequate, «vhat is required is a "synopsis"^ 
vision of the whole or insijht into the whole more akin 
to the method of creative art.It is such a synopsis 
which we employ in ioiowledge of self and in sympathetic, 
significant understandinc of other selves. But the effort 
after such an Interpretation of the reality of the whole, 
of the meaning of the i?orM,nust employ concepts drawn 
from our experience—»fron our experience of Nature, of 
ourselves as persons, or of value. That categories are so 
adequate as those of value? «e are entitled (therefore, to 
seek an interpretation of reality in tormc of values. 
Such an interpretation will be valid IF it fits the facts. 
The final tost of this,as of any alternative interpreta­ 
tion, is in experience,
We have already seen that values appear to "be one 
of the three fundamental types of reality as we experience 
it. They ara related to reality at at least two points:* 
I.They exist in the consciousness of men and women and 
are vital forces in determining their eonduot. But 
reality is ranifostoct in persons, therefore values 
are efficient faators in existential reality in the 
time-process.
3*They point to and as^uaa tbs reality of moral laws 
and ideals, indeed a Realm of Values. To be sure,these 





actual world as it is but rather that world as it 
should be. They bear a relation to persons almost 
exactly parallel to the relation of the laws of Nature 
to material things,except that the latter constitute 
the realm of matter as it is while moral ideals are the 
laws of persons as they should and might be. But they 
are none-the-1ess constitutive of reality for their 
validity does not depend upon actual residence within 
individual human minds;they possess objectivity quite 
independent of the time-process or their acknowledgment 
by persons. Since they have reality but not existence 
in the time-process and since their validity is quite 
independent of persons,their reality and validity must 
derive from another source—namely from their status in 
ultimate reality itself.
Values,therefore,are constitutive at once of ultimate 
reality and of reality as an existing system. In fact they 
ap ear to be a point of connection between the world as we 
know it and ultimate reality. «,e are further encouraged to 
seek in values a principle of interpretation for the 
relation between the two—the key to the Absolute which is 
our goal.
Of the possible alternatives to Theism as an inter­ 
pretation of realityfNaturalism may be sumnarily dismissed 
since it allows no real status for values which twlth us, 
are fundamental data for interpretation. Two other alter­ 
natives remain—Pluralism and Monism* Neither is acceptable*
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Pluralisnitrecognising the reality of finite selves only, 
cannot account for either the order of Nature or the 
order of values, since neither can possibly be regarded 
as due to the activity of finite spiritual units* Hven 
more impotent is it to explain what we have come to regard 
as the crucial metaphysical problem—the relation of the 
two orders to one another* Monism fails because it cannot 
recognize the reality of human freedom nd purpose in the 
cosmos,and consequently the genuine reality of the moral 
order* For freedom and purpose are indispensable features 
of a moral universe. We turn to the consideration of the 
adequacy of theism*
The three traditional theistic proofs—the Cosmolo- 
gical f the Ontologlcal and the Teleological Arguments— 
are no longer persuasive, both for the reasons urged by 
Hume and Kant and on even more compelling evidence of 
inadequacy* Critical examination suggests that all three
may best be viewed as variations of the Cosmological
16 
Argument —arguments to an adequate cause of the world*
But their view of the world is not sufficiently inclusive; 
they neglect the central importance of values* AS a con­ 
sequence their arguments and the resulting conceptions of 
God are alike inadequate. Moreover.a disproportionate 
emphasis upon Nature (in the Cosmological and Teleologioal 
Arguments at least) estops them from giving any satisfac- 
tory explanation of the facts of dysteleology,disease and 
suffering. Finally all are infected with a hedonistic
16. In contrast to Kant fwho reduced all three to variations 
of the Ontological Argument.
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point of view. i3ut one thing is certain—our world
cannot possibly be interpreted as a process whose 
purpose is the gift of pleasure or the distribution 
of even-measured rewards for merit.
We are forced to consider the validity of a thelsM 
based upon a reformulation of the Moral Argument •
Kant*s statement had the merit that it Insisted 
on the recognition of a realm of ends as well as the flbalm 
of Nature in any adequate metaphysical view* 1ts great 
weakness was that it set these two orders over against each 
other as two closed and self-sustained systems* God was 
requiredfTo^sOToehowJ bring them together* A more valid 
restatement will start from the recognition that they are 
not two disparate orders but are intimately interrelated, 
Indeed different aspects of a single reality* (The genuine 
objectivity of the moral order is assumed to have been 
established by the preceding argument.) The key to the 
meaning of the whole will be sought in the inner logic of 
the moral order* It will be urged that the world can best 
be regarded as a medium for the realization of goodness 
by finite selves* On this view the ethical neutrality 
and apparent injustice of Nature can be justified since
"an imperfect world is necessary for the growth and train-
17 
ing of moral beings."
"Are wo justified in saying that the imperfect and puzzling world that surrounds us is an unfit 
medium for the moral life—if by the moral life we 
mean the triumph of the spirit—or that it makes 
impossible the adoption of an ethical point of view 
in interpreting reality?" 18
17* Moral Values.p*345. 
18. Op.cit. 9 p«346*
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In this form,the moral argument beoomes the cope- 
stone of a more comprehensive Cosmologioal ArgumenW-an 
argument to an adequate cause or ground of the whole of 
reality as for as we can apprehend it. The regularity etc. 
of the Order of wature leads to the conception of God as 
the Great Lawgiver; the discovery of abstract principles 
behind and beneath the cosmic order suggests the enlarge* 
ment of our thought of God by the conception of God as the 
God of Truth; and the objectivity and eternal validity of 
the Realm of Values completes the conception of God as one 
whose nature is goodness* The world as a whole is regarded 
as animated by a universal conscious purpose—the produc­ 
tion and training of finite selves who may freely realise 
goodness. And the freedom of finite selves to serve or to 
thwart this purpose will be asserted; to be sure,not un­ 
qualified freedom,but freedom of self-determination linited 
only by the conditions of their physical existence and by 
the character of their own past.
To recapitulate,it is clear that in such a theism 
certain corollaries are implied:*
1. Nature is the medium for the production and perfection 
of finite minds.
2. Human beings possess real though limited freedom.
3. The communication of genuine freedom to finite selves 
must be regarded as genuine self-limitation by God.
4. Divine self-limitation may not preclude complete 
divine foreknowledge.
5; It is the moral order in which the divine nature and 
purpose are expressed.
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6. Svil,the final perplexity for ail forms of theism, 
while not fully accounted for, is seen to be inevitable; 
in a world where finite selves may choose or reject
the good. *t is a "temporary failure in the realiza-
19 
tion of the divine purpose. 11
n It is not contended that the view solves 
all questions or that it does not raise problems 
of its own. The solutions it gives are for the 
most part General; they offer a principle of ex­ 
planation rather than an explanation of each event 
in detail. If particulars can be explained by it, 
it is mostly by the help of the religious conscious* 
ness which claims a more Intimate apprehension of 
Sod than morality can offer." 20
Phe Positive Finally,what is the idea of God which emerges from
Conception of God. such 3 s^udy?
First with regard to the traditional divine attri­ 
butes:— It is appropriate to say that God is infinite,if 
by that we mean that there is nothing else of the same 
nature by which he is limited,or to put the same point a 
trifle differently that he is not limited by anything 
other than his own nature. Self-limitation we have found 
to be most certainly true of God; indeed to deny to him the 
possibility of assuming self-limitation would really be 
equivalent to restricting the power of the infinite and 
thereby to render God finite. By the same token we may 
say that God is omnipresent in the sense that there is no 
part of space beyond his power; and everlasting because 
that power is conceived as continuing through all time. 
And we may call him omnipotent if we bear in mind our 
previous reservation--the limitation upon omnipotence
19.0p.cit.,p.466.
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implied in the creation of free finite beings* With 
regard to the absoluteness of God 9 the problem is not 
so simple. "Absolute" in its literal meaning involves 
the absence of relations* But our conception of God 
includes the thought of relations with finite selves 
who possess a measure of independence of the divine 
will* However thin independence is a limited <md given 
one. Therefore we may affirm that God is absolute in 
the sense that thero is nothing outside of him inde­ 
pendent of his nature or will.
But to pass on to a more positive conception of 
God: ••This must be reached through an interpretation of 
reality as *e know it. And we have already determined that 
the more significant aspects of the divine nature are to 
be discovered through the conception of value* We shall 
think of him as perfect.i.e. as one in rtiom there is to 
be found value or worth in its fulness. And f if it be charged 
that so to conceive God is anthropomorphism.it may be replie^ 
that it is legitimate,indeed inevitable anthropomorphism* 
Illegitimate anthropomorphism starts with certain human 
qualities and then argues that the B; me qualities must be 
found in the Godhead only in infinite degree; it makes God 
in the image of nan. But our procedure has been to discover 
certain qualities as necessarily implied in the ground of 
the world-order as we know it §and therefore necessarily 
present in the nature of God, It is anthropomorphic only 
in that it draws on the experiences of human life -ind the 
concepts of human thought; as such it is legitimate*
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Wisdom may be predicated of God since all knowledge must 
be his, though imuediately and intuitively and without the 
tedious and faltering labour by whioh human minds arrive 
at truth* And most surely God is ^ove, though again with 
some rood if i oat ion of the meaning of the term as we famil­ 
iarly employ it in reference to human character, "The
love of God is a will to the good of men which has as its
20 
end the communion of man with God."
But our final thought of "Od must be in terms of 
the embodiment which that love has in the actual world* 
process,in terms of divine purpose* And that purpose has 
in view both the perfecting of individual human personali­ 
ties as they too ma Ice the supreme values their concern 
and their delight; and the gradual realisation within the 
time-process of a perfect Realm of Values 9a Kingdom of God, 
as human spirits take the divim purpose as their own and 
become fellow-creators wltla him . But such cooperation by 
man with God is always wholly voluntary;it is best con­ 
ceived as the hum?m response to One who stands at the door
21 
of human life and knocks. The final emphasis falls upon
the necessity for human enlistment in the divine purposes.
w The spirit of God is conceived as working in 
and through the spirit of man,but in such a way as not 
to destroy human freedom....Love works through freedom. 
Compulsion or threats interfere with freedom;but in 
love spirit appeals to spirit in virtue of their fun­ 
damental affinity. The soul may be immersed in routine 
without thinking of the deeper things of life,or it 
may assert its lower interests and remain deaf to the 
call of God. But that call is to its essential nature 
and spiritual destiny;and,if the call is answered,the 
soul finds its freedom in fulfilling the divine 
purpose," 22
aO*0$*cit.,491. 22.Moral Values. p. 495. 
Sl.Cp.Pringle Pattison.Idea of G
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IV.
The Argument It is difficult to bring serious criticism against 
Criticised* a position with which one finds one's mind in such essential
agreement* In concluding our comment on Kant we suggested
four questions by which any subsequent statement of the
23 
moral argument might be confronted. Our criticism of Sorley
may well more forward by examining his success in meeting 
these four difficulties.
a. Objectivity It is hardly an, overstatement that the validity of 
of Moral Values. Sorley' s whole position rests on the objective character
of moral values; and the great burden of his early dis­ 
cussion is to establish that objectivity beyond any possible 
question. We have already outlined the three arguments ad­ 
vanced in support of this central, contention. They are re* 
produced though in /slightly modli'ied form in Professor 
Sorley 1 s later that s tic apologetic , and may be quoted from 
that in abbreviated statements*'
1. "Value is objective because it is a characteris­ 
tic which belongs to the personal life •....Persons 
must be regarded! as belon/jiBG to the objective order , 
the order of reality- and l}hey are the bearers of 
value t for Values are to a certain extent manifested in 
tfteir lives ad characters." 24
2. "Life is a process of striving after values 
which are not yet attained .which in their perfection 
may never be attained— may even be unattainable— in 
the conditions of personal life so far as wo are ac­ 
quainted w^th theni in experience. It is easy to see 
that the actual^beauty and goodness and truth which 
experience revqals are objective; but what of the 
Ideals which claim the allegiance of persons without 
being manifested by ttyem f which in actual life remain
23. See above, p. 7^ / 24. "talue and Reality", p. 254.
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a 'not yet* and may be a 'never quite'? How and 
in what sense crin we assert objectivity of them?
"This question can be answered best by com* 
paring ideals of value with the conceptions which 
are reached by science and are spoken of as 'laws of 
nature'...•..The objectivity claimed by moral laws 
and by ideals of value generally is similar. Its 
reference is not to the feelings or desires of the 
person who may formulate these laws or Ideals. Nor, 
on the other hand,is that validity dependent on the 
extent to which they are realized in actual life... 
.•At the s me time,while the moral law and the law 
of nature aro both objective,their relation to actual 
events is not the same. The law of nature describes 
actual events; unless it did so with a high degree 
of accuracy it would not be accepted as valid. But 
the noral law does not profess to describe actual 
conduct;its relation to it is not descriptive but 
imperative... .The imperative of duty is an imperative 
because what ought to be is not always actual. But 
the validity of ethical principles, like all validity, 
is a validity for reality.....
"Natural law and ethical principles are equally 
objective,but they differ in the objective orders to 
which they apply and in their modes of ap lication.. 
...Values apply to personal life,and their validity 
consists not in describing how persons comport thesj- 
selves,but in expressing an Ideal which they should 
realize. w 25
3. "Values are objective in the sense of belonging 
to—being a factor in or aspect of— the system of 
reality which it is the aim of philosophy to under­ 
stand. 'They belong to the sum total of reality as 
an existing system'." 26
One explanatory comment should be added. The second 
proposition above turns on the author's distinction between 
'existence' and 'reality* ; a r. ther detailed analysis and 
definition of the two terms is appended to the relevant 
section of ^oral Values and the Idea of God.Suffice it to 
say that in his usage "reality is nearly equivalent to 
existence,but with two differences.....first,it marks its
object off from the imaginary......second,reality and real




factors in the oonditions and behayior of existing things 
to which we do not assign existence by themselves, although 
without them the things would not be what they are*" The 
author cites as illustration 'grayitationv v and the mathe*
matical and logical relations which are constitutive of thi
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nature of the universe. The difference between such laws
of nature and the laws of value is in their reference to 
the actual existing order,end this difference has been 
pointed out above*
It is not our purpose to submit the argument to 
criticism in unessential detail,but to consider its 
essential validity* For example question might be raised 
whether he has advanced three or really two considerations 
in its support ,whether the third proposition adds anything 
to the first and second* If values by virtue of their 
residence in persons and influence upon persons share the 
status of persons in the order of reality,and moral lawa 
derive their validity not from their realization in the 
order of existence but from their status in ultimate 
ronlity, it would seem obvious that "they are objective in 
the sense of belonging to—being a factor in or aspect of*- 
the system of reality which it is the aim of philosophy to 
understand* The third proposition is then implied in the 
predecessors and becomes superfluous* The fact that the 
author's putting of the three arguments is not exactly 
paralleled in the corresponding section of the larger work 
and that he seems to waver from three to two would suggest 
27*:vloral Value s*pp*206~»215*
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some uncertainty on his own part about the classification* 
But that is a very small point*
The first section of the proof is clearly the most 
convincing. To employ Sorley's own illustration,when I say 
"the sky is blue" and "the sky is beautiful".! regard my­ 
self as making two assertions of fact. Both pertain to an 
objective existent,indeed different features of the sane 
existent* In either case I may be mistaken* In the one case 
it would be my sense of colour which would be defective;in 
the other case.my capacity for appreciating beauty* But the 
sky either J& or J& not blue;it either is. or Is not beauti­ 
ful* ?/e agree,"the goodness of the good man is as objective
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as the man himself," It would seem that no theory other
than a rather crude form of ^aturalism would be able to 
deny the genuine objectivity of values, their states witMn 
existent reality.In that sense.
The case for the objectivity of the Moral Order— 
the system of ideal and as yet unrealised values—is not 
so clear* T^ere can be no doubt that an analysis of the 
moral Judgment reveals its implicit if not explicit appeal 
to such an ultimate and ideal order* But its presence in 
human thought does not ptfPve its status in reality; for 
Professor Sorley does not propose to include within his
rubric of 'reality* ideas which are merely « imaginary* ,
29 however great their actual influence upon human action*
It is not quite clear how the reality of the ideal order
of values is established beyond ideas in human imagination* 
2eT*Value and Heality" f p*255. 89^orai Values.p.212*
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That there should be such an order ,we grant; but IB 
there? It would seem that the proof of the objectivity 
of the moral order is a corollary fron the validity of 
the larger a»taphysioal position for which Professor 
Sorley is arguing* Until that has been established*the 
reality of the moral order remains a postulate,though a 
postulate for the truth of which there is no little 
important evidence*
In our Judgment the argument for the objectivity 
of values could have been strengthened at one point, It 
suffers from what we shall repeatedly urge is the most 
serious single weakness in Professor Sorley9 s position 
(as we have already urged it against Kant)—his exolu* 
sive attention to moral values. An advance to the idea of 
God from a philosophy of values as a whole has two advan* 
tages. In the first place it strengthens the case for their 
objectivity. It is true that moral values pertain largely 
not to the actual order of events as it is,but rather as 
it should be. Their reality is not descriptive,but impera­ 
tive. They represent a claim upon the future. But surely 
the same is not true of values of truth. If there is a 
system of truth parallel to the order of morality, it 
pertains in large measure to the world as it actually is; 
at least clear evidence of the reality of such a system 
is discoverable in the order of our world. (Here, too,may 
be an important and fruitful point of contact between the 
scientific order and the order of morality.) Even with 
regard to values of beauty,they seem to represent leas a
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claim upon the future,"an existential possibility rather 
than reality"*than moral value*. The fact that moral values 
more than any other type of value pertain to persons and 
oan win existence within the time-process only through the 
instrumentality of persons is a point of strength for 
Professor Sorley's case in another connection,but a source 
of weakness here* It renders their objectivity more diffi­ 
cult to vindicate* It is true that the ideal order of the 
values of beauty will not be fully realized in our world 
without human cooperation* But beauty is present in the 
world as an existent;and without dependence upon us.lian 
may be necessary for its appreciation,he is not necessary 
for its creation* AM it is at least possible that an 
argument for a system of beauty-values could be built up 
from the facts of natural beauty only; and so the objec­ 
tivity of that system vindicated,
Secondly, the more obvious objectivity of the orders 
of truth and beauty gives to their values a kind of im­ 
perative claim upon human recognition as well as human 
service that moral values do not possess* A violation of 
the system of truth (as found, for instance, in a law of 
H*turej may brine nore immediate and drastic punishment 
than a violation of one of the higher laws of morality, 
(It is this fact,of course, which gives moral laws their 
claim to supremacy in the hierarchy of values—their non- 
compulsory character,their dependence upon voluntary 
allegiance.) For this reason the reality and objectivity 
of the order of truth is nore unmistakeable . Values of
118,
beauty stand to some degree in the same case. But of this 
we shall have more to s y in the sequel.
b.The Realm of " Real ity, be sides the realm of existing things and 
Values and the their orderly relations,includes something more—the realm 
Realm of Nature* of values.....For convenience we may speak of the order
which science dlscorers in the existing world as the causal 
order;and in the system of values*. we may restrict ourselves 
to the moral order* A theory of reality must recognize both 
the causal order and the moral order.and try to reach some 
idea which will combine and harmonize them***.*
"These orders differ entirely in their laws;exper­ 
ience does not show any harmony between them,and yet they 
do not simply belong to different worlds,for they meet in 
the experience of conscious minds who acknowledge the equal
validity of both. A philosophy should be able to exhibit
30 
them as complementary aspects of a single reality."
This may be given as a fair summary of Sorley's 
position on the relation of values to the realm of Nature 
whi h is the object of scientific inquiry* "Two disparate 
orders";no harmony between the two ordersjtheir meeting 
point within the mind of man. Janerally speaking.the authors
attitude toward science is perhaps a trifle suspicious and
31 even derogatory; Joan Inge's cal? to task at this point is
32 
not without some justification. Professor Sorley had made
his principal criticism of Kant that the latter had regarded
the realm of Mature and the nor 1 realm as two disparate
and independent systems .and had required the postulate of
SO.^Value and Reality",pp.258.260*
31. See.espeo*.Moral Values-pp.llO2 166;222;241;etc*
32* HaTiew in Mind01919,pp.234ff.
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53 
God as "the Great Reconciler" to "weld them together,"
It might perhaps not unfairly be urged that Professor 
Sorley himself is guilty of almost the same unfortunate 
bifurcation of reality. He employe the same terms in 
description of his theory as in criticism of Kant f s— 
"disparate orders", "lio harmony between them". Their 
meeting ground is in the mind of nan as well as in the 
fact of God; but the critical discussion of this portion 
of Kant*s argument might be directed with the alteration 
of hardly a syllable against the author's own treatment 
of the relation between the two orders* Here we confront 
an instance of what we hare described as one of the most
unhappy features of the Kantian heritage—the dichotomy
34 
between Nature nnd values*
We would suggest that this difficulty mi£ht hare 
been overpassed and the true relation of facts and values 
more adequately set forth by two modlfications in the 
argument (modifications which involve no change in its 
fundamental positions,indeed ^ilch are thoroughly harmon­ 
ious with the argument as it now stands)—by a more com* 
prehensive treatment of the nature of value ,and by a closer 
attention to the evidences of purpose and meaning within 
the order of Nature,
l.Sorley seems to hold that the sole meeting*point 
of the two orders is in human consciousness, and that the
meaning of their relationship must be discovered solely
35 through an interpretation of 01811*8 moral experience. But
Moral Value8,DP*554. 5SS. 35,"Value and Reality? p.248ff, 
Above,p. 66.
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surely there are at least two other points at whioh 
values oontaot with the order of Mature—in the sys­ 
tematic structure of the Universe itself,and in the 
faots of natural beauty* If the scientific study of the 
data of Nature reveals an rt order* of relations and 
principles whioh has reality Independently of specific 
existents and yet without which ''existing things would 
not be what they are" t then this * order" is an element 
within the system of truth-values. Indeed it comes to be 
valued in ; nd for itself; he nee the significance of "pure 
scientific research" as the dispassionate quest for truthy 
It precisely meets Sorley's criterion of genuine truth*
value; "it is knowledge of truth, or truth as known,that
35 
has value." Again t natural beauty is a fact of the o: d»r
of Mature,not merely a fact of value within the mind of the 
beholder. By the author's own argument,the beauty of the 
sky is as truly objective a feature of the sky as the 
tolueness of the sky. It pertains to the natural order of 
which science seeks to render an account. And if it is not 
as easy to discover scientifically the principles of beauty 
as the principles of color or of structure,the task should 
not be surrendered because of its difficulty. We should 
retain,at least as a postulate,the possibility of discover­ 
ing a systematic order of principles of beauty which might 
stand "on all fours" so to speak with the recognized system* 
of scientific principles—as doocriptive of the order of 
Nature as it is,not merely of the hunon order as it should
be.
55.Moral Yalues.p.51.
2. But the relation of "facts" and "values" is nost 
truly viewed,and the dichotomy of Nature and values most 
adequately reconciled through study of the levels of 
reality.by the developiuent of what is often referred to 
as a "doctrine of levels" or a theory of "emergent evolution!! 
From this view,reality as it manifests itself in the total 
world of human experience is seen not as two disparate 
and independent types but rather under the figure of a 
scale of not two but several types of reality with the 
material order or scientific generalization at one end and 
the order of pure and absolute values at the opposite end,
as marking* the limit toward which the world-process points
26 
and presses* v Values are seen to appear or "emerge"
d 
within the wo reprocess as increasingly vital factors in
its upward advance from lower to higher levels; they ar*» 
organic to the order of Nature since they appear in f and 
are indispensable Influences upon the progress of,the
total world-process which has as its foundation-level,so
37 
to speak,the system of Nature as science knows It*
At a number of points,Professor Sorley seems to
hover on the ed t:-e of considering if not accepting $nis , 
point of view j 8O muon 8O thftt ,.i£, ^^ be conslderadfl
think,as in no sense incongruous with his oim position* 
For example,in the briefer statement he says:-
"The causal order and the moral order do not 
exhaust the complex system of conceptions required 
for the explanation of experience..*,They have been 
selected in order to bring out a certain opposition 
which is not lessened by pointing to intermediate or
Cp*Sorley's characterization of values as "the limit 
toward which the nature of persons points & presses." 
Moral Yaluea^iuasft. 37. See. be low. T>, r ~~
mediatizing conceptions* •••" 38 
But it is our conviction that such necessary intermediate
and mediatizing conceptions do cast important light on the 
relation of the two aete of conceptions which seam to stand 
in such sharp and unrelated antithesis to each othor* la 
any event it is obvious that an account of reality without 
regard to these intermediate and mediatizing conceptions 
is an a 00 traction, perhaps a dangerous abstraction*
Again, in discussing the fact of purpose, Professor 
Sorley stresses the inadequacy of median ism to account for 
the appearance of new and unpredictable types of exis tents t 
and outlines the theory of emergent evolution as he traces
the advancing levels of ex is tents from inorganic matter
39 
through life to mind* The argument aims to disprove
ism and demonstrate the reality of purpose. The foundation 
is clearly laid for a philosophy of values in terms of 
emergence, but the analysis is not carried forward from the 
level of mind to the next higher level of spirit or values; 
and the fuller philosophical implications of the data are 
not drawn*
Once more f toward thn close of the development of the 
idea of Gafl* there occur the so interesting sentences:-
" Within reulity as a whole a distinction may be 
drawn between higher and lower, more or less complete 
or perfect, manifestations of ree-lity. The distinction 
is expressed in the old concept of the scale of being; 
at present it is more familiar to ue as the distinction
38. "Value and Reality", p«3b9. 
39* I ^ral Valu es . pp * 405—408 .
cee also rrofessor oorley's exceedingly interesting 
oontributipn to a diecma ion of "Purpose and Mechanism", Proceed in^spf the Aristotelian Society. 1911-12.
pp.216ff.
5. Moral and 
>ther Values.
between degrees of reality • If w« attempt to draw 
out a soale or degrees of this kind, the moral order 
or moral law may be placed at the Huxomlt,and a direct 
inference may be made to (rod as th* conscious ground 
of thia inoral order* The argument in this form is 
well known; but I have not relied upon it,chiefly for 
one reason in particular. If the moral order by itself 
is made to involve the id en of uod,then this idea is 
apt to hav* for its content simply the moral order ... 
••My argument accordingly had a wider rr.nge. It was 
founded not on the nioril order by itself but on its 
relation to the order of existing things. Since 
existence and value belou, t;o the some universe they 
must have the same ultimate ground." 40
But we would hold that c. proper interpretation of the scale 
of being or the degrees of reality would reveal an idea of
God based not on "the moral order by itself", but on "the
order '5T?
relation of the moral order toYexisting things." Indeed, we 
would surest that Professor Sorlay does not adequately 
set forth the relation of the moral order to the order of 
existing things* It is true that existence and value must 
have the same ultimate ground since they belong to the 
same universe ;but their relation within that universe may 
be shown to be far more intimate and less antipodal than 
this treatment of the degrees of reality would indicate.
«'e shall try to outline such an alternative interpretation
41 
in our concluding
Perhaps enough has been said of Sorley's treatment 
of values other than moral. While consideration is almost 
entirely restricted to values or the latter type, it is 
repeatedly held that the nain line s cf tiia argument would 
apply with equal validity to a philosophy of value in
general* « Other vaSnss thai? tfte etliieal have drbpped out
ikloral Value s«p.479. Up. also, the description of his own 
position as an "extension of the cosin&logical argument" f 
p. 348. (See above, p. 108. )
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of sight in the course of the argument* Yet the general 
view which has teen reached might bo extended so as to 
cover them also. .Vherever there is intrinsic worth in the 
wo.rld f there alsD,as \vall as in moral 3oodness t we may see a 
manifestation of the divine* God must therefore be con­ 
ceived as the final homs of values, the oupreme .Yorth—
as possessing the fulness of knowledge and beauty and
42 
goodness and whatever else is of value for its own sake."
Moral values are selected for exclusive study 
because they are held to be the supreme type of value; their 
supremacy at the apex of the hierarchy of values is by 
virtue of their greater universality and catholicity than 
values of beauty or truth.
"Morality is of such great importance among the 
values be cause ,as I have put it, it is not envious <;:: 
exclusive* It does not, like the other values t depend 
upon certain special circumstances or some special 
endowment of intellect or skill* It can be exhibited 
in any circumstances whatever," 43
is the same for all,. ..except this t tha»t'g 
before it cen be attained,it may require a concentra­ 
tion of nind and a culture of the intellect which are 
possible only to those who have not only a fit endowment 
of mental faculty but also some amount of freedom 
from the ordinary cares of life and leisure to devote 
themselves to intellectual pursuits....,
"Much the same may be paid of the aesthetic 
values. It is true that in itself betiuty is as little 
envious as any good.... By t it In rarer than we could 
wish,uncl to enjoy it the intervention of material 
instruments is often necessary. Many of the beauties 
of nature. most of the beauties of art.,.. are thus t like 
the intellectual values, limited by external conditions 
which the social order he.s not bsen able to put within 
the power of all but reserves for those who are favoured 
by economic circumstances.
"Moral values are not limited in this way..... 
fVhatcvcr the circumstances there is always a ri^jht to 
be done, a morel value to be realized..... Riches and
moral Values, p. 467, 43.0p.cit.,p.5QG*
povertythealth and sickness,power and subjection are 
merely different conditions in which goodness can be 
cultivated and moral Talues brought into existence. 
The universality of the raoral value vindicates its 
rank as the most catholic among the varieties of 
value." 44
luce as a loyal Platonist has held this portion of 
Professor Sorleyf s argument up for special scorn,instancing 
Socrates and Spinoza,Bohme end Burns ,\iordsworth and Charlotte
Bronte from a long catalogue of those who,in poverty of
45 
circumstance,have sought truth and served beauty. And not
a few modern psychologists would contend that the realization 
of values in character was as houvily dependent upon favorable 
native equipment as outstanding intellectual achievement or 
noteworthy artistic production. To be sure Sorley seems here 
td be speaking of the appreciation rather than the creation 
of non-moral values,but i)ean inge's criticism has tru^h in 
it. It is probably true that a case may be made for the 
supreme rank of mor^l values booause of their greater de­ 
pendence upon human cooperation for their realization as
46 well t»s because of their greater catholicity ; but it is
a rank of primus inter pa res.
It must not be thought that Professor Sorley is blind 
to the importance of beauty and truth and their right to 
stand almost if not quite on a level *ith values of morality. 
This equality or near-equality is frequently asserted and a 
number of passages in which the relation and interdependence 
of the various values are developed merit quotation.
"Every kind of value is or n*y be related to 
and conduct....All values—the intellectual
44V Op.cit.,p«48—40. 46.See.abQYa t p.lOQ:3o below,p.13: 45. In a roview of ttoral Values and tno Idea, of ^od,in 
Mind. 1919. p.2
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and tha aesthetic, among the rest — have also a share 
in moral va.U*e t because taoy heighten personal worth 
and are | to some extent at Isast, within the reach of 
personal endeavour. The scholar's life and the life 
of th« artist are examples of the moral life Just as 
ranch as the lives of the philanthropist or of the 
ordinary >jood citizen,"
way is not from the categorical imperative 
alone, jj'rom nature and art and knowledge men have 
risen to the contemplation of God and found in him the 
key to the problems of life." 48
"A full view of th* worth of life must take all 
values into account, not u^ercly those which,from their 
specific reference to character and volition, are 
called moral value s..*«.
"The independence of the different values, more- 
overt is only partial, end it is not entirely onesided. 
*«e have seen how, in certain conditions, morality falls 
back upon tha other velues,and t kes then as its 
ideals, so that the good will finds a tisf action in 
their pursuit and attainment... .The pursuit of truth 
and of beauty ere themselves modes of moral activity....
"Human nature is so inporfeotly unified that 
a man raay show hich devotion to one region of values 
ancl trer t all the others with neglect or contempt. 
But he does so at his peril.. ..Uorality cannot be 
isolated from any port of life. The ideas of o'ood 
and evil which direct the lives of men are also for- 
mativa influences upon their rirtlstic production in 
picture or poem or building, ^or can knowledge claim 
to be completely independent of character. Character 
determines interest,ano interest selects its objects 
and its method. It FPP not mere fancy that led the 
tiheosophist and alchemist to hold that the mind that 
would find out the hidden things of the world FAist be 
purged fron bodily and selfish desire, and that the 
philosopher 1 ? stone can be touched by none but clean 
hands. Only the pure in heart can see God." 49
".Vherever there is intrinsic worth in the world, 
there also, as well as in moral 3°°dness,we nay see 
a manifestation of the divine. Cod nust therefore be 
conceived as the final hone of values, the Supreme 
Worth — as possessing the fulness of knowledge and 
beauty and goodness e,nd *hitever else is of value for 
its own sake.'* 50
Professor Sorley is to lie criticised therefore not because 





truth and is unwillin^; to nuke place for them in the 
category of ultimate and absolute values. Rather the 
defect is in hia chosen method. TJy concentrating atten- 
tlon two narrowly upon problems of nor- lity,the companion 
values fall to make their just and needed contribution 
to the total argument 5 the perspective Is slightly falsi­ 
fied and the conclusions robbed of their full rMige and 
power. It is further support for the conclusion which our 
examination of Kant forced upon us—any adequate approach 
to the idea of God through values raast rise from a philo- 
eophy of values as a whol«^^li0 experiences of be auty and 
of character and of truth &M of religion each making its 
Sift of insight to the final picture. Because of its failure 
to do BO,Professor Sorley's caso with ell of its power and 
appeal Is somewhat impoverished at ths familiar two points 
where a wider purview might have brought it added stretsthi- 
in the vindication of the objectivity of the realm of 
values; and in the Inpresslon of the imperative claim of 
that objective order upon human recognition and human 
allegiance.
Lastly,what of Professor Sorley's success in recon­ 
ciling his theistio belief with the troublesome realities 
of disease, suffer ing and evil in human experlenco? There 
is no point of the discussion where the writer's complete 
candour is more refreshing and reassuring. He claims no 
complete or final light on the problem of evil. Such ex­ 
planation as can be offered pertains primarily to the 
facts of evil in general;for the most part it brings no
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release for the perplexity of the individual. And it is 
in individual experience that we actually confront the 
bafflement of evil;it is here that its burden is most 
intolerable* But for the individual the final recourse is 
to light cast from a source beyond the purview of this 
study, from distinctively religious experience.
Professor Sorley's attitude toward evil embraces 
the following seven points: —
1.The purpose of the world is not to be found in the 
gift of happiness or pleasure to finite splrits.lt 
cannot be interpreted from hedonistic premisses. 51
2.Nor can the world be interpreted as a system in which 
happiness is distributed in exact ratio to merit .This 
is clearly not the actual character of our world. 52
3.The starting-point for an understanding of evil must 
be found in the recognition that the purpose of life 
is the achievement of character by free finite selves. In that view/'the world will be contemplated as pro­ 
viding a medium for the realisation of goodness". 53
4.For such a pur pose, an imperfect world is absolutely 
necessary if the higher values of life are to be sought 
for their own sake,and realised by free and voluntary 
effort with no assurance of reward beyond the doing of 
one's best. Here may be discovered some light on what we term "natural evil". 54
5.Further f the possibility of evil is implicit in a world 
where finite spirits may freely choose or reject the best. Actually,where the lower values lure free and 
fallible men,the doing of evil becomes Inevitable. 
(There is involved the voluntary self-limitation of the 
divine activity.) Here is to be found the source of most of what we call "human evil". 55
6.Suffering as such is not necessarily an evil from which 
no good may be won. The greatest spirits have not found it so. Indeed it is most often the spectator rather than the participant who most rebels against the injus­ 
tice of unmerited pain. 'That which we suffer ourselves 
has no longer the same air of monstrous injustice and 
wanton cruelty that suffering wears when we see it in the case of others. 9 (56) 57
51. Moral Values,pp.527t341- 52.0p.cit. f p.341, 
53.0p.clt. t pp.342;446;466. 54.0p.cit. t 343;421.
55. Op.cit. f pp.461;466. 57.0p.cit.,345.
56. R.L.Stevenson,Letters.Vol.I t p.370(quoted by
7.The foregoing considerations cast not a little impor­ 
tant light on the inevitability of suffering in a 
world with the purpose which our world seems to reveal. 
In some measure at least they 'solve the problem for 
the Universe 9 * But they do not solve the individual's 
problem as he confronts this and that instance of un­ 
merited evil in personal experience* So far as his 
perplexities win solution it is usually not by philo­ 
sophical reflection or a truer reading of the moral 
order, but through that unique power for the practical 
transcendence of evil which is the unique gift of the 
experience of religion at its highest* 58
The author's final conclusions in the matter may be given 
in his own words:-
" Are we justified in saying that the imperfect 
and puzzling world that surrounds us is an unfit 
medium for the moral life— if by the mor; 1 life we 
mean the triumph of spirit— or that it makes impossible 
the adoption of an ethical point of view in interpre­ 
ting reality? I do not say that experience of the 
relation of natural forces to moral ideas and moral 
volitions Justifies of itself the inference to divine 
goodness at the heart of all things. The mere frag­ 
ment of life with which we arc acquainted is too scanty 
to bear so weighty a superstructure. All I have argued 
is that our experience is not inconsistent with such 
a conclusion* And* if there are other reasons for say­ 
ing that goodness belongs to the ground of reality, 
and that the realization of goodness is the purpose 
and explanation of finite minds, then the structure of 
the world as we know it is not such as to make us 
relinquish this view; on the contrary a view of the 
kind is supported by the general lines of what we 
know about the world and its history*" 59.
is not contended that the view solves all 
questions or that it does not raise problems of its 
own. The solutions it gives are for the most part 
general; they offer a principle of explanation rather 
than an explanation of each event in detail* If parti­ 
culars con be explained by it.it is mostly by the 
help of the religious consciousness which claims a 
more intimate apprehension of God than morality can 
offer*" 60
" The conclusion of the central argument of 
this book gives a point of view from which reality 
may be interpreted without the incongruities into 
which other theories fall; and it succeeds in making 
intelligible just those features of experience which 
it is most difficult to combine into a harmonious
58.0p. f cit.,pp.468;506. "Value and Reality" t p. 266. 
59*Moral Values. p.346- 60.0p.oit. ,p.468.
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view of the whole. At tho sazoe bim3,ao I have 
repeatedly admitted,it does not solve all problems 
or remove all difficulties. It does not explain 
each particular situation,or the unique character 
of any particular person. Our knowledge of the 
details and of the Issues of life is far too meagre 
to adnit of our having more than a general principle 
of explanation. So far as the individual problem 
gets a solution at all,in is usually through the 
religious faith of the individual person; and there 
are few things more venturesome,or more offensive, 
than the attempt of any one else to interpret for 
him 'the ways of providence*•" 61
These somewhat long quotations have been given 
because they lead us to a final and perhaps the most 
important comment upon the theism of Professor S or ley. 
It will be seen that,in th« writer's own vlewt the philo­ 
sophy of moral values is not complete in itself. In its 
every statement it points beyond itself—to religious
experience and the need for a philosophy of that exper-
62 
ience. And not alone for light on this final stumbling*
block to all ethical theism—the specific incidence of evil 
upon the personal life. But also,it would seem,for that 
unity and constancy and confidence without which moral 
effort falls of its highest effectiveness and moral enthu­ 
siasm of its greatest buoyancy and kindling contagion.
"The conception of a moral order of the world, 
and of this order as rooted in the nature of God t gives 
to the moral life the unity and power of which it 
stands in need. It confirms the postulates of morality: 
the spiritual nature of God vindicates the supremacy 
of the spiritual factor in human life; the relation in 
which all men tas spiritual beings,stand to God gives 
meaning and validity to the idea of the Brotherhood of 
men.*•••In this way the religious conception of the 
world gives unity to the moral life. And it also gives 
it power. Moral enthusiasm can be fed only by the hope 
that effort is not in vainjand belief in God gives 
confidence that goodness will prevail." 63.
61.Moral ValueS.PP.
62.See,also,"Value and Reality" t p.266.
63.The floral Life and Lioral Worth,p.135.
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With all of Its clarity and cogency land in this critical
aection, criticism has perhaps somewhat overbalanced just 
appreciation) tProfessor Sorley's argument falls short of 
maximum adequacy nox merely because it neglects the evidence
of those in termed! a ice and mediatizing conceptions" which
64 
we rt^rd us of great importance ; nor because it under*
65 
value** Uue significance of truth and beauty. It fails
of maximum adequacy because, by the definition of its scope, 
there is excluded from its purview the final and climactic 
type of human experience in which all appreciation of value 
culminates and to which morality points for its completion 
and its richest meaning* Our conclusion is that the most 
complete philosophy of values must include within its view 
the experiences of religion, and find place within its final 
interpretation for religion* s vision of the meaning of the 
whole*
64* ^ee afcove t p.l21. 
65. See above, p.12 3f,
From Values to 
Reality*
NOTE TO CHAPTER FOUR 
SUMI/ARY OF THE ARGUMENT .OF 
"MORAL VALUES AT1D THE IDEA OF GOD"
Our purpose is to discover the significance 
of ethical ideas and ethical experiences for an 
adequate view of reality as a whole. We shall begin 
by a study of the experience of values; we shall 
conclude with the development of a conception of 
God* This procedure reverses the more customary 
sequence in metaphysical discussions; they usually 
propose a general metaphysical view based on cosmo- 
logical or epistemological considerations, and 
then attempt to deduce ethical principles from it* 
The latter procedure—whether Rationalistic,Idealistic 
or Naturalistic, and whether holding ethics to be 
definitely ancillary to general metaphysical prin­ 
ciples in the manner of Bescartes tor claiming to 
discover ethical norms implicit in more general con­ 
cepts as did Hegel— must fail. Ethical propositions 
under no circumstances can be derived from non-ethical 
concepts; the data of the latter is inadequate to 
the task because it omits the facts of moral experience 
However, the contrary procedure here attempted—the 
advance from a study of ethical ideas to the formula­ 
tion of an inclusive metaphysical view—is not alto­ 
gether new. It was followed by Plato in the Republic. 
and suggested by Lotze *a all his writings. The
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Justification of this method—the attempt to find 
in what pUi::ht t£ be li^ht on what .is—lies in the 
fact that morality is a vital element in all human 
experience. Indeed there is a sense in which values 
are prior to the cognition of facts in the develop- 
iseat of mind;at least the initial experience is at 
once perceptive and appreciative,only later are the 
two attitudes differentiated. 1'herefore parallel to 
the order of %ture which is systematised in scien­ 
tific knowledge is the experience of values sugges­ 
ting a c omp3.emontary system. Any adequate account 
of reality as a whole must find place for the facts 
of the moral life. (Chapters I and II)
Types of The attempt to classify values as they are net 
Values. in familiar human experience reveals a number of al­ 
ternative bases of classification. J^e well-known 
distinction botTroon intrinsio find instrumental values 
is ler>F significant th- n might be desired because so 
many things soom to possess value of both types« 
Similarly there Is no universal r.sreeinent on the 
superior importance of permanent oy,er trassient 
values. .Ore significant is the differentiation of 
values in terms of their catholicity or exclusive- 
ness. Generally speaking, values dependent upon 
material goods require monopoly for their full 
enjoyment while the values which mankind has agreed 
to rscognii'.e as the higher—beauty t truth,goodness- 
may be more universally possessed. IIoweverf of these ;
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moral values are the most catholic since neither 
special gifts nor special means are required for their 
cultivation by any man* The most usual division of 
values classifies them according to the nature of 
the objects or Ideals to which they are referred f as 
values of happiness.of beauty.of truth. of goodness* 
Hfip-^^Bo is an unsatisfactory norn of Judgment since 
it eiabraces so varied meanings;rather is it to be 
Shou.jht of as attaching to value of every kind. The 
autonomous utatus of fronifrh as an intrinsic value nay 
be established,since it is truth as such and not 
merely knowledge for its instrumental use which men 
seek, Similarly the status of teomtfry and Goodnooo as 
ultimate values can hardly be disputed,'.hough at first 
thou jht they are not readily distinguished xiom each 
other. But,they may bo differentiated either in terms 
of the attitudes they evoka (admiration for benuty 
but approval for goodness) ,or in terms of their re­ 
spective objects; G thine of beauty is valued in and 
for itself with no regard to its maker,or its purpose 
but a good act will win approval only when viewed 
"from its inner side%i.e. in terms of the intention 
of the door and as one element in a system of moral 
conduct. Again vfcon we try to distinguish values 
as ni^her ox* lower we confront the inadequacy of any 
empirical or quantitative basis of comparison and the 
nood for discovering a system to which all values may 
be related. (Chapter II)
135.
AT8 floral Values 
Objective?
The objective validity of moral Judgments is 
often denied on one of two grounds— either on the 
Ground that such judgments originate in the feeling 
of pleasure or in subjective) desire not in objective 
fact f or on the ground that such Judgments are merely 
the reflection of the social mores. Neither objection 
oan be sustained* For the moral consciousness distin- 
guialios good from bad desires and good from bad plea- 
suros;it is always directed not to the ssnsations of 
the subject but a quality in the obJect.Similarly, moral 
Judgment? appe r within socle £y but as criticisms of 
prevailing standards^elsc there would never be genuine 
moral advance* The attribution of value always? applies 
an obJeot assuiaed as actually existing, and not to
a noro relation between objects or o quality of an 
object;. (Chapter III)
Further difficulties arise in the effort to 
propose adequate criteria of T oral Volue. The fol­ 
lowing are suggested :-
a.ISvery moral Judgment claims objectivity as
independent oi" the Judging subject, and therefore as 
both uniVQroal and impersonal. 
b*;<iorul Judgments soek coherence 9 freedom from 
contradiction with one another, and therefore 
appropriateness for syster^itisation. 
c.Kvcry sound moral Judgment raust demonstrate its 
comprehensiveness by its capacity to take up 
within its e3f apparently contradictory Judgments 
and show their place within a system. (Chapter IV)
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To these threo formal criteria of moral values may 
be added the fact that they are always found in re­ 
lation to persons. This is true of all intrinsic 
values (with the ^occible exception of natural beauty), 
But regarding moral values thsre enn be no que-stion; 
"it is only to persons that the moral predicate can 
apply.' (Chapter V)
Further doubt is cast upon the claim of moral 
Judtpnunts to objectivity on the Ground of their 
relativity. This objection arises from en inadequate 
criticism of the concept! relative. * ^oral Judgments 
art not relaoive in the .: enoe of relative to the 
subject who pronounces judgment; in this regard their 
claim to objectivity is in exactly the came case as 
judgments of fcot,the knowledge of things and rela­ 
tions. 1'hey are relative to other factors in the ob­ 
jective situation,both because they are always found 
in relation to persons and ch .nee As the person in 
whori they inhere change s fand because they are always 
found in a specific, environment and change as that 
environment chanses;but neither relationship qualifies 
their essential objectivity. (Chapter VI)
The foregoing study nan revealed these charac­ 
teristics of moral values:—•
1.Value always implies a claim upon or postulate 
of existence (in contrast to certain mathematical 
judgments,for example,which have no relation to 
existence )«
1*XI7 •<-> f »
fc.Values are found only in relation to persons.
3.Value is always found in the particular, the 
concrete;but it always implies a universal,
4. The "absolute" factor in the noral life is not 
a set of specific precopts but a single principle 
of moral act ion-*"the w611 to good," This it is 
which furnishes unity in the variety of morq.1 
situations,
5.Through its claim to objectivity,the moral Judg­ 
ment also cla ins universality.
6,1 ".oral Judgments always triply a system or order of 
moral values.
7.Moral Judgments claim objectiv^ validity.
It is necessary to scrutl lise that claim more 
carefully. The objectivity of moral judgments may be 
vindicated by three lines of argument.: —
a.They claim objectivity. They do not pertain to 
feelings or attitudes of tiio subject;but assert 
something about an objeot.
b.Thcy are universal in t^t:-l) rt all who judge 
correctly must find the sarae moral value in any 
given situation", and 2}there is always tho appeal 
to a universal factor which may be vaguely identi­ 
fied as a "common spirit end purpose."
c.Mo single good can be confidently determined 
except Ttth reference to a Chief Good,an or0anic 
system of all values,a realra of ends which shall 




experiences, both the actual order and the moral 
order, in a harmonious whole* Thin is the .».bso- 
lute. (Chapteijvil)
Wo must mm tyirri to the large.1** metaphysical ques« 
tion— the status of values in reality as a 77hole,
Valuoa are related to reality at at least tno 
points:*
l.They exist in the consciousness of men end women 
and are therefore real factors in existential 
reality. in the time -process*
2 •They point to and asEiizns the reality of moral 
ideals and laws; and although these laws, unlike 
tiie la??s of science ,portain not to the actual 
wo&ld a? it is but rather as it should be, they 
are nono- the-less constitutive of reality 
because, a) they affect persons in the tine-process 
(as ia (1) ) ;and bjthey do not depend for their 
validity upon residence in individual minds but 
are v^lid irrespective of the tine-process and 
th«ir acknowledgment by persons • They bear a re­ 
lation to persons alnoct exactly parallel to that 
of the relation of the laws of Nature to material 
realityjexcept that the letter constitute material 
reality as it is while moral ideals are the laws 
of persons as they should and might be. Since theji 
have reality but not existence in the time-process 
they must belong to the system or order of the
universe, i.e. ultimate reality. 
To B' -y the some thing In a somewhat different way: —
when we affirm that moral values are grounded in the 
nature of reality, we tmpl;/ two things. Thirst, moral 
values have objectivity quite independent of tho 
persons to when they pertain. And since their reality 
is quite independent of per sons, it must derive from 
another source— namely fron their status in ultimate 
reality itself. But, second, they are not wholly dis­ 
connected fron exictonbi'.:! reality as uc know it. For 
reality i» mmifested in persons. And values are 
vi^al for persona. Indeed they characterise completed 
or perfected persons; they express "tho limit 
towards v:hich the nature of persons points, and presses 
Therefore they are constitutive not only of ultira<te 
reality but; of reality as an existing system. In fact, 
they are a t>oint of connection between the existing 
world end ultimate reality; it is possible that they 
furnish a principle of interpretation for the relation 
between the two. {Chapters VIII and IX) 
rja analysis of reality rsvoals:- 
l.":xisiwml;s; including :~ 
a. o elves | i.e. per none .
ar unities on an inferior level of the
orcanic world. 
c. Things.
2 delations, found only in rebus . 
S. Values, found always i.n pcrsonis.
Alternatives to 
a lucral Theism,
But our whole study emphasises the underlying 
connectedness of the different types of reality. 
Things are not found without illusions;nor relations 
except betwo n things* Valuer pertain only to persons; 
persons realise themselves only through values, "e are 
driven to a search for a view of the whole. For such 
an inclusive view,the scientific procedure of analysis 
plus synthesis is quite inndeauate. We must attempt 
a *T synopsis", a vision of the vvhole or insight into 
the whole more akin to the method of creative art. It 
is such a synopsis which we employ in knowledge of 
self and in sympathetic,significant understanding 
of other selves.(Chapter X) But,the ef ort after an 
interpretation of reality as a whole,of the meaning 
of the world,nust employ naterial drawn from our 
experiencejits concepts must bo taken from our exper­ 
ience of Mature,of ourselves aa persons,or of value. 
What categories are B) adequate as those of value? 
Employrnent of concepts of valu? to interpret the world 
is legitimate IF they fit the facts. ?he final test 
of this,as of any alternative interpretation,is in 
experience. (Chapter XI)
We turn to the examination of alternative inter­ 
pretations of the world.
The three traditional theistic proofs—the 
OntolC:jical,the Cosmolo;;ical and the Teleolocical 
Ar&uments«»-arfc no longer persuasive,for reasons 
advanced by Hume and Kant and on even riore compelling
evidence of inadequacy. Critical examination suggests 
that all three may best ba viewed as variations of the 
Cosmological Argument—ar;~uncn!;c to an adequate cause 
of the world* But they neglect the central importance 
of values; therefore their art*uments end the resulting 
conceptions of (>od are alike inadequate. On the other 
hand fa disproportionate emphasis upon Nature,in the 
Coemolo&icf'l and releolocical ^r&uuients t estops theia 
i'ron furnishing Rny adequate explanation of the facus 
of dysteleology t disouse and suffering. Finally,all 
wore infected with hortoniscic premisses, Jut it is 
clenr that the world cannot be interpreted as a pro­ 
cess whose purpose is ths (;if& of pleasure or the 
distribution of even-measured rowards for r^erit, 
(Chapter XII)
On the other hand tneither Pluralism, nor Monism 
is on acceptable alternative to theism, luralism 
of whatever variety fails because it cannot account 
for either the order of Nature or the order of value£ 
I-ioither* of these can possibly be regarded as due to 
the activity of finite spiritual units, ^von more 
obvious it the impotence of Pluralism to explain wha1! 
?/e hav COEIO to regard QG the crucial metaphysical 
problem—the relation of the cosmic order to the 
order of morality, (Chopter XIV) Monism fails becuu; 
it cannot recognize the genuine validity of the moral 
order, freedom for men end purpose in the cosmos are 
necessarily excluded from its thoory; but freodom an«
The Moral 
Argument.
1 1 O •~^£j «
purpose arc indispensable features of a moral 
universe. (Chapter XVrO ue nre therefore driven 
to consider the adequacy of a theism based upon a 
reformulation of ~ihe Morel argument.
Kant's statement had the norit that it insisted 
on the recognition of a realri of ends as well as the 
realTi of Mature in any adequate metaphysical view. 
Its great weakness was th; t it set these tv o orders 
over against o#e another as two closed and self- 
consistent cystems. ^od w c; required to bring them 
together. A more valid ret>U teiuenv will start from 
the recognition that they are not two disparate orders 
but intimately interrelated,indeed different aspects 
of a single reality. The key to the meaning of the
wholo i vill be sought in the inner logic of the moral 
orck;r. It will be urg^d that the world oen best be 
regarded us a medivun for tixe realization of goodness. 
And that the injustice and ethical neutrality of 
Nature ccn be justif le-3. frcrc this view since nan 
iJuporfoct world is necessary for the growth and 
training of moral beings." In this form, the Moral 
Argurcant become o part of a more comprehensive Cosmo- 
logioil \rg\unont. Then the regularity etc. of the 
order of Nature leads bo t:ie conception of God as 
tho Great Lawgiver; the discovery of abstract prin­ 
ciples behind ;ind beiieath the cosnic order suggests 
the additional conception of God as the Ood of Truth;
and the objectivity and eternal validity of the 
realm of values completes the conception of God 
as one whose nnture is 30 odnesc* (Chapter XIV) 
On this viow t thc world ac a whole will be regarded 
as animated by a universe! conscious purpose-*- the 
production of finite selves rho Eay freely realise 
Goodness .(Chapter X¥I) And the freedom of finite 
selves to serve or to thwart that purpose will bo 
as&ertedjnot t to be cure tunqualified freedom, but 
freedom United only by the conditions of their 
physical existence end by the character of their oi:n 
pfcLBb.iOiiapter ZVII) Fron such a theism certain cor* 
ollaries inevitably follow: —
1,'i'he coiiMunication of genuine freedom to finite 
selves ioufit be regarded as self-limit&tior* by
2«liature is the raediun for the production and 
perfection of Ooodness in finite i-iinds,
3 .Human beings possess real but definitely 
limited f roe a* am*
4 #Divine self -limitation may not p^-aclude complete 
divine foreknowledge,
S.Tha moral order expresses the divine nature and 
purpose.
6.SV11, while not fvlly explained f is seen to be 
inevitable in a world where finite selves ray 
choose or reject the good; it is a "temporary
failure in the realisation of the divine purpose, 
(Chapter XVIII)
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The Idea of God. Our argument has issued in the conception of a
world whose purpose is the realisation of values; and of 
the conditions and environment of life as subordinate 
to that purpose. The reality of both God and man is 
vigorously asserted. Nature is conceived as an appro­ 
priate medium for the realisation of values by free 
but finite minds. The ground of reality which is held 
to be characterised by the will to goodness as well 
as by intelligence and power is God. Dut any such 
interpretation involves certain difficulties in the 
familiar conception of God, and the traditional divine 
attributes demand reexaminatlon in the light of these 
considerations .
With regard to infinity, it is appropriate to 
call God infinite ,if by that we mean that there is 
nothing else of the same nature by which he is limited; 
or, to put the same point rather differently, that he 
is not limited by anything other than his own nature. 
Self-limitation in the existence of genuinely free 
human beings we have found most certainly true of God. 
With more confidence we may say that God is omnipresent 
in the sense that there is no part of space beyond his 
power; and everlasting because that power is conceived 
as continuing through all time. Human freedom is no 
denial of essential omnipotence, since to deny the
»
possibility of assuming self-limitation in this way 
would be to restrict the absolute power of ^od and so 
to render him finite. With regard to the absoluteness
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of God, the problem is more difficult* In its literal 
meaning, "absolute" implies the absence of relations; 
but our conception of God involves the thought of 
relations with finite selves who possess a measure of 
independence of the divine will* However this indepen­ 
dence is limited and given. Therefore we may speak of 
God as absolute. meaning thereby that there is nothing 
outside of him in the sense of independent of his 
nature or will.
But the traditional attributes give us only the 
form of the idea of God; for its positive content we 
must turn elsewhere. This must be reached through an 
interpretation of reality, as we know it. And we have 
already determined that the more significant aspects 
of the divine nature are to be discovered through the 
conception of value. Therefore we shall think of God 
as perfect, i.e. as one in whom there is to be found 
value or worth in its fulness. But here we will confront 
the allegation of anthropomorphism. The reply is that 
we are employing legitimate,indeed inevitable,anthro­ 
pomorphism. Illegitimate anthropomorphism starts with 
certain human qualities and then argues that the same 
qualities must be found in the Godhead only in infinite 
degree; it makes the Idea of God in the image of man. 
But our procedure has been to discover certain qualities 
as necessarily implied in the ground of the world-order 
as we know it,and therefore necessarily present in the 
nature of God. *t is anthropomorphic only in that it
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draws on the experiences of human life and the concepts 
of human thought for its conceptions; as such it is 
legitimate. However these terms taken over from human 
experience must be used guardedly. For example, wisdom 
may properly be predicated of God since all knowledge 
must be his, but immediately and intuitively and with­ 
out the tedious and faltering labour by which human 
minds arrive at truth. And most surely God is love. 
though again with some modification of the meaning of 
the term as we employ it with reference to human
character. "The love of God is the will to good of men
66 
which has as its end the communion of man with God.*1
But our final thought of God must be in terms of 
the embodiment which that love has in the actual world- 
process, in terms of divine pur pose. And that purpose 
has in view both the perfecting of individual human 
personalities as they too make the supreme values their 
concern and their delight; and the gradual realisation 
within the time-process of e perfect Realm of values, 
a kingdom of God,as human spirits take the divine 
purpose as their own and become fellow-creators with 
him. But such cooperation by man with God is always 
wholly voluntary; it is best conceived as the human
response to One who stands at the door of human life
67
ami knocks. The final emphasis falls upon the neces­ 
sity for human enlistment in the divine purposes. 
(Chapter XIX).
G6»gorley t^oral Values.p«491. 67.
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Two further objections to our position deserve
supplementary re joinder:-
a. It may be contended that too much stress is 
laid upon the imperfection of thw world and the facts 
of moral failure* But, an imperfect world is the only 
one appropriate for the purpose we have discerned as 
supreme—the training of character; and failure is 
an inevitable stepping-stone to moral achievement*
b.It may be held that the argument has rested too 
heavily upon morality,since morality is limited, and 
in two ways:-
1. By its dependence upon other values. This may 
be granted but the complementary truth is that they 
likewise are dependent upon morality. And it is certain
that in the theistic quest, character is indispensable;
68 
'f only the pure in heart can see God" •
2.By its dependence upon conditions of the time- 
process; it provides no conception of the perfect life 
when mortality shall have been transcended* Here,we 
can hardly dare to guess the answer; we cannot fully 
forsee the conditions of the 'beatific vision'. But we 
must believe that .in addition to the joys of perfect 
knowledge end the enjoyment of all beauty,there would 
be occupation for the employment of moral energy. "There 
would still be call and room for pressing further into 
the unknown and making all things subservient to the
values which it is the function of free spirits to
69 
realise? (Chapter XX).
68. Op.cit.,p.5H. 69. Up
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CBATTTJi FIT3 
rAlTTI 07 A MORALIST.
A.E.Taylor. Professor A.E*Taylor has been described by one who
is himself among the foremost of contemporary theologians 
as "the most learned living Briton." Fow f l suppo»e f would
challenge hia right to be cited as "the greatest of living
1 
Platonists" . And Professor Muirhead in reviewing hia
Gifford Lectures speaks of him as "one of the acutest»as ho 
is certainly tfco juf.-bt la arned, supporter of Theism in 
Great Britain ««.. More than any other writer since Coleridge 
he unites a profound knowledge of Platonic thoughtpboth in
the ancient and iiediaeval near Id » with depth of feeling for
2 
what is best in Ghrist5.an thMsn." One whose intimate
mastery of the relevant literature both within and without 
the fields of hie own special study is well-nigh encyclo­ 
pedic, who has written authoritatively on Aristotle and 
Huiae and the English moralists and White head as well as 
upon Plato (though his greatest love, it is said, is for 
Aquinas) ,who mar shall s to the service of his own philoso­ 
phy pretty much the whole gamut of Greek and Christian 
religious thout^ht, and who is at present the ablest expo* 
nent of liberal Anglo-Catholic theology cannot fail to have 
much of importance to contribute to the theme of this par­ 
ticular study. #e turn to his thought about God with the 
keenest anticipation.
Theology .March 1931,p.l21. 
g.J.li.Muirhead«i;i iiibbert Journal, April I931 9 p.b53.
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II.
Els Philosophic An exposition of Professor Taylor's theism IF made 
pal Pilfirimafl*^ more difficult by the extraordinary development his con­ 
viction has traced in More than forty years of philoso­ 
phical study. Inquiry concerning almost any aspect of his 
thought must be countered by the question, "At what period 
do you mean?" It is probable that no philosopher of equal 
eminence has changed his fundamental presuppositions more 
radically between his earliest writings and his mature 
position. If it would be an exaggeration to say that Profes­ 
sor Taylor's mind has "boxed the philosophical compass", at 
least it is not an overstatement that on not a few of the 
basic issues his present conviction seems to stand at the 
exact opposite of that of an earlier period. Happily he is 
completely self-conscious about the path his reflection 
has followed,and has given us a brief outline of the princi­ 
pal stages in this pilgrimage— stages which a careful study
3 
of his writings will clearly suggest.
Apparently Professor Taylor's thought has advanced 
through about four main periods,more or less coincident with 
four steps in his academic career,although I Judge there 
have been no abrupt transitions. To the first, the years of 
his life at Oxford first as an undergraduate and then as a 
fellow, he came as he tells us troubled by the apparent 
conflicts between his early theological heritage and the 
supposed results of evolutionary science and biblical
griticism. "What I looked for in philosophy was some sane 
si In*Contemporary British Philosophy.Vol. II,m).270ff.
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defence of convictions which I felt were essential for the
conduct of life against what seemed to be the disintegrating
4 
influences of scholarship and biological science." It
was a time of intensive study; his thought was largely 
dominated by that of T.H.Green and Bradley,and he seems to 
have rendered an almost unquestioning allegiance to the 
idealistic tradition which they represented. Although the 
first two of his larger works date from the period imredla­ 
tely following,-'- Judge we are to identify not a few of the 
strongest strains in fiem rith the Oxford influences* The 
next stage (1896-1903) found Professor Taylor at Manchester, 
in intimate contact with the realistic criticism of Profes­ 
sor S.Alexander;but the loyal adherence to Bradley in par­ 
ticular continued. It is the period of two large,and able,
5
pieces of writing—The Problem of Conduct and -lemenfcs of 6 ——————————————— ———————— 
Metaphysics. Both follow closely after and lean heavily
upon the Oxford Idealists,both exalt the importance of 
metaphysics and disparage the role of theology, both seek
to vindicate the validity of religious experience but hold
i
aloof from the historic religions and religious institutions, 
both advance a theory of knowledge,familiar enough i» 
idealist thought, which would seen to render the worship 
of a genuinely objeotive Deity very dubious. Clearly it is 
the writing of an exceedingly able critical mind which 
believes itself to have won personal satisfaction in a 
highly abstruse: philosophy;in his own words,"! suppose





into a kind of 'Positivist 1 •••'* It was toward the close
of this period at Manchester that Professor Taylor himself 
began to be aware of marked changes in his point of view, 
partly influenced by the thought of Professor James Ward f 
partly by a more incisive critique of empiricism and 
positivism on his own part,partly by a fresh return to 
Plato, as he says "in the light of Leibniz", We may infer 
that the five years spent at MoGill University,M jntreal 
(1903—-1908),gave opportunity for the germination and 
maturing of these new lines of speculation* In any event, 
his return to Great Britain in 1908 not merely narked the 
beginning of his greatest scholarly and literary producti­ 
vity* ftlth it began the final stage of philosophical re* 
flection in the course of which there has steadily develo­ 
ped toward completeness and finality what we may regard as
8 
Professor Taylor f s ultimate position* To this period
9 belong his three most important writings on Plato and a
veritable host of contributions to learned Journals in
10 addition to several especially interesting monographs •
It is also from the latter decade of this period that have 
come his most important utterances upon God , the material 
to which our attention will be principally given—the
Justly famed article on "Theism" in Hasting' s Encyclopedia11 ——-——**—— 
of Religion and Ethics t the contribution to the symposium
7. Contemporary British Philosophy .Vol. n f T
8«0p*oit • | p»£72 .
9 «Pla to .London* 1908 (Constable).
;o.The Man and His Work f T.nnrtnt» IQOA, (Methuen). 
Flatonism and its influence. London- (Harrap). 
10.See.espec..St*Tnomas Aquinas as a Philosopher, Orf or d- 192 4, David Hume and the Mirni.o^^iy^rfeir •
e rolem of sv. onon pQ- 
11. issued in 1921.
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Essays Catholic cind Critical under the title "Thejg— ~
Vindication of Religion* and finally the Gifford
13 
Lectures at the University of ct. Andrews of 1926—28 •
Of the influences whioh have been important in leading 
Professor Taylor to His later conclusions one only
deserves unique emphasis-- the mind of Baron Friedrich
14 
Von Hugel*
So marked has been the alteration in Professor 
Taylor' s convictions between his starting-point in 
philosophy and his jresent outlook that it is perhaps 
worth while to note the contrast in one or two especially 
important particulars* At no point is the contrast more 
vivid than In the relative significance attached to 
metaphysics on the one hand and theology and religion on 
the other hand* In $he Problem of Conduct metaphysics is 
defined as "the analysis of the formal characteristics
of experience, apart from all consideration of its concrete
15 
contents" ,and again it is stated that "the whole problem
of metaphysics is to construct a description of the world 
of experience which shall answer to our ideal of 'pure*
experience — that is t shall contain no single element which
1Ccannot be completely described in terms of experienced fact*"
To be sure, the term 'experience 1 is civen the widest 
possible scope; the apprehension of ^od in religious exper­ 
ience is accepted as part of the proper data of metapfey* 
si os but the letter "c: n never reveal to us any existence
1». 1926*
13* The Faith of a Moralist «8 vols*. London. 1930.
14. Contemporary British Philosophy. Vol. 1 1. 1>. 27 2,
e roem o Conduct. a. 441. 
16. Op. c it., p. 449.
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entirely beyond or entirely independent of an experience
17
in which it forms an inseparable aspect*" This concep­ 
tion if taken over and siven elaboration in Professor 
Taylor f s introduction to metaphysics itself,published 
two years later. Here the distinction between metaphy­ 
sics and religion is drawn in the most absolute and (as 
I should hold) invidious manner* Apparently metaphysics 
is useful only as an exercise in intellectual speculation 
but without practical fruitfulness for the morr:l lifej 
indeed,since it must expose the illusions and false logic 
of the popular mind,its influence on practical life would 
appear to be definitely dangerous* By the sane token, 
religion, Inevitably and invariably tainted with illusion 
(whet we in contemporary parlance would stigmatise as 
"wishful thinking"),nan have no significance whatever as a
dependable guide to truth;but it is of indispensable ira-
19 portanee as a source of Inspiration for practical endeavor »
To be sure,from the moralist*s point of view,the more 
significant function in this dichotomy ic assigned to 
religion. But one always feels behind the discussion the 
scholar's perhaps unintended condescension toward the 
merely practical discipline and his corresponding supreme 
valuation of the pure cjuest for truth, ffith this lofty 
estimate of speculation may be contrasted the following 
sentences—a passage from Professor Taylor'n oonfeaGio 
ffoei which is of the first importance for an understanding
17»0p.oit.,p.448.
18.Elements of Metaphyaio s fLondon
19.See especially the two closing ohapters.
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of hie prfloont point of
"The business of notapnyoical philosophy 
is,in a way,a modes t one. It has to be content 
to recognize that in tto sciences,in history,in 
morality and religion it Is dealing with a reality 
which is in the end simply 'given* and not to be 
explained away. Its concern is with the various 
intellectual interpretations of the 'given*,and 
its supreme task Is not,as I once used to suppose, 
the 'unification of the sciences',but the necessarily 
imperfect and tentative reconciliation of the 
exigences of scientific thinking with the imperative 
mor^.l and religious demands of life, t has not to 
invent an approved substitute for historically 
real religion and morality,but to fathom as much as 
it can of their significance. I'here is no special 
infallibility about raetaphysjcs and its methods 
are necessarily 'dialectical in the Aristotelian 
sense. It seen* to follow that there can be no final 
'metaphysics' ,and that the temptation of all others 
which a student of the subjoct should avoid as he 
grows older is the temptation to have a 'system* which 
leaves no unexplained mystery at the root of things. 
And it becomes a question whether,after all,the main service of raot»physical study to the mind is not to 
'liberate it from prejudices* and thus to prepare it to rooeive illumination from sources outside meta­ physics." 20
To this may be added the brief disparagement of 'systems* 
in much the same vein in the opening Gifford Lecture:-
"For ray own pert, the more I reflect on the deliverances of philosophers with a system,even 
those for whom I feel the highest reverence, the more 
readily do the words rise to roy lips«mirabilis facta 
est sclentla tua ex metopnfortata estVet non potero 
ad earn. (Psalm o»xirrlll.(Vuig.)6.1 21
The obverse aspect of the above contrast is seen 
in the writer's changed estimate of the value of theology 
for our final view of things. It is no wonder that in his 
earlier thought religious belief can be of no use in 
seeking an understanding of reality since its origin 10 so 
largaly In immediate feeling and the vagaries of individual
£&• Contemporary British Philosophy.Vol. II f p»272- 
21. The Faith of a MorariBt.Yol>I f ia,9.
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temperament s •
beliefs are in the last resort 
based upon immediate feeling, and not immediate 
feeling upon beliefs, n this sense, at «ny rate, 
it ia true that all genuine religious lii'e implies 
the practical influencing of feeling and action by 
convictions which go beyond proved and Known truth**** 
"What the convictions to which we thus surrender 
the practical guidance of life are, in any individual 
case, seams to be largely a question of individual 
constitution and social tradition." 22
From such premisses the following Judgment on the meta­ 
physical significance of theology would be expected:-*
•I have called philosophy a science, but theology 
a would-be science* The defect which, in my Judgment, 
deprives theology of all claim to the title of a 
science lies in the arbitrary restriction which its 
pdnt of departure imposes upon its treatment of the 
phenomena. Theologians, in fact, sin habitually against 
Plato's demand that the true lover of science shall 
be interested in the whole of his subject. Their 
conception of the religious problem compels then to 
isolate a pert of the religious life of mankind 
(e.g. the religious experiences described in the 
Jewish and Christian Scriptures) t and to treat that 
past as equivalent t >> the whole* Uich a rei'usul GO 
face all the facts fully and fftlrly must in any case 
vitiate the conclusions arrived at by theology aa to 
the essential nature and requisites of religion.*.*. 
Hence we are bound to XDaintaizu*.»*uhat theology*.., 
possesses only the external form without any of the 
concrete filling of science, or is, in other words, a pseudo-science*" 33
• Sleraents of Me ta physios^p« 300 . 
£3. Tn,e Problem of ConauctVp• 456.
Students of Professor raylor's earlier writings must 
often be sorely puazled as 60 liis truo estinate of the 
worth and validity of religious experience itself. In 
ffie Proble'fl a? Conduct that estimate is,on the whole, 
hi,3h. The following passage is representative :-"In one 
form or another the religious attitude towards the 
world-system seoms as inseparable from a fully developed 
Intelligent human experience as the ethical or the 
scientific.and this is,of itself f sufficient evidence 
that,whatever may be the accretions with which it Is 
overlaid and disfigured in its various transitory guises 
the religious experience in its permanent essence is an 
inseparable element In a comprehensive human experience 
of the world* And this is all that can be said of the 
soisritific or tiny other aspect of the world of exper­ 
ience. n (p*443)* But in the Elements of Metaphysics. 
published only two years later,is to be found the
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And Cha f:lnal conclusion re^rdinj; the use of either 
ethical cr religious idoas in the rormLition of a world- 
view is as follows:-
TfEthics trestlng,as wo have seen that it does ill 
all its stages, upon concepts which are tainted with 
illusion and cannot be purged from that illusion without suicidal re suits, cannot be found ed f except in ignorance 
of the nature of the subject-mat tor, upon a doctrine of 
metaphys6cGl first principles, and en still less be 
roQarded as itself affording the solo and sufficient 
basis for a !t*?t a physical theory of the ultimate 
character of existence ••••And again t a metaphysio 
founded upon ethiop would be a raeta physic of baseless 
and ultimately unraeaning assumptions— in a word, a 
science of f
"With our verdict upon the ultimate coherency 
of the 'religious 1 view of the world with itself that 
problem has, by irr.pllcatl on t received its solution. The 
final break-town of religious ideas when treated as a 
fund of trttfj information about the nature of the real 
world is itself the best proof that the study of the 
practice! life in all Itn stages le,and always must be f 
independent of all preconceived metaphysical notions » tuKl &JU.-.1; nt> ' postulates' can be forced by ethics or 
natural theology upon a reluctant metaphysio* For 
moral! i<y and religion the one thing needful,for 
inetaphyeiCB the one thing' BUS pent 1 ,is a vein of ardent natur 1 emotion unchecked and unsophisticated by philo­ 
sophical reflection upon the ultimate constitution of things ." 25
By way of contrast it is parhape sufficient to point out 
that in seeking to "vindicate" religion Professor Taylor 
proposes three parallel aM nutually complementary pathways 
to God*- that fron the order of ^ature f that from man's moral 
ex per lone e, and that from distinctively religious experience* 
the su section that Cod tniftht be reached through
rollorinr*:- rr ?hn f rell5lo\^» temperament is apparently 
shown by experience to be,in its intenser manifestations quits &s ruch an Idlosyncrany of congenital endownent as tlie 'aesthetic 1 , ihere are persons ,not otherwise 
raentr,ll:.r defective, who neem to be almost devoid of it.., 
As many of these persons are ethically excellent, some of toem exceptionelly no,.., there seercs to be no direct 
connection between religious sensibility and moral ex­ cellence. n (p«P90n) 
The Problem of Conduct. p. 493 - 
Op.oit. t p«500-501.
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another and distinctively irataphysieal e.venue of approach
ia decisively injected, "From this point, of view there is 
no real distinction between a peculiar metaphysical way 
to '-od and the ways we hav« just enumerated. In studying 
them I i. a,the evidence from Mature 9 from the moral life tand 
from religious experience) we are from start to finish wlthifn
the region of metaphysics and there is no fourth special
26 
'way of rtfitaphysics' to follow,* We may add the reminder
that the central purpose of Professor Taylor's latest and
most ambitious philosophical work Is to 'discuss the question
27 of the relations between norality and religion" fand from
that study to seek to determine what, if anyf definitely 
metaphysical realities are postulated by the moral life • 
And tlioso volumes reach their ultimate objective v;hen they 
confrontjtheir readers with the faiaous claim that "theolugy^ 
the knowledge of God t is the rightful nistress; 'philosophy1
and *3cienoe f f the whole body of our systematised knowledge
29 of the creatures,only the handmaid" *- a claim which the
writer at least welcomes and fully and confidently acknow* 
ledge B, Purely here is a "Copernioan revolution" in personal 
convict ioni
We should expect that,behind these vividly contrasted 
attitudes toward the relative significance of metaphysics, 
laorall ty treligion and theology, there might be found an even 
more fundamental transition in the writer's view of the ways 
by which knowledge comes and the scope of the knowledge
26«iijfleay6 Catholic snd GriticajL P p^45> 
27«The Fnlt.n QT IL ;loyalist,Vol.71. t -l£- 
28•
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which is passiols ior us — iiJU cjpisttfiflolegy. This expecta* 
tion is fully /indicated* In his early -nought, knowledge is 
given us by reason which "id always reflective, critical of 
arid systematising the material which is supplied to it by 
the various forma of iimaedlate a prehension, such as per*
ception, aesthetic enjoyment, and moral or religious intul-
20 
tion" ;but faith »ia contrast to reudon.is "a form of dftrect
and immediate apprehensioa,auti should in this respect be
compared rather with perception than with any conceptual'"i vA
form of consoiou»O80a'r • It is therefore not a form of 
knowledge* To be surtt.fuith IB, in one view»the higher avenue 
toward the apprehension of reality for it is itself a fora 
of diroct experience while '( the ,'orin of reason or knowing is
ultimately inadequate to the full representation of exper-38 
ience* ' In Professor Taylor's latest reflection on the
ever-puziilin£ problems of epistemology § the hiiiher authority 
is again given to tlie experience of immediate apprehension 
of which religious faith is an instance; but faith has now 
become vision, and such Immediate and inclusive vision is 
the alone type of true knowledge*
" it is this kind of direct and iismodiate ap­prehension of trutii T&iiieh wo should regard as the type of true knowing* All th t we commonly call our scien­ tific Imcwlcdgo is r.n ondeavour, never fully successful, to recapture for our mental vision of facts thlfi im­ mediacy and obviousness from ^hich ?/e begin by passing away the moment Judgement supervenes oji sense-percep­ tion. Judgoir^nt na& sci/ie times been spoken of ae the characteristic form of tho apprehension of truth* It beciLG to me that the very fuct tlio. t most of what wa 
know about the world has to be couched in the form of jiid£onont iP aie character^ tic it£,rk of the inevitable imperfection of our apprehension***
Problem of Ccn^t.-p>454. 31. Op.oit,
of the Arist°-
"If we ccuid completely achieve the ideal of 
knowledge. »••• the perfect adaequatlo intelleotus cum 
re tas we ounnot,3ur loiov*levi^Q WGU.JLU no longer be 
Tn*inking,or wear the form of jud^inc;; it would have 
recovered tiie directness characteristic of the per­ 
ception from which it begem by Getting out, It is this 
conception of complete knowledge a^ a direct vision, 
to which the form of Judgement is inadequate, which, 
as it seonis to n»,is already JUipilcd in the admission 
of a re<il distinction between knowledge and true 
belief.,. •! ice an that the type of perfect knowledge 
id an apprehension which is at onco direct andfas I 
may say, 1 self -luminous 1 or 'transparent.' The absence 
of either directness or Smsparency— what I mi^ht call 
the colour of * or-coursone s& ' --is an indication that 
our apprehension is not all thet complete knowledge 
should be*" 24
M I suppose it is impossible for any man to 
immerse himself Ions and thorou^h^y In the study of 
the life and work of a groat personality or a great 
ege without feeling that he in the end comes by a direct 
insist into purpose and meaning which he can c-11 by 
no nane but knowlrtclge, thou^it i<; is quite impossible to 
demonstrate who corroctnees of his insight to any one 
or even to conrmmicate it, n 35
The implications of two euch vicwr, of the nature of 
knowledge for our knowledge of Cod furnishes an even more 
vivid contrast* la The Problt-ia of Conduct, the question,
"Docs c'od exist *as God, entirely outside the religious
36 
experience or inEnkindV'^is xuut with a "decided negative, "
And a few pngeo follor/inG there is added this startling 
stetejoasnt,". e nay even s .y than, that, in a sense, the reli­ 
gious experience must be regarded as adding an important 
element TJO the life not only of ioan,but also of the Absolute 
itself* If i^an is not fully man until he has learned to
too is not fully Ctod until man has learned to
37 
worship Him.* Our initial surptie^ is somewhat mitigated
when we discover that this apparently "subjectivist* inter-
OT.e.t&t Ion o" the divine existence IB merely an implicate of 
;>i*Cp.clt.,p.21. 35.0p.cit*, p. 24,
I-TobJLcg of Cosduct* p , 443 .
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the thoroughgoing idealist theory or knowledge to which 
the writer aiiii ^ivo« full
""e ju*ilatoiiii t then.tfci:u taking existenca in -one 
full and proper cense of the terns, no thing ever is, 
out slue the concrete experience in >vhich it is an 
ingredient, what it is vrithin that experience* The 
utmost reality that oan bt> conceded to any object of 
experience outside the experience in which it is 
known, is the reality of certain conditions trhich, 
with the addition of the further condition of certain 
psychological dismal tione in the percipient, will 
yield the experience of the object in question," 38
While Professor Taylor'e later thought might find it pos­ 
sible to acquiesce in much of the foregoing, with a change 
of definition here end there, nothing could be farther re* 
moved , in point of view and central teitper,from his present 
outlook on our manner of knowing* It ^ls latest writing 
thoro stands forth the rugged real ism, ac to both knowledge 
of the objective -vorld snd ffpeelfl&.lly moral and religious 
knowledge, uhlch we should espsct in one who has drunk deep
of the palnatalcl nfl, guarded but invincible critic?*! realism
39 
of the late Baron Von Uugel,
"The sreen colour of th« grass, the crimson of 
the roct»|are ihore in che world as it is giron to us 
through the eye, no less th-un the chape of the blade 
or 1;ho petal, !; it> not ruy inind which, in knowing the 
i~ras£ or tlw rose, puts into it o Grocn or a red which 
was not there; en lihe contrary, it la from an indefini­ 
tely rich find complex sivsn that I come to singlo out 
these particular elements f r separ&te contemplation, tf 4€
f'7/hat is given is,,,,ji sin^ile most imperfectly 
discriminated wholQ,in which sh^pe, colour, size, odour, 
sound, aro all present from the outset, and progress in 
taaowlodfce means, not taking unauthorised additions to 
this whole, but beooming increasingly aenoitive to 
distinctions within lt, n 41
38, The Px o blara of C onciuo t . TTP , 449^50 *
.^l.ry^ leaiity of ^od f 
ffil , Critical 
400 SSii JMith of a f^
101.
11 How all tbis aeeffus to b© no less true of 
our moral f icloil* 1 ,«••?> do not, by nn'aot of 
valuation 1 * m?ce Jonathan's «f faction for David 
or the solf~d<rrotion of ^ettus i;urtius,th« humility 
of cit,Kruncis,or ft** ptitiimt labour of Darwin good; 
I find the ,?oo'lnasj- there in then, Presumably I should 
have no aoral • ideals' at all_if I had not begun in 
childhood by accepting f as a i). it tie child' the moral 
tradition of my comunity wi&h ITJS witness to the fact 
that qualities llfcs these aro 'objectively* £Ood f 
exactly us iron is hard ana lead soft*" 42
" It is not by 1 searching • that we find out God, 
•«»«Xt is the experience of rich f but confused, contact 
v?lth the supernatural which plays, in our knowledge of Co<f,the same part that izirodi^te contact through sense 
with a confused * other* does in our knowledge of
It is aurdly necessary to add that the God of whom 
we thus tif.in knowledge la noU a bcln^ .;ho cannot be re» 
garded as existint; apart: froia huiaui oxporience of hlaat one 
who is "not fully God until sauii has loarnod to worship
Him," Rather, ho jl«--w a transoendoat living and personal
44 
Good — orie f complete, eternal' , at onco t;lie Creator and the
45 
Redeemer and oanetifler of j
We have dwalt so lojjg upon the advance in Professor 
Taylor's philoeophical outlook not primarily to exhibit 
the startling tranomut a tloiu, ?;liicl; the oonvlctions of a 
truly ublu scholar jauy uader&o as life deepens and Insight 
ripens, but rather for two ot&cir reasons. First, that we 
mi^ht thus coirie by an appreoiation of the mental temper of 
the iMUi t so important for a just otifciiaate of his ideas. 
f scooridlyf 'alia'; such a hi&ioricul survey mit$ht supply
vso require for our min
enquiry. It has rtswoled not iserely the far distant points




from whiote ala thought has Journeyed to its present 
conclusions, but also such of those cone las iono as aro 
necessary prolegomena to theism proper— theory of 
knowledge, fcho scope -md innorttince of meta physics, the 
place of religious experience in our search for truth* 
We are now proparod to approach his idea of God directly,
III. 
Idea In tne period of his earliest writings, Professor
9f .fofli Taylor had maintained that there is only one possible
"proof of the being of God", but that it is quite con- 
vincing and adequate. It Is the well-nigh universal 
existence of religious experience as an important element
within the concrete whole of human life; this gives us a
46 
form of the "ontologloal proof •" Of the prevalence of
religious experience as "an inseparable element in a com*
47 
prehensive human experience" we have already made note.
It is quite unthinkable that nature should have produced 
a race doomed to believe something about the world which 
mature reflection indicates to be false; therefore we must 
believe the fundamental assumptions of the religious 
attitude to have correspondence with reality. "In this
sense the 'ontologioal proof seems valid and irrefraga-
48 
ble." To be sure, the Deity thus established is hardly
to be identified with the God of religion.
"The ontologionl proof , rightly understood, 
establishes not so much the existence of *Qod' as 
the existence of the 'divine 1 , as an aspect of the 
world system. Whether the 'divine 1 and 'perfect' 
46.T*ie Troblen of Conduct, p. 44S.^.^.ntT . ea lv, .  , 
The Problem of Conduct. fr.443.
•^•^•^•••^•••••^••^•••iM^^B^I^B^B^B^^^^r
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from whltrtx his tfaou&kt has journeyed to its present 
conclusions,but also such of those conclusions as are 
necessary prolegomena to theism proper—*theory of 
knowlnd^e, tho scope and importance of TOtaphysics, the 
place of ruligious experience in our search for truth* 
We ere now prepared to approach his idea of God directly.
III.
Taylor's Idea In the period of his earliest writings,Professor
Taylor had maintained that there is only one possible 
"proof of the being of God",but that it is quite con­ 
vincing and adequate* It is the well-nigh universal 
existence of religious experience as an important element
within the concrete whole of human life; this gives us a
46 
form of the "ontologioal proof. 1* Of the prevalence of
religious experience as nan inseparable element in a com*
47 prehensive human experience'*we have already made note.
It is quite unthinkable that nature should have produced 
a race doomed to believe something about the world which 
mature reflection indicates to be false; therefore we must 
believe the fundamental assumptions of the religious 
attitude to have correspondence with reality. "In this
sense the 'ontologioal proof seems valid and irrefraga-
48 
ble." To be sure, the Deity thus established is hardly
to be identified with the God of religion.
"The ontological proof .rightly understood, 
establishes not so much the existence of 'Qod* as 
the existence of the 'divine 1 ,as an aspect of the
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is to be regarded as •personal 1 or not fwhether it is 
immanent in the perpetual universe,or ,as Aristotle 
taught,'separatef t whether moral predicates can pro­ 
perly be ascribed to it•.•••.all the se are que stions 
which cannot be settled by any short and easy 'onto* 
logical* method." 49.
"The term 'God 1 means for us simply the perfect 
system which is the finally adequate object of reli­ 
gious worship,and nothing more* v;hether that system 
is personal or not fand f if personal,whether it exists 
in the form of a single consciousness or a society 
of consciousnesses.in what sense it is identical with 
or different from 'nature 1 —all these controversial 
questions must be left for the present undiscussed. 
What we have assumed as real in our statements about 
the religious experience is not the personality or 
impersonality,the 'transcendence' or 'imianence' f of 
the perfect Absolute,but simply its existence as a 
perfect systematic whole...." 50
In a discussion dating from the same period, the familiar 
traditional "theistic" proofs are reviewed, the devastating 
Kantian criticisms considered and these criticisms judged 
to be, on the whole, sound and unanswerable. It is recognized 
that they could be reformulated5but any restatements would 
be exposed to closely parallel attacks and there is no in­ 
dication that the substitute formulations would be found 
51
convincing. I have not been able to discover in this phase 
of Professor Taylor's thought any detailed consideration of 
the evidence for God from the moral order or nan's moral 
experience. Reliance is placed exclusively upon the facts 
of religious experience; but tfcii argument is handled
rationalistically and ideal!stiotilly rather than critically*
thus 
In his earliest apologetic,Professor Taylor.relied
entirely upon what he regarded as a form of the ontologlcal 
argument,and the classic expression of the moral argument
is Passed over if not entirely neglected, ^n his latest
49. The Problem of Conduct.p.444.
50. Op.oit.,p.441.
51• Elements of Metaphysics.closing chapters.
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discussion of tlieisia f on tiie other hand tattention is fixed
almost exclusively upon the implications of moral experience, 
and the possible value of the older proofs as supporting 
evidence is not considered. But in two important though 
briefer nomographs dating fron the same general period ae 
the Clifford Lectures ,he has traced a broader and more com­ 
prehensive approach to the idea of God. 'Ve think we are 
not mistaken in finding in this richer theism the author's 
full nature conviction.
The main outlines of this synoptfec position had 
been clearly anticipated by implication in the course of
his critique of other writers in the article on "Theiomn in
53 
Hast ing f s Encyclopedia ofPali g? on end Ethics . The
purpose of that article was primarily expository; It aimed 
to display the noro Important theistio arguments from Plato 
to contemporary Locion 1 Pluralism. But throughout, the write A 
personal viewn are permitted to eppear here and there ,and 
especially in the discussion of Kant'e attempted .amlhila- 
tion of the traditional proofs. H«re It is xnp.rte clear that 
Professor Taylor finds Kant's objections partially sound 
but invalid plains t the essential burden of each of the 
three "proofs". In particv.lsr.it is hinted that the cosmolo* 
gical ar(^uucnt might bo BO restate (\ a^ to eludo thff attack 
Kant bed brought against it. ?^e conclusion of th« nutter 
is that "speculation and practice alike point to the eternal 
nature of God as the object in which both find their comple­ 
tion. V/e have a doublo exigence of the praotioal and the
53. J?he raith of a Upr alls t. 2 vols., 1930. (Clifford Lectures
delivered in 1926-28.) 
52. Vol.12 t pp.261ff.( Issued in 1921).
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speculative reason on the aide of theism...One might add
54 
that there is a third exigence, the specifically religious,"
'fhese and other considerations are presented in am­ 
plified discussion in whu* ib, to the present writer, incom­ 
parably the most notable and satisfying summary treatment 
of theistic issues which Professor Taylor has {-iven us—
the essay "The Vindication of Religion11 in Essays Catholic
£5 
and Critical. The Gifford Lectures add nothing of first
importance which is not here sketched in outline. According­ 
ly we shall first review the argument of this essay, then 
pass on to a fuller discussion of the moral argument speci­ 
fically with such added light as Tlia T'aith of a Moralist 
may offer, and conclude with some more general comment.
IV.
"The Vindication The argument of "The Vindication of Religion" may
of Religion." be summarised as follows :-
The task of the Christian apologist in seeking 
to 'vindicate' the central truths of religion ie not 
unlike that of the scientist in attempting to interpret 
the world of Nature. Neither hopes to achieve any­ 
thing like complete demonstration. "In either case the 
most i;hat can be dea&Lded cf us is to show that there 
aac real and undeniable facts -*hich call for explanation 
und must not be explained away; that the interpretation 
supplied brings coherence and 'sense 1 into them, where 
they would, without it, be an unintelligible puzzle;
5Tr~"Theism", in H.E.R.E. .Vol.12, p. 285.






that the more steadily and systematically the principles
we fall back on are employed, the less puzzling does
56 
the reality we are trying to interpret become." In
both enquiries the attitude of trust and faith where 
demonstration is impossible is demanded. Each aims to 
discover the presuppositions of the facts of life. Each
is dealing with "something which it finds obscurely and
57 
confusedly •given 1 as part of our human experience."
In both enterprises, it is the word of the man who has 
steeped himself deeply in the material of his study 
which is alone authoritative; "the only consensus which
is of weight in matters of religion is the consensus of
58 
deeply religious men."
The interpreter of religion will find at his 
disposal three independent sets of facts - three parallel 
and complementary paths of approach to his goal. These
may be called "a witness of Nature to God", a witness of
a) 59 
Ethics to God", and "(witness of Religion itself to God."
a. The argument from Nature to God may be made in 
many different forms. But all embody a single funda­ 
mental conviction—"that the incomplete points to the
complete, the dependent to the independent, the temporal
60 
to the eternal." Further Nature is in some sense
•alive 1 ; motion characterizes her behaviour, and that 
56. Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 39. 57. Op.clt.p.41
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incessant change must have its ground in a reality which 
is unchanging. Nature's 'aliveness' is made possible 
by the interplay of two disparate and apparently ultimate 
factors—"law" which is unchanging, and "brute fact" 
which is forever in process of transmutation. Their 
inter-relation seems to point to a supernatural and trans* 
cendent Being behind them both. Added weight is given 
to these considerations when we recall that Nature seems 
to show a 'trend 1 toward the development of intelligences 
surpassing her own-—in the process we call evolution.
"This is the way in which Nature, as it seems 
to me, inevitably points beyond itself as the tem­ 
poral and nutable to an 'other 1 which is eternal 
and immutable." 61
"The spectacle of movement and chance which 
we call 'Nature' thus at least suggests the pre­ 
sence of some 'transcendent' source of movement and 
change which is strictly eternal, above all mutabi­ 
lity and having no succession of phases within 
itself, and is omnipotent, since it is itself the 
source of all 'becoming'. The orderliness and ap­ 
parent purposive 'trend towards intelligence' in 
Nature similarly at least suggest that this omni­ 
potent and eternal 'supernatural' is a wholly 
intelligent Will." 62
"From Man b. In Nature we discern 'footprints* of a Creator; 
to God." in man's moral being we may find the 'image' of God.
For in man "Nature and supernature meet; he has both
within his own heart, and is a denizen at once of the
63 
temporal and the eternal." Indeed it is precisely this
characteristic which marks him off from animal life—
61. Op.oit.,p.55. 63. Op.cit.,p.59.
62. Op.cit.,p.58.
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his inner necessity to adapt himself to an environment 
trans-earthly and ctornal; and a full fidelity to that 
necessity may require him to sacrifice freely those tem­ 
poral and human goods which all men prize supremely. 
The evidence from man's moral nature, also, may be 
developed in several different ways. (1) We may fasten 
upon the fact of Conscience. A careful examination of 
the consciousness of 'oughtness' will reveal clearly 
that the ultimate grounds of that obligation cannot be 
located in any human considerations, even the good of 
society. It is independent of all temporal consequen­ 
ces; it points to a supernatural sanction, (This is 
the essence of the Kantian doctrine.) (2) Or we may 
note that moral aspiration forever points beyond any 
goal achievable or even imaginable within human exper­ 
ience; it seems directed toward an immortal and eternal 
good. "Since the goal of the moral life cannot by any 
possibility be attained under temporal conditions, and 
yet its reality (which, in the case of an ideal which
ought to inspire and regulate all our conduct, must 
mean its real attainability by us) is the necessary con­ 
dition that the inspiration to progress shall not fail,
64 
our final destiny must lie in the non-temporal." (3) Or
we may remark that man alone of all the creatures as far 
as we know exhibits e sense of sin. And the poignancy 
and indelibility of the sin-consciousness, as well as
04, Op.cit.,p.G5.
169.
its irrecLucibility to the category of "mistake", "error" 
etc., is in direct ratio to the cultural sensitivity and 
ethical maturity of the sinner. At its noblest, it al- 
wtys seems to suggest an offense against not a "law" or 
a "value" or "society", but a person; an attitude to­ 
wards "an unseen being of transcendent purity and holiness
65 
of charactor. n (4) Finally we may concentrate upon the
restlessness, the unsatisfied idealism, the inherent 
nostalgia for the * Beyond* , which characterises all ele­ 
vated living. The inevitability of separation and the 
loss of all ecrthly ^oods through death is only an in- 
eecapable confirmation of this sense deep within human 
consciousness —the recognition that our true and final 
home is not in thie ?/orld« "Nothing seems plainer than 
this, that if true pe&ce and content are to be found by 
man at all, they cannot be found in anything temporal or 
secular* They must spring froEi a conscious intimate 
possession of personal union of hetirt and will with a 
being who knows us through and through as no man knows 
another, or even himself, who contains within Him an in­ 
exhaustible wet 1th of being which excludes all risk of
satiety, ^ho is utterly eternal t-nd abiding and therefore
66 
can never change or fail." And the final conclusion
from this manyoided evidence frora man's moral nature nay 
be stated thus:-
bb. Op.cit.,p.57. 66, Op.clt. ,p.G9. 
A very much fuller presentation of these four 'evidences'* 
from roan's moral nature with quotations from The Faith of 
a Moralist will b** found be low, pp. 188-194. ————————"
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"V7e see that the general character of the 
argument from Mature and from our moral being to God 
is the same in -both cases. In both we reason from 
fche temporal to the eternel. But there is this dif­ 
ference, that the elusive being to which we reason 
Is, in the second C-.GG, aonethinj; richer. Reflexion 
on what is below and around us suggested only an eter­ 
nal intelligent deai.jnar rjid source of Nature. He- 
flexion on the moral nature of man suggests a being 
who is more, the eternal something before whom we 
must not only bow in amazement, like Job, but kneel 
in reverence a 6 the source and support of all moral 
goodness. This is as it should be, since in the one 
cc.se we are attempting to aee the cause of the effect, 
in the other to see the features of the father in the 
child." 67
68 
"From God o. But what of the evidence of specifically
to God." 'religious experience'? Two remarks demand attention.
(1). So called 'religious experiences 1 are not to be 
thought of a a an i sole ted group of quite unique and 
rather bizarre happenings; rather they refer to "the
special way in which the v/Uole of life is experienced
69 
by the 'religious 'man." To be sure certain of life's
happenings awaken the religious response more fully than 
others. Here the analogy of the artist aids us. The 
true artist's eye sees beauty everywhere; but this is 
because* it has first been arrested by the presence of 
beauty wuere its manifestation was most vivid and unmis- 
takeable. 5o also with the religious man's outlook on 
life. (The analogy has a further eppllcation; it is 
because of the alert sensitiveness of the artist to the
beauty all about us that the common eye is inspired also
»••»••••
67. Op.cit.,p.70
08. 1-he two paragraphs \vhioh follow have drawn also on
E. article on "Theism".
C3.0p.cifc.,p.71.
171.
to find beauty there.) The clear mark of the distinct­ 
ively religious experience is that it is the conscious­ 
ness of a reality which is 'other 1 and 'ineffable'—a 
reality which stirs in us the response at once of f awe f 
and 'worship 1 . »Ve should not be discouraged from attach­ 
ing validity and significance to distinctively religious 
experiences because they are often crude in their early 
appearance in the individual or the race, or because 
they may sometimes be confused with sexual or aesthetic 
or merely sensory experiences, or because they are 
especially marked in conjunction with adolescence, or 
because of the presence of analogous experiences and 
the use of the same terminology in purely secular as­ 
pects of life; the same considerations might equally 
be urged to invalidate any other of the most significant 
of life's experiences, for example the aesthetic. 
The important point is— it is precisely these atti­ 
tudes, of 'awe' and 'worship' in the presence of the 
'other-worldly' and the 'ineffable', which have unfail­ 
ingly characterised the noblest and most sensitive of 
the sons of men. This leads to our second important 
comment upon the evidential value of 'religious exper­ 
ience'. (2) Exactly as it is the musician who can tell 
us most about music, the lover of beauty who can most 
faithfully report the presence of beauty about us, the 
trained and devoted laboratory worker whose word 
carries authority in scientific matters, so it is the
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"devotees of the Good", those who h-..ve surrendered 
their highest rifts M?d their full loyalties to that 
which is of ell things the most worthy of service, who 
may speak as 'experts 1 in the province of the spirit. 
"The verdict on the religious life if it is to count 
must come fro.m the men who have first made it their own
by living it. Only they can tell 'how much there is in 
70
I It1 •
"The lives of the 'saints' are the real answer 
of theism to the last insistent perplexities of the 
doubter 'vho lur^s in each of us. Others, without the 
thcist's faith, have often led noble lives; they 
have fousht a good fight with the untowardness of a 
world -hioh thwy have Irelifved in their hearts to be 
stupid or Eali£ncnt; yet the most clear-sighted amon^ 
them, like Huxley, have confessed that mortal hero­ 
ism is a losing j:airiS>, a battle with the cosmic forces. 
V/hat they lack—and one aoes not see how the luok is 
to be made good—is the secret of spiritual joy which 
belongs to those who are assured thct it is the Good 
rhich is supreme in heaven and in earth." 71
Summary. But our concluding emphasis would not be upon the
distinoEivenoss of the definitely 'religious experience' 
but rather upon the supreme importance of its complete 
integration with the whole of one's life and, most par­ 
ticularly, with the complementary evidences of God and 
pathways to God already noted.
"I have urged that the suggestions of an eternal 
ebove ?-nd behind the temporal are derived from three 
independent sources, and*that the agreement of the 
three in their common su^gustion ^ives it a force 
which ov::ht to be invlnciWe. .. .The full force of 
the vindication of religion cannot be felt unless we 
recognise that its v?ei t: ht is supported not by one 
strand only but by ?: cord of three intertwined strandia
70. OP •<.•!£• ,p*£0, ^
71. "Theism", in H.E.R.B.Vol.ia rP ,2flfi-
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we need to integrate Bone venture and Thomas and 
Butler with Kant to appreciate the real strength 
of the believer's position.. . .But I would end by 
a word of warning a^lnst a possible dangerous mis­ 
take. The fullest recognition of the reality of the 
transcendental and eternal 'other 1 world does not 
mean that eternity and time are simply disconnected 
or that a man is set the impossible task of living 
two absolutely disparate environments at once.
The two worlds are not in the end isolated from one 
another, since the one shines, here more, there less, 
transparently throufsh the other..., The true difference 
between the religious man and the worldly is that the 
religious man discharge? the same duties as the other, 
but in different spirit. He discharges them 'to the 
tflory of God' , with God as his chief intention, that 
is, with his eye on an end the attainment of which 
lies beyond the bounds of the temporal and secular. 
The truest detachment is not retreat to the desert, 
but a life lived in the world in this spirit. . .Christ­ 
ianity has always set itc face against the false 
treatment of the L»ternnl and the temporal as though 
they were simply disconnected 'worlds' ... .If wo are 
told on the one hand that a man who is in Christ is 
a 'new creation', we are also told by the great 
Christian theologians that *>;race f does not destroy 
'nature* but perfects and transfigures it." 72
And b^snind all of our meditation about the "evidences" 
for God should bo the recognition that our persistent 
searching is in itsolf proof that we have already in 
some measure found Him or been found by Him, The hold 
which value in each o.* its forms takes upon our life, 
prompting us to soek to find it, to understand it, to 
create it, to possess it, to be fully possessed by it — 
this 'grip' of value upon our deepest selves is itself 
the touch of ths Eternal und the Ineffable upon our
livec. tfe would not seek Him if we had not already 
72a
known Him.
"Is a man tempted to don^t whether there really 
is any absolute and certain truth, whether all our
7J? • assays Catholic and Critical. pp . 80 ; 63 ; 80 ; 81 ; 81 ; 31 .
72a. I have here ventured to attribute to Prof.Taylor my 
own summary 5 1 hope I am not untrue to his
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•truths 1 may not be mere 'human' or even 'personal 1 
points of view....? Let him rethink himself that it 
is only because he is not unacquainted with truths 
that he can frame the notion of the absolutely true, 
and only because he has framed the notion that he 
can raise his doubt. So it is only because we are 
all along secretly aware that there are things which 
we ought unconditionally to do that the question 
whether any given accepted obligation is really 
unconditional can so much as be put. If we knew no 
beauty, we could not even ask ourselves whether our 
Judfiments about beauty rest on illusion. In like 
manner it is only because the absolutely Good and 
utterly adorable has not left Himself without a wit­ 
ness in our hearts that we feel the need of an object 
to worship and are driven on from the worship of trees, 
or streams, or aninals, or mighty men, or anthropo­ 
morphic deities, toward an object in which our adora­ 
tion can at last find rest because that on which it 
is directed is adequate to sustain it...*Tu ne me 
chercherais pas si tu ne me possedais. Ne t'inquiete 




Our interest must center, of coursetupon Professor 
Taylor's handling of the moral argument specifically.
It is an indication of the comprehensiveness of his 
treatment of the theistic significance of morality that, 
at some point or other in his voluminous writings, support
is given to practically every one of the eight types of
74 
moral argument which we distinguished earlier. (1) On the
whole the reasoning of The Faith of a Moralist adheres so 
closely to the pure Kantian model that we can sympathise
with Professor Broad's judgment that "his main argument
75 
is of the Kantian form", although we do not regard that
73. "Theism" in H.E.H.T!.. Vol.12, p. 286. (I have taken the 
liberty of transposing from the be^innin :lthe quotation from 
Pascal, Pensees > vii t 555 t»|bo' the end of thgpassa :e\
74. See above, p. 77Jff. "———:—*~
75. C.D.Broad, in Mind, July 1931,p.
judgment as wholly accurate. Indeed in discussing Kant's 
own original formulation of the argument, Professor Taylor
had revealed his belief that, with very minor modification,
76 
it could be made impregnable to criticism. (II) But a more
discriminating classification of The Faith of a Moralist
would list it as what we have termed "a modified Kantian
77 
statement". Its scope is by no means confined as Professor
.Broad would imply to an argument "from the existence of a
moral obligation to the existence of those conditions without
7c 
which the obligation would be incapable of fulfilment."
V
It seeks a more adequate analysis of the whole range of 
moral experiences and its implications, (ill) And, as part 
of that analysis, there seems at one point to be a direct re­ 
ference "from conscience to its source", the third type in
79 
our classification.
-It is, in fact, a legitimate inference from the 
reality of a function to the reality of the environ­ 
ment where the function will find its use....To raise 
doubts on that point would be fatal to the admission 
of enough rationality in the case of things to make 
science itself possible." bO
(IV) **e have already noted the weight which the briefer 
essay places upon the fact "that moral aspiration forever 
points beyond any goal achievable or even imaginable within
human experience; it seems directed toward an immortal and
81 
eternal good". And the greatest single concern of the
76.Article "Theism" in H.JS,R.£. r Vol,lP r n.Pc 1. See above, p.60 t 
v.here the reference is quoted in part.
77. Gee above,p^O . /8.C.D.Broad, Op.cit. ,p,365 
79.See above,p 32 . EO.The Faith of a Moralist,
Vol. I,p. 282 
fil.See above,pA6Q > and Ju83.
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larger work is to demonstrate that, at not one but half a
dozen points, the moral life reaches beyond the limits of
12
mortality for its sanction and its fulfilment. (V) Pro­ 
fessor Taylor's earliest affiliations were strongly ideal­ 
istic and we have remarked that at this period his whole
reliance was placed on an "ontological argument" closely akin
83 
to what we have called "the idealistic form". In his later
thought this strain has almost disappeared. 3ut, unless I 
am mistaken, a single echo of it remains in the Gifford Lec­ 
tures. The writer's second proof of the rootage of values
84 
in actuality is, unless I completely misunderstand him,
practically identical with the argument associated with the
05 
thought of Dean Rashdall—our own "idealistic form".
(VI) Strangely enough there is not, as far as I can discover, 
any detailed development of the fact of a "moral order" in 
Professor Taylor's writings, except as it finds its place 
in his larger and masterly teleological synthesis.
(VII) Kis cogent plea for the interpenetration of values
87 
and reality we shall note shortly. (VI II) And his complete
theistic position in its wider outlook is, in our Judgment, 
as able an example of what we have termed an "inclusive meta-
6c 69
physical view" as may easily be discovered.
So much for comprehensiveness. One would naturally 
look to his latest and fullest discussion of the theological
c2.See below, pp.ISSff. i.'3. See above,p.i62»and p.84 . 
84. See below f pp.l83ff. eg. See P.R.Tennant, Philosophical
, Theology r Yol.II.p.*?.
86. See below, ppp2Uff. c7.3ee below,pp.133fT. ;and above, p.87 
88.See aoove,p.88 . 89.jee summary of "The Y^n^ication
of Religion",above ^M*n€ belov,.
p]?.225ff. A *
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implications of morality,i.e. to the Gifford Lectures, 
for the most adequate treatment of these matters. Thi» 
expectation is not fully Justified by the facts. The work 
is replete with illuminating reflection^, Hut as a theie- 
tic argument The ffaith. of a Moralist i& f in the opinion of 
the present writer, at once less adequate in its scope and 
less persuasive in its presentation than the far briefer 
essay we have already considered. However because of its 
general importance we shall give some consideration to this 
work, using it as immediate background for our general com­ 
ments on Professor Taylor'e thought.
VI.
"The Faith of It is not easy to make up one's mind about The 
a Moralist. Faith of a Moralist. It would be expected to represent
the author's ripened wisdom on the most vital of all philo­ 
sophical issues, his m^rium ouua in the field of constructive 
metaphysics. There are passages of unusual brilliance and 
indeed certain sections of the large two volumes which seem 
to vindicate the reader's anticipations. But it is by no 
means certain that in its entirety this can be called a 
great work, or that it will hold a permanent place as one 
among the most important in the Gifford series. This same 
difficulty of Judgment seems to have troubled certain of the 
reviewers. It is perhaps not surprising to find the Dean 
of Winchester hailing it with unqualified enthusiasm, for 
his mind and Professor Taylor f s have long been sympathetic
173. 
comrades in matters of theology.
"We have read no book in the last ten years 
which has impressed us more by the range and profun­ 
dity of its thought, the fervour of its enthusiasm 
for truth and righteousness, and the force of its 
exposition and defence of the Christian Faith. The 
lover of Plato will find the essence of his teaching 
here distilled and christened by the greatest of 
living Platoniats... .Disciples of Yon Hugel will find 
his rich and mature apologetic taken up into a philo­ 
sophy which, losing nothing in depth, represents a 
voider and more liberal Catholicism." 90
Almost equally high praise from Dr. J.H.Muirhead is more 
significant. After speaking in the warmest terms of the 
writer's personal eminence as philosopher and theologian
("one of the acutest, as he is certainly the most learned,
91 
supporters of Theism in Great Britain"), he says of the book
itself, "It would not be too much to say that, had he been 
dean or bishop in the Church of England, his book might have
i
a claim to rank with those of the great apologists of the
92 
faith from Hooker to Lightfoot." On the other hand Pro­
fessor C.D, Broad's note in gjUB^L must be called, at the least, 
icy. It amounts to hardly more than an enumeration of a 
partial list of the reviewer's radical criticisms of the 
argument. .Vords of praise are confined to a final paragraph,
added as though as afterthought and applying solely to the
93 
digressions in the text.
Several features of a general character in the method 
and style somewhat limit the force of the argument :-
90. E.G.Selwyn, in Theology TMaroh 1931,p.l21.
91. J.H.Muirhead, in Hibbert Journal r Anril 1931,p,J?53.
92. Ibid.
93. c.D.Broad, in MiM,July 1931»PP-364ff . see quotation below 
p.179.
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a. We hare already referred in passing to Professor
-j>4 
Taylor's fondness for digression. He permits his mind to
be lured from its main course along one and another faci- 
nating but comparatively irrelevant bypath. Of some of 
these ligressions the author is fully aware; he enters 
apologies for them. But others sesm to be unnoticed by him; 
one would Judge them to be inevitable in thought so obviously 
overflowing with ideas on every manner of topic. The di­ 
gressions are almost always interesting and not infrequently 
enlightening as well as delightful; but they do seriously 
interfere with the progress of thought, for both writer and 
reader, and consequently weaken the power of the case he ia 
making. This limitation is especially unhappy for an inter­ 
est like our own and in its contrast with the more orderly 
progress in the writing of the other thinkers we are con­ 
sidering. One may delight in Professor Taylor's lavish 
comment as Professor Muirhead does when he speaks, and quite 
truly, of "a book in which one constantly feels the richly
endowed mind of the author beating against the limits that
95 
two large volumes impose." Or one may, with Professor .Broad,
find this feature a satisfying compensation for certain other 
and more serious limitations:-
*I must remark that much of the value and inter­ 
est of Professor Taylor's book is to be found in 
the long digressions which he constantly makes. These 
do, indeed, seriously interrupt the main argument. 
J3ut they contain many of Professor Taylor's most
94. Gee above,p.92 .
95. J.H.l£uirhead,op.cit.,p.553.
lac ,
original and ingenious reflexions on all manner of 
subjects, and they are replete with the astonishingly 
wide and deep learning which he pours into all his 
writings."
In any event they are a delight to the casual reader, if an 
irritation to the serious student, ^uite probably they 
should be accepted, like the other limitations we shall 
speak of, as characteristics of the writer's mind and with 
gratitude for an intellect so abundantly stored,
b. Leas readily pardonable is the extent to which Pro­ 
fessor Taylor makes his own constructive argument the occasion 
for long and sometimes wearisome attacks upon other writers. 
I cannot avoid the conclusion that this amounts to a very 
serious weakness. Again the attention is diverted from its 
main concern, but this time without always the compensation 
of refreshment or illumination. The argument takes on an 
unfortunate polemical tone. One would not be so disposed 
to object on this point if the targets of Professor Taylor 1 s 
attack had been more widely selected from the thought of the 
centuries which he draws upon so readily for constructive 
purposes. But most of them are his contemporaries - prin­ 
cipally McTaggart, Bradley and Bosanquet - and this tends to 
stamp his whole discussion with a note of contemporaneity 
regrettable in the exposition of a thinker's final philo­ 
sophical credo. This is, I think, the most unfortunate 
consequence of this feature of the work.
c. Xrora the point of view of this study, there is a 
96. C.D.Broad,op.cit.,p.375.
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further limitation inherent in the writer's method of hand­ 
ling hia material. He is not primarily interested in a 
theiatic proof but in a diacriminating and acute analysis 
of moral living. Strictly speaking, The Faith of a Moralist 
contains no "argument for God". To be sure the opening 
discussion seeks to make good the most fatal shortcoming 
of Kant's poaition by showing the essential interdependence 
and interpenetration of Values and Actuality. J?Tom that 
point onward, it seems to be assumed that the main case haa 
been established; whatever moral experience requires for 
its fulfilment may be regarded as guaranteed for it in 
actuality. The discussion is occupied with certain in­ 
variable features of the moral life, and there are suggestions 
as to the character of the world, of the future life and of 
God which are demanded if the moral life ia to realise itself 
fully. But there ia no attempt to prove that belief in 
these realities is Justified. It ia shown what a God 
adequate for morality would be like; there ia no further 
evidence that such a God ia. 1 think it is not unfair to 
aay that, from the beginning of the third chapter of the 
first volume, the reality of God - and essentially the God 
of a rich and full Christian tradition - ia assumed, ouch 
light as we get concerning him comes almost by the way, aa 
corollaries to faoinating comments on a varied panorama of 
moral issues.
d. There ia a more fundamental limitation for which
182.
Professor Taylor is less blameworthy. At not a few points, 
the discussion advances "by dogmatic affirmation or 
argumenturn ad hominem. rather than by reasoned and per­ 
suasive argument. I find the margins of my two volumes 
liberally peppered with question-marks and crosses. .But 
I am not sure whether this failure of slow and patient 
cogency should be put to Professor Taylor's blame or credit. 
If one were to judge by this work alone, he would be tempted 
to the opinion that the author T s greatest powers are critical 
and polemical, but not constructive. His mind appears 
too impatient thoroughly to weigh and estimate an opinion 
with which he feels instinctive disagreement, too intrigued 
by interesting diversions ever to erect by tedious labor 
a compelling positive position, Uut from acquaintance 
with others of Professor Taylor f s constructive writings, 
especially the two essays discussed in a preceding section, 
I should rather conclude that this shortcoming in the Gifford 
Lectures it attributable to two reasons. Partly it is due 
to an inherent characteristic of the author's mind; but 
partly to the fact that, despite the importance of this 
lectureship, that mind was here by no means at its best 
throughout the two volumes. AS for the first reason— 
Professor Taylor's native tendency to polemic —I should be 
inclined to forgive it gladly. On every page one feels 
oneself in contact with a soul which holds|ief inite and 
strongly buttressed convictions and which must body them 
forth with vigor and incisiveness, at whatever pain to
185*
oversensitive toes which may be trampled on in the process* 
Possibly we have had too much of courteous but half-hearted 
apologetic. Certainly positive affirmation, unequivocally 
put, is as arresting as it is refreshing. One surmises 
that Professor Taylor was built for advocacy, rather than 
conciliation. And one rejoices in the fact. .out one must 
reluctantly acquiesce in Professor .broad's general comment
that these volumes are more calculated to "impart a pleasing
97 
glow of self-satisfaction to the already convinced" than to




An introductory chapter considers the proper meaning 
and scope of Natural Theology and then proposes the three 
questions which the writer intenda to make central for his 
whole aorJtJ-
1. Is the moral life autonomous; or does it aspire
''towards a good which is strictly speaking 'eternal 1 , 
outside the temporal order and incommensurable with 
anything falling within that order"V 9^
2. If our true good is something infinite and eternal, 
can we imagine it as achievable through human effort 
alone; or does it necessarily preeup^oae an antecedent 
outgoing movement from the side of the eternal —'the 
grace of God 1 ? 99
3a. "What is the kind and degree of autonomy which may
reasonably be claimed for any science?" 
3b. "Under what limitations ia it possible to claim
some kind of primacy for the science of theology?" 100
Consideration of the first of theee three questions 
brings ue at orce face to face with the whole troublesome
«• •••» «r
97. C.D.JBroad,op.cit. f p,368.




issue of the relation of facts to ralues --whether we are 
entitled to expect any "theological implications" from 
morality or whether morality by its very nature must tell 
us only of what "ougfct to be" but nothing of what "is? This,
Professor Taylor regards, as "the most important problem in
101 
the whole range of philosophy".
"The possibility of genuine worship and religion 
i« absolutely bound up with a final coincidence of 
existence and value in an object which is at once 
the most rea,l of beings and the good * so #ood that 
none better can be conceived' , at once the Alpha, the 
primary and absolute source of being, <-jid the Omega, 
the ultimate goal of desire and endeavour." 102
Professor Taylor proposes three considerations in support 
of the necessary connection between existence and value. 
They do not traverse any significantly new ground. In 
essence, they closely parallel Professor Sorley's arguments 
for the objectivity of value; indeed, Professor Taylor con­
fesses the agreement of his own point of view with that of
103 
Moral Valugfi and "frjie idea of God.
a) All reference to value is reference to values in 
the concrete not in the abstract. We do not think of "virtue, 
art, science, health" as having value in themselves but only 
as actually expressed in human experience. It is not trutfr 
which has value, but knowledge of the truth; indeed, "the 
knowledge we value as good is primarily always 'knowledge
in act', the life of an existent individual intelligence
104 




104. Op. cit., p. 4C.
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practice, it is the virtuous act which we admire not virtue
in the abstract. Similarly, beauty has worth only in terms
of someone* s appreciation of it. Furthermore it is clear 
to value is always reference
that reference to something which is exiatent. either in 
fact or ex hypothesi. To sum up then, "(l) the truth, beauty, 
goodness to which we ascribe worth are in all cases 'con­ 
creted* , embodied in individuals of which they are the 
constitutive forms, and our ascription of worth is only 
significant in view of this embodiment of the 'universal* 
in the individual; (2) in all such judgements of value the 
reference to peraonal activities is always more or less ex­ 
plicitly present." 105
b> A truth is a proposition; and a proposition is 
always an assertion about what jLa.. But all assertions v<ith
a mean ing. i.e. all assertions about a value, "make a claim.
106 
whether well-founded or not, to be true and not to be false."
The fact that values cannot be dated or located should not
estop us from conceding their existence since the same limi-
107 
tation might well hold of other types of genuine existents.
c) The alleged dichotomy of existence and value 
"falsifies the facts of real life where existence and value 
appear always as distinguishable, but always as conjoined.
105. Op.cit.,p.45.
106. Op.cit.,p.5°»
107. Unless I misunderstand him, Professor Taylor is here 
associating himself with Dean Rashdall in what we 
have termed the "idealistic form" of the moral argument. 
(3ee above, p.84 andf p.176.1 *
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•...In life aa we all, including the laboratory worker
himself, live it, all is given, facts and valuations together
106 
in an undivided whole." "What is given is neither a con­
figuration devoid of sensible quality, nor a number of 
qualitatively definite disconnected ££££&, but a single 
most imperfectly discriminated whole, in which shape, colour, 
size, odour, sound, are all present from the outset, and 
progress in knowledge means, not making unauthorised additions
to this whole, but becoming increasingly sensitive to dis-
109 
tinctions within it." I no more put the quality of courage
into the courageous man than I put the colour of blue into 
the sky; in each case and equally I fincij. the quality de­ 
signated already there in the object known. The function 
of my mind is not creation, but discovery.
"What confronts us in actual life is neither 
facts without value nor values attached to no facts, 
but fact revealing value, and dependent, for the wealth 
of its content, on its character as thus revelatory, 
and values which are realities and not arbitrary fan­ 
cies, precisely because they are embedded in fact and 
give it its meaning. To divorce the two would be like 
trying to separate the sounds of a great symphony from 
its musical quality." 110
Therefore, values must have light to cast upon the real 
nature of Ultimate Reality.
Of the validity of these three arguments for the inter­ 
dependence of fact and value we have already spoken at some
length. The first is Professor Sorley's major contention,
111 
we have recognized its soundness. The second is more
original with Professor Taylor, and less convincing; one's
10&. The Paith of a Moraliat .Vol. I r p-^^i *6~
109. Op.cit.,p.52«
110. Op.cit.,p.6l. cp our own similar view above . pp. 66ff.
111. £ee above, pp. 112Tf. f *^
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estimate of its weight will be governed by one's attitude 
on certain prior questions in logic* The third is the consid­ 
eration which we ourselves pressed with considerable insis-
112 
tenoe against Kant's original severance of facts and values*
It is Professor Taylor's chief reliance; he presents it with 
clarity and.as it seems to us, unanswerable persuasiveness* 
The most important comment to be made upon this
whole section is not one of criticism in details, but rather
113 
a more fundamental query which Professor Broad has raised—
as to whether this argument, however convincing* is really 
necessary for Professor Taylor's main purpose* The weight 
of his confidence rests upon the third point which in essence 
is a vigorous criticism of Kant. But his own constructive 
argument from this point forward is itself almost identical 
with that of Kant* In establishing the genuinely objective 
ground of values and the inter penetration of the two aspects 
of experience which Kant had sought to sever, the way is 
prepared for a fresh formulation of the argument from moral 
experience to God. From this point, a course might have been 
traced, somewhat akin to Professor Sorley's, to a thoroughly 
convincing position. But the opportunity is passed by. Instead. 
Professor Taylor turns aside to reassert Kant's claim that 
the fact of moral obligation in itself implies the reality 
of the conditions without which the obligation could not be 
fulfilled. But for the argument in this form, it is no more 
necessary for him than it was for Kant himself to establish 
the interpenetratlon of values and actuality*
112* See above,pp.66 ff.
115* C*D. Broad,op.cit.,p.365.
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The Idea of God* We hare pointed out that the coherent logical
sequence of reasoning ends here. From this point forward 9 
consideration foousses on one after another diverse aspects 
of moral experience* In almost every case.attention is 
drawn to certain features of the character of God which 
the particular aspect of the moral life under review would 
seem to imply. And it is assumed that these implied features 
must be true of reality. But no evidence or argument in 
vindication of them is presented. Nor are the scattered 
fragments of suggestion concerning the nature of God 
gathered into a unified summary; the task of synthesis 
must be undertaken by each reader for himself. However, 
it is quite possible to piece together the Individual 
bits;and from such a synopsis a coherent and lofty idea 
of God results. Tfee implications for our thought of God 
imbedded in the remaining chapters of these two large 
volumes may be summarised QB follows:-
a. It is the characteristic of our moral life that 
it is at one and the same time rooted in the flux of tern* 
poral events, and yet dependent for its fulfillment upon 
a perfect and absolute good and upon the possibility of 
possessing that perfect good for all eternity. Two con­ 
sequences follow:- 1) the actuality of God as the required 
perfect and final good; and 2) the assurance of an eternal 
life for the moral personality.
"Full achievement of the aspiration which lies 
behind all moral advance is only possible if there 
really is a good by the quest and attainment of which 
human endeavour will be finally unified and made single
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of aim. The moral quest will be self-defeating 
unless there is an object to sustain it which em* 
bodies in itself good completa and whole 9 so that 
in having it we are possessing that which absolutely 
satisfies the heart's desire and can never be taken 
from us. The possession must be possession of a 
•thing infinite and eternal', and this points to the 
actuality of God , the absolute and final good, as in* 
di spans ably necessary if the whole moral effort of 
mankind is not to be doomed ab initio to frustration. 
On the other hand t if the effort is to reach its goal, 
the possession of the supreme good on our part must 
also be itself final; we muat be able to look forward 
to having the infinite good, and to having it in 
perpetuity... .Thus morality Itself seems to imply, as 
a condition of being something more than a mere crying 
for the moon, an eternal destiny for the human person, 
and so far as life becomes an endeavor to adjust the 
self to such a destiny, it would be ceasing to be 
merely ethical and taking on a specifically religious 
character. n 114
b» Likewise, when we bring the sense of moral obligation 
under more careful scrutiny, we discover that it is always 
a sense of obligation not to a relative good but to an 
absolute good; that that absolute good forever stirs within 
us a restless dissatisfaction with whatever meager moral 
achievement may be ours; that this absolute good is but; 
slowly revealed to us and gradually and partially apprehen­ 
ded by us as we grow in moral grace; and that its recognised 
right to our worship as well as to our obedience suggests 
that it springs from a living, intelligent, moral Will.
"All the moral progress of intividual man, or of 
societies, has found its inspiration in a 'divine 
discontent', a sense of best which is beyond all the 
good that has so far been achieved. It is the men who 
will be content with nothing but the best whom we have 
to thank for every serious advance which man and 
society have actually made towards even a moderately 
1 better'. " 115
"We learn what the law of the moral life is by 
obeying it; clear knowledge does not precede perf ro­ 
mance, but follows upon it.... The moral law by which 
our conduct is to be Judged is.... gradually disclosed,
Moralist. Vol. I.115. up. ci
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as we gradually grow into humanity. Its primal 
seat,then,cannot be in a reason which is already 
ours by possession f but must be in that 'reason* 
into conformity with which we are slowly growing,? 
It is a reason which is only communicated to us in 
part and gradually,and that in proportion to our 
faithfulness to the revelations already received. 
We do not make the law, we discover it and assent to 
it,and it is for that reason that no attitude to the 
source of the law is adequate,unless it has passed 
from mere respect into that unqualified reverence 
which we know as adoration and worship. And we can 
only worship....that which is already all, and more 
than all, we mean when we speak of ourselves as 
living,intelligent,moral,and personal....Thus viewed, 
the 'supreme good' takes on the full character of a 
living,spiritual, and personal God, and the life of 
fulfilment of duty the character of a daily appro­ 
priation of the riches of God." 116
c. An even more particular examination of the con­ 
sciousness of moral failure,the sense of sin, reveals that, 
in its deepest, noblest and truest instinct, it is always 
felt not as the violation of a wise regulation but as an 
offense against a supremely worshipful person.
"When we fell as we ought to feel about the evil 
in ourselves, we cannot help recognising that our posi­ 
tion is not so much that of someone who has broken a 
wise and salutary regulation,as of one who has Insulted 
or proved false to a person of supreme excellence, 
entitled to whole-hearted devotion....If we are to 
think adequately of the shame of disloyalty to our best 
spiritual ideal, we have to learn to think of that 
ideal as already embodied in the Living and personal 
God,and of falsehood as personal disloyalty and ingra­ titude to God.,,.
nFor the moralist, belief in the true and living God cannot be relegated to the position of an 'extra 1 , 
which we iaay perhaps bo allowed on sufferance to add 
to our respect for duty or regard for the good of our 
fellow-men,if physicist,biologist,and anthropologist 
will be kind enough to raise no objection. Belief in 
the absolute reality of God,and love for the God in 
whom we believe,are at the heart of living morality. 
The good of our fellow-men is unworthily thought of 
when we do not conceive that good as a life of know­ 
ledge of God and transformation by the knowledge into 
the likeness of God. And the love which arises from
116. Op.oit.,pp. 158;153jl59. Cp.above, pp.168-9 ( 1 and 4).
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our belief is the one motive adequate to secure the 
full ?md whole-hearted discharge of the duties laid 
on us by our ideal." 117
d.Once again,when we turn to the problem of adequate 
motivation for the moral life, it becomes apparent that 
man would never aspire to an ideal quite beyond his reach 
had he not been touched by that ideal in very fact,in 
actuality. His aspiration is response to such an initiative 
from the side of the ideal. Moreover he sees that ideal 
as in some sense part of himself,but of his potential self— 
of himself as he may become. Here we confront God both 
immanent and transcendent—immanent as the ideal already 
in some measure within the human self, transcendent as the 
ideal forever beyond the realisation of the self and sum­ 
moning it to ever higher endeavour. There follow important 
corollaries for the doctrine of God:— 1$ He is not merely 
the Maker of men,but also their Redeemer and Sanctifier; 
2) He is the inspirer of all their high endeavour; 3) 
human moral effort is a response to this touch from the 
divine; 4) God is in his inmost nature self-giving. Such 
a conception of God Involves anthropomorphism; it is the 
anthropomorphism which is inevitable in any ethical theology.
"If a man is to be raised in his whole being 
above his present unsatisfactory level, it is not 
enough that he should be able to conceive of a self 
better than tiiat he now possesses. The 'ideal* must 
be able to draw him with an overpowering force; it 
must be an efficient as well as final cause.....
"In all moral advance the ultimate 'efficient 
cause* must be the real eternal source of botfc be­ 
coming and value. 'The initiative in the process of 
'assimilation to God' must oome from the side of the 
eternal; it must be God who first comes to meet us, 
and who,all through the moral life itself, 'works in
117. Op.oit.,pp. 207;208;209-10. Cp. above,p.168 (3).
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us 1 , in a sense which is more than metaphorical* 
Our noral endeavours must be genuinely ours f but thagr 
must be responses to intimate actual contacts in 
which a real uod moves outward to meet his creatures, 
and by the contact at once sustains and inspires the 
appropriate response on the creature's part." 118
w No philosophy of pure 'immanence' can take 
the moral life seriously*••.^ man cannot revoive 
th« power to rise above his present moral level from 
his own inherent strength,because the process is one 
of rising above himself ,and,in the moral as in the 
physical world, you cannot lift yourself by the hair 
of your own heed....Morality itself, taken in earnest, 
thus involves the 'supernatural* ,ln the proper sense 
of that word,as its environment and daily nutriment,"119
i
"We may proceed to formulate some important con­ 
clusions concerning the doctrine of God....
"(l)««««<an ethical religion is inevitably....a 
religion for the ' twice-born'. Thou must be born again 
is the central proposition of ail genuine morality, 
and it is therefore indispensable to an ethical theo­ 
logy that it should conceive its God not only as the 
Maker who has brought man,like the rest of the creatures 
into temporal actuality, but as the source and sustainer 
of the aspirations by which man is made a new creature 
and puts off his first merely self-contained and ten- 
porally confined selfhood.God,that is,..,.must be con­ 
ceived not only as Creator,but also as Redeemer and 
Sanctifier....
"(2) The God of a theism whioh is definitely 
ethical cannot be thought of as related to man, and 
the system of creatures generally, r imply as Creator 
or a 'great First Cause' ....Y.'e know our true good, 
whioh is no other than God Himself, toy obscure t but 
none the less real and impressive,personal contacts 
with God....He is the inspirer of endeavour in all 
of us....An ethical Theism has then to conceive God 
as the 1 efficient 1 ,as well as the 'exemplary' cause of 
the whole moral life. From its humblest beginnings 
that life is, at every step, one of transformation into 
the likensss of that which we contemplate....
"(3)....If God is not only the goal, but the 
author and sustainer of moral effort,the whole moral 
endeavour of man must be a response to what we can 
only call a movement from the other side.... We love 
God because God first loved us..,.
"When we use such language,we know,of course, 
that we are speaking 'anthropomorphioallyt ,and that 
all'anthropomorphic' utterances about the divine are
118.Op.oit.,pp.8225233. 119.0p.oit.,pp.228;229;230.
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imperfect and attended with danger. But the attempt 
to expel anthropomorphism from our language about 
God is attended with worse dangers,,, .An ethical 
theology is necessarily anthropomorphic, in the 
sense that it interprets God and God's ways by the 
analogy of all that is most nobly human, and always 
with the further caution that as a completely human* 
ised man would be all we can picture to ourselves of 
what is admirable in man and something more, which 
we cannot yet picture because we ourselves are so 
far from being wholly humanised f so God is all that 
perfect human excellence would be and abundantly 
more.Thus the simple statement that God,whose initia­ 
tive is the source of all our advance in good,loves 
man as a father loves his children is inaccurate 
only because it ascribes too little to God....
n (4)...»The God of a trufcy moral Theism (must 
ba one whose) fundamental activity must involve 
expansion. And when we think of His action upon the 
world,we can only think of it as a life in which He 
gives Himself freely and generously to Hie creatures 
that they may be able to give themselves to Him,.,. 
He cannot be wholly blessed,except in blessing....
"It is Important to an ethical Theism to insist 
that there is no necessity external and superior to 
the Creator; He neither creates because He is con­ 
strained to create *nor gives the created world the 
structure It actually has because that structure is 
dictated by antecedent conditions. He is the foundation 
and absolute prius of all actuality and all possibility 
and He is all,and more than all,we understand by an 
intelligent and righteous will...,Creation is an act 
of free and intelligent choice.,..
"Because the mutual love in which each party 
bestows himself freely and completely and is freely 
and completely received is ethically the supreme 
spiritual activity,the life of God is thought of as 
involving an internal distinction as well as an inter* 
nal unity,in order that the whole activity of the 
divine life may be one of perfect and unlimited self- 
be stowal. n 120.
e.Finally, our contemplation of what may be the con­ 
ditions of life after death suggests one further character­ 
istic of the life of God—his vision of all time as though 
within a single present.
"How the world is apprehended by God none o* us 
would venture to say fbut we cannot corceive that it 
is not apprehended as an ordered scheme exhibiting
1?0. Op. o it., pp. 2,,3j 237-239; 239-243; 243-249.
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what is fundamental to the moral life, the one­ 
sided and inversible relation of real causal 
dependence, in that sense , I take it, there must 
be a prius and goe Serius in the world as appre­ 
hended by God. But there is no prius or posteriua 
in God t or in God's apprehension of the world. Jhe 
whole process 9 prius and posteriuB alike, would 
fall for God, who never bee owes, bin; is, within a 
single present." 121.
This completes the deductions to be made from 
moral experience directly* The conclusion IB succinctly 
summarised as "a belief in the final coincidence of the 
1 ought 1 and the 'is', in virtue of their common source in
a transcendent living and personal Good— one f complete,
122 
eternal" •
The second series of Gifford Lectures was con­ 
cerned with the relation of the natural theology developed 
in the first series and just presented in outline to the 
theologies of the historic religions. It would not be ex­ 
pected to make much addition to the positive conception of 
God. Such additional light as is proffered comes largely 
in the form of f suggestions* of what one would expect in 
the highest type of living religion, linked with the indica­ 
tion that these 'suggestions' are vindicated in the concrete 
faith of Christianity. But here, even less than in the 
earlier volume is proof or supporting argument attempted; 
the lecturer felt himself estopped from any such apologetic 
program by the conditions of his lectureship. T^e most 
important of these supplementary* suggest ions' are:-
f . A God whose essential nature is self-giving would 
be one constantly revealing himself to men; but it would be
anticipated that the supreme instance of his self-revela-
121.0p»oit.,pp.4P6-7. 122.0p.cit.,Vol.II,p.l.
123. Vol. II /'Natural Theology and the Po«i Uve Religions."
195.
tion; to the human race would occur through a concrete 
human life. Precisely such a divine revelation Christia­ 
nity claims to possess in its doctrine of the Christ*
"The religion which grapples most successfully 
with the practical task of reorganising life with 
an eternal Good at its center will be the religion 
which brings its God down most intljnatel^ into con­ 
tact with the temporal historical process, not one 
of those which simply set Him outside and beyond it, 
and consequently that it will find its historical 
connecting link between God and man in, a personality 
standing iii a much oloaer relation to ^od than that 
of the prophet,.,. We should naturally expect in such 
a religion what we actually find in Christianity, 
that its his^orio-0. revelation of °od consists primarily 
neither in a body of propositions about Cod, nor in a 
code of preoepts from ^od.but in the whole of a concrete 
divine personality and life; that, in fact, the 'revea- 
ler* would be the content of his own revelation. And 
for the same reason we night,!, think, anticipate 
a priori that the intellectual elaboration of tho self- 
disclosure of the divine through the detail of a 
concrete human life, its abstentions and its silences, 
no less than its acts and utterances, would inevitably 
Involve,,., a doctrine of the person of an histirlc&l •Christ 1 ."
6, Bflt the self -disclosure of the divine will not 
be thought of as occurring solely through a single indivi­ 
dual, but rather there preeminently. Of other self-disclo­ 
sures, however made, two invariable characteristics may be 
underlined — they will appear in that which is definitely 
historical, and the vivid marks of historicity will be 
recognised as verifying rather than weakening their authen­ 
ticity; in every appearance there will bo felt an element
of the wholly given, of that "refractoriness to complete
125 
intellectual analysis" which is the stamp not only of ob­
jectivity but also f in spiritual experience, of what men call 
the supernatural,
124, The Faith of a Iuoralist.Vol.II t pp-lP.l-g- 
up.cit.,p.£l3,
196*
"If our human knowledge of God is to be rnore 
than personal opinion, there must be control of cur 
personal intellectual constructions by something 
which is not constructed but received* ••• We must 
remember that there is, in the case of our knowledge 
of God also (as in our knowledge of Nature), that 
which IB simply received, net invented by ourselves, 
and is therefore, in its nature, simply authoritative, 
e genuine control on the wilfulncss of our individua­ 
lism, It is not bjrf searching 'that v/e find out God. 
And it is clear what this control must be. It must be 
the experience of rich, but confused, con tact with the 
supernatural which plays, in our knowledge of GOd, the 
same pert that immediate contact through sense with a 
confused 'other' does in our knowledge of nature, 11 126
"It is the same ^od who discloses Himself , at dif­ 
ferent levels, through the order of nature, through 
prophets charged vjitli a special message, through a Son 
who is the 'express image' of His person. In all three 
casos we have a contact with the supreme source of 
actuality and value, mediated by a contact with some­ 
thing or someone historical and temporal* •••There is 
an element of the wholly given and trans- subjective 
whioh ib absolutely authoritative, has unquestionable 
rit-^ht to control our thinking or acting, just because 
it is so utterly given to us, not made by us.... TYhenever 
in nature or supe mature, we are face to face with 
objectivity not to be explained away, God is speaking, 
but whether God speaks through the processes of nature, 
through a specific message brou<^ht by a specific 
messenger, of through a unique human life as a whole, 
the communications, of very different worth and depth, 
coming to us in these different w?:ys,all come through 
a channel which is creciturely, and none of them ever 
wholly loses all marks of the creaturehood of the 
channel,"
in thg iRteegugfe?? volume, we are 
brought at the end to the reminder of the differences 
which must raark the divine experience as ve try to think 
of it in terns taken from our own finite expf^ience. It is
a sqlutary reminder of the necessity for tentativeness,
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humility and a 'sane agnosticism' in humar speculation
*
on the nature of God.
"We are forced to recognise that the ideal type
126. Op.oit., pp. 220-1. 127. Op.cit., T)P .236-7. 
ISO. u .
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of individuelity, perfect a/id complete personality, can 
onlj; be actual in an individuel whoso own inner character 
is not only the dominant and principal, but the complete 
and sole deterciinant of the individual life, and such an 
individual could be no other than the ens realissimum. 
God." 129.
"If ;ve have once understood that eternity is the 
characteristic form not of inaction, but of activity of 
self-expression, we shall hardly be likely to retain the 
prejudice that emotion has no place in a strictly eternal 
life.... There will be good reason for believing that 
emotion has its place in the divine life as for holding 
the same thins of intellectual apprehension....Emotion in 
God must be of a different tonality from emotion in our­ 
selves, since there it cannot iuvo the special characters 
which tinge even our richest emotional life,derived as it 
is from the experiences of aspiration to an unattained self* 
expression,of baffled endeavour,endutanoe of final impover­ 
ishment or defeat..., Neither in our own experience of 
knowing nor in our own experience of feeling do we ever 
reach the point at which there is actual achieved and com­ 
plete eatoration of subject by object, full and final 
posceccion of object by subject. Yet we may be sure that 
this point is always reached and rested in in God's perfect 
possession of His own bein&. Our Joy, and our self-apprehen­ 
sion, at their highest,can only be distant analogues of 
such an experience; but it is GO truo that the analogy is 
re*ul as it is that it is distant." 130.
Conclusion. At their close,the Gifford Lectures return to reconsider
the question which had been proposed at their beginning—the 
degree of automony and of interdependence of the different 
sciences and,£iore specifically, the character of the authority 
to bo olAAiaeu for theology,the; ocience of religion. The writer's 
irenio conclusion is that each great department of human know* 
ledge of reality should be conceded., unlimited freedom to deal 
with its own material without interference from any correlative 
departtient. Of the worker in each field, it should be required 
only that "the matter upon which hie thought works shall be
something genuinely fflven ,and that in his refleotiv* elabora-
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tion of it he shall be true to jit." The disciplines to which
129. Op.cit.,p.365, 130. up.cit.,pp.370-2. 
31. Op.cifc.,p.390.
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so full a measure of autonoKcy cay bo attributed are con­ 
sidered to be three— natural science, ethics and theology* 
But it must be expected that the conclusions of two or more 
of these independent avenues to truth nay show apparent con­ 
flict. Then no $remuture and facile reconciliation is to 
be sought. Such conflicts counsel careful re examination of 
premisses and positions by the contradictory sciences. But 
in the end we may be forced to accept the conflicting con- 
elusions unreconciled, -bove cJ-l,tlie straining after a com­ 
pletely synoptic view is not advised. "Systematic all-round
olarity is hardly possible except for a vision content to
152 
remain on the surf&ae." A vision of the whole in which
every difficulty had vanished and all conflicts had been 
obliterated would be possible only to an omniscience which 
is not ours. And heru §especlally f the 'sane agnosticism* 
which has already been suggested is to be strongly recommended,
"It seems to me, then, that in the matter of the 
i «o autonomy f theology,ethici>, and natural know­
ledge stand all on one footing. ^11 have a right to 
exist, uncl each has the ri$it to doal with its own 
probleios without dictation from either of the others.1*..
"The conclusions of natural science cannot be 
wholly irrelevant to thoee of moral science, nor the 
conclusions of either to divinity, since all alike deal 
with elements in the BtiJue given, Life and the world 
are, in the end, one ancl not raany, and therefore any 
version of She doctrine of tho 'double truth 1 must, 
in the lon^; run, be destructive of the ideal of truth 
itself... ••
"It is our duty as rational beings to aim at the 
unified view, but it ic surety an illusion to imagine 
that- the unified vieiv will ever be within the grasp of 
finite intelligences, eendeioned by their finitude to get 
at truth piecemeal. *r$ account of the real which is to 
do justice to all the features it presents to us is 




11 If fce are to find that ncrc excellent way. 
ire inust, * should say, safeguard our selves in all 
our thinking, alike as theologians, as metaphysicians, 
as workers in the various sciences, by a real and frank 
confession of a sane agnosticism, unwelcome to the 
temper of a self-confident age....A genuine agnosti­ 
cism, which is neither that of indolent indifference 
nor that of despair, means some, thing different. *t 
means the repression not of another man's self-con* 
fidence,but of uy own.... It deans.... in other words, 
scrupulous conscientiousness in distinguishing what 
is really forced upon me by the given from what may 
be personal and arbitrary in my interpretation of 
the given, and capable of being shown to be so by 
comparison with the attempts of others to say what 
they find given to iihen. ...
"The very fact of our OT<II existence and the 
existence of our world sets us problems, and thereby 
iiaposee on ui3 uiie iaor> 1 obligation of dealing with 
problems, not all of whicfe can be treated by the 
special nothods or natural science, #or yet all by 
the special methods of theology, and thus Justifies 
the existence of both studies, while the necessarily 
tentative character of all our human thinking makes 
it impossible tlu t eithor should ever be simply ab­ 
sorbed into metaphysics. That consummation would only 
be possible if the acbutJ. could be completely ration­ 
alised without ceasing to bo a given actual. And if 
v/e were in possession of a corr.piotely rationalised 
actual, we should no longer have either science or 
iheology; both would huve given place to something 
better than either— visi on. "
Criticism. It will be concede^ tltf.nk, 'chat the group of
extracts we hare fciveja present a clear, coherent and extra­ 
ordinarily attractive conception of Ood» But it is not 
unfair to add tiii c tne oa.-? ;iul reader of the two volumes 
froii which they have bew* drawn irlght easily lay his study 
aside without the impression of so definite and persuasive 
a theieia. If the quotations lose sone thing in individual 
colour by being lifted rron their respective settings, the 
conclusion to which Taiey unitedly contribute gains not a 
little in clurity ted power* Here is further ground for 
13c. ^p.cit., Chapter IX,espec.pp.594;399 j 397; 404-5 5 407.
800* 
&uftr.t'ioniii£ the wledca*. cf Professor Taylor s delightful
*»
but diffuse style,
If we had further critical comment to add, it would
be to raise the Question whether the meager metaphysical
134 
argument of Volume I,Chapter II ("Actuality and Value" )
can 8up;x>rt so considerable P. metaphysical superstructure. 
To bo sure. Professor Taylor's theisra.like that of Professor
Bfiillle, might have boon pudforward as an example of the
135 r 
pure Kantian type. It nifjhl; hold its great convictions
in the final analysis by faith ,without supporting evidence 
beyond thoir necessity £s postulates for the moral life* 
(Thore are strains In the argument which seem to indicate 
that ';hia io the author's intention,as we shall note in 
a rnoiaent.) But I do not understand that this is the writer's 
ds6Agn; lie intends to vindicate the reasonableness of 
inference fraa morality to (*od*The supporting argument 
hero presented lacks some thins of adequacy* The mere estab­ 
lishment of a loous for values within reality ( and this 
seems to be tho sum of tliu argument of the section on 
"actuality and Value") would justify the claim that moral 
experience nust throw aimo light on ultimate reality; but 
hardly the claim «hat all thd demands of the moral conscious* 
nsss are jpao faotp ^uaranteod satisfaction* With Sorley 
this was hardly more tlian tho first step of a theistic proof* 
Profosaor Taylor's ouse ot&nds soroly in need of Professor 
Sorley's closely reasoned argument.
To ba sure, it mi^lit be held, as indeed it is by 
134. §ce abovo f yp*183-7. 135 . bee above,p.78.
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Professor Broad, that, Professor Taylor Intends to follow
hard on tho example of Kant and furnish »o evidence for 
His metaphysical conelusions other than the fact that 
they are 'demands' of the moral consciousness. There are 
at least two important passages which lend strong support 
to this reading of his iaind.a)It is clear that the argu- 
nent for immortality is put squarely on the Kantian basis.
"4 moral argument for immortality should take 
the form of en ar^msnt that the destruction of our 
human personalities must stultify the whole moral life 
by making i^r; supreme and unattainable.... The argument 
will be, succinctly formulated, that since the moral 
law can rightfully command us to live as aspirants to 
eterrlty, eternity must really be our destination." 137
But a moment later we ure told:*
"It is, in fact, a legitimate inference from the 
reality of a funotioa to the reality of the environ­ 
ment where the function will find its use." 138
This is,I should suppose,an extension of the inner logic 
of Kant's argument which the latter nJLght not readily have 
recognised as a valid interpretation of his owa critical 
reasoning. xn >.;ny event, belief in irnnortality is here 
presented au a proper corollary of certainty of the ultimate 
etatuB of the iiortil life; %,nd whether it is held on any 
solider foundation than the appeal to "faith" will depend 
upon whether reasonable evidence is relied upon for estab­ 
lishing the strtus of tho riorol life in ultimate reality. 
This carries us to the second critical passage.
bjTorurd. the very end of th« second, volume, in the 
concluding discussion of ''Fuith and Knowledge", there occur 
theeo interesting sttiteiaents:-
"The conviction of the rationality of the world,
136. C.D.Droad,op.cit.,p.S65. See above, p. 187.
137. The Faith of & koralist.Vol.1 f p-gai- 138.0p.cit.,p.28S.
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on which all pursuit of truth is founded, is strictly 
a postulate of the 'practical* reason* >LH historical 
ror Id ie not rational in the s^nue that it ever has
beon, or ever will be, actually rationalised f i.zide celf- 
explanatory and self- justifying, by the labours of 
philosophers, ever, to the extent of successfully rapping 
out its ground-plan \,ith finality, t is our unending 
task to divine the suprene pn^ern 6f the- re:;l t end so 
to rationalise it, to the bftr.1; of our power Renewing 
y/eitl th^t the oleiaent of the disconcerting and per­ 
plexing will never be elininatecl." 139
Note that here it ie not only the character of the world 
as f moral* but ^bc character of the world ac 'rational' 
irhich is zaade a postulate of the practical reason. In brief 
it is simply a vigorous reninder tht:t we never ere finally 
successful in recttieinG cur t-'orld to logical catogori?!p t and 
that science «s well as norality and religion adV8.nceelat 
each step of progress on r. never -completely-proven as&umption 
of the inherent rationality of the universe. That the assumf* 
tion irust forever elude full proof is inevitable in the ! 
character of our experience as historical. These are points 
on wliicl'a we ourselves would wish to insist with soms empha­ 
sis. Tfca« it is Prof esscr Taylor'.s intention so to extend 
the meaning of 'pOLtul^te of the yraotirr! reason* , and that 
he intends nothing i/iore, is strongly ruggeBted by a closely 
parallel p
"Wheu we say that the world of the historical is 
rational and that its rationality is a postulate of 
s&ne philosophy, all that we h^ve Q right to mean is 
that this world has a definite pattern which connects 
ito part ̂  in a thorou^ligoing unity.,., The proposition
_
never to stop snort In the' business of looking for a 
hit>her and more doioinant pattern in the course of the 
historical than any we hava yet found, not; an assertion 
that the tusk hus been achieved. The v.orlc. is there
159.
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as a problem; we have to T rational!ef1 * it,but,ln 
fact twe never succeed fully in carrying out the 
rcork," 140.
But f some what in contrast \«ith those two otetenents,riay 
be placed a section which occurs in irn eoiat« proxir-iity 
to the first of the t??o quotations:-
"So far fie the sciences ero concerned, the real 
world Blent equally well he an ae&eirhl&ge of mindless 
a.hd ])urpor*el&&£ automate.! or & commonwealth of free 
end purposive ness events under the morel ftover&nent 
of uod; only the extrt«~ecientif ic consideration that 
if the first eccount Is the true one genuine *noral 
responsibility Trust be tua illusion Justifies our 
acceptance of the second, no the justification has 
no force except for the isan who accepts the fact of 
moral responsibility, and accepts it, not because 
there *ould bo a demons tra Die absurdity in denying 
it | but because he is personally a nan of high inward 
iiorality, tfhOBe life rould become purposeless if 
morality ^ere Sisiriseed as an illusion. So far t ae 141 
it iseeiiis to ioe f Kant f s procedure is thoroughly Round. n
We have here been re introduced to an unrelieved 
vein of thought. It is such passage 6 t no doubt 9 which have 
prompted Professor Broad to contend that Professor Taylor 
has no nedd of evidence fcr tho status of values in ultimate 
reality since," his main ar<!ur»nb is of the Kantian form, 
the existence of n rcorrl obligation to the exis­
tence of those conditions without which th* obligation
142 
would be incapable of fulfillment," But the general
tenor of the discussion and f far r.ore, his direct teaching
143 in hie other writings some of which have been reviewed above
would seem to support our own conclusion that this is not 
Professor Taylor's more fundanental position; he means to 
support the demands odf the F*ornl consciousness by a general 
metaphysical argument. In any ev*nt, we are left in so^e
. 141. Op.cit. f pp,379-a80. lA?>.C."j.Broad,op.cit.,p.3o5. 143, See.,3apecially, quotations
on. pp. 172-3 above.
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real confusion in the matter; and I *ua incJ ined to .think 
the reader's bafflement my reflect, a certain lack of 
clarity in the writer's own thoa^ht. It is one thin;; to 
adirJ.t,that the nature of ultimate reality con never bo 
fully inown by us, though it ic avor being progressively 
better known and such increaBinr; knowledge briars an 
increasing prngiaat&c verification of the postulate cf its 
complete raijionr.lity, It is quite another thing to hold 
that ultimate reality can never be assuredly known in its 
rtai nature and that its rationality xnnat forever resrln 
sorely a pootui^u of the practical reason, held by ?ai-ch f 
as Kant encouraged Den to do* It ia the elementary distinc­ 
tion between the "inherently unknowable" and the "unknown—
the not jret known, and doubtless never by us so be fully144 "* 
known, but still the ever to be better known" . By the
same token, it is one thln& to recognise that full proof 
that our vajuos are grounded in ulti^te reality and that 
they have the support of the reality behind the world riuet 
forever be wanting — the final certainty wam'c be ono of fr-ith- 
although our advancing undorst&ndino; of our world and of 
the testimony of history lends steadily jaounting support 
to the postulate. It is quite another thing to hold that 
the mor'il postulata oan 'txs ir4aintain^d only as-.^U^act of 
f&lth,l«9t tl-ife Tsior-- •! consciousness be outraged. It is the 
diffarencse between regBirdin.? faith es the final court of 
appeal or the only court of appeal ia the justification 
of thsistic belief, The latter was Kant's ;rx>?;itionjand we
144, A*S.?rin^.o-.?attison f I'hfc Idoa of ^>od in the Li t-; 
of e e ent Ph 1 .to no phy pVlo'Q' > *
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shall very shortly meet it again in the thought of
145 
Professor Daillie. But as I understand him,it is the former
of these two alternatives which Professor Taylor is con­ 
cerned to support»but his intention is by no means clear.
The frailty of Professor Taylor1 s substantiation 
of the objectivity of values and their rootage in the 
heart of reality is all the more regrettable when we dis­ 
cover that he had strong supporting evidence at his finger­ 
tips. His position could have been strengthened by appeal 
to either epistemological or cosmological considerations) 
both lines of argument are well presented in the body of 
his work but in neither instance is the weight of the evi­ 
dence brought to bear upon this particular point. It is in
the discussion of authority that the most satisfactory dis-
146 
ouscion of the writer's theory of knowledge occurs. He
there develops a type of natural or critical realism so 
nearly akin to that which Baron Von Hugel made the concern 
of all his later reflection that one can hardly resist the 
hazard that the one has strongly influenced the other. 
The heart of the case ifl—in both our knowledge of the 
physical world through sense-experience and in our knowledge 
of the realm of values through artistic or moral apprecia­ 
tion,we are dealing with a confused though real 'given 1 
which we do not create but which comes to us from a 'beyond'; 
in both cases,and in both cases alike, the energy of reflec­ 
tion should be directed merely to the better understanding147 —————————»
of this 'given 1 data of experience. An interpretation of
145. See below,pp.213ff.
146. The Faith of a Moralist.Vol. II r m>.213-237. 
147. See quotations given :,bove on pp.158-61; 196.
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the process of knowing along these lines claims for the 
reality apprehended through value-appreciation a status 
in reality fully as objective and as valid as that con­ 
ceded to the reality known through the senses with which 
the sciences deal. It is true that this position had been
anticipated in the third argument for the objectivity of
148 
values ; but it was there declared rather than expounded
and defended. The whole of the subsequent inferential 
reasoning from the* demands of the mor^l consciousness to 
the character of God would have been greatly strengthened 
if the epistemological premisses of the author had been 
clearly presented early in his discussion.
The other line of support to be proposed is raore 
important—that from cos Biological and teleological con­ 
siderations, .as we shall note be low, one of the most masterly 
Weltanschaunn which modern thought has given us is to be
found in the course of Professor Taylor's consideration of
149 
"Other-worldliness". In brief,he has here brought to
unity the soundest elements in the philosophy of •emergent 
evolution 1 of Professors Lloy£wMorgan and Alexander, the 
•philosophy of organism* of Professor v/hitehead, find the 
profoundly religious 'critical realism1 of Baron Von Hugel. 
The outcome is a portrayal of the "real world" as na 
hierarchised,or many-levelled,whole" in which "the'domi­ 
nant 'characters of the pattern should only be recognisable 
for what they really are when we set ourselves to study it 
in the light of the richest subpatterns of all, those of
the highest structures known to us, living and intelligent




creatures." Comprehension of the totality of this
organic pattern which our world is lies beyond our powers, 
but we are able to discern the relatively dominant features.
And it is quite clear that rtf values 1 are simply the domi-
151 
nant features in the pattern of reality." "In our view,**
the so-called 'values' must be the most potent of all the
152 
'forces' or influences which shape the course of actuality."
This is precisely the line of reasoning which we suggested 
might greatly have strengthened Professor Sorley's argument
and which we shall make the starting-point of our own con-
153 
structive suggestions —that the most convincing evidence
of the vital status of values in reality is to be discovered 
through a teleological view of thv world which reveal values 
as organic to the whole of reality, but as the consummatory 
level in the hierarchy of degrees of reality. Professor 
Taylor is quite right in claiming that "this is the final 
justification of the refusal we long ago made to admit any
ultimate dualism of a realm of actuality and a distinct and
154 
separate realm of value" . T^e pity is that this clinching
argument had not been presented 'long ago',that the inter­ 
vening inferences might have carried greater conviction.
The sum of the matter is that the theistic proof in 
these Gifford Lectures suffers through a too exclusive de­ 
pendence upon the evidence from morality. The author's 
earlier wisdom was the sounder:-
"I have urged that the suggestions of an eternal above ;ind behind the temporal are derived from three 
independent sources, and that the agreement of the 
three in tholr common suggestion gives it a force
150.Op.cit.,p. 362. 151.Op.cit.,p. 374.153 - s°'pp - 121f & below -
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which ought .to be invincible.... The full force of the 
vindication of religion cannot be felt unless we 
recognise that its weight is supported not by one 
strand only but by a cord of three intertwined strands; 
we need to integrate Bonaventura and Thomas and 
Butler with Kant to appreciate the real strength of 
the believer's position." 154
In summary then, our principal criticisms of The 
Faith of a Moralist would be: —
1.The diffuseness of its style and the author's inveterate 
fondness for digression seriously interfere with the 
cohesion of the argument and , consequently, diminish its 
power •
2. The case for the rootage of values in objective reality 
is not presented with maximum strength. Liore ftonstnuc- 
tivelyf the progress of the argument would have been 
greatly aided if a clear exposition of the author's 
theory of knowledge and of his world-view had been made 
early in the work.
3. The argument rests too heavily upon the the facts of 
tne moral life alone, to the neglect in the first place 
of the evidence from other forms of the experience of 
value, and in the second place of the important evidence 
from a philosophy of Nature and a total world- view.
4. The author does not make clear how much importance he 
attaches to 'evidences' for the reality of God, how far 
he believes all the great beliefs of religion to be 
held beyond evidence, by faith.
Certain other limitations which spring from inherent charac­
teristics of the writer's mind or personality we have had
155 
occasion to note earlier. One or two further weaknesses
which mark his thought as a whole rather than this particular
156 
work will toe mentioned in our final comi.ent.
he Four Norma- 
ive Issues.
VIII.
Professor Taylor's conviction on the first two of 
the four questions which we gfe using as connecting-links 
in our critical discussion hat appeared in the course of
154. Essays Catholic and Critical. pp. 80:65. See above, p. 172.
155. oee above, pp. 178ff .
156. See below, p. 224.
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Professor Taylor's conviction on the first two of 
the four questions which we &fe using as connecting-links 
in our critical discussion has, appeared in the course of
154. Essays Catholic and Critical.pu.80;65«See above, p. 172.
155. oee above, pp. 178ff.
156. Jee
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the preceding exposition; it may be briefly summarised 
here*
a.Objectivity a.Profesoor Taylor regards the relation of values
of Values. to actuality as "the moat important problem in the whole
157 
range of philosophy" . At various points in his writings
five independent but converging lines of reasoning in
five substantiation of the object] status of values in ultimate
reality are advanced. They are:-
1.From an analysis of the meaning of the term 'value 1 . 
This is an argument from the invariable reference to 
objective reality in value-terms as we habitually 
employ them.
v/henever men usd terms signifying value or worth, 
they always have reference to a concrete fact—to 
a particular thing or person or attitude or act- 
not to a value in the abstract. And the:jalways 
assume the existence, either in fact or ex hypothe si, 
of that which is valued. Further,their ascription 
of value always implies a reference,more or less 
explicit, to personal activity as the originator and 
the appreciator of that which is valued. In sum, 
values 'intend* reference to objective reality, to 
existent reality,and to personal agency. (156)
2.From a more careful examination of the concept of 
'truth' as a value. This may be regarded as an argu­ 
ment from logic.
We have just recognised that truth is one of the 
ultimate values. But any truth is a proposition; 
and a proposition must be an assertion about what 
is. Therefore, a value-statement ^vhich makes pro- 
ression to be a true statement must be a statement 
about an existent. (159)
3.From a study of the way in which value§ actually make 
their appearance within human experience. This is 
an epis temological argument.
Actual life knows nothing onmere 'facts' or mere 
'values', but only of 'facts revealing v^.Vass 1 . 
What is actually presented to us in experience 
is 'a single most imperfectly discriminated whole?
157.The Faith of a Ijoralist.Vol.I.p.,56.
158. Op. cit.,pp.37-47.bee above, p.184. Cp.also,ooiar,Bnt on
tho closely parallel argument of Sorley,above,pp.112ff. 
159. Op. cit.,pp.48-55. See above,pp.185 584;176.
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from which the aspects of shape, of colour, of 
beauty, e^c., are discriminated by the mind through 
analysis. In this respect, the knowledge of Nature 
and tna knowledge of ""lalues fltand on a par; there 
is no more valid reason to deny objectivity in one 
case than in the other. In neither type of know- 
lodge does the nind read its own interpretations 
into the data presented to it; the proper function 
of ; the mind in knowledge is not creation,but dis­ 
covery. And the energies of reflection should be 
devoted entirely to achieving a more complete and 
more discriminating understanding of the 'given' 
data of experience. (160)
4.From a study of the way in which values appear within 
the worid-process f and of their relation to other 
features of that process. This is a cosmologioal- 
tele.ological. argument.
Our world is most truly represented as a single 
complex pattern which is reproduced with varying 
degrees of fullness and distinctness in the 
various sub-patterns which constitute the different 
elements in human experience. This pattern of the 
one world embraces all the data available for 
reflection--ourselves and our values as well as 
the physical universe. Furthermore,this real world 
is 'a hierarchised,or wany-levelled f whole f . As such 
it is 'necessarily a teleological world 1 . Certain 
of the sub-patterns known to us in experience mirror 
the richness of the whole more fu&ly than others. 
And the sub-patterns which most adequately represent 
the pattern of the whole are our values. From this 
fact, two things follow:—values are organic to 
reality as a whole, as fully i*nd indubitably objec­ 
tive as any feature of our experience; and., by 
virtue of their status as the highest level in the 
hierarchy of sub-patterns of reality, they constitute 
our most significant key to the whole. (161)
5.From a more detailed analysis of the implications of 
man's moral experience specifically. This is an exten­ 
sion of the Kantian argument.
jkian's moral experience in every aspect points beyond 
itself to a supernatural ob jectiWreelity as the 
ground of its sanction and tc an eternal life as 
necessary for its fulfillment. The consciousness of 
moral obligation which universally characterises 
man's higher life cannot be accounted for unless
160. The Faith of a Moralist.Vol.I f rm -55-66 «T 356-^77 ? Vol.11, 
pp.220-2375 "Knowing and Believing" in Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society. 1928-9 ,pp.2(5ff. See,above , 
pp. 157-161; 186-6; 195-6; 205-6.
161. The Faith of a Moralist.Vol.I.pp,556-577;Essays
Catholic and Critical. TV?.46-59 f "Theism" in K.£.R.E«. 
Vol.12, pp.278-3. oee above, pp.166-7; 206-7. —————
we trace i«3 origin to an objective ground of 
absolute value. Similarly, man's aspiration 
toward loftier afcainLient in response to the 
which the yet unattained makes to his deepest 
nature presupposes that tLat 'call 1 comes to him 
from a perfect roality. Again his sense of guilt 
when he plays the traitor to his highest values 
is the consciousness cf the dessrtion of a personal 
and transcendent Guardian of those values. Finally, 
the longing for e. truer and richer existence, the 
sense of transience and iiaperiaanence in this life, 
which mark the most mature and sensitive human spirits 
suggest that they have been already touched in their 
inmost depths by the reality of iihat for which they 
yearn. These various features of moral experience 
embody a two-fold assumption—they owe their exis­ 
tence to the impact of a transcendent ground of 
absolute and perfect value which has caused them; 
and they are justified in the expectation of an 
eternal continuance in which aspiration after the 
ideal may achieve its goal, the yet unattained be 
realised, and the deepest yearnings of the soul 
find their appointed home and their perfect compan­ 
ionship. (162)
Our comment upon this five-fold vindication of the 
objectivity of values has been made at the points in the
discussion at which the arguments first appeared,and need
165 
not be repeated here. There are one or two points at which
we should feel the necessity of raising questions; but
are 
they.of secondary importance. Our final impression may
paraphrase an estimate of Professor Taylor's in another 
connection by saying that,however qualified may be the 
adequacy of any one of the arguments to prove his case f
•the agreement of the five in their common suggestion
164 
gives it a force which ought to be invincible* .
162. Essays Catholic and ^ritical.pp. 59-70; f'he Faith of 
a I.:oralist.Vol.I. Chapters III-IX; "Thalem" in 
H.^.R.377701.12.pp.280-281. See also above,pp. 167- 
170; 188-199.
163. See above, pp.112-118; 186-7; 199-208.





b. Professor Tayior's pjlilobophy of Nature 
be surmised fron a comparison of three passages in the 
writings to which we huve directed rcajor attention — in 
the critique of the Kantian fora, of the teleolfcgical 
argument where it is hinted that that the evidence for
God from Nature might bo so rephrased as to elude Kant's
165 strictures upon it ; in the essay in Essays Catholic
and Critical where *he promise of the encyclopedia————————— 166
article is partially redeemed ; and in the section of
the Gifford Lectures to which special attention has 
already be«n invited where the conception of Nature 
sketched in the intermediate essay is amplified and 
greatly strengthened, and is woven into a comprehensive 
world-view in which values also find thoir proper place. 
The arguments of the latter two of these thrse passages 
are essentially harmonious but the points of view from 
which they approach the problem are somewhat different. 
The earlier and briefer statement is set against 
the historic background of the development of cosmological 
speculation through the centnr-ies. Two observations urged 
the Greeks to posit a supernatural and ultimate ground of 
Nature: —
1.The fact that Nature is always dependent suggests the necessity of an unchanging and eternal source of all things mutable.
2. The fact of motion which characterises Nature suggests the necessity of an unmoving reality which is at once the source of motion and the assurance of stabi­ lity.
Our own conception of the physical universe has greatly 162 .""Tiieisr." in II.5.R.:E..Yol.l2«pp.g73-9«leo.Iiasaya Catholic :ind Critical, pp. 46*59. See above , pp. 166f« 167. ThG Ffcith of a"Tloralist.Vol.I.pp.556-585.
changed in nodera tines, out wa have not ascapoJ funda­ 
mentally the sane two speculative perplexities; and the 
soundest philosophy still points to a supernatural and 
ultimate reality Dohind Nature •
l.The order of Nature as wo discovar it is nade pos­ 
sible by the interplay of two sots of factors which 
are Shemselvss disparate and yet union occur in con- 
Junction throughout IJature—unohanging f lawf and ever- 
changing 'brute stuff 1 . The interrelation of those two 
apparently .ultimate factors andyconsequently, the 
existence of our world is explicable only on the assump­ 
tion of a transcendent and supernatural ground of the 
two orders and of thoir relation.
2•Nature is characterisod by incessant claange but, in the 
larger view,it is not aimless change but change in a 
definite direction. There is discoverable a * trend' 
toward the production of 'intelligence surpassing her 
own' . rhis Orderliness and apparent purposive "trend 
toward intelligence"* in Nature suggest that the omni­ 
potent und eternal supernatural(already discovered) is 
a wholly intelligent Will', (163)
In the later and longer statement these findings are not- 
neglected but they are caught up into a very much larger 
and more massive interpretation.
It is not uncharacteristic of Professor Taylor that 
his most notable contribution to the philosophy of Nature 
and,in the present writer's opinion, one of the most bril­ 
liant and suggestive passages in his voluminous writings 
should occur in a discussion of "other-worliliness" and in 
the form of an almost incidental comment upon a Remark of 
Professor Bosanquet. But these thirty pages are worthy of 
careful study. If our own concern were with restatements 
of the f teleological argument' rather than the 'noral ar­ 
gument', we should give Shem a central place in our study. 
For they furnish,in our opinion,perhaps the most important 
168, See ubove, pp. 166-7.
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and promising of Vhe 'new cosmologies'* Ar~d they may well 
lafr claim to roco&nition as the most notable single section 
in the Gifford Lectures*
It is not tmsy to give an adequate impression of 
so massive a world-view in a few sentences* It may perhaps 
be identified eis a form of the 'philosophy of organism'* • 
which has won contemporary currency through the influence 
of Professor Whitehead, Professor Taylor's recent reflec­ 
tion has evidently been much under the spell of Y/hitehead's
169 
thought. But his adaptation and. amplification of Whitehend's
basic position clearly surpasses it in comprehensiveness 
and gra^ft,and tho brief section we are considering holds 
more promise for further development than does Process and 
Reality, The distinguishine features of Professor Taylor's 
position have frewn referred to in passing; they may again 
be summarised thus:*
The world is a single complex pattern made up of 
the most varied strands. These constitutive elements 
are themselves patterns reproducing in varying degrees 
of fullness and distinctness the characteristic pattern 
of the whole. Therefore,the whole is rightly spoken of 
as 'all-pervasive', but it is more clearly discernible 
in some of the sub-pa c terns than in others,The pattern 
of the whole embraces our c;-wn life and all that rustains 
it, Jur task is to decipher the pattern of the whole , 
and our interpretation must therefore take into account 
morality.art and religion as much as the material of the 
physical and physiological sciences,
Moreover, this real world is a hierarchised or 
many-levelled whole. And as such it is necessarily a 
teleolo jical world. While it lies beyond our human 
powers fully to discern the character of the all-em­ 
bracing pattern, we may le:;rn something of its nature 
by attention to the various types of sub-re.thorns 
available for our study. But is obvious that the most 
important light will be found in the richest subpatterns, 
the highest structures known to us; these are intelligent
169, cee frequent references to rrof « UMtehead in Ihe Faith 
of a LiOralis5 « osooc . the 2nd vol. ^ee also "Some 
Inflections on Process and Reality in Theology.1929.
g creatures. The &ore i*udiiufciitary pa •* coins can 
be rightly understood only by recognising them as 
subordinate eleiiumts in tLe richer and lucre concrete 
patterns. i (1rom this point of view,those patterns which 
are 'other-warIdly from tJiy narrow und obvious int«r- - 
pretation of 'this .voirld' are now seen to be she nighar 
types of 8Ub«-paUernb in oenus of which alone the sub* 
patterns of 'this world* can be rightly understood. 
And, from a slightly different point of view,advance from 
one level of pattern to a higher :».« made possible by 
absorption into the lower of more of the higher or 
'othcsr-worldly1 patberu.
But it is clear that,by this process* of reasoning, 
we are pointed boyoud merely biological patterns to 
artistic production,moral action and religious adoration 
as daiiKindiiic; final integration. The be features belong 
to the one actual world in which life is lived and their 
specific patterns disclose fetii/ures of tlie pattern of 
the whole. Indeed,since we have already determined that 
it is to the richest and fullewt patterns of all that 
we must look for the least Inadequate glimpses permitted 
to us of the pattern of tiu whole f we can Lave no question 
whers that **innl light is to be sought. 'Values are the 
dominant features in the pattex-n of reality* 1 »
If it were possible for us bo see with complete 
clarity and certainty that the values which are funda­ 
mental for the spiritual life of man are also the domi­ 
nant characters ia the whole pattern of reality, we 
should be in present possession of the 'beatific vision 1 
of God. such vision /nay be regarded as the possession 
of those,pllgrirs who have reached the eternal haven 
intended for them. (170)
c.Moral and 
Other Values.
c.Professor Taylor has not given us his final thought 
on the relative significance cf the different intrinsic 
values. In his earliest importbnt work, he expressed pre­ 
ference for that usage of the term 'morality* which would 
bring all ultimate ends of desire within its scope,although 
he recognises that thAt is not tiie meaning which the word 
conveys in popular parlance.
"I.lorality is sometimes understood as a compre­ 
hensive' name for all the practical side of life,in­ 
cluding every experience in which the presence of an 
ideal can be detected, and it is in the main in this
170. the tfaitfl. o.r a I loyalist. Vol. 1 1^.556-575. ^s far as pos« 
si hie X have quoted the auchor's own words*
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sense that we have spoken of morality in the course* 
of the present Essay. In this comprehensive sense of 
'morality1 , the endeavour towards complete scientific 
insist or perfect aesthetic expression is of course 
a subdivision of morals, and as such we have ourselves 
for the most part treated it.... On the other hand,in 
common parlance a distinction would generally be drawn 
between 'morality* and the typically scientific or 
artistic activity." 171
It is not clear whether he still means to adhere to this 
employment of morality as inclusive of the other ultimate 
values. At least one passage in The Faith of a Moralist 
seems to carry on his earlier usage. Associating his own 
interpretation of values with that of Professor Laird,he 
says :-
"An artistic or scientific imperative,if it., is 
really imperative at all, is itself a moral imperative. 
....All imperatives are moral." 172
But his more usual use of the turms signifying the 
ultimate values would seem to imply his own acceptance of 
the more common terminology which his early thought had 
rather disdained as 'popular'. In the introductory dis­ 
cussion of the status of values within reality, he seeks 
to indicate the objective reference of the values of truth,
of moral practice, and of art successively and independent-
173 
ly. And in the section to which repeated reference has
been made above,he speaks of "morality,art,religion" as
three independent and correlative forms of value which any
174 
adequate world-view must bring within its grasp. Perhaps
the most significant indication of his mind's discrimination 
of aesthetic from moral values is the fact that almost
invariably, in seeking for support for a point in the field
171. The Problen of Conduct. p. '167.
172. The Faith of a i:oralist.Vol.I f p.29a.
173. Op. cit.,pp.39-46. 174. ^p. cit. ,p.361.
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of morals,he tnnns to an illustration in art as though 
to an independent though parallel and complementary
field of values. Save for the passage quoted above and
JothersJ 
one or twCTfapparently though less clearly in the same
vein, one would arrive at the impression that Professor 
Taylor's fclgory of the relation between the values might 
not unfairly be summarised as follows:-
1. There are three types of ultimate value—those of 
truth, of goodness,and of beauty.
2. Keligion has reference to value also, but requires 
to be classified in an independent category,not as 
a fourth correlative type,but rather either as the 
other values in a special reference or else as a 
quite separate and unique category of value.
3* Tfte values of beauty as they find expression in art 
are as genuinely objective and perhaps as signifi­ 
cant for our final philosophy as are distinctly 
moral values. ( The instances in which the argument 
hinges on an illustration from aesthetic experience, 
most frequently in either music or the drama,are far 
too numerous to be cited.)
4. The argument (of the Gifford Lectures) has been built 
with moral values principally in view; but it would 
hold in its main features with equal validity in re­ 
ference to the other types of intrinsic value.
5. J-n particular, the argument for the objectivity of 
values applies to them all equally.
6. Moral values are usually viewed in their distinction 
from values of truth and beauty; but occasionally 
they are instanced as representative of the intrinsic 
values in general and as embracing them.
Our final Judgment is that the author's opinion 
in the matter is by no means clearly revealed nor is his 
practice uniform and consistent. *t is one of the elements 
in his thought most standing in need of further elaboration 
and clarification. Like each of the other three writers of 
our study, his position would be greatly strengthened by a
216.
more adequate philosophy of values. The general problem 
will demand fuller discussion when we meet it in the thought
of Professor Baillie; ou* own comment on it may be reserved
175 
until that time*
d.The Problem d. in the same way,Professor Taylor 1 s more important 
of Jivil. writings contain no full discussion of the problem of evil.
The awful reality of evil is fully recognised. Assent is 
given to the contention that, without the supporting consi­ 
derations from moral experience, the evidences for God from 
Nature and history would hardly be sufficient to induce
theistic conviction in the face of the evil features of
176 the world and of human life. The issue is discussed from
the point of view of the attitude with which the religious 
man will receive evil. He will find refuge neither in a 
theatrical defiance nor in a Stoic resignation; his response 
will rather be the willing acceptance of such adversities 
as life may lay upon him as 'God's messengers 1 .
"I think we all know of a better way,which is fol­ lowed in practice by thousands of humble souls under burdens more gcevous than those which send the senti­ mentalists of literature to whining or cursing,accord­ ing to temperament, and the literary Stoics to admira­ tion of their own fortitude. It is po sible to do better than to abstain from complaints or to cultivate pride; it is possible, and we all know of cases in which it is finely done, to make acceptance of the worst fortune has to bestow a raeuns to the development of a sweetness, patience,and serene Joyousness which are to be learned nowhere but in the school of sharp suffering." 177
So far and no farther The Faith of a -.oralist carries us. 
Professor Taylor 1 s most adequate treatment of the 
question is to be found in a small pamphlet published in
175. See below,pp. 271ff . 176."Theism,"p. 279; The Faith of a 177. Op.cit.,p.l54. Moralist.Vol. 1.1)
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the series of "Affirmations" edited by Dr.Percy Deariaer.
position there taken is, in substance, as follows:-
In the problem of evil we confront three quite 
distinct questions. The first asks what evil is;the 
second, how it comes to exist; the third, how an 
almighty and all-good God if he exists can tolerate 
evil. The first question is strictly philosophical, 
the second historical, the third specifically theo­ 
logical.
A survey of certain historic theories of evil will 
prepare us to consider the specifically Christian 
attitude toward the problem.
a.One familiar theory holds that there is no such thing 
as evil; the belief that evil exists is a pure il­ 
lusion. This position is absurd,is self-refuting, 
and may be immediately dismissed.
b.The optimistic doctrine of the stoics teaches that 
evil,while not a pure illusion,is only relative. 
What may be actually bad for one individual would 
be discovered, in the largest view, to be beneficial 
to mankind. This position outrages both our feelings 
and our intellects. It cannot be proven true. And § 
even if it could, the fact that the suffering of one 
person may bring indirect good to humanity does not 
diminish the reality of the evil in the case of the 
vicarious sufferer.
c.The evolutionary view of evil so prevalent in the 
Nineteenth Century suggests that evil of all kinds 
is merely failure to make the appropriate adjust­ 
ment to the environment. Any such attitude simply 
fails to take the inner witness of the moral life 
seriously. For example,modern war is not to be 
explained merely as a reversion to savagery. It is 
something far more cruel,malign,reprehensible than 
any savage behavior could be,Just by virtue of the 
fact that it occurs in a high state of civilisation. 
It suggests not that men are in d anger of sinking 
back to the level of animals but that they are in 
danger of becoming devils.
d.In vivid contrast to the preceding theories is that 
shared by Christianity and all the most profound 
moral philosophers,notably Plato and Kant. It begins 
by recognising that evil is not of one kind but of 
several. Disease is a more serious form of evil than 
want, and sin than disease. The supreme and typical 
4ft&4. 3* the moral sickness of sin. ^nd the reason 
for the unique heinousness of sin is just that it 
arises from the deliberate rebellion of a genuinely
178.Tfae Problem of Hvil. London,1929.
220.
free agent against the altogether good will of 
God. Therefore any adequate theory of evil must 
take its start from a two-fold recognition—the 
reality of human freedom,and the good purpose of 
God for the world.
We are now prepared to examine this last type of 
attitude toward evil in its specifically Christian form. 
To the philosophical question,what evil is, Christianity 
answers that the most serious form of evil is sin, the 
viol- t ion of the sovereign will of God by the free act 
of one of his creatures. To the historical question, 
how evil comes to exist, °hristiahity offers no answer, 
as indeed no satisfactory answer t<a this riddle is 
discoverable by man. To the religious question, how evil 
can be reconciled with the will of an almighty and all- 
good God, Christianity attempts only a partially satis­ 
factory answer. The heart of that answer is that there 
is nothing in life,except our own perverse wills,which 
can prevent us from attaining the heights of moral Ban- 
hood, and nothing flhich cannot be transmuted into a 
positive help toward that attainment. But this assertion 
is not demonstrable; it is a coaviction of faith, ^nd, 
in any event, its validity presupposes the assurance of 
immortality; for, if death ends all,then evil is finally 
triumphant and there is no solution of the 'problem of 
evil'. This assertion of conviction is Christianity's 
first reply to the religious question, ^ut its final 
response is not to explain why evil should be and why 
it should be in the particular forms and occasions that 
it occurs; its final response is to give to souls who 
desire it the power to triumph over evil in their own 
experience. (179)
"The utmost that the theistic believer,or the 
Christian believer,is entitled by his faith to assert 
is that,in the attainment of the divine purpose,be it 
what it may, hie own true good is not immorally sacri­ 
ficed; the world which God has made is a world in 
which there is nothing, except our own morally evil 
will, which can prevent any of us from attaining 'the 
full stature of the perfect man',and nothing which may 
not be made into an actual help to the attainment of 
that stature, '.ven this, of course,is not demonstrable.. 
It is an open possibility—on one condition. If it 
were,indeed,certain, or all but certain,that there is 
no continuation to our personal life on the other side 
of the grave, it might fairly be said that evil is in 
the end triumphant over good." 130
"What Christianity has professed to do ?,nd whaV 
we see that it has done in countless lives,as no other 
doctrine or faith has done, is not to explain evil 
but to enable us to triumph over it by converting the
179. The Problem of Evil. passim. AS far as convenient,! 
have retained the author's own words.
180. _p.cit.,p.26.
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apparently most irreparable disasters of Mfe into 
actual instruments towards the enriching of spiritual 
personality." 161
It will be seen,I think,that Professor Taylor's 
attitude toward evil has two facets* The first attempts 
an explanation,though admittedly an incomplete explanation, 
of what evil is and how it may be justified. The second 
confesses that no satisfactory explanation is possible 
and has recourse to an appeal to Christianity's practical 
transcendence of evil. Our reaction to these two contrasted 
treatments may be put in a phrase—the first,in Professor 
Taylor's hands,is thoroughly unsatisfying; the latter makes 
a moving and helpful appeal. In the first place the attdmpteoy 
'explanation* does not grapple with those parttqular fottos 
and instances of evil which constitute a 'problem' for 
sincere reflection. It seeks to focus the issue upon the^* 
single type of evil,human sin. Now,while sin is confessedly 
the most heinous form of evil in its moral consequences, 
it is also the form which furnishes the least difficulty 
to the perplexed mind of man. It should be obvious that, 
in a world in which free creatures are set at the endeavour
j
after moral excellence, there inHBt be the possibility of 
wilful misdoing by them,and of the long trains of sad 
consequences following therefrom. The types of evil which 
furnish the greatest perplexity for the earnest mind are 
two—those which are not due to man's wilful wrongdoing, 
i.e. natural evil, disease, efrc.j and those of whatever origin
which not even the power of Christian faith seems able teo 
161.0p.cit.,p.29.
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transuutd into positive good. Professor Taylor's discus­ 
sion offers us no holp at these points. In the second 
place, the attitude which is commended to us begs the 
crucial issue, It is maintained that there is nothing 
save our own morally evil wills which can prevent our 
attainment of perfect iaanhood,and nothing which may not 
become an actual help toward that high end. But this is 
the assertion of precisely the two matters vhich are 
most in question. Certainly there is nothing within the 
range of our experience to lend credence to the two state­ 
ments in thair absolute form, Thus it will be see,\ that, 
at every critic; 1 p>vint,we are driven back upon the necessity 
of meeting the problem of evil with the defiance of faith.
Professor Taylor's handling of the question suggests 
to us that there are only two reasonable positions open 
to,us in this troublesome question. One may seek to 
'rationalise 1 ovil,i.e. to cast all available light 
upon its sources,its inevitability and its specific inci­ 
dences, Justifying it to human reason as far as may be 
possible, though acknowledging at the end that the ablest 
explanation falls far short of satisfying every difficulty. 
If one choose this alternative,it is possible,in our judg­ 
ment to present a far more adeq.uate interpretation of evil 
than Professor Tnylor has given us. Or,one may recognise at
the outset that explanation fails precisely at the pointst
where it is most needed and rest one's whole confidence in 
the transrational faith of religion, we shall have occasion 




at the very heart of the problem which strongly counsel
181. 
recourse to this attitude toward it.
IX.
We come then at the close to suggest a final 
estimate of Professor Taylor's thought.
•Ve have offered not a little critical comment
102 
in the course of the exposition. The most important of
those criticisms may be brought together in the form 
of three constructive suggest ions :-
1. Professor Taylor's theism would be greatly 
strengthened by a clear deliniation of his theory of 
knowledge. That there is a very definite episteraology
it in all of his later metaphysical writ ings, we
183 
have more than once suggested . And if one were in*
dined to employ with regard to his thought the method 
which he recommends as the appropriate one for meta­ 
physics in its approach to reality — the revealing of the* 
inherent logic of it— it would not be difficult to piece 
together the author's fragmentary suggestions into a 
coherent position. But Professor Taylor has not thus far 
done so himself. It would result in a theory of knowledge 
closely akin to that which w^s occupying the labours of
the late Baron Von Hugel at the end of his life and which
184 he had hoped to embody in his Glfford Lectures . It
would take the form of a religious realism. By an incisive 
and untiring examination of the process by which all know­
ledge cornea to UB^ it would deiuonstrate that in all our 
181. See below t p, ̂ 75. 132. ^ee above. pp. 177-83; 19^208:2^1.
183. oee above t pp. 157-162 ;205;209.
184. See The Reality of aod.espec.Ght-i f and unpublehed
Manuscript ,Gritigal Realism in the ffhouaht of Von IIuge|
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knowing— knowledge of Nature as well as knowledge of values, 
and knowledge of values no less than knowledge of Nature— 
we are actually in living touch with the Supernatural, 
with God. And that progress in true knowledge consists of 
a progressive xcastery cf this ever nysterious, ever finally 
incomprehensible, impact of the divine spirit upon our
lives,
2. Professor Taylor f s theism would be further 
strengthened if it were placed at the center of a carefully 
developed comprchenisve metaphysical view of reality as a 
whole. Here again h© has not left us without clear indica­ 
tion of what the outcoise would be. *.nd we have ourselves
made WOL* attempt to deduce it frcn his incidental discus-
135sions of cosnology L.nd to present its main outlines. 
Our suggestion would involve taking the discussion of
"Other-worldliness" to v:hich we ha TO repeatedly urged
186 
attention 9 applifyiiig it and making it the setting for
his more specific doctrine of Ood. In that event, the
resulting theism would be what Professor Gorley refers to
187 
as "an extension of the cosmoloGical argument" .
3. Jhere aro a number of other points on which 
Professor Taylor a thought stands btidly in neod of clari­ 
fication and acre precise definition. We have already noted 
two such sources of confusion for his readers: -
a.He does not clearly indicate his attitude toward the relations of the ultimate values and the character ofthe primacy to be attributed to moral values.
b.He doos not make clear how far his moral argument for ftod is nn appeal to religious f:jlth,how far he means
185. See above,pp.206-7;210;212-5.136. The Faitn of a I.io.i&list B Vol«I.pp»556-375. ;.nd op.cit.187. Moral Values and the Idea of uod.p.546.
to rely crxm ias taphysidal argument in substantiation 
of it,
To these may be added a certain confusion resulting from 
a varying classification of types of reality, his usual 
suggestion is that there are three great types of our 
experience of reality—experience of Nature,experience of 
values,and religious experience. There would therefore be 
three ways by which the Supernatural would be found to 
touch our lives. B^t on one occasion he tells us that
God speaks to man through Nature,through the prophets and
188 
saints,and through his Son. And the same uncertainty
in terminology may be discovered at a number of other 
points.
But our final word must be one of profound appre­ 
ciation. From the point of view of the concern which is 
motivating this study,Professor Taylor's theism is in­ 
comparably the most fruitful of those which are to come 
under our examination*
It has been said,with some measure of exaggeration, 
that in Batters of philosophy all differences are traceable 
to differences in point of view—those elements within 
experience which are selected for attention and the per­ 
spective from which attention is to be directed to them. 
This remark points to the nub of Professor Taylor's im­ 
portance; it is in the fundamental perspective from which 
every aspect of the problem of God is approached. It is the 
initial assumption of that perspective that in man's every 
contact with reality.whether with Nature through sense-ex- 
188. The Faith of a Moralist.Vol. II r p-225.
perionce or with beauty thrju&L appreciation or with 
a divine Comforter through personal cotimunion, he is 
in inmiedeiate contact with the supernatural, with the 
living and active God, To put the matter more accurately, 
it ie assumed that man's awareness of reality and his 
desire to comprehend it is interpretable only as his response 
to the prior movement of the living divine spirit upon him. 
So to conceive the setting of man f s relation to reality is 
radically to reconstruct our conception of the process of 
knowledge, of the function and scopo of metaphysics, and 
of the status of religion* Our whole outlook alters. V/e 
immediately become aware that the first datum of all reflec­ 
tion as it is assuredly the first fact of all experience is 
the indubitable existence of that most certainly real, most 
incomprehensibly mysterious, most persistently alluring 
Reality which is the prius of all knowledge as of all human 
existence. The achievement of knowledge becomes the pains*
taking, ever baffled but ever persistent, ever incomplete
lofrortj 
but ever more nearly complete"7Tto discern and define the
features of that Reality. The business of metaphysical 
speculation is no longer the attempt to construct a system 
or to unify the various sciences but "the necessarily im­ 
perfect and tentative reconciliation of the exigences of
scientific thinking with the imperative moral and religious
189
demands of life" , And religion, as the experience of the 
soul'c conscious communion with the ultimate Reality, far 
from being a dubious matter recognised if at all only by 
Contemporary British ?hlloGODhy.VQl.II f p-272.
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leave of the special sciences—at befit an 'elective in 
the university of life 1 — becomes at orce life's prical 
and final interest since it has to do with life's initial 
and life's ultimate relationship*
The meaning of ell this for the problem we set our­ 
selves at the outset of this enquiry will be at once appa­ 
rent. If theism is to find a w».y out of the sterile and 
Inadequate ferns in which recent liberal theology has cast 
it, it will be along the pethv^y marked for us by Professor 
Taylor'n approach. The first step must be e recovery of the 
recognition of the priority of Cod in experience.
w e hove urged that the heart of the weakness of con-
temporery theism is ii tho methodical inductive logic which
190 
it has increasingly accepted as its own. In another word,
it is in its 'point of view'. f It put* the cart before the 
horse.' It should be clear that if there is a God at all, 
he must be not only the primal fact in the universe,but 
the prior reality In all our experience . Ajnd vJtal religion 
is on the right track In attributing to him the initiative 
in our supremely significant experiences, Ood cannot be 
achieved as the Ir.rt tern of ?.n aflduoue intellectual inquiry. 
He nuet be recognised as present all along—ir the world 
which gives us birth, in our knowing of that world, and 
especially in these rich and de« p insights into reality 
which furnish some foretaste of 7?hat it lies within our 
life to become. If he is at all, be Is 'closer than breathing 
nearer than hands and feet'—-one without whose prior love 
we should never have known what it means to love, ^nd he 
190. See above, p.7.
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may bo DO discovored to.c the triplicate of our undeniably 
real experience. Then he ie no longer v cuest whom we 
consent to admit into our norld of thought,rather tenta­ 
tively and after severe scrutiny. He ie the source of the 
life of which we ourselves partake, through whose courtesy 
w© are admitted into the knowledge of himself and of our 
world and of til things worth knowing. TJaat is the truly 
religious attitude. Only in. that attitude can God be made 
sure*
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Of the restatements of the moral argument which 
we are to consider,that which most closely follows the 
orthodox Kantian pattern is the theism of Professor John 
Baillie,professor of systematic theology in Union Theolo­ 
gical Seminary,New York. I do notjthink Professor Baillie 
would welcome such an identification of his position. He 
would be inclined to insist that his thought was merely 
faithful to the great "catholic Christian tradition",rather 
than to any philosophical or theological school* And his 
writings do make frequent appeal for substantiation to the 
thought of the Gospels and the early church* But as an 
apologetic,an intellectual defense of religious faith,the 
dependence upon Kant is too manifest to be denied. Indeed, 
in his most important work.The Interpretation of Religion, 
Professor Baillie repeatedly defines his own position as 
a lineal development of "a characteristically modern insight11
which had"its first fully argued expression in the Critical
2
Philosophy of Kant" . A recent American analyst of contem­ 
porary theological tendencies is quite right in listing
3 Professor Baillie 1 s book with that of his brother and
The 
Professor Taylor's.Faith of a Moralist.but in advance of
the other two,as the most Important Kantian statements of
4
in personal conversation. 
ft! The Interpretation of Keligion.p.26Q. Cp.,p.299,etc. 
5,P.M.Baillie.Faith in Pod. 
4.professor Harris M.Rall,ln Religion and Life,Winter,1952«
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In any event it stands clearly distinguished from 
the other positions of our study. And the differentiation 
may be put in a single sentence. Professor Baillie does not 
argue for the validity of the Christian belief in God; he 
describes what that belief is. He does not tell why Christian! 
hare £ rteht to believe,but only what they believe and why. 
The appeal,not merely in the final estimate but at every 
important point in the discussion,is not to pjrgumenu or 
proof or reasoned conviction,but to faith, ive bavs already
given this as the distinctive mark of a genuine Kantian
5 
statement,
Professor Baillie's thought traces a single consistent 
course in all his writings;one meets essentially the same 
argument in each of his published works. Its most complete
and adequate expression is to be found in The Interpretation
6 
of Religion, It is sketched in the more popular little
book which was published while the larger work was in prepa-
7
ration.The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul • Its presup­ 
positions are given in unusually clear and persuasive outline
in his inaugural address as professor in Union Seminary under
8 
the title, "The Logic of Religion" , His latest book,although
preoccupied with christologic,1 rather than strictly theolo­ 
gical matter s, moves forward from the same premisses and may
9
be regarded as fully of a piece with its predecessors. Pro­ 
fessor Baillie himself has pointed to his brother's book,
Faith in God,for a less faulty exposition of his own convio-
IS '
tions. We shall be primarily occupied with the large, 5,See above,p, 73, G.New York,1928.
7.London,1926, 10.Edinburgh,1927,
8.Published in the Union Theological Seminary Alumni Bulletin. October, 1930. —————————H———————*——————•—————'
9.The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity*N.Y. ,1928.
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systematic work, The Interpretation of Religion,But only 
with those portions of it which are directly relevant to our 
problem* In this essay we can do much less than justice 
to a truly great piece of systematic theological exposition* 
And if our comments must be largely in the rein of dissent, 
it is not from want of appreciation for the power and ana­ 
lytic skill of the author f e raind* For this book, in our 
Judgment, should take rank wilfa Dr.Tennant's Philosophical"
,Tft oology and Dr . Oman* slNafoiral and the Supernatural and Grace 
and Personality as among the most important theological 
works of the present period*
II.
The Position Of first importance for an understanding of Dr.Baillie 
in Summary* is a clear grasp of his view of the scope and task of apolo­
getic. This is the point d'appui of all he has to say. It is 
Presuppositions, reiterated with almost wearisome insistence in each of his
waitings* It is the conviction which we have already noted 
as marking him off most clearly from other writers, "T^e task 
of theology is to bring to light the inner logic of religioud 
faith, w "Its duty is to exhibit t with the sharpest possible
detail and under the greatest possible degree of magnifioa- ,i 
tion,the nature of the passage which religion makes from i
12
value to reality. from a moral obligation to a moral cosmos^ j
Or , more simply put. "it should consist simply in the attempt 
to bring to clear consciousness, and to express in precise 
language, the nature of the compulsion which in every age has 
led earnest seekers after righteousness to trust in an
LU"The Logic of Religion" f p*6. 
12*The Interpretation of Religion. p. 551.
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Eternal Righteousness,and has inspired devoted workers to
13 
believe that they are working for a more-than-human Causes
And again,"The task of theological science is not to con­ 
struct a system of dogmas,but"—in a phrase which echoes 
like a reffain and voices the author's feeling in the matter
more graphically than any other— "to lay bare the nerve
14 
of this thing which men o; 11 faith" • So to define the
function of apologetic is to view it as a science,for "the
essential aim of science may be said to be correct defini*
15 
tion or description" • But it is a science of the type
which the Germans call Gelsteswissenschaften.a science of 
spirit, a science which interprets its material not by
description and analysis from without but rather through
16 
sympathetic understanding from within.
Such a reading of the aim of theology rests on a 
number of assumptions. Two in particular are stressed by
the writer:— "first that religion does possess an inner
17 
logic", "ultimate interior principles which inspire and
regulate religious faith,the true fountain and source of
18 
religious belief" ; and,"second that the processes of this
logic are not fully patent to the consciousness of the
19 
religious subject as such" • To these we may perhaps add a
third assumption,concerning the priority of religious exper­ 
ience to articulate religious belief ,and the type of quali­ 
fication needful in one who would advance from faith to an 
understanding of its Interior logic:*
13.The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul.p.235,
14. Tne Interpretation of Religion.p«l6«
15. Qp,ciT;,,p,ll, 16,0p,cit,,p,5.
17. "The Logic of Religion",p,6,
18. The Interpretation of Religion. p.16.
19. "The Logic of ^elision",p.6.
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w The process of reasoning by which faith rises 
to the thought of God,which is the name as to say the 
path which leads from our values to reality f is so sim­ 
ple and direct that no man hats ever been prevented 
from finding it by slowness of wits or deficiency of 
logical power t but rather by too much logic of a false 
and abstract kind or else by something lacking from 
his living expereinoo. Intuitive insight will here 
always precede fornal proof fand where there is as yet 
no such insight,formal proof is likely to be powerless 
to convince* In a word,everything depends,not upon the 
rigour of our logic,but upon the depth and the vigour 
and the richness of our practical acquaintance with 
the realities from which our logic starts." 20
Here is suggested the final assumption—what apologetic may 
and may not be expected to accomplish. In no case can it be** 
expected to bring to birth belief or faith where they are 
not already firmly rooted.Its function is clear and definite* 
ly delimited; it can ma Ice plain to faith the nature of the 
assurance which faith already possesses and,in so doirg, 
have some weight in silencing false theologies.
In summary, then: —
The task of theology is to reveal
to the religious consciousness the innate convictions and 
grounds of conviction which are implicit in the experience 
of faith itself. It will add no new or supporting consider* 
ations to the certainty which the religious mind already 
possesses. Nor will it bring the tiniest ray of suggestion 
or conviction to a mind where they are not already present. 
Jt £££ Sive to the already believing soul a heightened sense 
of assurance—a bolder face against the derision of a scep­ 
tical theology, science or philosophy—by laying bare a cer»
tainty which it already possesses but of which it may not
21
be fully aware. Dr,Baillie summarises the matter in these
••^•••io
20.The Roots of Religions.251 «
21.1 assume that this is a fair rendering of what theology 
is expected to accomplish, although there are passages 
which seem to question its competence for this task.
Outline of the 
Argument •
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words,"Faith itself nay do battle with nature,but only
22
scientific theology can do battle with naturalism," 
B^t it would,I think,be a truer rendering of the heart 
of his meaning if the order of phrases were reversed :- 
"Scientific theology may do battle with naturalism,but 
only faith itself can do battle with nature."
With so much understanding of its presuppositions, 
we are now ready to follow the development of Dr.Baillie's 
thought in outline.
ftflr purpose is to understand religion. Our tool 
is tho science of theology. Cur c«thod—the only proper 
method for theolofey—is to ask the religious conscious­ 
ness what it ffcnds religion really to be;what it exper- 
iences twhat it believes,what it knows. For a true inter­ 
pretation of religion is possible only for one who stands 
fully within the experiences he seeks to interpret. Such 
a science of religion is,within the limits of its subject- 
matter,completely autonomous and author!tatiye.Neither 
science nor philosophy can discredit or confirm its cer­ 
tainties. It nay pass on its findings to metaphysics for 
incorporation in a larger synthetic view. But they must 
be ia0PJ?ptrated unmodified and UT-9?ttioised; metaphysics 
can offer no opinion whatever on the validity of 18186?: . .„ 
logy's convictions. Our attention will be given not to 
the religion of our own age or sect,or of Protestantism,
t *"
or even of Christianity in distinction from other type«
of world-religion; but to f religion itself,in its most
2,3
universal and deepest significance 1 , 'our whole human 
22.The Interpretation of Religion*p.25
23.WVR.lng en Essays»first series,p.229
835,
insight into the Sternal World 1 . And TJC shall attach 
no importance to evidence for the truth of religion's 
certainties drawn frcn outside the religious conscious* 
ness itself , e.g. by one of the traditional theistic 
proofs* For those seldom point beyond a designing Wind 
or Ultimate Reality behind our phenomenal world; even 
if they prove the existence of God they do not establish 
his goodness* Further we shall aim to incorporate signi­ 
ficant data from religion's historic development and 
from psychologies! analyses of its phenomena , but without 
conceding tto essential independence or unique importance 
of the History of Religions or the Psychology of Religion, 
(Part
H
The initial item in our constructive task is to 
bring clearly before us the actual characteristics of the 
religious consciousness, the phenomenon of fnith* This
can be done most helpfully by facing examples of religious)i 
faith where it stands in boldest contrast to the • natural*
reaction to circumstance* Two instances will suffice. The 
first is the predicament of Job; life badgered by cruel 
and unmerited misfortune; belief challenged by the 
problem of evil. The other is th* dilemma of Ami el; the 
mind convinced by a natura.listic science; belief raade 
unreasonable by accredited soientifio findings. In each 
case the natural response would be the surrender of 
belief* In each case the actual response is a defiance 
of external evidence, a sense of trust which finds ex­ 
pression in the one case as 'Though he slay me t yet will
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I trust him1 , in the other oaso as 'Yos.but the heart 
has reasons of which the mind my never know 1 . How 
shall we account for this paradox? Two quite inadequate 
explanations nay be sunr^.rily dismissed* Faith's response* 
cannot be interpreted as 'wishful*thinking' since all 
too frequently faith stands under the necessity of 
believing not what it wants to be true but what it feels 
must be true* And faith's response cannot be atttibutod 
to ingrained religious tradition since faith's own self- 
consciousness denies such a dependence and also since 
this interpretation merely pushes into the past the 
explanation of the initial rise of fnlth's distinctive 
attitude. Accordingly we must turn to more promising 
explanations of the phenomenon of faith* By examining 
three such theories which we must reject.we can make 
our way townrd a fourth which we can accept* (Pe.rt II , 
Chapter I)*
1.There are those who would account for religion's 
distinctive attitude as an Instance of inslent,analogous 
to but more diffuse and popular then,the insight of 
science or metaphysics* There is only one possible path 
to the knowledge religion desires—systematic observation 
of facts and generalization based upon deduction fron 
these facts. This Is the HatiopBlistic theory of religion. 
There are Important elements of truth in this view: — 
Qellgion is the mother of speculative philosophy.as it 
is of medicine,politica t lawt art,etc.; ard both religion 
and speculative philosophy aim to give knowledge of
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ultimate reality. But there are more weighty considera­ 
tions which preclude the acceptance of this identifica­ 
tion of religion and philosophy;—while religion and 
metaphysics share much common ground,there are interests 
Of each to which the other is indifferent; while each 
attempts a world-view,there are only certain types of 
world-viewsjwhicii wouK be permissible for religion; 
further while metaphysics presupposes learning and intel­ 
lectual training» religion is an affair of the untutored; 
finally religion is characteristically more practical in 
its reference than is philosophy, and at its heart 
carries a sense of obligation which metaphysics feels no 
necessity to acknowledge. Rationalistic theories are at 
one in regarding religion as an inferior kind of know­ 
ledge whether their stress falls upon primitive cosmo­ 
logies or the phenomena of animism or,as in the case of 
Hegel,upon an a priori dialectic which views philosophy 
as religion come to maturity. In any case the rebuttal 
is the same—the progress of religion away from primitive 
concepts has paralleled that of science and metaphysics; 
and by no reading of the facts can religion be interpreted
**
as a species of speculation. (Part II f Chapter II).
2.At the opposite pole yet not without its points of 
affinity is the Romanticist theory of religion. Its claim 
is that religion characteristically takes its rise in 
feelingf an element in the mental life prior to knowledge 
or will. But this position is untenable both psychologi­ 
cally and religiously. It is inadequate psychologically 
since there is no auch thing ae significant feeling
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without prior sonsations,perceptions and ideas. It is 
inadequate religiously because 'feeling 1 is too vague 
a locus for so definite a content as that of mature 
religion; and because 'feeling 1 is too subjective a 
locus for an activity t/tiich means to be objectively true* 
Objections of n similar kind may be urged against three 
variations of the Honanticist the ory~-that prevalent 
in schools of the psychology of religion;that which 
locates religion in e special 'religious sense'} and that 
whose appeal is to'religious experience.' There is no 
special 'spiritual sense' discoverable;and there is no 
'religious experience' save in conjunction with religious 
faith, i.e. In conjunction ' ith definite religious belief* 
(Part II.Chapter III)*
3,Another school of thought would show religious 
faith as a distinctive vype of insight or intuition^ 
springing from a distinctive religious a prlor^* These 
a priori categories are held to be analogous to but com­ 
pletely independent of the a priori categories of the 
theoretic' 1 reason which guide science and the a priori 
categories of the practical rear on whioh determine 
morality* The two most Important exponents of this theory 
were Troeltsoh and Otto, It may be called Theological 
Intuitionlsm* Against all views of this kind.two devasta­ 
ting criticisms should be brought. Whnt is this 'religious 
a priori'? Unlifce the a priori categories of theoretical 
reason and praotloal morallty.it forever eludes precise 
definition, 'Jecondly.it IB impossible to go behind or
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below a form of religion which is ethically germinated; 
the religious consciousness takes its birth from the 
ethical consciousness and the specifically religious or 
'numinous 1 element appears when our respect for the good 
coalesces with our awe before the power which controls 
our fate. T^e character of the specific 'religious 
emotion' is not 'awe f but rather 'reverence'. (Part II, 
Chapter IV).
4.There is a fourth theory of religion which finds 
it rooted not in speculation nor in subreflective feeling 
nor in some unique intuition of truth,but in the moral 
consciousness—in our apprehension of values,in the sense 
of duty,in the categorical moral imperative. With this 
line of thought are to be linked the names of Kant, 
Fichte,Lotze,Ritschl and Herrmann. And it is to this 
interpretation of religion that our own allegiance must 
be giwen. With the reflections of these great writers 
as our stimulus,we are now prepared to suggest a defini­ 
tion of religion and from that definition to procede to 
a fuller examination of its meaning and its validity. 
(Part II,Chapter V).
Our basic conviction is that there is "an organic
and all-determinative relationship between religion and
24
morality" . Like morality,religious belief !• always 
relevant to the practical concerns of life and it is 
always accompanied by a sense of urgency,even of obliga- 
toriness. The distinction is that while morality is con- 
24. The Interpretation of Religion • P.305.
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cerned with values,"the essential concern of religion is
not simply with value but with the relation of value to
25
reality." Thus religion may be defined as "an appre­ 
hension of reality through,and in terms of 9 our moral
26 27 
values" or,more simply,as "a moral trust in reality" •
Objection to this definition may be brought from either 
of two opposed perspectives—on the ground that religion 
should not be so closely identified with morality, or on 
the ground that religion is merely •morality touched with 
emotion1 and presupposes no necessary connection of 
morality with reality. The first objection,in turn,may 
be urged on either of two quite different grounds.lt is 
claimed that the identification of religion with morality 
impoverishes the religious consciousness by neglecting 
the approach to religion from other types of value,notate
bly beauty; but this objection springs from a too narrow
m 
view of morality which ebraces all ultimate values and
* 28 
is indeed "but the art of living'1 . It is claimed on
the other hand that the identification of religion with 
morality is invalidated by the facts of primitive reli­ 
gion which show religion to be premoral in its earliest 
forms; but this objection springs from a sophisticated 
reading of primitive life since even primitive religion 
reveals an affinity with correspondingly primitive 
morality. The second and contrary main objection—that 
religion presupposes no necessary connection of morality 
with reality--also rises from two quarters. It is held
25. The .interpretation of Religion.p.517.
26. 0]S.cit.,p.318. 27.vp .clt.,p.318.
28. op.cit.,p.304.
that primitive religion shows no concern of religion 
for the nature of reality; but tas in the other instance, 
this objection springs from a too sophisticated view 
of primitive life,since even primitive religion trys 
to relate its values to what is for it the ultimate 
reality. On the other hand,it is held that religion 
should be severely limited to faith in the validity of 
our values but should not seek to tie those values to 
a reality which is in fast indifferent or hostile to 
them; but such an attitude is not what men mean by 
religion. (Part II,ChapterVI ).
Our view-point can be further elucidated by 
replies to a series of questions: —
What is it that religion affirms of reality?
Religion affirms that ''the inner core of reality must
29 
be continuous with the moral consciousness" ;and that,
consequently, "the highest ends which our conscience
sets before itself are....our surest available clues
30 
to the nature of the world's om final end" .
What gift does religion make to life? It brings 
•salvation 1 ,i.e.release from spiritual homelessness 
and isolation as well as from sin.
"It is this outlook and attitude which are tho 
essence of religion. Its great and abiding superior­ 
ity over any merely moral or social or humanistic 
outlook lies in the sense it gives us of being at 
home in the Universe. To the man in whose heart there 
is any germ or grain,even as a mustard-seed,of reli­ 
gious faith,the Universe is,at the heart of it,no 
bleak and foreigh wilderness in which he,with his 
ideals of righteousness coid love and faithfulness,is 
a forlorn and unheeded stranger. Still less is it an 
angry sea,ready to devour him an^ to swallow up for
29.0p.cit.,p.325. 30.0p.cit.,p.327.
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ever all that he holds dear. Rather does it seem 
to him as his father's house ;and he feels,as 3 t,Paul 
long ago felt,that he is no longer a slave in it,but 
a son; and if a son,then an heir." 31
Whence comes the conviction that lies at the very 
center of all religion—the conviction that reality is 
on the side of goodness? In other words,how does faith 
in God come to birth in the soul of man? Its starting- 
point as we have repeatedly noted is in our awareness of 
human values,in our moral consciousness as such. Further 
it is of the first Importance to recall that the impera­ 
tive claims of duty are absolute and absolutely autono­ 
mous, in no sense dependent upon support in the nature of
32 
reality; "right is right,though the heavens fall. 7 •
Starting from this initial and underivable recognition 
of duty, the moral consciousness passes,often by wholly 
imperceptible and unanalysable s-ages* to tiae farther 
conviction of a Divine Reality. It is exceedingly dif­ 
ficult to give any adequate psychologic-.1 account of 
this transition from the conviction of duty to the cer­ 
tainty of duty's transcendent sanction. But it seems to 
lie in an implicit recognition that the claims of duty 
are absolute and,because,absolute, derived from the 
Absolute. If it be contended that this argument falls 
short of rigid logical demonstration,it must be replied 
that it is the only appropriate apologetic for religion, 
one which merely aims to reveal as clearly as possible 
faith's own implicit logic. For,as we noted earlier,
the duty of theological science is "to exhibit.with the 
—-gho Roots of Religion*p . 112 .
§itThe Interpretation of Religion. p . 343 .
sharpest poa ible detail und under the greatest possible 
degree of magnification,the nature of the passage which
religion mates from «alue to reality,from a moral obllga-
33 
tion to a moral cosmos" . Th* only possible escape from
the power of this argument would seem to be through a 
denial of the absoluteness of our values.
"Under the long tuition of moral experience,the 
consciousness of the moral claim comes,by an almost 
imperceptible transition of thought,to be interpreted 
as an awareness of a Divine Reality. The process is 
not really a passage from believing in duty to be­ 
lieving in something else but is much rather a passage 
from one way of reading the meaning of duty to 
another way of reading it. For what religion does is 
Just to give a deeper meaning to duty,a deeper signi­ 
ficance to our values." 34
"Religion is,essentially,a product of our con* 
sciousness of value: it is an outlook on things which 
arises,ohai$ajteristically,in the doing of one's duty— 
which grows up in the hearts of those who love what­ 
soever things are true and honest and Just and pure 
and lovely and of good report and who,if there be any 
virtue and if there be any praise,think on these 
things and do them. Yet religion is more than the 
consciousness of value and more than the love of good­ 
ness. It has to do,rather,with the relation of value 
to reality.with what Socrates and Plato long ago 
called 'the identity of goodness and being*.... All 
the religion that is in the world today has its ulti­ 
mate root and ground in this one irresistible convic­ 
tion which comes to upward-striving mortals,that in 
such values as those of love and honour and purity 
and living for others they are striking the rock- 
bottom of reality and are lighting upon the real key 
to the meaning and purpose of life—of the Cosmic 
Order as a whole and of their place in it." 35
"Faith's natural understanding of absolute obli­ 
gation as an obligation deriving from the absolute... 
.may be set out in logical form somewhat as follows. 
The major premise is that an unconditional obligation 
can only mean an obligation laid upon one by the ulti­ 
mate system of things in which one has one's part to 
play. The minor premise is my sure knowledge that an 
unconditional obligation is laid upon me to seek after 
that which is good, ^nd the conclusion is that the 
universal system in which I find myself involved must 
th-ggrefore be of such a nature as to demand this good-
55.THe Hoots of
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ness of me," 36
But the question nay be asked, How important and 
valuable is arfcunent in the field of religion? Its 
chief usefulness will be negative, in clearing away 
artificial hindrances to belief; it will hardly bring 
faith in kod to birth in a man's soul. For the major 
premise of faith's logic is a value- judgment , and here 
it is Intuition not argument which persuades* And the 
precondition for such insight is not learning or intel­ 
lectual acumen, tyit purity of heart, a whole-hearted self- 
surrender to our values*
"If *e are right in believing that it is out of 
our corjs clous ness of value that religious belief ........
arises, then every proper and valid argument for reli­ 
gious belief must have as its major premise the aware­ 
ness of some moral value. It must always be an argu­ 
ment from the beauty and the claim of goodness to the 
reality of Eternal Goodner>o k and from the loveliness of 
love to the Love of God." 37
"Argument is therefore here at this far-reaching 
disadvantage, that it carries conviction only in pro­ 
portion to the depth of each man's moral conscious­ 
ness, and that in thst same proportion it is likely to 
have been already anticipated by the swifter processes 
of ohe intuitive understanding." 38
"The assurance of the Divine Companionship has 
in every age been promised not alone to the learned 
thinker, nor to him in any wise pre-eminently, but to 
all those who have sought it with a true and humble 
heart,,., Not good deeds are here required;but a humble, 
child like, pat lent, a spiring heart. In a word, the graces 
of character in which faith takes its rise are graces 
not of satisfied achievement but rather of receptive 
ness; and f ith,when it comes, cones not as a thing 
accomplished but as a thing found— not as a meritor­ 
ious performance on our part but as a gift on God's 
part." 39
Thus faith stands contrasted to scientific knowledge in
•»»•«•«»
36. "The Logic of Religion", p. 11,
37.The Roots of Religion. p. 230.
38. The Interpretation of Religion .p. 362. 
39,0p«'clt.,pp,365;365,
24:5,
•that the latter interprets reality as a system of causer- 
ana effects tbut the former as guided by a purpose for 
good. Each gives certainty of a kind; but the certainty 
of science is ofle of intellect while the certainty of 
religion is made secure to the personality as a whole* 
(Part II, Chapters VI and VII).
Our study of values has led inevitably to the fact 
of God. And the God to whom we have been led is primarily
one who conserves what is valuable. Such a God must be
40 
personal, for "o&Ly personality con appreciate character".
Indeed the progress of religion has been in the direction
of a more living, approachable, intimately knowable God. To
the worshipper^
C&od is n froth "another and greater Person and in some sense 
also the Eternal Spirit that moves, in scant or in satisfy*
ing measure, in his own heart" . These two invariable 
elements in the fullest conception of God are represented 
in its early history by Animism and Mana respectively, 
and in theological thought by the attributes of transcen­ 
dence and immanence. Both elements are required. (Part II, 
Chapter VIII).
Our study has also supplied us with criteria for 
judging differing religious systems and for testing 
genuine religious progress. That religion is the higher 
which embodit s the hi$ier ethical values. And gxrogress 
within any religion will follow closely upon advancing 
moral values. These criteria are justified by a survey 
of the religious history of mankind and, especially, of
4Q.ru« Interpretation of ueligion.p.591. 
41. Op. ait., p. 392.
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progress in the conception of Ood among the Hebrews. 
Applying these criteria we have no difficulty in reach­ 
ing the conclusion that it ic in Jesus of Nazareth that 
both religion and the conception of God reach their cul­ 
mination. (Part II, Chppter IX).
Finally we must note that the progress in man's 
discovery of spiritual truth is but one side of a rela­ 
tionship which has as Ito obverse the divine activity 
in revelation. YThile God's self-disclosure must be recog­ 
nised in all our knowledge,yet it is most significant 
in what we call specifically religious knowledge. The 
revelation of God is progressively recognised in the • 
inward rather than the out ward,and in the normal rather 
thin the abnormal. Accordingly it is in man—in man at 
his manliest and best—that God reveals himself most 
fully. It is in man as a locus of values which themselves 
belong to a higher world.
"What we call our values are really the self- 
disclosures and beckonings of a transcendent order. 
What we call our consciousness of moral obligation 
is really a consciousness of One who is actively 
striving to make Himself known to us and to win us 
for Himself." 42
And the culmination of that process of self-disclosure 
is to be discovered in the personality and the sacrifi­ 
cial death of Jesus Christ,for,«God, who at sundry times 
and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers
by the prophets,hath in these last days sTX>ken unto us
43 
by a £5onf
• (Part II f Chapter X).
•»•»«»«»«»••»
42. "The Logic of Religion",p.14.





In so lengthy and general an outline it is only 
too easy to lose hold of the heart of the matter. Before 
advancing further it is of first importance to grasp clearly 
the precise nature of Professor Baillie's reasoning from 
moral experience to God. We can come at this understanding 
most readily by marking the contrasts which he himself 
suggests between his thought and that of Kant.
In commenting upon Kant's statement of the moral
argument,Professor Baillie had suggested two serious
44 
limitations in it. In the first place,Kant's "reading of
religion is too 'moralistic* in the bad and narrow sense
45 
of that word" ;he was not mistaken in linking faith to
morality but rather in the inadequate interpretation of 
morality from which he finds faith to spring. In the second 
place,Kant 1 c analysis is inadequate in "its account of the
exact nature of the transition from the moral to the reli-
46 
gious outlook" . Professor Baillie proposes to make good
the first shortcoming by a broader and more catholic view
of Morality as "the quest of the highest and most inclusive
47 
ideal which it is possible for man to seek after" —with
48 
what qualified success we must note a little later.
It is in his desire to improve on Kant's formulation 
in the second regard that we meet the very core of his own 
argument. It seems obvious t he says t that if the doctrine of
44.irof.Baillie lists three criticisms; but it is difficult 
to discover any significant distinction between the first 
and the third. Their differentiation is due to faulty 
analysis .
45.The Interpretation of Religion.p.274. 46.0p.cit.,p.275.
4S»Op.cit. l p.274. 48.bee below ,pp.
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the summum bonum be granted,the existence of ^od and the 
assurance of immortality follov; logically and inevitably. 
The crux of the problem is not,as Kant thought, to establish* 
this sequence but the prior difficulty of providing logical 
proof of the doctrine of the summon bonum itself.
"Has Kant ever really offered any demonstration 
that our recognition of duty's claims upon us carries 
with it the belief that the universe,as r.ioral environ­ 
ment,must be no less ethically constituted than our­ 
selves as moral agents?" 49
1 Release from Kant's difficulty is deary open to us along
these lines :-
"Surely Kant makes the passage fronmorality to 
religion not when he deduces the existence of ^od from 
belief in the objective vindication of goodness but 
much rather when he passes to the belief in the objec­ 
tive vindication of goodness from the attitude of mere 
unquestioning obedience* •••It is for this reason that 
the question of the exact nature of the transition from 
the moral to the religious consciousness has proved*. •• 
a fruitful ground for further investigation and discus­ 
sion." 50
We may thus fix our eye on the crucial question—the objec­ 
tive vindication of goodness. How does Professor Baillie 
propose so to restate the Kantian position as to strengthen 
it at this critical point?
The briefest and clearest putting of his argument 
is in his inaugural lecture where it is stated in this 
simple logical form:-
"The major premise is that an unconditional ob­ 
ligation can only mean an obligation laid upon one by 
the ultimate system of things in which one has one's 
part to play. The minor premise is my sure Imowledge 
that an unconditional obligation is laid upon me to 
seek after that which is good. And the conclusion is 
that the universal system in which I find myself in­ 
volved must therefore be of such a nature as to demand 
this goodness of roe." 51
49.0p.cit.,p.275. 50.Up.cit.,p.275-6. 
51."The Logic of Religion" ,p.11.
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In The Interpretation of Religion.the order of the
premises is reversed :-
"The major premise from which the logic of faith 
proceeds is not only a value-judgment but the value- 
Judgment par excellence—the consciousness of duty's 
claim upon ouv wills , the awareness of a distinction 
between a higher way that must be followed and a lower 
way that must be eschewed." 52
The syllogism is not completed;but we may assume that the 
minor premise would propose that our consciousness of duty 
is of such a character as to involve an absolute obligation, 
and that an absolute obligation can proceed only from an 
absolute and transcendent Being;therefore such a Being must 
exist.
We may be permitted to restate the argument in some­ 
what less rigorously logical form in the following proposi- 
tlons:-
1.The consciousness of moral obligation is an ultimate 
and underivable fact of human experience,intuitively 
apprehended*
2. The obligation which conscience recognises is an 
absolute one*
3."No obligation can be absolute which does not derive 
from the Absolute." 53
4.Therefore,the Absolute must exist,and must be of such 
a character as to be the author of the consciousness 
of duty, i.e., "One Who loves the Good", 54
This,then,is the core of Professor Baillie's position,upon 
the validity of which his argument stands or falls. It will 
be seen that its adequacy might be questioned at any of 
three points :-
a.Is the consciousness of moral obligation objectively 
grounded?
b.Even if objective,is it necessarily absolute?
52«l?he Interpretation of Religionp.361 .
53 •Op.cit.,p.350,54.0p.cit.,p.352.
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c.Even if 'absolute 1 , does that fact necessarily 
prove the existence of God?
a)As in the cases of the other reformulations of 
Kant's position which we are considering,the weight of 
the case is squarely placed in the first instance on the 
genuine objectivity of the moral judgment. Unlike them, 
no elaborate defence of this conviction is offered. Indeed, 
strange as it may appear,the larger and systematic work 
offers no direct evidence for the objectivity of goodness
at all. One would suppose that it,like the fact of moral
i 
obligation,is regarded as self-evident. In the inaugural i
ad ress it is pointed out that those who profess doubt of 
the objective grounding of morality are none the less quite**; 
convinced of the truth of our moral Judgments;but their 
truth implies their objectivity.
"In the end there is no way to be sceptical about 
the objectivity of the moral consciousness except by 
denying the truth of its utterances, ^nd that,as I 
have said,I can find no one ready to do. w 55
b)Fuller attention is given to the absoluteness of the moral
imperative. But here again the final appeal seems to be to
f 
a sel^evident fact,intuitively grasped. "Nothing could be
clearer than that the terms in which duty asserts its claim
are terms of a quite absolute,and not merely a relative and
56 
partial,obligation." It is recognised that this is the key*
stone of the archf-
"The argument,for all its simplicity,is neverthe­ 
less as inescapable as any argument in the sphere of 
values can ever be. The only possible escape from it 
is to deny the presence of absolute values in our ex­ 
perience, or, as Kant preferred to put it,the uncondition-v 
al nature of the obligation with which our duty presents
55. "The Logic of Religion",p.8.
56. The Interpretation of Reluaon«p.35Q.
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itsalf to our wills ." 57
o) For the inference from the absolute character of duty's 
oluims to their source in an Absolute Being, a somewhat 
more detailed argument is presented. It is pointed out that
an absolute obligation cannot arise from society since the
d standards of society must find their sanction in some more
ultimate reality of fchich society is only a fragment;and 
such an explanation would only press one step farther back 
the problem of origins, fore ing the query of how the con­ 
sciousness of absolute values came to arise within society
58 
unless from a transcendent source. Equally unsatisfactory
are those more sophisticated interpretations which try to 
ground moral values in a "realm of essence" which is dis­ 
tinguished from and antagonistic to the "realm of existence1!*! 
it is clear,as any true re-ding of Platonic doctrine would
remind us,that the two realms interpenetrate and are aspects
59 
of a single ultimate reality. But,as before,the finally
convincing evidence proceeds from the inner consciousness 
of conscience itself.
"And so we come to see that what the voice of 
conscience actually does say is something more like 
this: 'The very heart and nature of things,the most 
ultimate reality that there is,demands that I be pure 
and true and tender and brave' No obligation can be 
absolute which does not derive from the absolute." 60
It does not fall within our purpose to examine the
l/ioivj
adequacy of this chain of argument);we shall have something
61 
to say on that point below. It is sufficient to point out
that there are those who would raise queries at each link
in the chain,and perhaps especially at the second and third.••<•••»»
57.The Interpretation of Religion.p.552.
58."Logic".PP .10-12; Interpretation.pp.550;552ff .
59."Logic"jj>.12 60.Interpretation.p. 550. 61.See
252. 
Is it not possible,it will be asked, to conceive of an
obligation which would have rootage in objective reality 
but not in any absolute ground? If we conceive a pluralistic 
universe, our values would be grounded in reality but not 
in absolute reality5but their claims upon our allegiance 
would be no less imperious because of the finite character 
of their source. Similarly,if we conceive of a network of 
partially conflicting values,each of which is in some sense 
relative, the highest of these would still deserve adherence 
despite the relativity of its authority. But its right to 
a complete devotion would rise merely from the fact that 
it was the best among a number of values all relative,not 
from its inherent absoluteness. Finally,if we conceive of 
a hierarchy of values within either a finite or a dualistic 
(or even a pluralistic) universe,the consummatory value 
within the hierarchy will possess a kind of 'absoluteness', 
but surely it does not in itself establish the existence 
of an Absolute—especially if the universe be dualistic or 
pluralistic by definition.
Such critics would,! think,be inclined to summarise 
their criticism in precisely the words which Dr.Daillle 
himself applied to Kant:—"Has he ever really offered any 
demonstration that our recognition of duty's claims upon us 
carries with it the belief that the universe,as moral en­ 
vironment,must be no less ethically constituted than our-
62 
selves as moral agents?"
62 » The Interpretation of Religion t T>-g7S.s** above,p.64 .
r.'.-




Our criticism will be directed not primarily upon 
the turning-point in the moral argument—faith's implicit 
logic—which has been considered in the section just pre­ 
ceding ,but rather against the wider setting in which Prof­ 
essor Baillie seeks to set this argument and the more gen­ 
eral presuppositions upon which his position rests* Speci­ 
fically it will raise questions at the following four 
points :-
a.The writer's conception of religion;more particularly, 
his insistence on finding religion rooted in morality 
exclusively.
b.His doctrine of the relation of moral to other values 
and their place in religious experience.
o.The significance of reflection in the religious con­ 
sciousness.
d.The nature and function of religious apologetic. 
It will be seen that these four topics strike very deeply 
into the whole ground-work of Professor Baillie*s thought.
It is perhaps not without significance that Profes­ 
sor Baillie carries us two-thirds through a very long and 
scholarly examination of religion without once telling us 
precisely what he understands by the term 'religion'. To 
be sure there is a definition introduced almost casually 
quite early in the introductory chapter,and a thoroughly 
understandable and acceptable one it is:— "in itself
religion is a -relationship or commerce between the human
• 63
and the Divine n . This is a definition on which,presumably, 
it would be possible to find a very wide measure of agree- 
63.The Interpretation of Religion.p.10
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ment. We are left to presume that this is the concep­ 
tion of the nature of religion which the author wishes t* 
us to carry through his discussion. Some three hundred 
pages later we are confronted tfith his formal definition:•
"There are two converse forms into which our 
definition can be thrown. We irdght say that what 
lies at the heart of religion is a projection of 
our moral values into the real order of thingsTT»» 
Or we might speak of religion as an apprehension 
of reality through.and in terms of.our moral values. .•« 
Our present purpose will,however,be better servedTy 
a simpler phrase which will take in both the above 
meanings...,Here then is our definition: Religion is 
a moral trust in reality• " 64
But this conclusion should not surprise UB. For the start* 
ing point had determined that no other destination was pos­ 
sible .
At the very outset of his inquiry,Professor Baillle 
had proposed to bring the phenomenon which he intended to 
investigate—religion—clearly before us not by means of 
a definition but by the more vivid method of case-illustra­ 
tions. He chooses two,selected he says because they are 
"situations in human experience in which what we call reli­ 
gious faith stands out in particularly bold relief ,because 
in them it stands in contrast and opposition to the other 
mental elements that go to make up the situation;and not f
as at other and happier times,in harmony and agreement with
65 
them." The two,instances are—the man of high character
and noble ideals who nevertheless seems to be haunted by 
crippling misfortune;and the man of serious mind and high 
ideals of conduct who finds his inherited religious beliefs 
apparently invalidated by his studies in naturalistic




science. The predicament of Job,and the dilemma of .oaiell
The problem of personal evil in Its most harassing and in- 
supjortable form,and intellectual difficulty in the face 
of the most powerful intellectual authority. Nowf noone 
would wish to deny that these are genuine examples,and 
magnificent examples,of religion. Indeed they might be cited 
as cases of religions faith in its very noblest expression, 
religious faith par excellence. But , equally,noone with even 
a modicum of historic or philosophical knowledge could 
suggest that they are in any measure representative of 
religion in its scope and variety. Nor that they supply an 
adequate picture of what religion is upon which to base a 
comprehensive study of the subject. From the vast and 
multiform panorama of genuine religious experience,Professor 
Baillie has selected two instances of very similar variety— 
both cases in which the emphasis falls upon the dogged per- 
sistence of faith against apparently overpowering objective 
negative evidence, both cases in which the distinctively 
ethical,indeed the defiantly moral , element in the religious 
attitude is dominant—and then proposes to give us an 
analysis of religion with these instances as our examples of 
the phenomenon I No wonder religion is found to be grounded 
in morality. Religion is first described in terms of a 
purely ethical experience;and then is discovered to have its 
sources in ethics. Morality,having been introduced into the 
premise,is now triumphantly exhibited in the conclusion.
To the attempt to find religion rooted in morality 
above,p.2350
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exclusively f there are two insuperable objections—the
evidence* from the rise of religion,in the race and in 
the individual;and the evidence from the most mature and 
comprehensive religious experience.
There is no part of Dr.Baillie's discussion which 
is more baffling and exasperating than his handling of the 
data of primitive religion,unless it be his treatment of 
the relation of moral to oliier values. There are times 
when one is almost tempted to think that he rejects the 
evidence where it seems to threaten his a priori hypothesis , 
but is only too eager to welcome it when it promises to 
lend support to his views* The phenomena of primitive reli­ 
gion come in for consideration at a dozen or more places
in the course of The Interpretation of Religion.but perhaps
67 
most significantly in the critique of Troeltsch and Otto,
and in the defence of Professor Baillie f s own theory of
68 
the origin of religion against possible objections. The
position maintained throughout these sections and in most 
of the others is the same:—early students of primitive 
religion described it as preiporal; this interpretation was 
due to "an elementary confusion of thcughtn f the mistake 
of Judging primitive ethics in terms of our own standards 
instead of in terms of ideals appropriate for that stage of 
advance; the truth is that the religion of primitive ..aan... i?i 
is related to such standards of value as he possesses. 
Now that position is interesting and important as far as 
it goes,if it be a sound reading of the historic facts (and 
there are not a few eminent anthropologists who would
67. Op.cit. t Pert II.Chapter IV.
68. Op.cit. t pp. 307-11;320-22.
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that it conveys an impression far beyond that 
warranted by the facts/* In any event, it has very little 
significance in establishing Professor Baillie's point. 
For his central premies is not that u people's religion 
is rel&ted to its moral standards, but that it is rooted 
in its moral standards* And for the latter assertion 
there is not,as far as I con discover, ulie slightest siired 
of shadowy evidence from the dtrba of primitive relijicn. 
We should expect a people's religion to be related to their 
morals as we should expect—and find—their religion to b& 
related to their art and their hone life and their recrea­ 
tions; but we do not on that account assert that their 
religion has taken its rise out of their art or their 
family loyalty or their play. Indeed the history of the 
relations of religion and morality are instructive; they 
seem to show a progressive moralisation of religious ideas,
an increasingly close linkage of religion and morality
69 
(as Professor Baillie is at pains to point out }* The
whole of the evidence would seem to point to a conclusion 
which the general character of primitive life and the
general history of civilisation would prepare us to expect :-
Iof manj 
religion had its first rise IE. the history^trfmany factors
of which shere non-ethical awe before ehere non-iaoral Power, 
the primitive'numinous 1, was probably the most important,and 
primitive conscience a distinctly subordinate one; the 
early connection of religion and morality was,precisely as 
Tr^eltsch and Otto maintain,a secondary one; with the 
progress in man's life as a whole,his advancing ethical 
69. See op, oic«, pp.400-415.
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Ideals and his advancing religious conceptions have 
been brought into a relationship of increasing intimacy
and mutual fructification, professor Baillie f s master, 
Hitsohlpsaw the truth of the matter in his later researches 
and confessed his earlier mis statement of the matter by 
an addition to the third edition of Justification and 
^oconciliation which Professor Baillie quotes with reluc­ 
tance and only to refute:-
"Religious knowledge.,,. cannot be traced back to 
the conditions which nark tJtio knowledge belonging to 
moral will,for there exists religion which goes on 
without any relation whatever to the moral conduct of 
life....For , only at the higher stages do,we find reli­ 
gion combined with the ethical conduct of life. Reli­ 
gious knowledge moves in independent value-Judgments, 
which relnte to man's attitude to the world*" 70.
Such an alteration in fundamental premiss must have cost 
its author no little trouble of mind and loss of pride. 
But it seems well-nigh indisputable that he l»s put the 
matter fairly and correctly.
There are nomentn when one seems to note a slight 
wavering in Professor fiaillie's own conviction on this 
crucial is:-ue of the priority of morality to religion. 
For example,in discussing the transition from ethical 
awareness to religious faith,it is said:-
"The certainty of conscience is a certainty 
which is logically prior to the certainty of faith,.., 
Needless to say,such evidential priority may not,in 
the case of a particular individual,imply chronologica] 
priority." 71
But the admission is recaptured in the following sentence:-»
"The faot of corporate tradition clearly inter­ 
feres with the reproduction of the race's original 
order of knowledge in the learning-process of the 
individual." 72
Sows learn that religion may arise in the individual,if 
70,TUTpolil t 'TuFl;ii'icatiQn and ^eoojioiliation t VolIII.p.205. 
71»The In-corpretation of Kelift'iun.p. 34tf. 72.0p.cit..B.3£U
not in th» race,in sources othar than the voice of 
conscience. Again,when Profou^or Bs\illie comes to trace 
the development of tho conception of God,he recognises 
its earliest beginnings in either animism or,more pro* 
bably^Ear'a—primitivo nan's do situation for vague super-fr« 
natural potency,force or influence wherever it is rocorj- - 
nised. M.DurkhftiEi'a statement is accepted that:-
"What we find at the origin and basis of religions 
thought are not determined and distinct objects and 
beings poyeossiug a sacrod character of thcnselvos; 
they are indefinite powers,anonymous forces,,,,whose 
impersonality is strictly comparable to that of the 
physical forces whose manifestation? the sciences of 
nature study," 72
And this leads Professor Baillie to the conclusion that 
"it is possible to penetrate baclcward to a rudimentary form
of religion in which the Power whose aid the ritual Invokes
73 
has not yet cone to be concsivsd of as a spiritual being*
And again • Tt r>jani:lnd > s earl last gods are spirits who are 
conceived as posse a sing* and being thQ . sources of.inana»and
who for that reason come to be venerated and to have a
74 
place in religious ceremonials," And once more," The
germ of primitive religion is to be looted for not in the
belief in spirits but in the conception of a supernatural
75 
potency that may be called to nan's aid" , But we are
immediately told that the great superiority of this theory*- 
of mana over the alternative theory of animism lies (not, 
apparently,in its closer fidelity to the facts,but)in the
«
fact that "the notion of value is implicitly present in76 ————
the idea of inana" • Here,if ever,we are i"ace to face with•»**~<»~
7£>A)ugJchalm«_Elgm9ntary Forms of the Religious Life.p,200,
73,71,75, Tue I^te^prctotion of P!*li<d.on7p»584,
76,
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an 'elementary confusion or thought 1 • FJ^ if value does 
attach to mana.it should be sufficiently clear from the 
writer's own statements that it is purely instrumental 
value and not in any sense what we mean by moral value- 
precisely the same kind of value which primitive man might 
find in water to feed his herds or cyclones to destroy 
his enemies or alcohol to dull his senses, the kind of valued 
which might attach to any non-ethical source of Power 
which he might turn to the use of his non-moral desires* 
The natural and proper conclusion from the passages quoted 
from the text would seem to be that religion arises in 
man's response to what he conceives to be supernatural 
Powers of a non-moral character which he seeks to win for 
the furtherance of his erids, moral and otherwise. The same 
confusion of thought baffles us in Professor Baillie's
final statement of his dissent from Otto's theory of the
V? 
'numinous' ; but we have argued the point at perhaps undu«|h
length already*
Our final coationt on the problem of primitive reli­ 
gion must be merely a notation of the principle of inter­ 
pretation which Professor Balllle proposes for our use. In 
stressing the difficulty of discovering precisely what the 
inner experiences of primitive peoples were like, he presentr 
not once but repeatedly § the astounding suggestion that our 
own inner knowledge of what religion means to us should be
our ultimate guide. "The only final apneal is to our inward
73 
knowledge of what religion really is" | "our interpretation
77. The Interpretation of geli^ion.p.254. 
Op.cit.,p.l39,
of the scanty objective data concerning primitive human
mentality being very largely dependent upon our intro-
79 
spective knowledge of our own spiritual natures" .
Would it be suggested,one wonders,that by the sane prin­ 
ciple when we discover primitive man contemplating some 
strange natural phenomenon which excites his wonder or 
dread,for example a shooting-star,we should properly
interpret his emotions in terms of Professor Eddington(s
*
reaction to the same phenomenon; Or that when we see
primitive man yielding to his instinctive passion for 
physical gratification in pursuit of a mate,we should 
read his inner experience in terms of what we know of the 
love of Elizabeth and Robert Browning; If there is one 
principle of interpretation which is banned by the canons 
of good criticism it is precisely this. If it is manifestly 
wrong to Judge a mature human characteristic by its pri­ 
mitive origin,it is equally unsound to interpret •roots* 
in terms of 'fruits 1 . Nor is Professor Baillie wholly 
free from apparent self-contradiction on this point also. 
In one breath we are warned that to judge the ethical
standards of the savage by our own ethical canons is to
80 
be guilty of an elementary confusion of thought; in the
next that to interpret the primitive human mentality in 
the light of our own inmost spiritual experiences is the 
only sound method of procedure*,
It is not merely the rise of religion to birth 
within primitive religion which gives the emphatic lie 
79. Op.cit.,p.l89. 80.0p.cit.,p.508.
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to Professor Baillie«s account of the origin of religion
in the moral consciousness. Essentially the same story is 
told by the rise of religion to birth within the soul of
the child. We have already had occasion to urge this point
81 
against Kant's parallel too-narrow theory of religion.
"The religion of childhood does not begin in 
consciousness of duty;it is brou^it to birth by the 
gift of love,devotion,sympathy,sacrifice,faith from 
another—parent,nurse,teacher,friend. The God whom 
children know does not speak through a voice within, 
but through a person without* And the sense of duty, 
as far as it is more than reluctant acquiescence in 
an external rule,is the glad return of the child's 
soul to the trust,the love,the high expectation of 
another. Religion begins,not in the awakening to 
something within myself , but in the spontaneous response 
to someone outside myself."
Now whether this is a true account of the characteristic 
beginnings of religious faith we must leave to the students 
of childhood religion,and to the witness of each man's own 
inner consciousness—a court of appeal to which Professor 
Baillie is always eager to concede a final authority.
The added tragedy of Professor Baillie's perverse 
reading of the facts of religion lie s in the fact that it 
might have been saved from a measure of its absurdity if 
it had professed to give us a theory not of "religion 
itself embracing "the furthest limits of our human traffic 
with the Sternal World" ,but of mature religion. For,as far 
as we can understand it,Professor Baillie's view of the 
matter might be reduced to something like this analysis: — 
the early life of races and of individuals very generally 
contains experiences with which are associated the emotions
of awe,gratitude,obeisance,comradeship,and corresponding
81* See above f p,71.
82. The Interpretation of Heli/Uon.pp.63.62^
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ceremonial practices; these experiences are very commonly
but quite mistakenly termed 'religious'; considerably 
later in the development of the race or of the individual 
there comes a time when there arises an acute awareness of 
the apparent enmity between Nature and human values; the 
earlier naive trust in the Power or Powers behind Nature 
wavers,and the beliefs mistakenly labeled 'religious* are 
overlaid with doubt; But as men meditate upon their values 
and serve them with whole-hearted loyalty, they find them­ 
selves projecting these values upon reality or reading 
reality in terms of their values; and finally they surrender 
themselves in complete trust to reality so conceived,against 
the apparently overwhelming evidence of scientific study and 
the facts of life; this final act of trust is religion*
and to no preceding stage in men's maturing experience can
83 the name properly be applied* This,I suggest,is a form in
which Professor Baillie's position might quite reasonably 
have been presented* It would have met an initial objec­ 
tion from those who would charge it with unjustified 
license with an old and widely used term,one of the great 
indispensable words in mankind's vocabulary, Question 
would be raised whether it is legitimate to exclude from 
the meaning of 'religion' what the overwhelming number 
of men have always regarded as 'religion' and identified 
by that name. But the meanings of the word are already 
legion; an original definition would,perhaps,do no harm.
To be sure,had Professor Baillie employed this
SfiliS® and agreed to furnish us with an interpretation
85.Cp.The Interpretation of Religion.T>p«252-255;546-551;etc»
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of 'nature religion1 rather than religion in its most 
general and inclusive connotation, his rendering of the 
inmost character of mature religion would have had to face 
far more fundamental criticism than a mere terminological 
objection. And this time not from the voice of early reli-
voice of religion in its most advanced and 
comprehensive expression. >aid on two distinct counts— 
a)the priority of morality over religion in mature exper- 
ience t and b) the rootage of mature religion in ethical in 
contrast to other types of value-experience.
a}. It is Professor Baillie's contention not merely 
that religion originates in morality f but that its progress 
depends upon and follows after prior advances in morality. 
And,again,in both racial and individual experience. Th»
case as regards the religion of the race is made in the
84 
discussion of "The Nature of Religious Progress" . The
evidence from individual experience is presented in the 
same chapter in a study of the distinctive contribution 
of Jesus to the advance of religion. For the sake of economy 
of space our attention may be confined to the latter point. 
In seeking to explain how Jesus came to his supreme concep­ 
tion of God as loving and redeeming Father, the following 
conclusion is offered:-
"The secret of our Lord's insight is the universal 
secret of all religious insight: it is simply that His 
thoucht of God kept pace \vith His thought of human life 
It was because He had a great new thing to say about 
how men should live with one another here below that He 
had this great new thing to say about what Go& above 
was like. He had made discovery of a new moral value— 
and he applied it to His faith in God." 85
84.The Interpretation of Religion.Part II,Chapter IX. 
85.0p.cit.,p.440.
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"We now see plainly that the new thought of God 
to which the gospel of Jesus leads us is nothing else 
than an application to the eternal world of the secret 
discovered^in the sphere of the life of the family." 86
Now whether that is a true account of the way by which Jesus! 
mind came to its unique hold on God is a question which 
could be answered in only one of two ways—by expert Gospel 
criticism,in which only the scholars may speak;or by an 
analysis of the inner processes of Jesus 1 consciousness, 
where even the most forward would hesitate to speak. Suffice 
it to say that there are able and lifelong students of 
Jesus' thought who would hold that it exactly reverses the 
true causal sequence or f at most,tells half the truth; that 
Jesus' direct reflection upon the character of God and his 
sense of personal communion with God were as instrumental 
in lifting his ideals for human living tas were the latter 
in elevating his thought of God. Shall we say that his 
advance to the thought of God as loving and redeeming 
father was wholly due to inference (albeit unconscious 
inference) from his observationa of family life and the 
anticipation of his own sacrificial end? Or,to put the 
question in a slightly wider reference,shall we say that 
the religious insight of the eighth century prophets re­ 
sulted from their advancing ethical consciousness,rather 
than that their advancing conception of what Jahwe demanded 
of his people resulted from their heightened personal 
consciousness of what Jahwe himself must be like? That Anos' 
great vision of the righteousness of God was derived in
contrast to his growing abhorence of the unrighteousness 
86«0p.cit.,p»441,
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Of Israel and not at all from his own reaching after God 
in the lonely night watches on the hillslopes of Tekoa and 
his sense of God's direct impact upon his life in the midst 
of that solitude? That Isaiah's vision of the Holy One and 
the Holy One's requirement* fcr his life,could we but 
properly psycho-analyse it,would be seen to have sprung 
entirely from certain ethical experiences in his own life, 
and not at all from the experience of worship itself—the 
prophet's own vivid consciousness of the immediate voice 
of the Divine to his conscience? Or,to set the question 
in a still slightly wider reference, shall we affirm that 
the ordinary worshipper carries into the experience of 
personal worship just such religious insight as his moral 
experiences have furnished him,and returns from worship 
with precisely the same insight; that worship furnishes to 
him nothing of new spiritual or ethical vision,save as its 
atmosphere might bring to the surface of consciousness 
ethical truth already latently present? It may be that this 
sequence of queries should without exception be answered 
in the affirmative. If it be so,religion is reduced to a 
position of most inconsequential and ancillary dependence 
upon morality. And the significance of religious worship 
would appear to be quite incidental,its ethical value 
negligible. But the most serious difficulty would be to 
render a satisfactory explanation of the historic evidence 
for the apparent direct ethical fruits of high religious 
experience.
Would it not seem a more defensible view that morality
267. 
and religion are reciprocally related,if not as regards
origin,at least as regards mutual fructification toward
87 
progress? If religion is (as Professor Baillie has urged
88 
us to believe ) the mother of philosophy,of medicine,of
politics,of law,of art and "of we11-nightverything else", 
are we to believe that in this realm alone—the sphere of 
moral insight,her fecund owers have failed her; she is
87. Here,as at so many other points,Professor Baillie f s own 
thought does not seem to be wholly clear in the matter,but 
It has not seemed necessary to display the inconsistencies 
in the text. For example,at one point he seems to hold to 
the view that the relations of religion and morality are 
reciprocally fruitful:— ,
"The relation of religious faith to our moral experience 
is thus seen to be in some sort a double one. First faith 
emerges out of the moral consciousness and then,having 
emerged,it quickens that consciousness. First it is born 
of moral desire and then,be ing born,it reveals itself 
as the only means whereby that desire may be fulfilled." 
(p.332)
And again,it is pointed out that the moral progress of 
humanity would have been even slower than it has been,"had 
not religion in its turn exercised an inspiring effect upon 
moral practice. New spiritual insights first reveal them­ 
selves as a quickening and illumination of the conscience; 
.•••yet,had conscience not been strengthened and established 
by the co-operation of the existing religious conceptions, 
it would hardly have had the power to rise to those higher 
moral insights out of which the new religious conceptions 
have grown." (pp.412-413. )
But these are qualifications,not always easy to harmon­ 
ise,upon the central doctrine. The latter is reiterated in 
a dozen statements of which these are typical:- "AlQJordinary 
reforms in religion are immediately due,not to the dawning 
realisation of a new ethical value,so much as to the carry­ 
ing over of an existing value into the sphere of religious 
belief and practice...,It remains true of every forward move 
in religion,great or small,sudden or gradual,corporate or 
individual,that it goes back for its ultimate causation to 
some heightened realisation of value in the ethical sphered 
"The broad lines of the religious development of our, race.... 
follows,sta^e by stage,the line of the development of the 
racial mores • "(pp.411 • 412.413)
88.0p.cit.,p.l79. i7e do not pause to point out that it is 
a little difficult to understand how,if religion is wholly 
the child of morality and waits on an upthrust from within 
the moral consciousness to give it birth,it can itself be 
the parent of such a motley progeny,some of them apparently 
non-moral in character and many of them premoral in their 
chronological advent in mankind's history!
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herselnthe child end not the parent, ths child of morality?
Indeed, if she is the mother of Lill the arts, has she not
given birth to one of the elements in Professor Baillie f s
89 
broader interpretation of Morality? It would seem more
plausible to expect that morale, like moot of the others 
of the great huiaftn concerns and activities, had had its origi* 
nal nurture within the fertile shelter of religion and then, 
like them, had declared its majority, established its auto­ 
nomous status and continued to bring helpful •ariching 
contribution to its original parent, V/e have elsewhere sug­ 
gested that the mutual relationship might be thou^jht of 
somewhat in this fashion :•
"Vital religion— by its very nature fecund, 
germinative, creative— can and should give birth to 
ethics. Ethics cannot give birth to religion. The 
function' of religion is to stir to life the latent 
creative energies, the incipient idealistic urges, 
within human nature; the task of ethics is to give 
those superabundant energies intelligent and con­ 
structive direction." 90
b), Onco more, Professor Baillie's account of mature 
religion wqnts adequacy not only because he pictures its 
relationship to morality as one of dependence, but also 
because he interprets it in relation to luoral experience 
exclusively, in disregard of the other great types of value- 
experience*
Wo have already irged that the whole inquiry is 
given an initially false and na&w setting by the instances 
which Professor Baillie has chosen as typical cases for his 
analysis, the^specimens^f or his "dissecting table". These,
89. Op. cit., pp. 304-7. £ee below, p.272.
90. "The Sickness of Liberal Religion" , in World Tomorrow. August, 1931, p.259. —— ———————
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it will be remembered,nsrw tv,o—tho man of high purpose 
and character who maintains hie trust in God despite the
pressure of unmerited adversity upon his life,and the man
of similar worth! 
| who holds to hie belief in :^od despite the apparently
naturalistic conclusions of the prevailing science—cases 
which we have ventured to cull the 'predicament of Job 1 
and the 'diloictifi of Ami el* » But nurely,anyone determined 
to conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the nature of 
religion v/ould need to la$ alongside these true and notable 
illustrations siany nore chosen from the varied gamut of 
circumstance in which characteristically religious exper­ 
iences take their rise. lie would need to portray for us*- 
the nature-lover set over against the immensities of stars 
and peaks and spaces;and the Eadonna wrapt in the glory 
of infancy; and the peasant bowed befoi*e ligh altar or 
simple hearthside; and the patient scientist at the moment 
of great discovery; and the reformer in the face of 
defeat and destitution; and the craftsman at the birth- 
moment of creative achievement; and the man who gazes into
a 
the eyes of.trusted friend; and ten thousand times ten
thousand of the family of Everyman who,in the presence 
of lilies and birds and solitude and gay comradeship and 
glad laughter, have been certain of the companioning 
Presence of God and have known religion as "a relationship 
or commerce between the human and the Divine",
Surely we are not to think of Jesus' certainty of 
God as born only in the agony of Getnsemane or the harrow­ 
ing doubt of the Cross; or primarily in these and similar
£70,
episodes of his life. And we are not to think of his gift 
of the some confidence tc men ad rede exclusively through 
the travail of temptation in the Garden and his persistence 
in trust at the End, though it was made perhaps supremely 
there. Rather his communication of his own faith in God 
must have been the outcome of all manner of contact 
between him and them— his attitude toward children, his 
clear love of Nature, his homely humour, his own winsome 
and altogether trustworthy friendship, as well as his way 
of meeting life's bitter testing. And in this respect, his 
gift of assurance to men would be truly representative of 
God's gift of himself. He comes, and he is recognised, not 
alone in the voice of conscience commanding us to duty, but 
in every manifold touch of value upon our lives.
Probably the finally convincing denial of Professor 
Eeillie's definition of religion would come from that 
eourc'e to which he is ever ready to grant authority in 
these raatterr- — the voice of religious experience itself. 
Defin.3 religion as " e relationship or commerce between 
the hurcan and the Divine" and that voice would reply with
virtual unanimity ,Ve understand what i&ant;we recognise 
that re a true description of what we mean by religion J 
But define religion as "a projection of our moral values 
into the real order of things", "an apprehension of reality 
through, and in terms of, our moral values", "a moral trust 
in reality", and millions of worshippers in every age and 




membership of Christianity!would rise up to protest:
•We repudiate your definition; that is not what the world 
has always known ns religion, nor That we ourselves have 
experienced as religion; and thet is not the way by which 
religion has actually cone to birth within our souls,* 
We are forced to a conclusion which has already been 
hinted. The PUTTJ of the mtter would seem to be that Dr. 
Balllie starts with the determination to recognise as 
genuine religion no experience or conviction which Is 
not primarily norc.l in character and which has not arisen 
from a dominantly ethical source ; he concludes,inevitably^ 
with -ftae conviction that "religion is a moral trust in 
reality".
Our criticism of Professor baillle's general view 
of religion has occupied us longer than had been our inten­ 
tion. This is perhaps warranted by the basic importance 
of the issue for the validity of his whole position. The 
three other points in our critique must be given correspond* 
igly summary consideration.
Vie have more than once called attention to the 
absence of clear consistency in Professor Baillie's at­ 
titude on a number of vital matters. This is nowhere so 
apparent or so confusing as in his treatment of the 
relation of moral to other values. It Is his avowed deter­ 
mination to correct Kant's onesidedness at this point by 
giving to •morality 1 & meaning sufficiently broad to 
bring all of the ultimate values within its scope. For
272. 
•morality 1 is to bo understood ar, "the nuest of the
highest and most inclusive ideal which it is possible for
91 92 
nan to seek after" ,end agp.in as "but, the art of living".
But in actuality,throughout most of the discussion, mora­ 
lity appears as almost precisely what Kant meant by ufu* 
term. And the resulting theology seems almost as open to 
the charge of narrowness, rigorism and moral ism as that 
of the master. The impossibility of handling theory of 
values in this way end the unsr.tisfactoriness of Professor 
Baillie's treatment of the whole problem may be discovered 
in any of three ways:-
1,Through his own failure to maintain a consistent
view-point in the natter*
2 ̂ Through an analysis of the nature end types of values. 
3,'xhroUoh the testimony cf the ? experts* •
l.A brave start is made in the resolution to give to 
moral values the wider significance which would escape 
the most serious objection to the Kantian interpretation 
of religion. At the outset of the historic survey of this 
theory of religion it is said:-
"In order to avoid misunderstanding,it may be 
well to mice a few prcliininr,ry observations concerning 
the meaning that is here to be attached to the terms 
Lioraliti snd value. ;!crality is, of course,to be under­ 
stood in its widest (which is,to be sure,its only 
proper) SMLGC. In come modern rr it ings th« word has 
been taken more narrowly, be ing made to signify one 
particular (and net altogether prniseworthy) attitude 
to life rather than the art of living in general;and 
to anybody vho has this UE^GC in rind the declaration 
that all religious faith emanates from the moral con­ 
sciousness must look >oth like an elementary histori- 
cal solecism and like an attempt seriously to curtail 
the scope of religious aspiration. There is,however,
91 •The Inucrurstation cf P^ 
92.Op.cit.,p.304.
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no possible excuse for such a usage,and in the dis­ 
cussion which follows the moral consciousness will 
be understood as including the awareness of all 
ultimate ends of desire of wl^atever sort." 93
Again,in a critique of Kant's way .of stating the argument 
for God from morality,one of the three shortcomings of 
his statement is held to lie in the legalism and formalism 
which impoverish his interpretation of what morality is.
"The real root of our difficulty with Kant lies 
not in the nature of the bond which he forges between 
faith and morality but rather in the kind of morality 
to which religion is thus attached and in terms of 
which it accordingly comes to be interpreted. If mora­ 
lity means only keeping the comrandments— * obedience 
to a categorical imperative 1 —we may well feel that it 
provides too narrow a basis for Christian faith to 
rest upon. But if (as a more adequate ethical theory 
would instruct us) morality be rather the quest of the 
highest and most inclusive ideal which it is possible 
for man to seek after,the case is surely very differ­ 
ent. To envisage moral laws as divine commands is one 
thing; to envisage the goal of human endeavor as being 
in line with the eternal purpose of God is a very dif­ 
ferent thing." 94
Once more,in defending his own theory of religion as rooted 
in moral values against the charge that it threatens to 
impoverish the religious conscious ness, it is aaid:-
"As for this line of objection generally,we cannot 
but feel that its point is not really made against th^ 
view of religion which unites religion with morality 
but rather against a certain narrow and riforistic view 
of morality itself. If there was anything wrong with 
Pharisaism and Puritanism,it was not that their religion 
was too moral so.much as that their morality was too 
legalistic.....!,! rality is after all but the art of 
living. It is that from which flow our mores. It stands 
for the control exercised upon our lives by our ulti­ 
mate ends and ideals. It does not mean one particular 
way of living or one particular view of life but what­ 
ever way of living is right and good and whatever view 
of life is true. Our moral consciousness is but a con­ 
venient name for our awareness of those values which 






And, finally, with reference to art as an avenue of approach
to religion independent of and parallel to morality :-
"It is completely to misread the moral conscious* 
ness to suppose that it deals only with one kind of 
value, one kind of good, one kind of thing that is worth 
seeking or having or doing; on the contrary, its busi­ 
ness is rather to instruct us as to the relative 
importance of all particular values, and so to show us 
what things are ultimately valuable and good, and what 
things are worth seeking and having and doing in the 
end. If morality is less than the whole of life, it is 
only as having characteristically to do with the ulti- 
mate,as distinguished from the proximate, ends of 
desire." 96
Now this portrait of 'morality* is so broad and 
altogether attractive that we feel an immediate favorable 
disposition toward it and the interpretation of religion 
which shall emerge from it* What could possibly improve on 
the idea of morality as the art of living, committed to no 
particular way of life except any which should prove good 
and no particular view of life except any which is true? 
Surely religion, at least in its more mature stages, is 
organically related to such a conception as that I Indeed, 
although there are certain specific phrases and sentences 
in the book which are difficult to harmonise with these 
exceedingly catholic definitions, I hardly think anyone 
would be likely to appreciate how far the actual treatment 
of morality, page by page and chapter by chapter f f alls short 
of the anticipations these definitions arouse until he had 
steeped himself in the book and caught its underlying temper 
and tempo •
To be sure, so to employ the term morality seems, as 
in the case of Professor Baillie's use of 'religion* and
96. Op.cit.,p.305,
a number of other terms,a departure from familiar usage 
which might demand Justification, For I think there can 
be little question but that f in the plain man's speech, 
morality is thought of as standing in particular relation 
to one rather than all of the ultimate ends of life,some­ 
what as art is conceived with reference to beauty and 
science or philosophy of logic with reference to truth. 
Professor Taylor favored the same departure from common 
practice in his earlier and more sophisticated writings 
when he said,"Morality is sometimes understood as a com­ 
prehensive name for all the practical side of life,inclu­ 
ding every experience in which the presence of an ideal
97 
can be detected" , although he immediately recognised
that so to employ • morality 1 was to fly in the face of 
the parlance of ''common sense"; and apparently he has, 
in his later writings,preferred to return to the great 
historic tradition which has envisaged three ultimate
values—truth,beauty and goodness—and morality as espec-
98 
ially concerned with the third. Surely the classic
triad which has stood through so many centuries must have 
some firm grounding in reality,and to seek to bring all 
three within the meaning of one is to court confusion of 
thought.
Professor Baillle's thought is never free from 
precisely this confusion. Hardly has he given us his first 
broad definition than he adds on the next page," To place
the roots of our religious faith in our moral nature is the
•»•»•••»•» •
97.A»E.T&ylor,The Problem ofl Conduct. p.467.
98. Op.oit,,p,467. See above,
same as to say that such faith is grounded in our
99 
knowledge of good and evil" —not our recognition of
beauty and ugliness,or of truth and error. And the 
handling of the relation of morality to art must prove 
woefully unsatisfactory to anyone who happened to ap­ 
proach the question from an interest in art. First we 
are told that morality is the guardian not of one type 
of value but of all of them,and of all of them equally; and 
that its business is to establish their relationships. But 
at once it appears that "our deepest ethical standards"—
which are tc guard all the ultimate values—are "standards
100 
of character and service" ; surely * character and service*
are not words drawn readily from the familiar vocabulary
of art. This begins to appear like the old fashioned meaning
of * ethical* after all. And then we are warned that "Art
101 
can only become religious by first becoming ethical" .
And finally," Consequently it is doubtful whether we are 
at all right in speaking of art,taken by itself , as a source 
of religious Insight or a means of reaching God;seeing that, 
when taken by itself , it is more likely to lead us away from 
Him...,The truth is that we are not likely to find God in
art unless we have already found Him in our life as a
102
whole." Can we say that the artist would lack justifica­ 
tion if he remarked,"Our original suspicion is immediately 
vindicated. It is the old 'morality* which is meant after 
all—not the custodian of all the values but the jealous 
guardian of *a single value,and one which all too often 
seems to stand over against and in despite of the value
99. The Interpretation of Religion. p.259.
100. Op.cIt.,pp.305-6.10l.0p.cit.,p.306.
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to whose service art is pledged. The wolf in sheep's 
clothing invites art in f not to nourish but to destruyS? 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the fact that 
Professor Baillie has not really achieved a broader and 
inclusive meaning for 'morality' is found in his almost
invariable identification of value and duty. "The Funda-
103 
mental Certitude of Duty and Value" is a section heading.
"The imperativeplaim of the ideal" end "the certitude of
104 r 
duty" . "The deeper implications of our moral conscious*
105 
ness" and "the consciousness of moral obligation" .
"The major premise from which the logic of faith proceeds... 
the value-judgment par excellence—the consciousness of 
duty's claim upon our wills,the awareness of a distinction
between a higher way that must be followed and a lower way
106
that must be eschewed." "Indeed we may say that to be­ 
lieve in duty and to believe in God are not,for the man 
of faith,two different beliefs,but only one belief. To
believe in God is,at least in its beginnings,hardly more
107 
than a deeper way of believing in duty." "And when we say
that we 'ought' to do right,we do not mean that we want to
do right,but much rather that the nature of things wants
108 
us to do right,whether we want to do right or not" .
(This sounds suspiciously like 'obedience to a cetegorioal
109 
imperative! ) Now,411 this may be the language of
moralityjand it is the language of morality in the common 
use of the term. But it can hardly be claimed that it is
103.0p.cit.,p.xiv and 340. 104.Op.cit.,p. 342.
105.Op.cit.,p.338. 106.Op.cit.,p.361.
107.rho Roots of Religion. p.221.
108 « The Interpretation o'f Religion, p .353.
109. Op.cit.,p.27^s. See above, p.273.
a language native to or appropriate for aesthetic apprecia­ 
tion; perhaps hardly more for the search for truth. Morality 
may be including all values, but it is talking in terms which 
only one type of value would readily comprehend.
And that this is Professor Baillie's real feeling 
in the matter crops out more than occasionally :-
"Religion is, in the inmost heart of it, an affair 
....of conduct, of how one lives one's daily life and 
faces one's daily task and trial." 110.
"We have in the end but two main alternatives to 
chooce from— the view which makes faith's birth and 
growth in the soul depend on moral earnestness and 
depthtana the view which makes them depend on intel­ 
lectual capacity and attainment." Ill
Here we seem to see the intellectual values set in some 
sense over against the moraltwhile distinctively aesthetic 
values, as so oftent escape notice altogether!
We have selected illustrations almost at random. 
They might be multiplied tiresomely. *nd in other connect 
tions— his critique of R^anticism^his hostility to Rationa- 
lism,hls hailing of primitive religion discussed earlier. 
Or we might again refer to the instances of typical religion 
to which his mind instinctively turns— the defiance of faith 
in the presence of practical adversity and intellectual 
scepticism, AS stated above, a deep immersion in the point- 
of-view as a whole would have to precede atull appreciation 
of our point. The quotations given will perhaps give a taste 
of its characteristic tone. On their evidence ,one nay put 
these queries: —
Q.v;ould the artist or the scientist regard this as an 
adequate handling of the TOlues for which he is 
concerned^
Roots of Religion, p. 91, 
111. The Interpretation of R-ligion»p»569«
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b.Does morality in this interpretation differ essen­ 
tially from tho familiar historic meaning of norality 
as related primarily to the 'good',in distinction 
from the 'true* and the 'beautiful 1 ?
c.Does this interpretation of morality differ essen­ 
tially from Kant's original view of it?
No,the truer wisdom on this confessedly obscure 
issue of the relation of the values is given by one of 
Professor Baillie's sources whom we quotes with apparently 
full agreement,indeed partly in his own paraphrase. We 
should regard this,I think,as his own real position in the 
matter and the terms in which hia view should have been 
set forthi-
"The values of truth and benuty thus give rise 
to imperatives no less thtn the values of moral excel- - 
lence,but 'the kinds of these imperatives may conflict; 
and morality,which,on the one hand,admits their author-f 
ity,claims on the other hand,to override the authority 
of any one of them (except its own) for sufficient 
reason. The scientific or artistic conscience,as we 
have seen, is a conscience; yet the general or moral 
conscience asserts its claim to be suzerain over 
both'." 112
Here,a final authority is reserved for morality, but it is 
the authority of a military command erjwith the power of 
suppression,not the authority of a gracious arbiter with 
capacity for comprehensive synthesis. And morality's final 
authority is granted only after recognition on the one hand 
of the prior authority as well as existence of the indepen­ 
dent values of truth and beauty,and on the other hand of 
the independent character- of the values of moral excellence, 
not as embracing the other two but as distinguished fr»m
themt Finally it is recognised that between the imperatives
*••»«•»••«•»
112.John Laird.The Idea of Value. p.54. moted in The Inter­ 
pretation of Religion, p.SOft.' —————
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arising from the various values there is all too likely to 
be conflict,and the consequent need of ^n arbitrator.
2), The impossibility of bringing all the ultimate 
values under the wing of morality is further shown by an 
analysis of the nature of these values. I mean such an
analysis as that of Professor Sorley,which we have already
US 
noted with appreciation. To confine attention to the
distinction between beauty and goodness, his main contention, 
it will be remembered, was that the two values could be 
clearly differentiated at at least two points. First,in 
the attitude each calls forth—for beauty,admiration;but 
for goodness,approval. becondly,in the object to which the 
value-judgment attaches—in the first instance,to an object 
as beautiful in and for itself , with only a distinctly secon­ 
dary reference to the human agentjbut in the case of good­ 
ness, to a per son, and to an action only as the external 
proof of the character or intention of a person. To give a 
single illustration. If I see one man rescue another from 
drowning, I instinctively pronounce the action 'good 1 ; but 
if I discover that the rescue has been for the purpose of 
inflicting greater torture on the rescued man,the action at 
once loses its character &£ 'good*; what matters is the 
attitude and design of the doer of the act. On the other 
hand,if I se® a very moving picture of u woman which I take 
to bo a Madonna,! pronounce it both 'beautiful 1 and 'good 1 ; 
but if I discover that its purpose is not to inspire reli­ 
gious devotion but to seduce youth,it is no longer 'good*, 
«»«»*i«»«»
112, See above,p.125£f.
but its character as 'beautiful 1 is not affected; what 
natters is a quality of the picture as a picture, without 
regard to its purpose or the moral character of its creator. 
In other words, the beauty of an object refers to something
inherent in the object: but the goodness of an action to
114 
the character and design of the doer. And the tendency
of the different ideals to "fall asunder" and even to 
conflict is pointed out with refreshing frankness and 
clarity by Professor Sorley. To be sure they find their 
true unity in a "full view of th<3 worth of life", but this 
is by no means assured in him whose concern centers in
matters of "character and volition", i.e, in the "life of
115 
duty",,
3, A final appeal, if needed, may be made to those who 
are by general consent 'experts' i*i these matters. V/e have
already suggested thepuestion whether those whose great 
devotion is to science or to art, those to whom the Ultimate 
Source of all ultimate value has spoken through truth oif 
through beauty or through that simpler and more universal 
voice of human love, would be likely to recognise Professor 
Baillic's 'interpretation of religion' as in any sense an 
adequate rendering of the inmost nature and validity of 
religion as they have known it. Their answer almost certainly 
would be in the negative,
c,The Place of One fur tha:|reapect in which Professor Baillie's
Reflection in thought fails to saintain reasonable consistency with itself, 
Religion. and in oonaequen.3e ls led on 4. 0 a faise interpretation of
IK73orley .Moral Values and the Idea of God. p . 32 . 
115.0p.cit.,pp.508ff. Cp.pp.l65ff.;467;etc.
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religion concerns the significance of reflection in the 
religious consciousness. The main burden of his conviction 
on this point seems clear enough. It is precisely what we 
should expect from one who wishes to find religion grounded, 
not in any intellectual process nor in the realm of feeling, 
but in the activity of will as it lifts our experiences of
value into affirmations of moral faith. It appears clearly
116 
in the critique of "The Speculative Method in Theology"
and again in the discussion of "The Rationalistic Theory
117 
of Religion"
"While disciplined academic learning and the 
pursuance of strict scientific method undoubtedly 
count for a very great deal in the study of meta­ 
physics,we cannot help feeling that religion is a 
thing for simple men.•••Here is a region in which 
pre-eminence follows not upon the possession of a 
more perfect scientific method but upon the posses­ 
sion of a purer and simpler heart*" 118
"Religion's faith is not a hypothesis,but a sacred 
trust. What it manifests ib not the humble and em- 
pirioally minded acceptance by the human mind of 
nature's appearances,but rather the self-assertion 
of the huioan spirit over against nature." 119
"The determining conditions of religious belief 
arc moral c one! i t ions,, ,» nothing counts here but the 
fineness of the hold we Ixave upon our values and the 
'livenoss and steadiness* with which they are present 
to our minds in ail tneir proper richness and depth.... 
What avails her« is not the or la but praxis. Not to 
him who passively contemplates them do our values 
reveal their Divine significance and depth,but only 
to him who yields himself to uheir imperious claim. 
And therefore it is that,'Blessed are the pure in 
heart;for they shall see Ckxl».,..The assurance of the 
Divine Companionship has in every age been promised 
not alone to the learned thinker, nor to him in any 
wise pre-eminonuly,but to all those who have sought it 
with a true and humble heart..,. Hot good deeds are 
here required; but a humble,childlike,patient,aspiring 
heart." 120.
These paseages,! suggest,ar3 thoroughly 'in character' with
<••»••«»«»«•
116. The Interpretation of IteliaioiuPttrt I,Chapter IV,
117. Op.oit.,Pap| Il.Chaptar II. 118.Op.cU.,p.182. 
119. Op.cit.,p.l85. 120.Op. cit.Ipp.363-368.
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the dominant point of view. But there c.rc- others, and 
by no laeans few or incidental, which appear in sharp 
contrast and seem to give to the interpretation of religion 
a decidedly in to 11 actualist tone,
"Whatever may be true of other experiences, of 
religious experience it must be said that it is it­ 
self essentially refloctive in character— born of 
reflection and constituted by reflection. Ho bein^» 
it; is granted, could be religious who could not think; 
and so for as wo know or or n guess, no being who can 
think is wholly without the germs of a religious 
consciousness. Therefore,ooein'- that thought consists 
in nothing else than the /oanipulation of ideas, it 
cannot be true that 'ideas are all foreign to religion!"
"Rationalism seems to be right in believing 
religious Inoicht to be a product of intelligent 
reflection... .The kind of intelligent or rational 
insist in which religion takes its rise is none 
other than moral insight." 182
The difficulty of reconciling these two selections of 
quotations (and, be it remembered, each is representative 
of a considerable portion of the text) would seem to stand 
forth on their surface. Indeed, if reflection and thought 
are regarded as synonymous and thought consists in "the 
manipulation of ideas", it is difficult to see how religion 
could be held to take its rise in "intelligent reflection" 
on any other than a rationalistic theory of religion. 
In fact the most convincing refutation of this 
latter picturing of religion would seem to lie precisely 
in Professor Baillie's own test cases, his instances of 
religion oar excellence. Strange paradox that one who cites 
as typical of the rise of faith Amiel and Job should then 
tell us that religion takes ita rise in 'intelligent reflec- 
121. Op.cit.,p.2;38* 122. 0P.cit.,p.257.
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tion". For /Uriel id portre.yeil *o ue e.s ono torn by conflict 
between 'intellect 1 which ootinbelled frcepticism and his 
•heart* which demanded faith; and hie significance as a 
typical devotee of religion arose Just from the fact that 
he trusted the latter against the former • Similarly,the 
historic portrait of Job is of one deep in bitter reflection 
upon life's misuse of hin who rose to the height of religious 
faith precisely at the moment when he thrust reflection 
from his mind and banished his fellow-counsellors from his 
presence with the cry,"Though he slay me,yet will I trust 
him," In neither typical instance,as far as I can see,was 
intelligent reflection of the slightest possible use to the 
troubled mind,but rather a positive disservice. In neither 
instance did the religious man become an example of the 
life of faith until he substituted for thought a blind 
trust of self against all the evidence reflection urged 
upon him. /vnd this is 3 faithful account of the religious 
nan facing the problem of evil. I recall one of the more 
advanced intellectual leaders in religion in America tell­ 
ing me that at 1;he tiirjs of his child's death, all the 
arguments for Crod and Irnmortaltty which he had employed in 
discussion with college students repeated themselves in 
his mind like a phonograph record but brought him less than 
no p*ace;unti3 finally he found himself saying to himself, 
"Look here,old men,why dont you trust?" ^s he did,peace 
came. That would seem to be a case in point of what Profes­ 
sor Baillie terms "the phenomenon of faith".
We do not say that that is the only way in which
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religious faith comes to birth in the human soul for, 
unlike Professor Baillie fwe do not hold religious faith 
to be always grounded in moral experience. But we do 
suggest that that is the way which is wholly congruous 
with his theory of religion. In any event,if religion be 
said to be trust in the Ultimate Goodness against the 
prevailing evidence which the mind possesses,it is hardly 
less than preposterous to propose that such experience of 
trust arises out of reflection.
d.The Function It was our contention that Professor Baillie had 
of Apologetic, unhappily circumscribed his investigation of religion at
the very outset by furnishing les^ than adequate illustra­ 
tions of what religion is. By the same token,he has thrown 
the whole task of apologetic into a somewhat false light 
an unwarrantedly limited definition of what theology is. 
The task of theology,it will be remembered,was defined 
very explicitly. It is,purely and simply,to "lay bare the 
nerve of faith", to interrogate the religious consciousness 
as to what it finds religion to be and to record the 
answers to that question, in particular it is warned against 
the temptations to construct systems,and it is forbidden 
to seek or accept the slightest possible light from any
other source as to the truth and validity of religion's
123 
certainties.
"It is in a very reul sense true that theology, 
considered as a science,has no special means of its 
own whereby it can demonstrate the fundamental validity 
of the religious consciousness and the fundamental 
truth of religious belief. In the end all it c^n do
125.Op.cit.,Part I. .,ee above,pp.23 Iff.
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is to take over into itself the assurance which 
already and natively belongs to faith. And this 
assurance it passes on to metaphysics* It is there* 
fore incompetent for metaphysics to attempt to throw 
any new light on the nature or degree of the validity 
attaching to the religious pcint of view....The one 
conclusion which clearly emerges is that twhatever 
be its real task f metaphysics t considered as such t can 
have no new and peculiar li^ht of its own to throw 
upon the religious problem." 124.
A question immediately suggests itself—what if the 
"assurance" which theology receives from faith and in turn 
passes along to metaphysics should prove in radical con­ 
flict with the "assurance" on the some issue which meta­ 
physics has received from some other science. Professor 
Baillie's reply seems quite clear;*theology maintains 
unquestioningly the certainties furnished it by faith. 
Metaphysics has no power to criticise them or to suggest 
criticisms of them for it does not possess the inner 
understanding from which alone such criticism could be 
made;it must accept them unaltered and weave them into its 
total view as well as it can. Now,memory of the age-long 
and tragic warfare between theology and the sciences or 
philosophy would urge the acceptance of such a device only 
as a last resort. We know only too well the proclivity of 
faith to pass on to theology and then in turn to metaphy­ 
sics all manner of assurances which subsequent centuries 
have taken in humiliating surrender. No* will it do to 
remark that these particular assurances were outside 
theology's proper sphere. At the time of their declaration 
faith did not regard them as in any sense outside her proper
 
sphere. It is clearly out of the question satisfactorily 
Op.cit. 9 p.48.
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to denatrk those elements of truth on which theology's
word shall possess an absolute and unquestioned authority, 
and those which may be handed over to this or that special 
science for similar illumination* It is a safe hazard that 
theology is today confidently asserlng on the sure certainty
of faith any number of beliefs which no self-respecting 
theologian will profess a hundred years hence.
It is at onoe a broader and a humbler task which 
should be proposed for theology. Not merely to search out 
and articulate the implicit logic in the moral conscious* 
ness*rise to faith in God,though that is admittedly no 
easy or unimportant undertaking. But rather to reveal the 
manifold ways by which faith takes its rise within the 
human soul,to seek to discover their reference the one to 
the other, and to seek to bring the whole body of religious 
conviction into mutually enriching relationship with other 
sources of knowledge as they,likewise,present themselves to 
metaphysics for criticism and synthesis. We are not urging 
that theology should accept its premisses from the sciences 
or metaphysics. Or that faith should surrender its deep 
certainties merely in the face of what metaphysics may 
say. v/e are urging that truth is too great and obscure and 
many-sided a reality and faith's many beliefs too uncertain­ 
ly sure to warrant the cavalier attitude which Professor 
Balllie recommends. And we are suggesting that it would 
be more appropriate and more sincere if theologytas the 
point of reference between religion and mankind's other 




sibility an earnest wrestling with problems of apparent 
disagreement,that theology may bring its own unique con­ 
tribution fully into the purview of a sympathetic meta­ 
physics, and may in turn convey to religious experience 
for her greater enrichment the insights of the other dis­ 
ciplines. If theology should^so conceive her task, it 
might be that Professor Taylor's hope for her would come 
true; and she should once again be discovered to be the 
<4ueen of the Sciences.
V.
There has emerged in the course of the foregoing 
discussion Professor Baillie's attitude on three of the 
four questions which we have agreed to put to each of the 
writers of our survey—the objectivity of values,the rela­ 
tion of values to Nature,and the relation of moral to 
other values. It remains to consider his answer to the 
problem of evil. This is the single issue in the light of 
which the value and importance of the whole position may 
be most appropriately estimated.
There is a sense in which Professor Baillie's 
writings contain no explicit consideration of the problem 
of evil;there is a sense in which his interpretation of 
religion is Just a consideration of the problem of evil. 
In one view,he offers us no specific light on the question; 
but,in another view,If we are won by his point of view,the 
question no longer remains. These paradoxical statements 
require elucidation.
We have already noted several times the very
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definite and limited perspective in which he has elected
to conduct his investigation of the nature of religion. 
The two examples of the setting in which religious faith 
characteristically comes to birth in the soul of man are 
both circumstances of difficulty for belief—the evil of 
acute and unnerited personal suffering and the evil of 
an apparently indifferent and mechanistic Nature. That 
this is,in Professor Baillie's view f the familiar atmos­ 
phere in which faith habitually lives and grows is clear 
enough.
"The truth is that the assurance of God is much 
more an assurance with which we,as spiritual beings, 
face the facts of nature than it is an assurance w&ich 
we derive from the contemplation of these facts.... 
What religion manifests is not the humble and empiri­ 
cally minded acceptance by the human mind of nature's 
appearances,but rather the self-assertion of the human 
spirit over against nature. " 125
"What faith has always stood for is Just this 
persuasion that,however heavily the world's evils may 
press upon us,yet in those mysterious and searching 
experiences of the spirit's life—experiences whos* 
actuality nobody can deny,like the vision of ideal 
goodness,the felt zeal for righteousness,the sense of 
obligation,the sense of sin and of repentance after 
sin,and the power to rise above the leadings of mere 
natural impulse towards a higher plane of living—we 
are having personal dealings with the Soul of the 
Universe and the Power from which all things proceed." 
126
Quotations in the same tenor might be multiplied manyfold.
The sum of it all is:—Religion ±x,in Professor Baillie's
i3 
view, (that experience in which man asserts his certainty of,
and rests his implicit trust lft t an Ultimate Power for 
goodness,against the well-nigh overpowering facts and 
forces of evil which surround his life.
125. The Interpretation of ^elip:ion.p*185«
126. "The logic of Religion" t p
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This is one paradox,and the most important one, 
which is tas it were,the very seedplot of genuine and 
vigorous faith. There is another—a paradox which,in a 
sense,is the obverse of the paradox of evil—the paradox 
of grace. It is the fact that when the nan of faith ndoes 
a base thing he blames himself bitterly and accepts the 
whole burden of responsibility for it,whereas when he does
a fine thing he does not pride himself on his achievement,—— 127 
but refuses to accept the credit as his own" • Now it
is clear that there is nothing logical in this;it is just 
as illogical as that a man,confronting the weight of unjust 
adversity or of legitimate doubt,should proclaim his cer­ 
tainty of God, Indeed it is precisely in the experience of
t 
"grace" that religions defiance of all obvious and t common.
sense* rationality is most inescapable; here it is most
128 
clearly "nonsense to the Greeks" , Professor Baillie
has put the paradox in its double form when he describes to 
us the predicament of a man wrestling with temptation 
greater and more insidious thfxn he has ever hitherto con­ 
fronted. This is faith's way of meeting the situation:-
"I am impelled to speak as to One who under­ 
stands, I am impelled to kneel and pray. And if I 
succumb to the temptation,then I am impelled to 
such penitence,such confession of my fault and such 
a seeking for forgiveness as can have no proper 
meaning except within a personal intercourse; while 
if I triumph over the temptation,! feel,OB know I 
ou$it to feel,no pride and self-congratulation as 
at a conquest achieved by my own unaided power, but 
rather once again the impulsion to worship and to 
give thanks and to sin^ to the praise of Him who 
has triumphed in me, n 129
127, "The Logic of Religion" ,p.15,
128,1 Corinthians 1:23.
129,"The Logic of ^eligionrt f p,16.
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We have said that Professor Baillie's treatment of 
the problem of evil furnishes a basis for an estimate of 
his position as a whole. The question which each reader 
must put to himself is«—are the circumstances which Pro­ 
fessor Baillie pictures as surrounding the man of faith 
a true representation of the setting in which human life 
is placed? If they are,our estimate of his theism should 
be a high one. For there are but three main alternative 
views in this crucial matter. There are those who hold 
that evidence for the Christian God may be clearly read in 
the facts of Nature and ordinary human experience; but 
the tragic reality of injustice and suffering would oeen 
to render so easy an optimism insupportable. We must choose 
between the remaining alternatives. There are those who 
hold that there is much strong evidence for the goodness 
of God in the orderliness,the progress and the propose 
within Nature,and in the manifold touch of the Divine upon 
human experience,and especially in the rationality of the 
Order of Values, but that this evidence is never completely
satisfying or convincing; faith Is indispensable as the
130 
final bulwark and vindication of religious belief . But
there are those who find little assurance of Importance 
in Nature or man's common-place experience, who see life 
characteristically face-to-face with adverse circumstance, 
and for whom religious faith appears only as ihe brave 
defiance of man's inmost spirit hurled at the burden life 
thrusts upon him. N0w,if the latter view seems to one the
130. This would,! .judge be a fair rendering of the attitudes 
of Professors Sorley,Taylor,and Pringle-Pattison.
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true rsading of the facts, then he will r-rant to Professor
Baillie's ' interpretation of religion* ,iii spite of its 
patent inconsistencies and its unjuistfied negations (for 
these,in the final analysis,are unhappy ilemishes upon his 
single central argument), a high measure of respectful and 
grateful praise,
VI.
Final Comment. Probably few things are more distasteful to a
writer than the attempt of a critic to explain short­ 
comings in the writer's thought by reference to certain 
of his mental characteristics, by what some writers might 
contemptuously refer to as a 'psycho-analysis' of his 
convictions* But my own study of Dr.Baillie's mind,not 
merely through his writings bjit through a very considerable 
personal contact,has increasingly suggested to me two 
sources of the features of his thought which we have found 
it necessary to criticise unfavorably. These conclusions, 
if correct,may prove helpful to a truer understanding of 
his position. The weaknesses in Dr.Baillie's thought are, 
I believe, largely due to two facts:-
a.Two factors have been majorly influential in the 
formation of Professor Baillie's conviction—the general 
view-point of the Platonic philosophy,and the rigorous 
noralisia of Scotch Presbyteri^nlSm. Intellectually,his 
mind has found its true kinship in Plato; religiously,he 
is a true son of John Knox a.nd Inmanu«9l Kant; his nature 
feels a deep spiritual sympathy with each of the two strains
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which have so much influenced its development. Now there
are important respects in which those two types of thought 
cannot be harmonised. They have never achieved anything 
like harmonious reconciliation within Professor Baillie f s
philosophy. It is thie fact,it may be suggested, which is
h« 
largely responsible for the inconsistencies ofAthought.
When we are promised a broad and inclusive investigation 
of religion which will not confine its scope to any one 
type of religious thought or even to the Christian religion, 
we are in the atmosphere of a catholic philosophical point- 
of-vifcw; when it subsequently develops that nothing is to 
be recognised as religion unless it springs solely from 
the individual moral consciousness,the sense of duty, we 
hear unrrJ. stake able echoes of the voices of Kant and Hitschl. 
When we are assured that 'morality1 is a tena whose true 
meaning would embrace all of the ultimate values and be 
nothing else than the quest of the good life itself, we 
seem again to be under the ironic spell of the master of 
the Academy,though it is not certain that he would have 
fully approved of the absorption of all values within the 
•Good 1 in quite this manner; but closer examination reveals 
that the interpretation actually given •morality 1 would 
gladden the sympathies of Kant but horrify any loyal Plato- 
nist. When we discover that religious experience is "essen­ 
tially reflective iu character—born of reflection and con­ 
stituted by reflection", we have once more returned to the 
halls of the philosophers,though this time perhaps more in 
the spirit of ' egel than of the great humanitarian Plato; 
but vmen it it maintained that religion is a "thing for
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simple men" whose preconditiou is not ability of intellect 
but humility,childlikeness,purity of heart, we recognise 
the authentic features of the great Christian Puritan 
tradition* There are times when the narrowness of Professor 
Baillie's conception of what may be called religion outdoes 
Ritschl, There are times when the rigor of his ethical 
ideal seems almost to exceed Kant's moral ism. But in the 
third particular where we personally would be most prepared 
to stand with him against the more philosophical view and 
in loyalty to a simple untutored piety, the weight of his 
favor seems on the whole to swing to the intellectualist 
interpretation of religion. In any event,we are suspended 
between such a theory of religion as might be expected in 
a very liberal Christian Platonist fand a defence of such 
a strict Puritanism as would gladden the heart of a stalwart 
of the 'old kirk'.
b,Whatever his intention,Professor Baillie's mind 
does not possess a high capacity for catholicity. He is 
not able to enter sympathetically into the merits of a 
position from which he feels instinctive recoil. It is this 
limitation which estops him from such a comprehensive 
analysis as he had marked out for his enterprise. We are 
assured at the outset that it is not the religion of a 
particular age or sect or even the religion of a great 
world-faith which is to occupy us but "religion itself in 
its most universal and deepest significance",our whole human 
insight into the Sternal World, w The guidance of ^chleier- 
mucher must be rejected because he thou ;ht theology should
(* <9«s.
aim merely to reveal the faith of an existing branch of 
the Church. Likewise the leadership o.f Ritschl whoso great­ 
est failing was that he could not allow his thou.'Jht to 
encoiapasts true roliftion beyond the :?c|nks of organized 
Christianity. Actually what we are given in Professor 
Baillie'e powerful book Is not an 'interpretation of reli­ 
gion' , nor even of Christianity,nor of the Protestant type 
of Christianity, but a masterly defence of the very limited 
and particular brand of Protestant theology which had its 
origin in the thought of Immanuol Kant and traces its 
central convictions directly to him. Of this particular 
theory of religion, rgfoe Interpretation of Religion is 
possibly the finest exposition and most spirited apologia 
which the Twentieth Century has brought forth. But the 
exceedingly narrow limits of its view of religion and of 
its author's appreciation of the variations of true religion 
debars it from adequacy,either religious or philosophical.
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CHAPTER SE
PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON* S THEISM
Characteristics Chronologically Professor Pringle-Pattison should
of His Thought, precede the other authors of our study. He was their
senior in age t and his most important theistic argument
which was also his magnum opus, The Idea of God in the
1 
Light of Recent Philosophy , antedated the major work of
each of the other writers whom we have considered. But 
a number of considerations have urged postponement of 
investigation of his thought until the end. For one 
thing,speaking strictly, his theism is hardly to be 
classified as a "restatement of the moral argument". 
To be sure it has been truly pointed out that "it is 
largely by means of the concept of value that the author
reaches a conclusion demanding definitely theistic langu-
2 
age" ; but with a characteristic ample inclusiveness
which sometimes blurs really important distinctions, vulues 
are considered in the large without careful discrimination 
of types of value and with no special attention to moral 
values as such. Indeed Proftssor Pringle-Pa tt ison 1 sjthought 
fetches a wider circle than any of our other authors. The 
evidence for God from scientific study, in particular, is 
fundamental for his final conclusions; and his lifelong 
allegiance to the general idealistic tradition has led him 
to speak of his philosophy as a form of "objective,transcen
1.Oxford,1917;2nd edition,revised,Oxford,1920. 
2.William Temple,in Contemporary British Philoso ^
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dental or absolute Idealism" , though an Idealism
forcefully "disentangled" from "the epistemological
4 
heresy of Subjective Idealism or Mentalism" . It is,
in fact, an attempt to develop what we have termed an 
"inclusive metaphysical view" ; and its broader and more 
catholic reach make it an especially useful point of 
departure for our own final summary.
Then Professor Pringle-Pattison's handling of a 
number of the issues which we have come to regard as 
central—especially the relation of values to Nature and, 
to a less degree,the objectivity of values and the relation 
of moral and other values—is the most satisfactory we 
have met. His critique of Kant and his analysis of the 
causes of contemporary confusion in theistic thought are
almost identical with those to which we have been led on
6 
independent grounds ; and his basic insistence that man
is "organic to Nature" and that the whole cosmic process
is properly interpreted only in the light of its bringing
forth of man coincides with what we shall suggest as the
happiest starting-point for a constructive approach to
7 
theism. Finally,the significance of distinctively religious
experience is more adequately domesticated within a general 
philosophy of values than in any of the othe* statements. 
These facts among others have led us to postpone considera­ 
tion of Professor Pringle-Pattison until this point.
5.The Idea of ^od in the Lteht of Recent Philosophy. p. 190.
4.0p.cit.,p.421.
5.See above,p.38,
G.See above, pp. 57-^^ below, p. 358 t n2.7.See 1|F '
29Q.
It is hardly an overstatement that the fontal 
convictions and the controlling outlines of Professor 
Pringle-Pattison' s thought remained essentially unchanged 
throughout his philosophical life. A more striking contrast 
to Professor Taylor in this particular could hardly be 
imagined. Pick up his writings at almost any point in the 
nearly fifty years of his active scholarship and one dis­ 
covers the stress falling upon the same notes—the futility 
of a mechanistic reading of Nature,the parallel delusion of 
a strictly Hegelian monism, man's rational life as our best 
key to reality, the Divine Nature incarnate in and revealed 
through mankind's noblest aspirations after values. The 
thought characteristically takes off from a vigorous and 
uncompromising critique of Kant's dualism of 'noumenal*
and 'phenomenal' ,' knowledge' and 'faith 1 and of its
8 
crippling disservice to subsequent speculation ; and in
the counter-assertion that "the phenomenon is the noumenon
9 
so far as it has manifested itself" , in a plea for "the
10
reality of appearances" , ^n ei;rly excessive facination
11 
for Hegel's ready solution of all philosophical tangles
quickly gave place to a criticism of Hegelianism so strin­ 
gent that the critic thought it necessary to apologise for
12 
his apparent lack of appreciation; but the dominating power
of that alluring dialectic remained witii him and is inajorly
8.The Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel,Cht»II;
bcottish Philosophy,last chapter iHegeliaMsm and Persona­ 
lity, espec+Chts,! and 2; Idea of God,espec« Ght«II« ' 
9.Idea of God,p,214 10.0p.cit.,p,216. 
11 • The Philosophy of iteligion in Kant ond Hegel.Cht,III. 
(published in 1882;reprinted in j?he Philosophical 
Radicals and Other Assays,pp,215ff, 
12.Hegelianism and Personality «pp.221ff •
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13 
influential in his final Idealism , Almost his first
constructive attack upon metaphysical issues gave his 
governing convictions in the prefaoe:-
"i<ian as rational,and,in virtue of self-conscious 
reason,the free shaper of his own destiny,furnishes us, I contend,with the only indefeasible standard of value, and our clearest light as to the nature of the divine"14
"Our human rendering of the divine•..•must rest 
ultinateiy, 1 think,upon a conviction of the absolute 
value of ths ethical life.Every idealistic theory of 
the world has for its ultimate premiss a logically unsupported Judgment of Vfvlue—a Judgment which affirms 
an end of intrinsic worth and accepts thereby a stan- 
dard of unconditional obligation," 15
And in the Inaugural Lecture delivered on the occasion of
his induction to the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in
16 
Edinburgh University and reprinted in this same volume,
there is to be found an even clearer foreshadowing of the 
line of argument which his mind was to follow throughout
its development •
I only!
"I haveTtime here to mention one or two points 
on which I think that a true philosophy should lay stress,and on which it shou&d lay special stress at 
the present time. The first is the necessity of a 
teleological view of the universe." 17
"As it defends the truth of teleology in spite of former abuses of the principle,so it has to champion the truth underlying the old view which made man the 
centre of the universe .., .Philosophy must be unflin­ 
chingly humanis t ic . anthropocentric • " 18
"Not to man as a creature specially located upon 
this earth,but to man and all creatures like him who 
are sharers in the life of thought,and called thereby to be authors of their owi perfection—to man as 
rational,all things are relative. To him the creation 
looks;for him all things are made,,,. To me the old 
idea of the world as the training-ground of individual
15.The Idea of God.pp.38.67.218.504.415.etc..etc.
14 .Man's Place in the Cosmos.p,vi, 15,0p,cit,,p,vii,16. October 26,18&1,
17. Llan's Place in the Cosmos.p,39,
18. Op,eit.,p,42,
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character seams to offer a much more human,and, 
I will add,a much lucre divine,solution than this 
pitiless procession of the car of progress (Hegel's 
interpretation of hfttory as the incarnation of the 
divine aature) ••••The possibility of any theodicy 
depends on our being able to show that nature and 
nature's ways are not the last word of creation, 
Nature is non-moral,indifferent,and pitiless;but manr 
is pitiful and human nature flowers in love and self- 
denial, in purity and stainless honour .....•'•£ shall do 
well to recognise in such attributes of human-kind 
our nearest glimpse into the nature of the divine. 
The part is not greater than the whole;and we may rest 
assured chat whatever of wisdom and goodness there is 
in us was not born out of nothing,but has its fount, 
sonaewhere and somehow,in a more perfect Goodness and 
Truth." 19
More than twenty years lator when the opportunity offered 
by the Gifford Lectureship was seized upon by Professor 
Pringle—Pattison to throw his meditations on the theistic 
question into systematic and comprehensive form,a full 
half of the volume was devoted to a detailed outworking 
of precisely the some convictions. The rt lower Naturalism" 
of a mechanistic science is made to give way before a 
nhigher Naturalism" in which the stress falls upon the 
teleological character of the evolutionary process. Man 
is portrayed as at once rooted in Nature and yet the cul­ 
mination of Nature's developing process. In his ethical 
and social qualities which constitute his humanity is to 
be sought light on the nature of the ultimate Life behind 
Nature ;that final source of man's values cannot be inter­ 
preted in lower categories than the high fruitage to which 
it has given birth.
"Man must be taken as organic to nature....From 
the side of the higher Naturalism,! sought to emphasize 
man's rootedness in nature,so that the rational intel­ 
ligence which characterizes him appears as the culmin-
«»•>»•»«••«»
19. Man's Place in the Cosmos.pp.45-44.
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ation of a continuous process of immanent development. 
...•And so it is that the sentient and,still more,the 
rational being appears as the goal towards which Nature 
is workiu&,nai0ely 9 the development of an organ by which 
she may become conscious of herself and enter into the 
Joy of her ova bein&.
"The nature of the i^ower at work in any process is 
only revealed in the process as a whole,and the world 
is not complete without man and his knowledge..*, ivian 
is, after all,the child of nature,and it is on the basis 
of natural impulses,and in commerce v/ith *he system of 
external things,that his ethical being ic ^uilt up. 
Hence the characteristics of the othical lifA must be 
taken as contributing to determine the nature of the 
system in which we live, according to the principle of 
value and the distinction between lower and higher 
ranges of experience,they should,indeed,carry us 
nearer to a true definition of the ultimate Life of 
which we are partakers than categories which suffice 
to describe,at most,the environmental conditions of 
human existence.
''God as immanent--the divine as revealed in the 
structure and system of finite experience—this may 
be said to have been the text of (the first half of) 
the discourse and the outcome of my argument." 20
And,again,after an interval of another ten years,in his 
last published work but one,we find a studied dependence 
upon the same fundamental presuppositions: -
"Man can no more rise spiritually above himself 
in his own strength than he can raise himself from 
the ground by tugging at his own shoulder-straps. We 
did not make ourselves,and we do not weave our ideals 
out of nothing. They are all derived;they point to 
their source in a real Perfection,in which is united 
all that,and more than,it hath entered into the heart 
of man to conceive.
"Here,as elsewhere,nothing comes from nothing-­ 
whatever elements of goodness exist in us must iQv* 
their source in the Power that brought us into being, 
and the ideals of unattained perfection to which we 
reach forward are due to the same inspiration.On this, 
which seerns the only reasonable view,the permanent 
ideals which have lighted mankind on its way muct be 
taken as our best clue to the inmost nature of the 
real...." 21
These quotations will sufficiently indicate how thoroughly 
•of a piece' was the lifelong basic certainty of ths mind 
which is ths immediate subject of our study,
20. The Idea of God.pp.210.211.213^215.
21. The Idea of Immortality.pp.193—195,
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Before passing to a detailed examination of his 
thought treference must be made to one feature of Professor 
Pringie-Pattison's habitual Method in writing—a feature 
which renders a concise but comprehensive exposition of 
his philosophy especially difficult. I mean hi: practice 
of revealing his own position only incidentally in the course 
of a critical examination of other writers. His published 
writings are almost entirely expository in character;and 
it is precisely here that his rare gifts of appreciation 
and discrimination found their most felicitous expression. 
His book-reviews were models,if it be thought that the 
primary function of a book-review should be to reveal the 
central argument of the book in brief compass. His note on
Sorley's Moral Values and the Idea of God in the Hibbert22" 
Journal from which we have quoted above is a literary and
expository masterpiece; but characteristically it offers 
absolutely no critical comment;it tells us what the author 
has said but gives no hint of the reviewer's dissents,if 
any. And even in his own magnum opus Professor Pringle- 
Pattison offers no .systematic* statement of his own theism; 
fragments of his personal conviction come to light here 
and there along the way as the discussion reviews one after 
another recent philosophy j lt«t the reader must piece them 
into u moseic of his own devising with little direct help 
from their maker. It should be understood that this unusual 
method has been deliberately chosen; in the preface to 
The Idoa of ^od in the Light of Recent Philosophy.the author
22. See above t p.96 .
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intention in the matter is explained:-
w ln short,although it consists largely of crit- 
iaism.the interest of the book is neither critical 
nor historical f >>ut conn true tive throughout. This 
method or construction through criticism is the one 
which 1 have instinctively followed in everything I 
have written, I do not claim that it is the best 
method;! sinply desiro that its nature be recognized223
This method Lukes for both strength and \joakneu.'; in the
resulting work. It results in "the nearest approach to a
24
Suinma Philosopaiae that any contemporary has given us" • 
but to the faot that the writer has nover been under the 
necessity of bringing his views into systematic unity and 
exhibiting them as a coherent and self-consistent whole 
are perhaps due not a few of the apparent inconsistencies, 
the hiatuses in the argument,and the blurring of distinc­ 




The Substance of Bearing in inind the difficulties created for us by 
the argument* Professor Pringle—Pattison 1 a method,we may attempt to sum­ 
marise his position as he has given it in The Idea of God 
in the Light of fteoent Philosophy, It will be recalled that 
only a portion of his discussion bears directly on the 
moral argument 5 but it will be fairest to his thought to 
give a digest of its development in its entirety.
The Background of We may well make the beginning of our investigation 
Recent Theism, into the idea of Cod in the thought of David Hume, x'he
traditional ontological argunuat is rejected as unworthy
2ft, The Ides cf CfOd in the Light of Recent Philosophy,p,vii, 
24•William Temple,in Contemporary Btttish Philosophy.Vol,I.
below,pp.o
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of consideration, Hume's attention is centered entirely 
upon evidence of design in Nature. The presence of beauty, 
of purpose,of intention in Nature clearly indicate4the 
existence of a Deity. But the co-presence of evil in 
Nature immediately forces the problem of his moral at­ 
tribute*. We can hardly take refuge in the conception 
of a Deity perfect in moral purpose but limited in power. 
Hume's net conclusion is that the ultimate cause of the 
universe probably bears some remote analogy to human 
intelligence out is quite indifferent to good and evil; 
and that,in any event,whatever we may be able to infer 
about God can have no practical consequences for human 
conduct. (Lecture I.)
The determinative influence in modern philosophy 
passed from Home to Kant. Hume had erred in arguing 
solely from a study of Nature,to the neglect of evidence 
from human experience. It was precisely at this point-­ 
through an analysis of man's moral experience—that Kant 
grounded his certainty of God. To him the reality of 
•absolute value' as revealed in the moral personality 
was fundamental. From it follow the fact of human freedom, 
the assurance of immortality and the certainty of God. 
Kant's weakness lay in the 'baldly hedonistic lines on 
which he rounded off his ethical theory',and the externa- 
lism and over-individualism of his theism through which 
'God seems to be introduced in Kant's moral theory almost 
as an after-thought....in the merely administrative 




Idealism which succeeded him its keynote—'the concep­ 
tion of intrinsic value as the clue to the ultimate 
nature of reality1 j and determined the battleground for 
the Nineteenth Century's central philosophical issue— 
'the relation of man and his human values or ideals to 
the universe in which he finds himself. In that battle, 
the basic contention of Idealism should be that our 
fundamental judgements of value are essentially true; 
that they pertain to genuinely objective realities;and 
that the 'world of facts' must be interpreted in terms 
of the 'world of values' since it is manifestly unsound 
to interpret the hi^ier by the lower, (Lecture II.)
Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century may be viewed 
as a duel between Idealism and Naturalism. The root of 
the conflict lay in Kant's vicious dualism of 'knowledge' 
and 'faith',and of 'phenomenal' and 'noumenal'. In the 
hands of more consistent thinkers, Kant's phenomenalism 
readily gave birth to Lange's materialism,to the agnos­ 
ticism of Spencer and Huxley,to Lotze's heightened 
dualism, to Hitschl's dangerously sceptical distrust of 
philosophy,and to Mr.Balfour's anti-intellectualism. The 
only convincing rebuttal of ^aturalism is to be made 
through a demonstration that Naturalism's interpretation 
of its own scientific data is unsound. This release from 
the strangle-hold of a false materialism was cade initial- 
ly possible through advance in biology. In the biological 
organism we confront a phenomenon for which physical and
•v
The Validity of 
Human Knowledge*
chemical categories are hopelessly incompetent, which 
demands to be interpreted in terms of teleology and 
purpose . A sound reading of evolut ion , instead of 
thrusting man back into a materialistically conceived 
sub-strata, points to the higher forms of life and 
especially to intelligence as 'the event to which the 
whole creation moves*. Thus the 'Ifcwer Naturalism* which 
so minimized man's differentiation from non-human Mature 
as to amount, in effect, to a form of materialism must 
be supplanted by the 'higher Naturalism' which acknow­ 
ledges a hierarchy of the sciences, each science handling 
a distinctive order of facts in Nature's advance and 
employing a distinctive set of categories appropriate to 
its data. 'Continuity of process and the cnsrgenco of 
real differences— these are the twin aspects of the 
cosmic history, and it is essential to clear thinking that 
the one be not allowed to obscure the othe*.' A new 
type or level of phenomena is seen to emerge 'under a 
convergence of appropriate conditions'; and the pretence 
of explaining the higher by reference to the lower is 
finally surrendered. Rather, 'every evolutionary process 
must be read in the light of its last term'. (Lectures
Such a rendering of the evolutionary process not 
merely delivers us from the shackles of materialism; it 
enables us to overpass Kant's unhappy dichotomies and 
to gain helpful light on the ever- troublesome problem
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of knowledge • For man is organic to Nature and Nature 
is incomplete until it has flowered in man. f The idea 
of nature as a completed system and of man as a spectator 
ab extra is essentially false.' Rather is man to be 
thought of as an organ through which 'the universe beholds 
and enjoys itself. Therefore man's striving to comprehend 
correctly the world in which he finds himself should not 
be conceived as the effort of an external beholder to 
penetrate an essentially alien and obtuse substance,but 
rather as Nature's unfolding to a developing intelligence 
of the truth about herself. 'It all strikes one as a 
process of "communication" or of progressive revelation. ' 
'Things are as they reveal themselves in their fullness 
to the knowing mind.' 'However limited ; nd imperfect our 
knowledge may be,it is still,so far as it goes, a know­ 
ledge of reality....The phenomenon is the noumenon so far 
as it has manifested itself,so far as we have grasped it 
in knowledge. In a strict sense,it is not really correct 
to say that we know phenomena: that is like saying twice
over that we know. It is the noumena or real things that
26 
we know,and phenomena are what we know about them.'
Thus we are led to a view of knowledge which might 
be called Natural Realism. Unlike the older Natural Realisij 
it admits no duality of substance between man and Nature, 
for man's mind lies at the heart of the reality which he 
desires to know. This view vindicates the objectivity
26. The quotations in the foregoing parpgraph will be
found in the order of their use in The Idea of God.pp.2115111; 155 ; 130 ; 163. ————————————
not only of the secondary qualities but of \vhat may be 
called the 'tertiary qualities' — f the aspects of beauty 
and sublimity which we recognize in nature,and the finer
spirit of sense revealed by the insight of the poet and
27 
the artist'. Man's powers to apprehend both secondary
and tertiary qualities could have developed only in re­ 
sponse to the prior reality of the qualities apprehended. 
So,no less,with regard to the ethical and social insights 
which distinguish man as man.
"Man is,after all. the child of nature,and it is 
on the basis of natural impulses,and in commerce with 
the system of external things,that his ethical being 
is built up. Hence the characteristics of the ethical 
life must be taken as contributing to determine the 
nature of the system in which we live, /vccording to 
the principle of value and the distinction between 
lower and higher ranges of experience,they should, 
indeed,carry us nearer to a true definition of ^he 
ultimate Life of which we are partakers than categor­ 
ies which suffice to describe,at most,the environ­ 
mental conditions of human existence." 28
But if we are to view man's progressive comprehen­ 
sion of his world as,in another perspective,reality's 
self-revelation to him,then we are already face-to-face 
with God immanent in that process of self-disclosure. 
'The nature of Reality is to be read in its manifesta­ 
tions,and may be read there truly. V«:e may be sure the 
revelation is not exhaustive,for &11 revelation must be 
ad modum recipientiszit must be proportionate to the 
capacity of the receiving mind. Every advance in know­ 
ledge,or in goodness,or in the intuitions of beauty and 
grandeur offered us in nature or in art,is a further






revelation of tho heights and depths of the divine 
nature, 1 'The Absolute is not unknown.,.,jwe read 
its nature in the system of its appearances. God 
as immanent—the divine as revealed in the structure
and system of finite experience—this may be said to
29 
be.... the outcome of the argument 1 thus far.
(Lectures VI-XI.)
In the light of this position,the inadequacy of 
certain alternatives to a full theism is made clear, 
The agnosticism of the Religion of Humanity errs in 
severing man from Nature and failing to note that the 
loftiest human virtues which it would deify are born 
of the commie background which it abhors. The agnos­ 
ticism of Spencer.on the other hand,which claims tlie 
ultimate reality to be forever unknowable, confuses 
the inherently unknowable with the 'not yet known,and
doubtless never by us to be fully known,but still the
30 
ever to be better known' * Pan«»psychism. and its plura*
listic and pragmatistic variations can p,ive no reasonable 
account of the origin or ultimate ground of its monadic 
units and involves more difficulties than it dispels. 
On the other hand Mentalisin or bubjective Idealism which 
tends to deny the reality of the physical universe by 
positing existence as dependent upon being known is a 
perversion of a sound Idealism. The position to which 
our study points is that of an objective Idealism—an
29. The Idea of G-od,pp.l75j215.
30. Op.cit.,p.l65.
CIO, 
Interpretation of the world as finding its completion
in self-conscious life,and of God as the Power increas­ 
ingly made known in the process of th» world's self-
31 
expression and self-realization, (Lectures VII-X.)
From Values to 'God as iiananent 1 is our conclusion thus far,or 
God. 'the reality of appearances'. We must resist the tendency
to stigmatise appearances as 'illusory' or 'unreal' and 
to set them in opposition to reality; our only knowledge 
of reality is through its appearances. On the other hand, 
not all appearances are of equal significance as revela­ 
tory of reality. A final interpretation must encompass 
'the systematic structure of finite experience as a 
whole*,and it will recognise degrees or levels of truth 
and reality. The criterion by which these levels are to be 
differentiated as 'higher' and 'lower' must be discovered 
in the nature of the system as a whole; each individual 
Judgment of value must justify itself by demonstrating 
its harmony with this inclusive principle of value. 
(Lecture XI.)
Mr.Bradley has proposed a two-fold criterion of 
absolute value—inclusiveness and harmony. The Absolute 
is that which includes everything,and with complete 
harmony, ^s to what such an absolute experience would 
be like,we get only a vague suggestion through our own 
experiences of immediate intuition. Professor Bosanquet
accepts essentially the same criterion of value. But
31.Professor Pringle-Pattison's own sum ary of the argu­ 
ment thus far is given in The Idea of God «po. 207-216.
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the proposed criterion is too formal ;<nd abstract » It 
first accepts such abstract tests as f inclusiveness 1 
and 'harmony1 and then attempts to deduce the concrete 
character of the absolute experience therefrom. The 
sounder procedure will be just the reverse—from the 
concrete character of fiinite experience upward to a con­ 
ception of the absolute experience formulated in essen­ 
tially the same terms. In other words , it is in human 
experience at its highest and best that we must find 
suggestions as to the nature of the absolute experience! 
as to the character of Ood. It must be frankly recog­ 
nised that behind this procedure is one unproven and 
improvable assumption— f the conviction of the essential 
greatness of nan and the infinite nature of the v^luos 
revealed in his life*. It is an assumption underlying all 
forms of idealism,the supreme significance of rational 
life and the objectivity of man's values. But it is an 
assumption closely parallel to that which precedes all 
learning and .-ill Boieuoe—the final rationality of the 
world of facts. Each assumption in the last analysis is 
a venture of faith,but it is a reasonable faith; for each 
receives progressive verification in experience. This is 
the great conviction which the ontological argument 
tried clumsily to express—the best which wd can think 
cannot surpass what actually is. (Lecture XII.)
How when we press on and ask what is highest and 
best in human experience from which we may derive our 
insight into the character of God.we conclude that it
is man's ideals which are the creative forces shaping 
and lifting his life. Those ideals are as real facts 
of human experience as any others. But,whence are they 
derived,hov/ do they happen to have ooroe to birth within 
the human soul? They can only have originated in a 
transcendent perfect Truth and Beauty and infinite 
Goodness; 'the presence of the Ideal is the reality of 
God within us 1 . This line of reasoning is really allied 
to the cosmolosicul argument t from a, known effect in the 
world to an adequate c^use. But the cosmological argurnent 
usually reasoned from tho physical universe to its 
transcendent ground j this argument proceeds from the 
ideals which are such a vital element in human experience 
to their adequate Source, v.'o have already :'ot God imma­ 
nent, progressively rovealod in the upward advance of 
the cosmic history. But here we confront God transcen­ 
dent, as the Perfection of all that nan aspires to be 
and to realise j offering itself to the human soul as its 
inspiration and its goal. (Lectures XII and XIII.)
"The eternal contrast between the actual and the 
ideal seems to me to furnish the natural key to the 
problem of immanence and transcendence. Transcendence 
does not mean remoteness or aloofness. The distinc­ 
tion it points to is that between the perfect and the 
imperfect;and by perfection we do not understand the 
possession of innumerable unknown attributes,but the 
perfect realisation of those very .values which we 
recognise as the glory and crown of our human nature.. 
..It is the immanence of the transcendent,the presence 
of the infinite in our finite lives,that alone explains 
the essential nature of man—the 'divine discontent 1 
which is the root of all progress,the strange sense of 
doublenoSB in our being,the incessant conflict of the 
lower and the higher self....And the more clearly 
we identify the call of the higher with our true self
the more unfeignedly do we recocnise the illumination 
of the divine Spirit." 32
God and the But if we are to find God most certainly through 
Individual* human aspiration at its highest,how shall we conceive
the relation of the finite individual to the Absolute 
life? The individual is organic to society and,by the 
same token,to that larger environment from which the 
currents of inspiration and refreshment,of regeneration 
and redemption,course through it. The universe is best 
conceived as a 'vale of soul-making'. Nevertheless, we
*
must (5uard against the tendency to deny real individuali­ 
ty, genuine autonomy,to finite selves. The true indepen­ 
dence of men is as necessary for the life of the .absolute 
as it is for their own significance. For only so are 
they truly his 'creations'. These necessities are confir* 
med by the religious consciousness. For if the religious 
attitude is in the first instance one of 'dependence', 
it is only by virtue of a certain measure of independence 
that the dependence could be affirmed. And if the final 
religious action be self-surrender,it is the surrender 
of a genuinely free self ta surrender freely and volun­ 
tarily made. The ultimate Good constrains but it does not
compel; it is the constraint of One who stands at the
33 
door of human life and knocks . And if the perfection
and fruition of finite experience comes through giving 
of solf ,nd finding of self in others,here once more is
to be found a hint of the divine nature as 'a self-
32."immanence and Transcendence" in The Spirit.pp.21-22.
33.Cp.W.R.Sorley's similar suggestion;above, p.111.
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communicating life f ,Jind of the divine method of self-
fulfillment through the creation and redemption of
34
a world of individual spirits, (Loctures XIV and XV.)
God and the W« have spoken of 'creation' as a characteristic 
World. feature of the divine life; but it must not be conceivj&d
traditionally as an event at a definite date in the past, 
'Creation must be regarded as an eternal act, an act 
grounded in the divine nature, and therefore,.., coeval 
with the divine existence 1 . 'God is cause only in the 
sense of ground'; for in Hegel's phrase, 'God is not 
more necessary to the world than the world to God' • 
Further, the method of creative activity is that of self* 
communication or self-impartation; and it assumes the 
necessity of a universe to which such self -manifestation 
can be made, 'The infinite in and through the finite, 
the finite in and through the infinite— this mutual 
implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we 
know it. It is the eternal fashion of the cosnio Life.' 
(Lecture XVI.)
The traditional conception of divina 'purpose 1 
require* to be similarly reconstructed. It itoplieo not 
an intention to accomplish an end against intransigent 
circumstance; but rather that reality is a significant 
whole. It is to view th« whole in the light of an ulti­ 
mate ISnd. 3o to view the world in terms of Purpose or 
End 13 to interpret it in tsr;as of Yaluejand thus to
upon the concepts of 'conation* and 'satisfaction* 
3*.cp. discussion, "Do Finite IndiTiduals Possess a Sub-
The Problem of 
Time*
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without which we cannot conceive the realization of
values. But although these are terms associated with 
finite experience,we should not hesitate to apply them 
in our thought of God, tfor wo have all along agreed to 
find our conception of the Absolute through the highest 
human experience jand we may say that 'if the finite 
world means anything to God.the ideas of activity and
SBpurpose are indispensable 1 . (Lecture XVII.)
But for the finite experient time is an essential 
feature of all experience,while the divine conscious­ 
ness has traditionally been interpreted as embracing 
ell eternity. The meaning of 'eternity* which may 
properly be usod in this connection would seem to be 
that of an experience which •includes time •:ut soiwhow 
transcends it f . Two facts are included in such a defi­ 
nition. First, since all vital human activity and procass 
depends upon the reality of the time-procass, time as it 
Is experienced by finite creatures must be comprehended 
within the divins andorstfinding. 3ut,on the other hand, 
the divine mind must also see all tine as a whole. We 
get some foretaste of what such an eternal consciousness 
would be like in our occasional intuitions of a whole 
which,in fact,spc*n8 a considerable duration of time; 
further, the stress should fall not upon a comprehension 
of various temporal stages simultaneously,but upon the 
comprehension of various factors as elements in a com­ 
pleted whole. The analogy which will most aid our imagi­ 
nation is tiitit of the author of a drama or story,who
so. up."Immanence and Transcendence" in TheSToirit.pp.13ff 
Also Life and Finite Individuality.p. ——
envisions the tale and all of its jx\rte as a single 
unity but to whom the temporal development of the 
plot and the action* of the Individual characters also 
have reality. This view is not without difficulties. 
But they arise largely,as in the thought of Bergson 
and James,from conceiving time spatially. 'The source 
of reality dwells neither in the past nor in the future. 
The three dimensions of time....are rather our human 
ways of refracting the Kternal Nature in which we live 
and on which we draw.' Finite activity adds no real 
novelty to the Absolute; even moral progress \vhich at 
first thought appears to create new values is recognised 
by the moral consciousness itself as merely bringing 
to realisation values already present in reality. H-jre, 
as elsewhere f the religious consciousness lends support 
to our conclusion in its conviction that progress is 
predicable only of ^he finite parts,but not of the whole. 
Likewise,the religious outlook gl~/Bs the ancwer to 
pluralistic views which ?re usually notivtited by deter­ 
mination to guard the independence of finite beings and 
the reality of the moral struggle. These perplexities 
have not troubled the saints;for them 'the victory for 
which morality fights is for religion already,or rather 
eternally,won; and it is the assurance of this victory 
which inspires t}ie finite subject with courage and con* 
Tideace in his individual struggle*, fcuch difficulties 
spring frori an abstract, conception of the Absolute as 
an Ali-knov;cr; but for us he is • a door and sufferer
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in the world's life'. (Lectures XVIII-XX.)
Conclusion. Finally wha t answer can be givwi to that
trouble SOUK question—how dare we traca a world so 
scarred by suffering,so defaced by wickedness,to the 
roason and will of a f»erfact Being as its solo explain-** 
ing causo? «Ve cannot seek a way of escape through 
dualism or the conception of a finita God. «lost scepti­ 
cism because of the facf,a of evil springs froia one or 
the other of two xiisconceptions. It uiay bo due to a 
falso Tiaw of 'oiaaipotano©' as shere Power or Will. But 
tho oscrcise oi* povwr must be within the limits pro­ 
scribed by God's nature and purpose as moral. Or scepti­ 
cism may arise from a falsely hedonistic icaal of human 
life. But 'effort,difficulty, hardship,pain,seen to be 
involved in any Kind of moral v/orld which we can con­ 
ceive, or in any v.orld which is really worth having; and 
the end of euch a world would seeia to be fby the operation 
of just such 3>,ctcr.V? the reading of souls" '. The confir- 
Djation of this interpretation of human life is to be 
found in such an experience as that of Rosiola who found 
the highest happiness so like pain that it could be dis­ 
tinguished only through the fact that our souls would 
chocsc it before anytning else because they see it is 
good*
W« come,then,at tiie end to summarise our conception 
of C*od, It is a conception whioii finds its supreme ex­ 
pression in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation—
516. 
the story of a God 'who lives in the perpetual giving
of himself twho shares the life of his finite creatures, 
bearing in and with them the whole burden of their 
finitude,their sinful wanderings and sorrows,and the 
suffering without which they cannot be made perfect*. 
The omnipotence upon which God relies is that of the 
atoning power of goodness and love. And 'for a meta- 
physio which has emancipated Itself from physical cate­ 
gories, the ultimate conception of God is not that of a 
pre~existent Creator but,as it is for religion, that of 
the eternal Redeemer of the world*. (Lecture XX.)
III.
The . osition We have tried to sketch in outline Professor Pringle- 
Further Analysed. Pattison's the istic argument. Let us now consider more
specifically his attitude on our four normative Issues.
a.The Objectivl- Of the discussion of the objectivity of values, 
ty of Values, three comments may be briefly made:*
1) The issue is regarded as the central one of all 
modern thought. It was determined—determined unfortunately. 
Professor Prlngle-Pattlsan thinks—by certain features of th« 
Kantian philosophy. It precipitated the century-long duel 
between Naturalism and Idealism which,in turn, "bequeathed 
to us the peculiarly modern form in which the theistio
problem,as the ultimate question of philosophy,presents
36 
Itself tp the modern mind" „
2) A systematic argument for the objectivity of 
36. Tbebdea of
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ivalues comparable to that which we have examined in the 
writings of Professors ttorley and Taylor is nowhere 
offered. Yet the certainty of their objective status is 
assumed throughout the discussion;indeed it is one of the 
two or three structural pillars of the whole position. 
The following would seem to be the considerations regarded '. 
as most convincing in proof of their objectivity:- j
a) The consciousness of values is an invariable feature 
of the nicest human consciousness. AS such,It is 
actually a constitutive factor in the total life of \ 
the world. 37
b) The value-consoiousnesB presents unanimous and univer­ 
sal testimony that it does not create values; it 
merely recognises and responds to them.
"In no sphere of our experience is the implica­ 
tion of objectivity—the 'truth-claim' , as it has 
been called—more insistent, one mi^ht say tmore over- 
whelming,than Just in the moral and religious life'..«j 
..On the evidence of the moral &nd religious life, 
therefore,we are bound to treat the ideals of that 
life not as devout imaginations,in which fancy has 
combined with desire to heighten and idealize cer­ 
tain features of the actual,but as having their 
authentic basis in the nature of the world." 38
"Man does not make values any more than he makes 
reality. The soul,in Plato's metaphor, 'feeds upon' 
truth,upon goodness,upon beauty." 39
o) Men find it morally impossible to believe that their 
values are not grounded in ultimate reality; this 
'moral revulsion' is of a piece with their refusal to 
believe that the world is ultimately irrational.
"familiar with values in our own experience,we 
feel it impossible to conceive anything devoid of 
value (such as an unconscious material system would 
be) as ultimately real or eoIf-subsistent,in other 
words,as a whole, a res complete. It is this moral 
impossibility,! think,as much as the speculative 
contradiction of a world existing absolutely un­ 
known, that IB the driving-power of the Idealistic 
argument....It is not so much an argument perhaps 
as an absolute conviction,but it is, I think,a con-
36. The Idea of ^od.p.252. 39.0p.cit.,p.239.
37. (?p. .ihe similar argument of Sorley.above p. 104. Ttt: Idea of God.p.^44.
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viotion whose reasonableness is sustained by the 
unreasonableness of the opposite hypothesis." 40
"That our ideals themselves should perish,that 
nothing worth existing should have any pledge of 
continuance or growth,that the world of values,in 
short,should have no relation to the world of facts— 
that is the one intolerable conclusion. ^Jid Just 
because its intolerableness has nothing to do with 
any private hopes or fears,we feel that the refusal 
to entertain it is a Judgement of objective validity, 
that it is, in short,of the same texture as the inab­ 
ility to believe an intellectual contradiction." 41
"It is the permanence of our ideals themselves, 
as expressing the eternal foundations of the world, 
which is the irreducible minimum of a reasonable 
faith and the irreducible Ainimum of the moral demand 
we make upon tiie universe." 42
d) It is not merely our individual values which are ob­ 
jective; we confront a system of values, a realm of 
Ends,which wites ?.n equally authentic claim on objec­ 
tivity.
"Judgements of value are not to be taken,like the 
intuitions of an older philosophy,as so many detached 
and mutually independent pronouncements of one faculty 
or another upon particular features or aspects of the 
world. They represent rather so many parts of one 
fundamental Judgement in which the nature of reality, 
as exhibited in the system,may be said to affirm 
itself. r:very particular Judgement depends for its 
ultimate sanction on the recognition of its object 
as a contributory element to this inclusive whole."43
"The conditions of moral experience are as Inex­ 
orable as any law of thought f.md no less founded in 
the nature of things." 44
"Here,then,we have a world of meanings,related or 
interconnected with one another,possessing a kind of 
reality different from the reality which we attribute 
to an existent thing or to an event that happens,but 
still a reality which we instinctively acknowledge, 
for f we all feel certain In the moment in which we 
think any truth that we have not created it for the 
first time,but merely recognized it; it was valid 
before we thou^it of it, and will continue so without 
regard to any existence of whatever kind 1 ." 45
40. The Idea of God.p.290. 41. Op.cit.,p.45.
42. Life and Finite Individuality,p.112.
43. The Idea of God.p.223. 37 Op.oit.,p.404. 
45. Op . c 1 t ., p .345 . The quotation is from Lotze,Logic, 
Part III,Cht.il.
e) There is no way to account for the rise of the 
recognition of values within human consciousness 
save as the response to a prior and eliciting 
stimulus in the nature of things; our sense of 
values is as surely produced by an objective order 
of values as our sense-organs have developed in 
reaction to objective realities of form and color,
"There is no explanation possible of the 
evolution of the sense-organs unless we assume 
the reality of the new features of the world to 
which their evolution introduces us. •••And what 
is here claimed for the secondary qualities holds 
good also of the aspects of beauty and sublimity 
which we recognize in nature and those finer 
insights which we owe to the poet and the artist. 
These things ought not to be regarded as arbitrary 
fancies,subjective glosses upon nature's text—on 
the contrary,they give us a deeper truth than or­ 
dinary vision,just as the more developed eye or 
ear carries us farther into nature's beauties and 
refinements than the less perfect organs of a 
lower specles....i£an is,after all,the child of 
nature,and it is on the basis of natural impulses, 
and in commerce with the system of external things, 
that his ethical being is built up. Hence the 
characteristics of the ethical life must be taken 
as contributing to determine the nature of the sys­ 
tem in which we live." 46
It will be evident at once how closely these points retra­ 
verse ground with which we have become thoroughly familiar 
in the course of our earlier discussion. Although they are 
never given systematic presentation, most of the persuasive 
evidences of the objectivity of values find reflection 
in Professor Pringle-Pattison's thought at one or another 
point. Special attention should be directed to argument (c) 
above. It will be seen to stand tjuite apart from the others 
in character; it is an appeal to man's inmost conviction 
intuitively arrived at. This is the only point at which 
we are on definitely Kantian grounds, ^nd here we make con­ 
tact with the thought of Professor Baillie who, it will be 
remembered, placed reliance almost exclusively upon this 
46. The Idea of God.pp.212-213. Cp.also,p.246; 3ee below, p.
intuitive certainty for his assurance of the objectivity
47 of values. It is the fact which Professor .Vhitehead has
in view when he remits us so forcefully that it is the 
poets to whom we are indebted for our escape from the 
shackles of Nineteenth Century materialism,and that the 
poets tnotably Wordsworth,were impelled to their rebellion
not by "any intellectual antagonism" but by a "moral 
48 „ . repulsion" • Lastly we should note that the concluding
consideration mentioned (e) is,in effect,a form of cosmo- 
logical argument and is »o presented by Professor Pringle-
fc <7
Pattison at another point in his discussion • This suggests
our third comment.
3) Consideration of the objectivity of values tends 
at every point to pass into the broader issue of the ulti­ 
mate interpretation of reality itself , of what we have per­ 
sistently argued for as an "inclusive metaphysical view". 
In particular,while there is no explicit reference to the
reasoning upon which we ourselves shall try to place con-50 
siderable weight —from the experience of values as the
culmination of a cosmic development which has its beginnings 
in the physical universe,to the objectivity of these values— 
this point of view may be said to be presupposed throughout. 
Indeed we shall not fully grasp Professor Pringle-Patti­ 
son 1 s view of the matter unless we have constantly in mind 
his even more fundamental conviction on the relation of 
values to Nature*
47. bee above,pp.24Qff.
48. Science and the Loclern V/orld,p./04.See below f p.225£f,
49. The Idea of God.p.249 ff .
50. Joe below,pp.
b.The Realm of Here,in the judgment of the present writer, we 
Values and the meet Professor Pringle-Pattison's powers at their very 
Realm of Nature.best; here he makes his most important single contri­ 
bution toward the comprehensive rephrasing of the argu­ 
ment from values which we are seeking*
His attitude toward Nature is woven of two strands. 
In the first place, there is no minimization of the stark 
cruelty of Nature,her complete indifference to the race's 
highest concerns. But here it is the physical substructure 
of Nature which is always in view—the physical universe— 
although that fact is not always discriminated as it 
should be for the greatest clarity of thought.
"The moral indifference of nature,or,as Professor 
Huxley more strongly phrased it,'the unfathonable in­ 
justice of the nature of things',is a problem as old 
as the Book of Job and older. Apart altogether from 
moral desert,what are we to make of the terrible con­ 
tingencies of nature to which at every turn man is 
exposed—the agonies of the quivering flesh or the 
laceration of the spirit through his tenderest affec­ 
tions!" 51
"The kaleidoscopic transformations of external 
nature possess in themselves no trace of that intrin­ 
sic value which must belong to what Kant calls an 
end-in-it.self. They are all sum; ed up in Spencer's 
phrase,the redistribution of matter and motion; and, 
apatft from conscious results which the process may 
condition,it is hard to see what interest lies for 
God or man in the infinite shiftings of the cosmic 
dust." 52
And,at the very end of the discussion,on the last page but 
one,we are brought back to face the same somber picture 
of the impersonal background of human existence.
"Contingency is written across the face of 
nature—not in the sense that what happens is not 
determined by natural l:.w,but in the sense that it
51. The Idea of God. p.26. 52. Op.clt .,pp. 29-30.
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appears to be only so determined,and cannot,in 
its detail,be brought within the scope of any ra­ 
tional or beneficent purpose. Contingency,casualty, 
or accident in this sense was frankly recognized by 
Plato and Aristotle,the great teleologists of the 
ancient world.... Mature is,...an element,savage and 
dangerous,into which the human being is thrown to 
show what stuff he is made of*" 53
This is the dark aspect of Nature's relation to the world 
of human values. But so gloomy an interpretation roust be 
tempered in the light of facts hinted in a qualifying 
phrase in the second quotation—"apart from conscious re­ 
sults which the process may condition". Here is the transi­ 
tion to the second strand in the writer's view of Nature* 
This other and dominant meaning of Nature for our
values has appeared and reappeared so repeatedly in the
it) 
course of the argument as a whole that /need hardly be more
than mentioned here. Indeed it may properly be regarded as 
the foundation principle of Professor Pringle-Pattison*s 
entire philosophy, and the TTP? err to for his constructive 
argument for God. It is the contention that,since man is 
organic to Nature. Nature herself can rightly be inter­ 
preted only in the light of her culmination in man. From 
this perspective Nature is seen as at once the mother and 
the nurse of human life and its values; she has brought man 
forth through the travail of her age-long exertion upward, 
and her impersonal discipline steels him to the achievement 
of the highest moral character.
It is attention to Nature's begetting of man which 
points a way of escape from Kant's unhappy legacy to modern 
thought. Release is won through a more acute analysis of
4» •»«•«••»
53. The Idea of God.
this very problem--the way in which the higher ranges of 
human experience are related to the groundpl^n of Nature.
The answer is found in the 'higher Naturalism1 which has
54 
already been described • Nature, in the wider reference,
exhibits a series of types or levels of reality. The lowest 
with which we are familiar is that which untutored usage 
most readily identifies with the 'phenomenal world 1 —the 
level of inorganic matter. Even here, a more discriminating 
study discovers a hierarchy of not one but several types 
of matter—the molecule being clearly differentiated from 
the atom, the crystal from simpler aggregations of molecules, 
etc. Above the level of the inorganic, we meet organic life; 
and here again a number of sub-levels in hierarchical 
advance may be more or less clearly distinguished. Then 
appears consciousness. Then reason, /aid—finally—the 
experience of values. (One further short step,though one 
which,! think,Professor Pringle-Pattison does not explicitly 
stress,shows that it is not only man but roan's values 
which are organic to Nature,since they are^so to speak, 
'organic to man' at the higher levels of man's life. And so 
their objectivity is further established.) It is a single 
organic progressive process from first to last,from the 
protons and electrons which lie at the basis of the struc­ 
ture of matter to the incarnation of the true,the lovely, 
the holy with which the life of spiritual beauty culmina­ 
tes, "Continuity of process and the amergonce of real dif­ 
ferences—these are,in short,the twin aspects of the
55 
cosmic history." Students of recent biological theory
54. See above,p.306* 55. The Idea of God. p. 103.
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will at onc« recognise a variation of the interpretation
of Nature known as 'Emergent Evolution' or f Creative 
Evolution' although The Idea of God antedated Professor
Llogd Morgan's most influential presentation of the former
56 
theory and does not refer to it by that name.
"After the first incomprehensibility of the 
nature of matter and force comes the origin of move­ 
ment, then the origin of life and what appears to be 
purposive adaptation,then the origin of sentience, 
and finally the origin of rational consciousness and 
will. Each transition is one of the eternal 'limits* 
set to our knowledge of nature,in regard to which the 
confession of Science must be a perpetual 'Ignora- 
bimus 1 ." 57
"Man must be taken as organic to nature....The 
rational intelligence which characterizes him appears 
as the culmination of a continuous process of im­ 
manent development....The existence of such living 
centers capable of feeling the grandeur and beauty 
of the universe and tasting its manifold qualities 
is what is alone really significant in the universe. 
All values are in this sense conscious values; and 
so it is that the sent ient,anoL, still more,the rational 
being appears as the goal toward which Nature is work­ 
ing, namely, the development of an organ by which she may 
become conscious of herself and enter into the Joy of 
her own being. :t 58
Here then wo are led to see Nature as,in an immediate 
though not in an ultimate sense,the source of the world of 
values. If she is the parent of man the valuer,she is also 
in some measure the unwitting tutor of his education toward 
spiritual maturity. For,once we see that the destiny of 
human life is to be conceived as the realisation of character 
rather than the conquest of happiness, Nature appears in 
a fresh perspective as an appropriate training-ground for 
that learning-experience. And we may now repeat the earlier 
pessimistic indictment of Nature but this time giving it
56. In Emergent Evolution and Life .Mind and Spirit.
57. The Idea of God.p.104. 58.Op.cit., pp.210-11; 6p.:-
"Spirit is the terminus ad quern of nature" .(p. 200) .
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its wider and truer setting,
"Nature may be regarded,on the large scale of 
history,as the instrument of man's moral and intel­ 
lectual education; but this does not mean- that we are 
bound to take each of nature's happenings as the ex­ 
ponent of a particular moral purpose..,,Contingency 
is written across the face of nature—not in the sense 
that what happens is not determined by natural law, but 
in the sense that it appears to ba only so determined, 
and cannot,in its detail,be brought within the scope 
of any rational or beneficent purpose. Contingency, 
casualty,or accident in this snnse was frankly recog­ 
nized by Plato and ^ristotle,the great teleologists of 
the ancient world. But whereas they treat it merely 
as hindrance end defect,does not further reflection 
show that Just such a world is better fitted to be 
a nurse of what is greatest in human character than 
any carefully adjusted scheme of moral discipline? 
Nature is more than a training-school of the moral 
virtues in the specific sense; it is an element,savage 
and dangerous,into which the human being is thrown 
to show what stuff ho is made of—an element testing 
with merciless severity his powers of courage and 
endurance.but drawing from him thereby the utmost of 
which he Is capable," 59
Aoral and Other 
Talues
Professor Pringle-Pattison's writings nowhere,so far 
as I have been able to discover,undertake a careful study
of the relation of the different values to one another and 
of their relative importance. At only one or two points, 
which we shall have occasion to note in a moment, does he 
even suggest his own precise conviction on this much 
mooted issue. From a careful scrutiny of his thought we 
may,however, summarise his attitude as follows:-
l.His usual practice is to regard the three traditional 
ultimate values indifferently, sometimes instancing 
one, somotime s two»3ometir«s all three when the con­ 
text seems to indicate that the argument in view 
would apply to any or all v;ith equal appropriateness, 
"As in the quest of beauty,so in the life of moral 
endeavor,'(GO) In this regard, a parallel may be sug­ 
gested to his tendency to employ the terms 'God', 
'the Absolute* and «n .ture' interchangeably and without 
careful discrimination. In this instance too there 
results something of the lack of clarity which has 
brought forth a storm of vigorous criticism in the 
parallel case.
Idea of C,od,pp,215-6, 60.0p.cit.,p,243,
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"Nature may be regarded, on the large scale of 
historyt as the instrument of man's moral and intel­ 
lectual education; but this does not mean, that we are 
bound to take each of nature's happenings as the ex­ 
ponent of a particular moral purpose.*.,Contingency 
is written across the face of nature—not in the sense 
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in the sense that it appears to be only so determined, 
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nized by Plato and ^ristotle,the great teleologists of 
the ancient world. But whereas they treat it merely 
as hindrance end defect,does not further reflection 
show that Just such a world is better fitted to be 
a nurse of what is greatest in human character than 
any carefully adjusted scheme of moral discipline? 
Nature is more than a training-school of the moral 
virtues in the specific sense; it is an element,savage 
and dangerous,into which the human being is thrown 
to show what stuff ho is made of—an element testing 
with merciless severity his powers of courage and 
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.Moral and Other Professor Pringle-Pattison's writings nowhere,so far 
Values as I have been able to discover,undertake a careful study
of the relation of the different values to one another and 
of their relative importance. At only one or two points, 
which we shall have occasion to note in a moment, does he 
even suggest his own precise conviction on this much 
mooted issue. From a careful scrutiny of his thought we 
may,however, summarise his attitude as follows:-
l.Hls usual practice is to regard the three traditional 
ultimate values indifferently, sometimes instancing 
one,sometimes two t sometimes all three when the con­ 
text seems to indicate that the argument in view 
would apply to any or all with equal appropriateness. 
"As in the quest of beauty,so in the life of moral 
endeavor. f (GO) In this regard, a parallel may be sug­ 
gested to his tendency to employ the terms 'God', 
'the Absolute' jmd *n iture' interchangeably and without 
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resul-cs something of the lack of clarity which has 
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537"'TEe Idea of God,pp.215^6. 60.Op.cit., p.243.
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2,It Is insisted that all three of the Great values 
must be conceded ultimate significance• ^gainst 
Kant's narrow moralism,it is protested, "The hackneyed 
triad of the True, the Beautiful tand the Good is suf­ 
ficient to remind us that there are at least two other 
phases of experience to which it would be strange to 
deny an intrinsic value."(61) And again,adopting Plato's 
metaphor, "The soul 'feeds upon* truth f upon goodness, 
upon beauty," (62)
3.The case is strongly put for a system or scale of 
values; but it is not suggested that such a scale 
would classify the ultimate values in order of 
precedence, but rather distinguish values which are 
instrumental or definitely lower from all values 
which are intrinsic* (63)
4.Not infrequently the case is put,as though by prefer­ 
ence, In torus of beauty and then transferred with ap­ 
propriate comment to the credit of morality. An in­ 
stance is the argument for the objectivity of values 
which has already claimed our attention; from the 
objectivity of the secondary qualities, the reasoning 
advances to substantiate tho objectivity of "beauty 
and sublimity" ,and finally a further inference vali­ 
dates the objectivity of the ethical values.(64)
5.While the writer's choice most often falls upon beauty 
as the type of ultimate value through which he can most 
happily illustrate his point, the burden of the argu­ 
ment at its most serious and crucial turns falls almost 
invariably on the evidence from moral experience (sup­ 
plemented not infrequently by distinctly religious 
experience). It is "man's nature as an ethical beiiig" 
which is most acutely aware of its cleavage from the 
non-moral character of the world from which it springs. 
(65) It is "the characteristics of the ethical life" 
which are claimed to give us oar nearest access to the 
nature of the ultimate Life. (66) It is "the conditions 
of moral experience" which exhibit a law of reality as 
inexorable as any law of thought.(67)Finally,it is 
the "moral impossibility" of believing in an ultimate 
reality entirely devoid of concern for values which 
furnishes the driving force for the whole idealistic 
conviction.(68)
6.The supremacy thus inferentlally conceded to moral 
values at not a few places receives explicit affirma­ 
tion in the author's only clear statement of his own 
relative 'weighting' of the values, defending Kant's 
insistence upon the fundamental priority of morality,





he goes on to say,partly in his own words and partly 
In quotation from Professor Bosancuet, "Even those 
who object moct strongly to the too exclusive moralising 
of Kant's theory,admit that his error is excusable,in 
so far as we get,in morality and religion,'the essen­ 
tial and fundamental conditions' of the perfect life, 
to which all other excellences--intellectual or artis­ 
tic, for example— 'are relatively posterior and depen­ 
dent 1 . 'I^oraiity1 ,says Professor Bosanquet, 'can more 
nearly stand alone,and its absence shakes the whole 
foundations of life and r ind. Such absence is in re­ 
spect (to life as a whole,what a failure of belief in 
the first principles of rational system is to intel­ 
ligence.' We accept this justification of Kant's 
procedure." (69)
But we may add a further insight into Professor Prin^le- 
Pattison's feeling in this matter of the significance of 
different types of value from his frequent and deliberate 
resort to poetry to bulwark the case he seeks to establish 
and to put it in the way most congenial to his own raind. 
Of this habit he has this to say:-
"It is possible that some readers may think that 
I have drawn too frequently upon the poets. That is 
perhaps a question: of temperament. But my procedure 
was f at any rate,quite deliberate,for I accept Words­ 
worth's description of poetry as 'the breath and finer 
spirit of all knowledge',and I am even ready to be 
persuaded by kr. Yeats that 'whatever of philosophy 
has been made poetry is alone permanent'." 70
In brief,Professor Pringle-Pattison follows the classical 
tradition in recognising three supreme values; for each 
of then? he claims objective status and absolute worth; 
personal inclination leads him most frequently to turn to 
the evidence from beauty and the insights of,the poets as
supplementation to reasoned argument; but morality and reli-*
tare held toj
gion]provide the more basic foundations of full life to
which the values represented in intellectual and artistic
Interest are ancillary; all values are conceived as finding
69. xhe Idea of^od.UP •50-31. The quotations are from 
Bosanquet,The Principle of Individuality and Value, 347-8. ————————'——————————————*—————****«••




harmonious unity in an ultimate system with reference to
which all specific judgments of value derive their auth- 
ori ty.
We look to Professor Prln^le-Pattison in vain for 
helpful light on the problexa of evil. From the particular 
interest of this study, no oiher aspect of his thought is 
so inadequate and unconvincing. The extraordinary insight 
and ripe wisdom which we have discovered informing his dis­ 
cussions of other central topics seeia to desert him here 
almost completely. One cannot reci&t the impression that 
this is an outcome ,and perhaps the nost unfortunate outcome, 
of his fealty to the absolutist tradition.
To begin with, there is no sufficient recognition of 
the shere reality of evil and the distressing perplexities 
which it forces upon an earnest mind seeking a rational 
belief. To be sure f the indifference of physical nature 
and ite gift of suffering to huxoan life arefcranted from ther
outset; the disposition made of these difficulties we have
71
already noted. But, this aspoct of evil aside, the larger 
problem receives hardly so much as a passing reference until 
the argument is almost at its close; it is not an overstate-. 
ment ohat the general discussion advances in almost complete 
disregard of the matter. At the very end we are brought 
sharp against the issue:- "But this world of ours, so scarred 
by Buffering, so defaced by wickedness, DO entangled, as it 
often sccias,in -;he neshcc of a non- rational contingency- 
how dare we trace buch a world to the reason and will of a
331,
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perfect Being ae its sole explaining cause?" Here is 
promise of a vigorous grappling with the problem et last. 
But the fulfillment of the promise is most disappointing. 
The alternative solutions of Plural!cm ancl of a finite God 
are both immediately rejected as untenable. It is suggested 
that difficulties over the facts of evil arise from faulty 
thinking at one of two points—either from a misconception 
of the meaning of omnipotenoe or from an unworthy ideal for 
human living. Omnipotence does not mean unqualified employ­ 
ment of unlimited power; God's exerdise of will must be 
within the limits im)?osed by his nature as moral and the 
inexorable conditions of the moral lew. On the other hand § 
the highest purpose for life is rot to secure happiness but 
to achieve character; the true end of our world is "the 
making of souls" and it is an appropriate medium for that 
purpose. How obviously these tv/o observations are sound, 
and they are important prolegomena to any thorough wrestling 
with the perplexities of evil. But to imply that all men's 
doubts can be accounted for in terms of two such obvious 
and naive misconceptions is to impugn both the intellectual 
capacity and the genuine earnestness of the doubters. As a 
matter of fact these two explanations do not touch the 
fringes of the really harrowing features of evil's impact; 
they leave off precisely at the point where most men's 
difficulties begin. The real tack is to explain why,within 
an omnipotence in which shere power is assumed forever unde 
the restraint of goodness and purpose, fcbsre should occur 
so much whicb appears without purpose or good fruitage t sc 
72. The Idea of God » pp.399-400.
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much which suggests the unrestrained handiwork of shore
power* And t on the other hand, the difficulty from the IIUILELI* 
side i& not that life should Tr.il to give happiness; but 
that it should brin^ so much suffering—for example, 
insanity,inherited feeble-inindednes6,etc,—which nothing, 
net even the religious consciousness at its highest,seeus 
competent to trunsiLute into good* lu the face of such 
questions as theso,Profess or Frin^le-Pattison's hasty 
treatment must appear,at the very least, superficial* It 
is matter cf regret that a theistic argument otherwise 
so carefully end persuasively reasoned should suffer such 
severe anti-climax on the r^ost crucial difficulty every theia 
must attempt to dispel* We ere again driven to the sugges­ 
tion that it is the writer's legacy from an Absolute 
Idealism which forever holds its vieion partially closed 
against the bitter realities of life.
Moral Values and An added word on the writer's view of the significance 
Religious Exper- of distinctively religious experience may not be out of 
ience. place at this point. We suggested earlier that this is one
of th3 features of Professor Pringle-Pattison's theism 
which xnost commends it to our study. It is probable that 
he would welcome the description of his book as a theism 
in the light of religious experience; it is indeed an ar- 
guiienfc from religion rather more than an argument from
morality, I'.ost frequently the two terms are linked; the
73 
usual reference is to "the moral and religious life" .
Morality is regarded ac more indissoluMy connected with
religion than with either of the other great areas of 
73*See,for example.The Idea of God.PP.252:582;etc.
intrinsic value. Put it is to the religious consciousness 
even more than to raornl experience that find appeal is 
made,both for substantiation of the conclusions previously 
arrived at anymore significant,for li^ht where reasoning 
unaided by spiritual insight aives no light. It is the 
religious consciousness which furnishes1 an assured sens^ 
of a Divine Companion "whose perfect oomprehension is the 
pledge of a sympathy as perfect,a sympathy to which we
appeal with confidence even where we might hesitate in
74 
regard to those nearee) to us and most dear" * It is the
religious consciousness which is able to arbitrate for us 
the puzzling dilemma of the relation of finite selves to 
the Absolute §assuring us that only genuinely independent
ispirits can recognise the dependence,irake the surrender
and achieve the attitudes of worship and adoration which
75 
characterise the religious life. ^gein it is the religious
consciousness which, while it ms.y claim genuine progress for
ourselves,testifies that to the Divine Life there can be
76 
no real novelty, no intrinsic growth or progress. Lastly,
if there be granted to us »iny li^ht on the facts of evil 
(beyond the feeble surest ions whose inadequacy we have Just 
found it necessary to regret) it would seem to come alone 
through religion. Here, in truth,would appear to be Profes­ 
sor Prin^le-Pattl^on's most promising answer to evil's
mystery. For to the contingency written across the face of
77 
Nature whiqh we have twice portrayed , the religious
attitude makes a distinctive responsej-
74.The Ide-^ of God.T:.269« 75. Op.oit.,pp.290-1.
r* /* /-__ • ±. _ r .-> TT _ _ _ ' * *77. bee a^ 327.
"The religious man -.'ill, no dOaM,,seek to accept 
whatever happens JiO him as froia. tho hand of God, and 
by doing so he will /rake this account of the occurence 
true, because he thereby transmutes the event into an 
instrument of spiritual growth." 78
And thereby, the religious consciousness discovers both the 
profoundest meaning of human lifo and the final truth re­ 
garding the divine nature itself,
"No deeper foundation of Idealism can be laid 
than the perception,. • .of the spirit's power to 
transform the very meaning of the past and to trans­ 
mute every Io3s into gain,' finding even in the worst 
of tragedies the me^ns of an otherwise impossible 
triumph 1 , a triumph which but for that wrong or trea­ 
son had never been* This IB the real omnipotence of 
atoning love f unweariedly creating good out of evil; 
and it la no far-off theological nystery but, God be 
thanked, the very texture of our human experience." 79
Our examination of Processor oorley's thought discovered 
his argument from moral values pointing beyond morality to t 
religious consciousness but we found his position somewhat
deficient because the further step into a philosophy of
80 
religious experience is indicated but it is nowhere taken*
on the other hajad,we criticised Professor Baillie for a
too exclusive emphasis upon the religious attitude of faith
81 
grounded in laoral experience. Here both deficiencies are
made good. .«'e are presented with a theism based upon a broad 
philosophy of values— , rendering of values in which all 
ultima ce values are significant guide-posts to the divine, 
but in wnich a supreme importance attaches to moral exper­ 
ience; a philosophy of values, finally, in which the deeper 
and most; vital insights and the ultimate assurances are 
made known oiily tnrou^h the distinctive experience of 
religion.
78 » *ha Idea of God.u.415. 79.0p.cit. ,p.417. 





We have cited Professor Pringle-Pattison's theism 
as an instance of an "inclusive metaphysical view". Justi­ 
fication for that designation may be discovered in the fact 
that all of the traditional arguments for God,though in 
modified presentation,are embodied in it.
The Ontolofiioal Argument represents man's ineradica­ 
ble conviction of the trustworthiness of careful and com­ 
petent thought—the conviction that the conclusions to 
which human reason has been led by a process of criticised 
and self-consistent induction must correspond with reality; 
in another reference,the conviction that the best which the 
human mind can conceive must represent reality. This argu­ 
ment has usually been employed to vindicate the ontological 
status of the principles of logic; but it may properly be 
extended to validate the objectivity of the carefully 
reasoned conclusions of the moral faculty,since they,like 
the processes of thought,represent the outcome of the highest 
exercise of man's native faculties.
"This fundamental confidence of reason in itself 
is just what the ontological argument is really 
labouring to oppress—the confidence,namely,that 
thought,when made COIIF latent with itself , is true,that 
necessary implication*, in thought expresses a similar 
implication in reality. In this large sense,the truth­ 
fulness of thought—its ultimate truthfulness—is 
certainly the presupposition of all thinking: other­ 
wise there would be no indlcement to indulge in the 
operation.
"Fundamentally,it is the conviction that 'the 
best we think,or can think,must be,'—a form of state­ 
ment which perhaps enables us to see the real inten­ 
tion of the old scholastic argument that 'a perfect 
being necessarily exists'. In other words,the possibi-
lities of thought cannot exceed the actuality of 
being;our conceptions of the ideal in their highest 
range are to be taken as pointing to a real Perfec­ 
tion, in which is united all that,and more than,it 
has entered into the heart of man to conceive." 82
The CosmoloKical Argument in its ordinary form is 
the argument from known effects in the empirical world to 
an adequate cause. Usually it has been applied to the neces­ 
sary dependence of a finite and imperfect world upon an 
infinite and perfect Reality; or,as in Loeke f from man's 
knowledge of his own existence as a real but finite creature 
to the existence of a necessary and eternal Being. But here, 
likewise,the scope and setting of the argument may be broad­ 
ened by its application to the reality of man's values 
without altering its essential structure or validity. As 
has already been argued in connection with the objectivity 
of values,there is no way to explain the rise of the con­ 
sciousness of ideals within our human existence unless they 
have been inspired there by an objective and ultimate Per­ 
fection* This is a restatement,in terms more congenial to 
modern way* of thinking,of the argument which Descartes 
introduced into modern philosophy.
"Whence,then,are these Ideals derived and what 
is the meaning of their presence in the human soul? 
Whence does Man possess this outlook upon a perfect 
Truth and Beauty and an infinite Goodness,the world 
of empirical fact being,as Bacon says,in proportion 
inferior to the soul? Man did not weave them out of 
nothing any more than he brought himself into being. 
f lt is He that hath made us,and not we ourselves' ; 
and from the same fontal Reality must be derived those 
ideals which are the masterlight of all our seeing, 
the element,in particular,of our moral and religious 
life. The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God 
within us." 83
82. The Idea of God.pp.240-241.
83. Op.cit.,p.246. Cp.op.cit.,pp.212-213,quoted above, p.
3i>7. 
The Teileologioal Argument expresses man's impression
that the world as he meets it represents the expression of 
a transcendent and divine Purpose* It is not possible for 
us,as for traditional exponents of the argument, to con* 
ceive of an external and contingent design which is being 
superinduced upon a world in some sense refractory and alien 
to that purpose. But we are forced to recognise that our 
universe exhibits a systematic and intelligible unity; 
further, that within the conditions of this structure there 
is apparent a process which can only be rightly interpreted 
in terms of the direction toward which it points. The unity, 
in other words, is a whole involving the progressive reali­ 
zation of an immanent Purpose ;and this is the essential . 
meaning of a teleologlcal world.
"A teleological view of the universe means the 
belief that reality is a significant whole.
"Rationality is not a lucky accident; it is the 
fundamental feature of the world. Intelligibility,as 
we actually discover it,and as we everywhere presume 
it,means that the world is the expression or embodi­ 
ment of thought. In this sense mena agitat molem; 
reason is present at every stage as the shaping spirit 
of the whole.
"In the interpretation of any process,it is the 
process as a whole that has to be considered,if we wish 
to know the nature of the reality revealed in it. In 
other words,every evolutionary process must be read in 
the light of its last term.
"To proclaim the End as the true principle of ex­ 
planation is no more than to insist...*that the True is 
the Whole...,The last term is only important because 
in it is most fully revealed the nature of the principl« 
which is present throughout. It is precisely this 
linkage of the first term with the last and,to that 
extent,the transcendence of the mere time-sequence in 
the conception of an eternal reality,that seems to me 
to be expressed by the profound Aristotelian idea of 
or End." 84
84. The Idea of God,pp.330;331;106;331-2.
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But, as we remarked at the outset,the major stress 
in Professor Pringle-Pattison*s philosophy falls upon the 
Argument from Values, Indeed it becomes a center of refer­ 
ence for the older traditional arguments,affording a prin­ 
ciple of unity in their interpretation. It is his conscious­ 
ness of value-ideals which leads man to postulate an onto-
logically real ultimate and perfect Ground of values. It is
Ireluctaul) 
the imperious command of values upon hisfailegiance which
requires causal explanation in terms of a trans-human Source 
of values. It is the emergence of the awareness of values 
and himself as 'valuer* in the late stages of the cosmic 
history which justifies a teleological interpretation of 
the world, a recognition of the immanent outworking of the 
Purpose of God.
la so far as the ethical consciousness is to be dis­ 
tinguished from the awareness of values in general for spe­ 
cial attention, it leads to the distinctively Moral Argument. 
In correction of Kant's too individualistic and external 
formulation, this argument may be stated as follows:-
rt lt is upon the attitude of the mor^l man himself 
that the moral philosopher should base his theory.... 
The real postulate or implied presupposition ofpthical 
action is simply that we are not acting in a world 
which nullifies our efforts,but that morality expresses 
a fundamental aspect of reality,so that in ou* doings 
and strivjpgs we may be said,in a large sense, to have 
the unigerse somehow behind us. i.oral action,in short, 
implies^pellef in a moral order,just as deliberate 
action of any sort implies belief in the orderly con­ 
nectedness of physical nature." 85
"Consciousness of imperfection,the capacity for 
progress,and the pursuit of perfection,are alike pos- 
siblejto man only through the universal life of thought 
end goodness in which he shares,and which,at once an
85. The Idea of God . PP . 34-35 -
indwelling presence and an unattainable ideal,draws 
hiti 'on and always on'. M (86) "The authority claimed 
by whaii is commonly called the higher self is thus 
only intelligible if the ideals of that self are 
recognized as the immediate presence within us of a 
Spirit leading us into all truth and goodness." 87
Here,in tbs second paragraph,we see the argument from 
morality passing naturally and inevitably into the causal 
argument* And we see it pointing to God in both his imma­ 
nent and his transcendent aspects, at once *an indwelling
88 
presence* and 'an unattainable ideal* .
But,lastly,it should be clearly recognised that none 
of these four familiar lines of reasoning nor indeed all of 
them together furnishes absolute proof ,unchallengeable 
certainty,of the divine existence. The ontolo&ical argument, 
at best,encourages us to believe that we are not self-de- 
ceivedjin our confidence that ultimate reality will be dis­ 
covered to be as perfect as our lifcghest imaginative con­ 
ception of it; but that is u far renove from absolute proof. 
To be sure that confidence is and should be the presuppoii- 
tion of all our highest activity,just ao confidence in the 
rationality of the world is the necessary 'presupposition
of all our thinking*; but to the end each remains a *prac-
89 
tical assumption* , Likewise, the causal argument must
confront Hume's fanlliar rejoinder that it carries us only 
to belief in a transcendent reality of 'sufficient power
86. The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays. p, 98
87. The Idea of God.p. 577
88. Cp.V/hitehead's definition of religion as "the vision 
of something which stands beyond,behind and within the 
passing flux of immediate things; something which is 
real,yet waiting to be realized; something which is a 
?gg3ig.P9ssJ^ji.^«naad y«J: frhtjiUBaft-freaf of present
89. The Idea of^ftflg^jkl/y n*lir»-dN*j h ;
and sufficient intelligence to account for the tangled
web of empirical fact 1 ; not to the certainty of a perfect
90 
absolute Heality. ^nd the teleological argument however
skillfully freed from external! sm and formalism never suc­ 
ceeds in fully justifying to human reason the pressing 
facts of dysteleology and apparently purposeless waste in 
Nature (facts which,unfortunately,escape Professor Pringle- 
Pattison's attention almost altogether^.Again,the central 
argument from values is admitted to proceed from an inher­ 
ently unprovable assumption 'of tho essential greatness of
man and the infinite nature of the values revealed in his
91 
life 1 . In particular,morality does not establish the
fact of @od; it acts as though God were. The fact is always
92 
the 'postulate or implied presupposition of ethicaJL action'*
In brief , theism at each point of its supporting evidence 
rests finally upon an act of faith, but a reasonable faith— 
a faith progressively vindicated by experience. I hope I 
shall not offend Professor Prlngle-Pattlson's thought if I 
suggest that this final appeal is to an essentially 
Pragmatic Argument. Speaking of the measure of certainty 
which the evidence from values affords, it is said:-
"A few words more may be added as to the nature 
of the assurance with which we hold our position. The 
logical principle of non-contradiction,or,to express 
it more largely, the principle of intellectual co­ 
herence, we must and do accept as absolute, v/e accept 
it as a necessity of reason involved in the possibi­ 
lity of knowing anything—involved therefore in all 
practical living as well as in the immovable belief 
in law and order which inspires all scientific inves­ 
tigation. And,needless to say,life and science alike 
vindicate the principle; all experience nay be looked
90. The Idea of God,pp.249-250. 91. Op.cit.,p.236. 
93. Op.cit.,p.35.
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upon as its progressive verification. But if we ask 
what is the nature of our certainty that existence, 
the world of facts,is ultimately and throughout intel­ 
lectually coherent—that we have to do,in short,not 
with a chaos but with a cosmos, a world whose laws may 
be infinitely complex and difficult to unravel,but 
which will never put us to permanent intellectual con­ 
fusion—we are bound to reply that in a sense it is an 
unproved belief. It is unproved in the sense that we 
have not explored the whole of existence, and in t;ie 
nature of the case can never hope to include all the 
facts within the net of reason. And hence it may per­ 
haps be called a postulate of reason, a supreme 
hypothesis. Llany would describe it as a 'venture of 
faith*." 93
Then,after showing that in a similar fashion our ideals 
tend to create the conviction that ultimate reality must 
correspond with them also,the argument continues: -
"Admittedly,however,such a conception transcends 
the empirical reality of man's own nature or of the 
factual world around him,just as the perfectly coherent 
intellectual whole transcends the achieved results of 
knowledge* And,so far,the argument seems parallel in 
the two oases; in both there is an aspect of faith,and 
in both a similar claim to objectivity. But it is idle 
to deny that,although the belief in ultimate Goodness 
and Perfection at the heart of things may be held with 
a more passionate energy of conviction than the more 
colourless postulate of the intellect,it does not pre­ 
sent itself to most minds with the same impersonal 
logical cogency. 'The ultimate identity of value and 
existence' has been described as the great venture of 
faith to which mysticism and speculative idealism are 
committed."
But, "whatever aspect of faith may cling to a phil­ 
osophical conclusion,it must be presented as the con­ 
clusion of the reason upon a consideration of all the 
evidence and after due weight assigned to all the modes 
of our experience. It must be a reasonable faith. w 94
And of the attitude which is required for such a steady 
assurance of the reality of God,we are reminded:-
"Faith,which is an active belief in the reality 
of the ideal,is the very breath by which humanity lives, 
and it will reconstitute itself afresh as long as the 
race endures." 95
93 » The Idea of God. p.239. 95. Op.cit.,p.82. 
94. op.clt.,pp.241-2. The oitatlonUA»oflroa,1913Inee in 
She Times Literary Supplement t
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V.
The Conception What,then,is the Idea of God to which we have been 
of God* led? Here we shall allow Professor Pringle-Rattison to
speak in his own words,bringing together some half dozen 
of the more important statements out of the many more
passages from which his full-orbed conception of God ie
96 
to be discovered.
"Of the Absolute it has been finely said, f its 
predicates are the worlds', e learn its nature through 
the facts of the universe,especially so far as any system 
or scale of values is discernible in them. This is the 
immanent God.,..The nature of ultimate Reality is to be 
read in its manifestations,and may be read there truly."97
"All experience might not unfitly be described,from 
the human side,as the quest of God—the progressive 
attempt,through living and knowing,to reach a true con­ 
ception of the Power whose nature is revealed in all 
that is....Man is the visible presence of the divine.\7e 
are far too apt to limit and mechanize the great doctrine 
of the Incarnation which forms the centre of the Christian 
faith. Whatever else it may me an, it means at leaat this— 
that in the conditions of the highest human life we have 
access,as nowhere else,to fhe inmost nature of the divine, 
'God manifest in the flesh is a more profound philoso­ 
phical truth than the loftiest flight of speculation what 
outsoars all predicates and,for the greater glory of God, 
declares him unknowable." 93
"The existence of finite centres is a fact as true 
and important 'from the side of the Absolute' as from the 
point of view of the finite beings themselves—nay,this 
differentiation or creation constitutes the very essence 
and open secret of the Absolute Life....
"Although the individual may not make himself his 
own Bnd, the world of finite individuals may well con­ 
stitute the End of the Absolute. How can we ascribe to 
the absolute, as many theologians have done,the self- 
centred life,the contemplation of His own glory,which 
spells moral death in the creature? Is it reasonable to 
deny of the fontal life of God that giving of Himself 
and finding of Himself in others,which we recognize as 
the perfection and fruition of human life'*
"The divine life is essentially a process of self- 
communication. Or,to put it in more abstract philoaophi- 
cal language,the infinite in and through the finite,the
957TrTaddition to the sections quoted,see Idea of
215;238$246;254',269;382;430-4355etc;etc: 
97.The Idea of God.PP.174-5. 98.Op.cit.,pp.156-7.
finite in and through the infinite — this mutual impli­ 
cation is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know 
it* It is the eternal fashion of the cosmic Life." 99
"God becomes an abstraction if separated from the 
universe of his manifestation, Just as the finite sub­ 
jects have no independent subsistence outside of the 
universal Life which mediates itself to them in a world 
of objects. V/c may conceive God as an experience in which 
the universe is felt and apprehended as an ultimately 
harmonious whole; and we must,of course t distinguish 
between such an infinite experience and the experiences 
of ourselves and other finite persons. But we have no 
right to trea-c either out of relation to the other. We 
have no right to suppose the possibility of such an 
infinite experience as a solitary monad—an absolute , in 
the old sense of the old term already condemned,self- 
sufficient and entirely independent of the finite intel­ 
ligences to whom,in the actual world which we know,it 
freely communicates itself....The notion of God is in­ 
separable from that of a spiritual community.
"But so long as we apply the terms infinite and 
perfect to God....such a view is misrepresented by phrasee 
which seem to laake God one individual mind among a number 
of equally self-subsistent individuals....However impious 
and intolerable one may feel the image of the potter and 
the clay,however certain one may be that the integrity 
of the self-conscious being is involved in the very per­ 
fection of the divine nature,still the relation between 
the finite spirit and its inspiring source must be,in the 
end,incapable of statement in terms of the relation of 
one finite individual to another. To treat God as no more 
than primus inter pares is to lose touch both with specu- 
latioh and religion." 100
"God is not a causa remota.who created a universe 
once upon a time. He is its ever-present sustaining 
ground. The universe of the finite and everything in it 
exists from one moment to another only because He per­ 
petually creates it....Greation is an eternal aot §which 
means that God never existed without a world in which He 
was manifested.....
"God is cause only in the sense of ground,that is to 
say,the Being whose nature is expressed in the system as 
a whole....God exists as creatively realizing himself in 
the world,Just as the true Infinite is not a mere Boyond, 
but it present in the finite as its sustaining and inclu­ 
ding life." 101
"By the existence of the personality of God we do 
not mean the existence of a soIf-consciousness so con­ 
ceived. \\9 mean that the universe is to be thought of, 
in the last re sort, as an Experience and not as an abstract
——— .. fality , pp.215ff_« 
99. The Idea of God t pp.277;294-5;515.Gp.^egelfgflr^m ^ i
100.0p.cit*,pp.314;i520. Cp.Life and Finite individuality,
101. The SDirit.DT).135.15! Tha Td«n nf find . TTO.SOP * *1 9 tl9f f .
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content—an experience not limited to the intermittent 
and fragmentary glimpses of this and the other finite
consciousness,but resuming the whole life of the world 
in a fashion which is necessarily incomprehensible save 
by the Absolute itself.... We call God personal because 
in personality is revealed the highest we know,and it 
is better,therefore,to affirm personality than to call 
the Absolute impersonal. The epithet,like the statements 
of the creeds,is the denial of an error rather than a 
definitely articulated affirmation of ascertained fat t. 
And if the affirmation of personality were taken to imply 
identity of conditions,then,but for its tendency to be­ 
come a merely empty name,supra-personal would obviously 
more appropriately express our meaning." 102
"It is a great misfortune that 'the spirit of God* , 
the influence of God in the human soul....,the mystic 
presence of the Lord in the hearts of His followers, a 
spirit of comfort and consolation in their loss,revealin, 
the mind of the Master whom on earth they had often so 
ill understood.and so guiding them and the Church after 
them into all truth—it is a misfortune that expressions 
like these,and the spirituej. fact for which they stand, 
should have been materialised so as to suggest the exis­ 
tence of a third personality or agency distinct from both 
the Father and the Son. For what better word could be 
found to express just the fact of divine immanence on 
which the possibility of communion with God is based,the 
illuminative presence of God operative in every soul 
which he has created? The conception of the Spirit is, 
in fact,the final and complete account of the one God as 
the Father of spirits,their Creator,Inspirer,and Redeem­ 
er." 103
"Truth,Beauty,Goodness have no reality as self- 
existent abstractions; they have no meaning apart from 
conscious experience. They carry us therefore to a primal 
Mind in whose experience they are eternally realized. 
God himslof is at once the supreme Reality and,as Dante 
calls him,the supreme Value—11 primo.il sumi..o Valore. 
And the highest conception we en form of perfect person- 
ality is Love,not in any shallow sentimental sense,but 
the self-giving Love which expends itself for others,and 
lives in all their Joys and sorrows. Such love,then,the 
principle of our argument bids us take as the ultimate 
value of which the universe is the manifestation. It 
bids us conceive the inmost being of God not colely as 
the realization of eternal Truth and the enjoyment of 
perfect Beauty,but pre-eminently as the exercise and 
fruition of hie nature as Love." 104
102. The Idea of God.p.590 (the second part of the quotation 
is taken from the footnote on the same page),
103. Th,e Spirit.p. 11. bee r also,the fuller quotation on
Transcondonce and Immanence, p. jnaabove.104. The Idea of Immortality.p.1§0. **
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"What was the secret of Christianity,the new 
interpretation of life by which it conquered the world? 
The answer is in a sense a commonplace. *t was the lesson 
of self-sacrifice,of life for others,precisely through 
which,nevertheless,the truest and intensest realization 
of the self was to be attained—in the Pauline phrase, 
dyinG to live,in the words of Jesus,losing one's life 
to find it;... .This conception of the meaning of life 
embodied in One who spoke of Himself as being among men 
as one that serveth,this was the victory which overcrme 
the world. It is the final eibandonnent of the hedonistic 
ideal , through the recognition of the inherent emptiness 
of the self-centered life....And here the bearing of the 
change upon our argument becomes apparent.
"For if this is the deepest insist into human life, , 
must we not also recognize it as the open secret of the 
universe? That is the conclusion to which we have been 
led: no God,or Absolute,existing in solitary bliss and 
perfection,but a G-od who lives in the perpetual giving 
of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures, 
bearing in and v;ith them the whole burden of their fini- 
tude,their sinful wanderings and sorrows,and the suffering 
without which they cannot be made perfect...•The divine 
omnipotence consists in the all-compelling power of Good­ 
ness and love to enlighten the grossest darkness and to 
melt the hardest heart. 'We needs must love the highest 
when we see itj« It is of the essence of the divine pre­ 
rogative to seek no other means of triumph—as,indeed,a 
real triumph is possible on no other terms. And thus,for 
a metaphysic which has emancipated itself from physical 
categories,the ultimate conception of God is not that of 
a pre-existent Creator but,as it is for religion,that 
of the Eternal Redeemer of the World. This perpetual 
process is the very life of God,in which,besides the 
effort and the paintHe tastes,we must believe,the Joy of 
victory won." 105
VI.
Criticism, Our comment upon Professor Pringle-Pattison's dis-»
cussion has been almost altogether favorable. From this it 
should not be inferred that his thought is wholly free from 
serious limitations; and these inadequacies necessarily 
infect his idea of God and in some measure detract from 
its value. We have not given them extended notice because
they fall almost entirely outside the lines of the principal
••••»«•»<•»•
105. The Idea of God*pp.411-12.
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interests of this paper* They have been reviewed in a
series of sympathetic and appreciative but none-the-lesr
106 
vigorous critical notices* The criticisms which have been
most frequently urged are these:*
l.A confusion in the use of the terms 'God', 'the Absolute} 
'Nature' t « the ^
failure to establish genuine transcendence for God; or f frora another angle, a too intimate identification of God with th« world.
3 .A merging of finite personalities in the nature of the Absolute in such a way that their genuine individuality is compromised*
4.An iittidequet,* view of ' tii<i«*' , which tends to deny the 
reality of the time- process and consequently to mini­ mize the significance of history*
To these we would %ish to add a fifth: -
5. A superficial treatise nt of the problem of evil. 
Our own conclusion would be that each of the five criticisms 
is justified by certain strains in Professor Pringle-Patti- 
son's thought, though not by what we should like to regard 
as the dominant and coherent tenor of his teaching. It 
would be our further suggestion that 9 in each case, the 
unsatisfactory strain of argument is a direct heritage from 
the Hegelian idealism which has never been fully criticised 
in the light of the writer's nain position; and that it is 
finally inconsistent with the wore realistic and thoroughly 
Christian type of Idealism which we believe to be the most 
fundamental | as it certainly is the most attractive , current 
of the author's conviction.
106*Se«tej3pecially:~Charles Gore. Belief in God » pp. 65; 69-75 > 
H.R. Mackintosh, n A Philosopher's Theology" in Contemporary Re view r December 1917, end in Some Assets of Christian Belief. pp*252ff ; William Temple in Contemporary Brit ish Philosophy. 
Vol*I t p.415f ; H.Rashdall in Mind. July 1916.pp*261ff ; B.Dosanquet in tiind > 1917.pp.474^f ; C.A.Richardson in Mind • January
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Professor Prlngle-Pattison' s discussion of the
107 
problem of evil hat already bean considered. A very
brief comment on each of the four other points of cri­ 
ticism will suffice.
God and the 1. The confusion resulting from Professor Pringle- 
Absolute. ^attison's identification of the terms 'aod','the Absolute*,
•Nature 1 and 'the All 1 has been remarked by most of his 
critics. His nomenclature and its deficiencies in this par­ 
ticular have been subjected to thorough and acute analysis
by Professor Mackintosh in his friendly note in the Contern-
108
porary Review —perhaps the most considerate and discri­ 
minating examination which The Idea of God has received. 
By a careful collation of passages,it is shown that through­ 
out most of the volume the four alternative terms are used
109 
indifferently as though exact equivalents. In a rejoinder
appended to the second edition of The Idea of God.Professor 
Prlngle-Pattison justifies his usage by pointing out that
his argument is progressive in character and,as it proceeds,
110 
employs its terms with increasing exactitude* But this
explanation hardly satisfies the objection since one of the
most perplexing equations of 'the Absolute 1 and 'the All'
111 
occurs in the -last lecture but one. In any event it is
clear that in no proper theistic usage could 'god* be iden­ 
tified with either 'Nature' or 'the ^11'; and the equation
107. See above,pj>.330ff .
108. December 1917,reprinted in Soiae aspects of Christian 
3clief»pp.259ff .
109. OpTcTt. f pp.263ff . Cp.Prof.Bosanquet: -" The author seems
to recognise no distinction between God end the absolute, 
in Mind*1917.p.478; and Dean Hashdal^-
fPiHITvvhuffl^he palls indifforontlzJin nina.iyio.p t 2co. .. n^c
110. TheTSea of God.p.451. 111.0p.cit.,p.3o8.
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of 'god 1 and Uhe Absolute 1 , although familiar in idealistic 
thinkers ,1s frought with only slightly less difficulty. The 
Absolute, in Professor Pringle-Pattison' s most carefully con­
sidered definition, is "a self-contained und internally or-
112 
ganised whole, beyond which there is nothing" • But if
the independence of finite spirits is of such a kind that 
they may enter into fellowship with God voluntarily— indeed,
by the inherent character of the relationship, cannot be
113 
linked in fellowship with him in any other way — , then
it should be clear that God is not Identical with the 
Absolute as just defined. And there is the added difficulty 
of recognising the reality of evil in a world which is held 
to be contained within a perfect absolute 'beyond which 
there is nothing1 * These are, of course, hackneyed objections;
they have been urged by Dean Rashdall and answered by Pro-
114 
fessor Pr ingle-Pa ttison in a joint discussion in foind ;
but the critic appears to us to have the better of the con­ 
troversy. The sum of the matter would se^m to urge a clear 
discrimination between God and the Absolute, reserving the 
term ^od 1 for that 'self-communicating Life 1 who forever
stands at the door of human life and knocks but will not
113 
enter save at human invitation ; while employing f the
Absolute 1 in that wider reference as including f God-and- the-
World f , a usage which is said exactly to express the writer 1 6
115 
meaning •
112. Tho Idea of God. p. 458. 113. Op.cit.,p.292.
114. HTRashdall, "The Religious Philosophy of Professor
Pringle-Pattison",in Vlnd.-Tuly 1918; and A.S.Pringle- 
Pattison, "The Idea of God: a Reply to ^ome Criticisms" , 
in Mind . January 1919, p. Iff.




God and the 
World*
2. Bishop Gore's principal dissatisfaction with 
Professor Pringle-Pattison's theism is that his careful 
inductive argument which, however, refuses to recognise 
any unique divine revolution never carries us to the
reality of a transcendent Deity existing in independence
116 
of the world. And Archbishop Temple is confused by a
similar ambiguity as to whether God is to be taken as
"the Supreme Reality in whom all existences find the ground
of their being" or merely as "the sum total or perfection
117 
of adjectival values" • v'fe should be inclined to assent
to these criticisms though on slightly different grounds. 
Here again .thorough consideration of the matter would 
traverse old ^nd familiar territory which is somewhat beyond 
our proper purview. The crux of the issue concerns God's 
relation to the world— whe the r and in what sense God is to 
be thought of as existing either prior to,or independent of, 
his creation. Professor Pr ingle-Pa tti son seeks to overpass 
the first half of the difficulty— God 1 s priority to the
world— by a doctrine of time which is, to say the least,
118 
difficult. On the second part of the issue — God's indep­
endence of his creation— he is emphatic. "God never existed
119 
without a world in TChich He was manifested" ; "God is not
more necessary to the world, says Hegel, than the world to
120 
God. Without the world ,God were not God" . *n Ititial
confusion disappears when it is clearly recognised that it 
is not really our world, this universe as we know it, which
116. Charles Gore, Belief In Gqd,pp«69ff«
117. Wlllluic Temple | in Don-G^Trrorayy British Phil. t Vol.ItP»415118. Ut»e belo\;,pP«35$ff; 119. The spirit. p.15 342 „ 12 C. The Idci» cf vCkl«P»304s see also quotations above, p.
250. 
is held to be so indispensable to God,but rather some
object of creative activity* In this end similar idealis­ 
tic writings the phrase 'the vjorld' in this reference 
should bo replaced by '& world',and the latter terra 
should be understood in the general terms Ju&t suggested. 
But it uust be confessed that Professor Pringle-fa^tison's 
meaning,like that of e true Hegelian, is seldom clear on 
this point; constantly we are left under the impression 
that it is our world,indeed we ourselves, without whom God 
would not bo God. In f&ct it is maintained that from all 
eternity there must have been not merely a 'world 1 but 
rational spirits like ourselves; and this inveterate 
Hegelain prepossession achieves the zenith of its absurdity 
when we arc directed,not once but several times, to assume
"such larger intelligences existing now in worlds beyond
121
our ken'1 . e\i» own view may be summarised in two state­ 
ments. While the conception of God'a nature as inherently 
creative would sugge st that he could hardly be without some 
object for his creative activity, it does not justify us 
in assuming that that object luiist be of such a character 
that the term 'world 1 would properly apply to it. And while* 
there is no ground to deny the existence of conscious finite 
spirits elsewhere within the creation, there is not the 
slightest positive evidence for affirming their existence. 
It is pure guess-work. Here, if anywhere, we confront a 
departure from the emplricol evidence to which Professor 
Prlngle-Pattison is resolved to be faithful—one of those 
The Idea of God.p.175,
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illegitimate flights of specula wive imagination which
122 
he IB elsewhere concerned to discourage • The appro­
priate objective of theistio inquiry is to discover 
much as may positively be known of the divine nature from 
the very merger evidence available to finite spirits* 
But when it is tempted to pass on to declare negations 
and limitations upon the divine possibilities— as that 
Cod could not exist without the world or without finite 
spirits-speculation is venturing into territory where it 
inay well preserve a discreet silence.
This consnent touches upon only ono f though the 
principal, source of difficulty in Professor Pringle- 
Pattison's interpretation of 'transcendence 1 . That it 
is possibl3 to develop a far more adequate doctrine of 
'transcendence 1 while fully conserving the f inmianental' 
interests so close to his concern is demonstrated in a
statement by one of Professor Pringle-Pattison's pupils
123 
to which reference may be strongly recooaended.
The Absolute and 3. So Intricate and so important are the idsues 
Finite Spirits, involved in the problem of the relations of finite
spirits and the absolute that it furnished the topic for 
a symposium of the Aristotelian Society in Joint session
with the British Psychological Society and the ^iad Associ«
124 
at ion in June 1918 . The terms of the discussion were
determined by certain passages in The Idea of God; and 
Professor Pr ingle-Pa tti son appeared as respondent to
Professor Bosanquet who opened the symposium. The various 
iaa . ^lyc Idea of^ Clod , p . 157 , f o r uxriaplc « 
12 T6 , C- . F • Eeu' o - ^ir , "/lie :ifolcnl _* • '!v>.rgtio_h to i'holgLi, pp . 82 ff . 
124. LT-'ocet^dliv:^ ol the Aristotelian ^ociQty^Vol
Life and Finite IndiVidutill by.
phases of the question are there given full treatment, 
To enter the problem \;itb oven a meager meabure of 
thoroughness would carry ue far beyond the scope of cur 
study* Our judgment on Professor Pringle-Pattison' s 
handling of it has been indicted in our conclusion on 
the larger issue. In portions of his discussion of the 
status of finite individuals their identity appears so 
completely merged in the all-engulfing reality of the 
Absolute that their freedom, else where so carefully 
safeguarded, seecisjto be sacrificed. But this is not the
prevailing impression icade by his treatment; it is clear
[to] 
that his leaper concern is/preserve the identity of both
125 
God and man.
The Problem of 4. It is increasingly recognised,! think, that
the problem of ti,me has become the central issue in con-
126 
temporary philosophy. Professor Pringls-Pattison
127 
wrestles earnestly with it in a chapter considered by
Professor Mackintosh possibly "the most masterly and sus­
tained example of purely philosophical reasoning" his
128 
Gifford lectures contain . His conclusion, as we have
noted, is the suggestion that the experience of the Absolute
129 
"includes time but somehow transcends it" . More speci­
fically he proposes to displace the familiar three-dimen­
sional view of time — as past, present and future— by thopp. 215-221.
125. Gee quotations above,p.a43 .Cp. Hegelian! sin & Personality
126. H is so regarded, for example ,»by Professor v/hitehead.
127. "Time arid Eternity", The Ideti of ivod* .Lecture 
see Buacuary above ,pp.
129. x'he Idea cf ^ od,p.CX-v.See above, p.
353. 
conception of a single intuitive grasp of the span of
time in which past,present and future are caught into 
an instantaneous whole. Time as it enters into the exper­ 
ience of the Absolute is,apparently,a one-dimensional 
eternal present. This is, I think we may say,the quite 
usual view not only of absolute idealists but among 
orthodox theists generally. It is closely akin to the
s
conclusion to which Professor Sorley is led from quite
130 
different premisses. Furthermore,as Professor Pringle-
Pattlson urges,there are certain not unfamiliar human 
experiences,in artistic appreciation and creative endeavor 
as well as in dreams and contemplation, in which a span 
of time is caught into an instantaneous experience,which 
seem to T include tine but somehow transcend it v . These 
experiences might promise a faint suggestion off what such 
an absolute experience might be like. In the face of so 
weighty a bo^y of opinion,it may appear presumptuous to
question tho validity of this interpretation . But in the
131 
sequel we shall find it necessary to do so. Suffice it
here t* urge that,so to conceive the divine knowledge,and 
to make earnest with the conception,is to negate the reality 
of human freedom. The difference between the human parallels 
of artistic or contemplative comprehension and the alleged 
divine foreknowledge is a crucial one—human insight is 
always of an artistic whole,or of past time,or of the 
future only as an imaginative forecast; but the assumed 
divine wisdom is foreknowledge—certainty of the future
130. Moral Values and the Idea of ^od.pp.464ff . See atoove,
P»145,
131. See below,p.386*
behavior of supposedly free finite creatures. To be sure 
the dramatist envisions his play in its entirety including 
the words and actions of the actors; but the vindication 
of his foresight by the sequel hangs on the degree to which 
the actors are automata, reproducing his plan for them with 
meticulous accuracy. One bad actor spoils the play. Arid this 
mortal drama of ours is, unhappily, a 11 too dotted with bad 
actors, A favorite escape from the dilemma is to suggest that<;
a future which from our perspective is genuinely unpredic­ 
table is, from the greater perspective of the divine, clearly 
foreknown. But this is to apply to the divine perspective
we cannot conceive; and its final outcome
is always to reduce human freedom to a mere appearance of
131a 
phenomenal experience, without genuine reality. There seems
no way for our feeble human powers of understanding to es­ 
cape the conclusion:— if man be in limited measure the 
determiner of his own decisions and his own future so that 
his future is to him unpredic table , then that future must
• r-1 ~\ "-iO I
be thou{£it of as J in some degree unknowable by the divine 
mind conceived as it lies within our power to imagine it, 
This is not to deny the possibility of divine foreknowledge*;- 
it is to deny the possibility of our conceiving it while 
still safeguarding our conviction of manf s freedom. We 
may, if we choose, assert divine foreknowledge; but it is 
a formal and empty predicate without concrete meaning for 
ua» It is an effort to interpret the nature of the divine 
in terms drawn from beyond the range of that which we
have power to know, our own experience of reality; and
131a. On a further difficulty with this conception of time
Ss it affects GUI thought cf hi story, see H.R.ll
ackin- 
osh f op.ci t, , pp,2VOff ,
this is precisely the procedure which Professor Pringle- 
Pattlson was determined to abjure.
We have suggested more than once that the weak* 
nesses in Professor Prlngle-Battison 1 s position spring 
from a too great servitude to a Hegelian typo of absolu­ 
tism. From another angle,they may be said to arise when­ 
ever he deserts his own fundamental principle of inter­ 
pretation—the reading of the divine from the highest 
human experience. One flagrant instance of that departure 
occurs in his rejection of James 1 vigorous insistence that
life is" a real fight in which something is eternally gained
1r/>*? Ofc.
for the universe by success'1 . He replies,"But can we 
hope to find in the characteristics of our om practical
activity a description in ultimate tsrms of the fundamental
133 
nature of the universe?" One would have thought that
that was an accurate definition of his own method. Had he 
not said earlier," In the conditions of the highest human
life we have access t as nowhere else,to the inmost nature
134
of the divine" ? And again,at the very end, "The revela­ 
tion of the infinite in the finite is the eternal fact of
135 
the universe" .It should be noted that in justification
of his divergence from James f he makes his appeal to the 
confirming insight of religious experience. "The victory
for which morality fights is for religion already,or rather
136 
eternally,won." This may be,but it comes dangerously
near a form of' \7ords without meaning. For ourselves, we
132. William James.The V/ill To Believe.fr.61
133. Tfre Idea of God.p.595.
134„ Op.cit,,p.l57,
135. Op,oit.,p.4:14.
136. op.cit« 9 p«396.
are inclined to regard his fundamental principle of inter­ 
pretation which informs and inspires his ^hole work as the 
truer wisdomfand any departure from it as of doubtful 
validity.
Summary. But it would be most unfair to conclude our study
of Professor Pringle-Pattison on a note so negative and 
critical, rhe aspects of his thought which we,following 
others,have felt obliged to criticise are 9 for the most
part,subordinate strands. In each instance they are
137 
balanced by other and sounder insights. Reconciliation
of the two strains of conviction is not always easy;some­ 
times it appears definitely impossible* But ,where apparent 
inconsistency occurs, the strand of thought which has 
seemed to us the truer will always be discovered to take 
its place in an inclusive and coherent pattern* This 
larger pattern we would fain recognise as the substance of 
the writer's inmost certainty. For,in its entirety,it is 
one of the loftiest and most moving visions of God which 
it has been given to a modern mind to conceive.
137. On this point,see the careful comparison of ultimately 
irreconcilable strains of thought on the relation of 
God and the Absolute,and on the problem of time in
H.R.Mackintosh,3ome Aspects of Christian Thoufjit.pTj*———— *
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TOW/.RD A CONSTRUCTIVE THEISM
The Method of
the Summary*
A0 we approach the task of final suinmary and con* 
elusion, two alternative methods lie open for our choice* 
The first would again review the ground which has been 
surveyed, comparing and contrasting the views of the four 
contemporary thinkers who together with Kant have furnished 
the material of the enquiry, especially in the light of the 
four questions which huve been used e loose connecting
threads in our critical appraisal. From such R comparative 
review certain general conclusions might be expected to 
emerge* The alternative method would proceed at once to 
suggest the main lines of & constructive conclusion in 
which would be embodied our own response to the contrasted 
view-points discovered in the body of the paper. The 
second method has besn selected HS promising a less tedious 
reading and a more fruitful outcome* Our more important 
conclusions have already emerged in the course of the 
critical discussion; we may therefore present them here in
summary outline, indicating points of contact with the
1
theisms surveyed as we proceed,
-«j—«—•
1, It had been originally intended to present a fairly full 
theistio argument at this point. Considerations of 
sequence as well as of length have counselled its omissio 13 
in favour of this brief summary. The longer stateirent will 
appear in a small volume to be published in the autumn 
under the title -The Plain Man Seeks for God. 
The outline which follows has not hesitated to incor-











Our interpretation of the setting of the 
contemporary theis tic problem and our analysis of its 
causes coincide alfcost exactly with those of Professor 
Pringle-Pattison. « recognise the determinative 
influence of Kant upon all subsequent philosophical and 
theological development. And we trace the sterility and 
scepticism which have infected recent theology to his 
mistaken divorce of phenomenal experience from ultimate 
reality. In the period since Kant, his dualism has been 
increasingly reinterpreted as the contrast between a 
•realm of facts' and a 'realm of values'* The reality 
of the first is certain; the reality of the second is 
matter of dispute. Concerning the 'realm of facts' science 
gives us truth; metaphysics and theology speculate con­ 
cerning the hypothetical 'realm of values'. The findings of 
science have been conceded an increasing authority; the 
conclusions of philosophy and theology have been received 
with increasing scepticism. This scepticism has been 
heightened by a philosophy of science which, until very
recent years, WKS at its worst materialistic, and at its
1 
best agnostic*
Vie follow Professor Pr ingle-Pa tti son also as to the
2 first steps in the development of a constructive position.
A way out of the dilemma just stated is to be found, in the
4» «•» *a»^4»
1. The foregoing anaVsis has been developed at greater 
length in Chapter One above; the fuller statement need 
not be repeated here*
2. The position here outlined so closely parallels
359,
first instance,not by rejecting the findings of science 
but by subjecting them to a more acute analysis and then 
embodying them in a more valid interpretation. This inter­ 
pretation will follow the lines of the theory of emergent 
or creative evolution. Nature presents us with a number of 
distinct types of reality* These types are seen to consti­ 
tute a hierarchy of levels, forming an ascending scale in 
terms of increasing complexity and comprehensiveness end 
significance. Each higher level embraces the lower levels 
which antedate it in the cosmic history, from which it 
emerges, and upon which it is dependent for its existence. 
The lowest level known to us is that of the physical- 
chemical basis of matter, which materialism would make nor­ 
mative for its interpretation of reality as a whole. The 
highest level within our ken is that of a certain quality 
within human personality, which may be referred to as 
•spirit', marked by a recognition of, a worship of, and a 
devotion to values —the quality which religion would raake
that of Professor Pringle-Pattison that a natural infer­ 
ence would regard it as a reproduction of his. It seems 
only fair to state that, as far as I am aware, it has 
been reached on entirely Independent grounds. I had read 
The Idea of God ten years ago but do not recall being 
impressed by its teaching on these points. Chapter One 
and Chapter Ei$it of this paper had been completed in 
preliminary draft before returning to Professor Pringle- 
Pattison*s thought for intensive study. I have been 
amazed at the extent of coincidence between these conclu­ 
sions and his. I had been led to this reading of the 
problem of contemporary theism by a critical examination 
of Kant, and of modern theology; and to this interpre­ 
tation of science by a study of some or the eminent 
scientists, especially Professors Lloyd Mojtan,Alexander, 
and J,S. Haldane, ^
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normative for Its interpretation of reality as a whole. 
The historic development of this hierarchy in the time*- 
process appears to have traced a course exactly parallel 
to the normative scale of levels; level after level has 
emerged from or supervened upon those lower than itself in 
the scale* It h*s been a process marked throughout by 
twin features—continuity from lowest to highest and the 
emergence of genuinely new types of reality* It has been a 
process which has achieved its summit thus far in the moat 
nearly perfect human spirit* Such an Interpretation of 
Nature discovers evidence of the reality of God at two 
points* It points to an 'order* or 'structure 1 behind the 
space - time world as we know it, and to the interplay 
within that structure of unchanging 'laws* and ever-ohang» 
ing brute 'stuff by which our living, growing universe is 
made possiblegand it points to a developing process occar­ 
ting within time through which ever higher and higher levels 
of reality are achieved - the process we call evolution* 
The underlying structure of Nature which has rendered such 
a world and such a process possible can be accounted for 
only as grounded in an ultimate Power and Mind* And the 
procesB Itself^ereloplng ever higher and more significant 
types of phenomenal existences, suggests the iiomanent 
realisation of the Purpose of its Ground* Further, it would 
seem reasonable to seek in the highest, the most climactic 
term of an advancing process clearest li^ht on its immanent 
Purpose and the character of its Purposer.





with which experience confronts us within Its view; but 
It finally brings attention sharply to focus upon nan's 
awareness of Yalues as the supreme type of reality and 
therefore the best key to the meaning of the whole* Thus 
far our reasoning has olosely paralleled that of Professor 
Pringle-Pattison. From this point the argument may well take 
the form of a philosophy of Yalues. It should begin with a 
discrimination of the kinds of intrinsic ralue. Here we 
would concur with Professor Sorlay in recognising the quasi- 
autonomy but final interrelatedness and harmony of the 
three classic forms of ultimate value—Truth, Goodness and 
Beauty* And in olauding for moral or ethical Yalues a 
measure of primacy. But we would wish to modify Professor 
Sorley's statement by aiming to build the theistlo argument 
from the experience not of moral values alone but of all 
three kinds of value* And a well-rounded treatment would 
need to face the further question of the status of the 
religious Object within the order of values. Is religious 
experienee a fourth distinct type of value-experience to be 
differentiated from and classified as superior to the three 
recognised forms of value-experience, or is it merely a 
variant of the experience of truth, or of beauty, or of
goodness? Our judgment favors the first of these alterna-
8 
tlves, but we do not offer evidence in its support*
5.In the theory of value , the two problems which seem most 
in need of further exploration at the present time concern 
(A) the relations and relative significance of the three 
traditional types of ultimate value; and (B) the status 
of religion within the experience of values. In (A) the 
principal question is, What is the character of the prim­ 




The reasoning from the experience of values to God 
nay well follow the course traced by Professor Sorley in 
his carefully and closely reasoned argument from moral 
values, supported by certain supplementary considerations 
urged by Professors Taylor and Pringle-Pattison. It will open 
with a vindication of the objectivity of values* Evidence in 
proof of their objectivity will bo presented from three 
distinct but complementary sources - from the nature of 
values; from the implications of man's moral experience; 
and from the fact of a moral order.
(1) Judtpnents of value assume the objective reality of 
their objects. livery value-Jugdment claim* objective validity 
independent of the Judging subject} it always pertains not to 
a feeling or attitude of the subject, but to an actual fact 
about an object or an objective relationship. Further, the 
notion of value always refers to something ^hlch actually 
exists or ought to exist. Again value- Judgments make their 
reference not; to an abstract quality, but to a concrete ex­ 
pression of ttefc ciU£ility;but while value is always discovered
it
in the particular,the individual, yet/always implies a 
universal. Moreover ,-ralue Judgments claim objective universal­ 
ity since they assume that f all who Judge correctly must 
<»«•»•»•»••
best work on the problem has been done by John Laird in The 
Idea of Ya^ue and by V..M. Urban in rhe Intelligible World and 
in his article 'Theory of Value n in Encyclopeaia BiTttanioa, 
14th ii4ition§ Vol.S2 t pp,961ff»(See also J.3. lackenzie's admir- 
able little book Ultimate Values.and his more recent Cosmic 
Problems* and ^.CUlihrerott's roral Values.) But no clear 
agreement has thus far been achieved and much fundamental 
worK still awaits attention, i.'ith regard to (B),the main 
question is,Doee religious experience apprehend a distinct 
type of value t or merely one or more of the familiar triad in 
a particular way?Put otherwise,is religion a unique form of value-experience,or •imply intrinsic value-experience under 
a slightly modified perspeotive?No answer is here attempted.
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'find the same value in any given situation*. Onoe more 
through their prosenoe in the consciousness of persons and 
their influence upon persons, values are actually efficient 
factors in the existent world;and the ascription of value 
always implies a reference, more or less explicit,to 
personal activity as the originator and the appreoiator of 
that which is valued. Finally, values involve an appeal 
to an assumed ideal Order of Values* No single good can to 
confidently determined except with reference to a Chief Good, 
an organic system of values, a realm of ends which shall 
embrace both general principles and concrete experiences, 
both the actual order and the ideal order, and unite them in 
a harmonious whole* Therefore every value-judgment carries 
reference to a Realm of Values which obviously does not 
possess full existence within the world as we know it and may 
never do so* It is an appeal to an assumed system of values.
It is thus apparent that values 'intend* reference 
to objective reality,to existent reality,and to personal 
agency, /aid they are related to reality in at least two ways; 
1) they are vitally effective influences upon the actual 
lives of men and women who are themselves manifestations of 
reality within the time-process; and 2) they are not depend^ 
ent for their validity upon residence within human minds but 
assume a Realm of Values which pertains not to the world as it 
actually is but rather to the world as it should be. Values, 
therefore, are constitutive at once of reality as an existing
964.
system and of ultimate reality* Indeed they appear to be a 
point of oontaot between the world*process as we experience 
it and ultimate reality* They suggest a principle of 
interpretation for the relation between these two apparent­ 
ly disparate realms—the order of Nature and the order of 
Values*
Lastly, values come to man as though from a living 
objective reality, and with an imperative claim upon his 
affection, his loyalty, his allegiance, to which all that 
marks him as man makes instinctive response* Indeed in 
their more delicate manifestations, they seem to speak to 
him as though with the voice of a person-yes, a voice of 
Love,
(8) The consciousness of the categorical imperative, 
of the insistent claims of the moral law upon men's 
allegiance, is one of the most indisputable 'given* facts 
of human experience* & careful examination of this sense 
t) Conscienceof 'oughtness* will reveal clearly that the ultimate
ground of obligation cannot be located in any human consid­ 
erations, even •# the good of society* It is Independent 
of all temporal consequences; it point c to a supernatural 
sanction. Moreover it is always a sense of obligation not to 
a relative good but to an absolute good* That absolute good 
is but slowly revealed to us and apprehended by ue as we 
grow in moral grtce. It for ever etlra within us a restless 
dissatisfaction with wn&tever meagre moral achievement 






well as to our obedience brings the added suggestion 
that the claim of the moral ideal upon us springs from 
a living and intelligent moral Will* On the other hand, 
we would not feel an adequate motivation to serve the 
moral law did it not speak to us with the voice of one 
who is Redeemer as well as Judge. And this * intention of 
the soul* toward a Person rather than a law becomes most 
apparent in the consciousness of moral failure and guilt— 
precisely those characteristics of the moral life which 
most clearly distinguish man from the sub-human levels and 
mark him as man. For in its deepest and truest instinct, 
the sense of sin is always felt,not as the violation of a 
wise regulation, but as an offense against a supremely 
worshipful Person* Thus it is clear that the awareness of 
moral obligation in its various aspects presupposes not 
merely an objective sanction,but a personal spiritual Source. 
b)Aspiration. But conscience represents only one side of our
moral experience | there is a positive obverse of the 
sense of moral obligation. Our moral aspirations are for* 
ever pointing us beyond any goal achievable within human 
experience; they seem to be directed toward an immortal 
and eternal good. Indeed it is a characteristic of the 
moral life that,while it develops within the flux of 
temporal events , it is dependent for its fulfillment upon 
a perfect and absolute good which is never to be found 
within the .time sequence. It is marked by a restlessness, 
an unsatisfied idealism, an inherent 'nostalgia for a 
Beyond 1 . Now,man would never aspire to an ideal quite
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beyond his reach had he not been touched by that ideal 
in very faott in actuality* His aspiration is response 
to aucU an initiative from the side of the ideal* More* 
over he sees that ideal as in some sense part of hicself, 
but or his potential self~~of himself as he may become. 
Here we confront God both immanent and transcendent— 
immanent as the ideal already in seme measure within the 
human self, transcendent as the ideal forever beyond the 
realisation of the self and summoning it to ever higher 
endeavour.
Thus we see that,in its every aspect,the moral
N
consciousness points beyond itself to a supernatural 
objective reality as the grounds of its sanction and 
the guarantor of its fulfilment. In its rich and 
manifold nature it has been discovered to be one of the 
indisputable facts of life* As such,wo must conceive it 
to have a cause adequate to its richest expression* On 
no account can the rise f the astounding development and 
the mature flowering of man's moral nature be explained 
in terms of 'natural selection' or some other purely 
naturalistic instrumentality. It must have developed 
under the influence of a power not less but greater than 
itself.an infinite moral will,i.e., God. We are therefore 
poi&ted to the conclusion that the various features of 
moral experience suggested owe their existence to the
impact of a transcendent ground of absolute and perfect
that 
value which has caused them; and .they are justified in—A
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the expectation of an eternal continuance in which 
aspiration after the ideal may achieve its t>oal, the yet 
unattained be realised, tincl the deepest yearnings of the 
soul find their appointed home and their perfset 
companionship.
3) The Loral (3) The facts of the individual moral consciousness, 
Order. important as they ar«| are noc the only data of a dis­ 
tinctively morel kind i&ich warrant metaphysical con­ 
clusions, vi'e have at our dieposol evidence of a far more 
objective and empirical character* Conscience believes 
itself commanded by an ultimate rnoral law. But that law 
finds concrete embodiment in fact, in the structure of the 
world itself which surrounds human life and forever reminds 
It of the essentially moral framework v/lthin which it is 
set. 'Virtue does not always meet with its due reward » 
nor vice with its due punisluient in any obvious outward
shape... »3ut internal moral lawsjof an essentially
in 3a 
retributive nature are JLncescant operation*; and they
show all too clearly what i& the judgment of the universe 
on both character and conduct. For individual,for 
nation, and for race,the wages of sin is death. As we 
suggest a little later, human freedom to follow the 
dictates of desire is real, but it moves within fixed and 
rigorous limits which represent the moral structure of the 
universe. A too great disregard of that structure brings 
Its inevitable penalty. 
3a. Robert Flint,Theism,pp.327-229.
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The Status of 
Tallies in the 
lorld-Prooese.
Likewise history ae well as personal experience 
affords abundant evidence of the; reali ty of the morel 
law. 'The laws of morality ure conditions of the 
progresG,and oven of the existence, of society. . ..If we 
examine history as a whole we cannot but recognise that 
it has been in the main a process of moral progress, of 
moral growth. ...Oft: r*ce does on the whole advance in the
path towards good.... Tile testimony \thich moral progress
3b
involves as to the moral character of God is certain*.
Thus we are led to recognise two indications of the 
objective character of fhe moral order — the chastening and
moralising influence of the vjorld upon perconal character
oc
aiul the evidence of jnoral advance in world history.*
And we are also brought to another, arid to us the 
most important *evi dene e of the objective status of 
values — namely, their appearance at the highest level of 
a continuous but hierarchical cosmic development. 
Further they appear there not simply as Isolated values 
but as constituting a system or order or realm of values. 
Therefore the * realm of valties 1 is organic to, and the 
climax of f a cosmic process which has its structural base 
in the joaterial order of the 'realm of facts 1 . Thus the 
organic intorrelatedneas and true relevance of the two 
orders rahioh Kant and his successors sought to sever from 
each othor is discovered. And, if the cosnic process as a 
whole be regarded as objective, then objectivity muet be 
predicated of those factors in which the process culminate 8*
oo.Tne roregoing argument for the objectivity of Values is largely a oondensed summar of earlry of rlier sections.
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Moreover,if it is sound procedure to seek the key to the 
cosmic history in its highest emergent term, then the 
Reality which is the ground and source of the history 
should be pictured in terms of the supreme values—as 
the Constitutor of truth, the Guardian of goodness,and 
the altogether lovely One*
The Conception of From these conclusions the conception of God may 
God Suggested be more specifically developed* Values point to a Being 
By Values. whose nature is personal, whose purpose is two-fold—
the perfecting of individual human personality,and the 
gradual realisation on earth of a perfect Realm of 
Values—,who is truly represented as standing at the 
door of human life knocking, calling men to make the 
supreme values their concern and their delight,and to 
take his purposes as their own and so to become fellow 
creators with him of a Commonwealth of Love* He is to be 
thought ofjas a per son. because it is only to and in and 
through persons that values have reality within our 
world. He is to be thought of as the Sharer of our hopes, 
and our ideals and the Participant in our life*8 struggle, 
because it is through our world's travail that his Purpose 
is achieving fulfilment, and it is toward a oorranonwealth 
of incarnate Ideals and perfected hopes that that purpose 
forever reaches. He is to be thought of as a Spirit of 
Love,because it is in love that ideals and values best 
make their appeal to our human spirits,it is by the 




laziness and cowardice In men's hearts,it is to lore 
alone that the human spirit makes its supreme dedication 
and through the response of lore that it finds a final 
fulfilment. He is to be thought of as the supreme 
Saorlfleant,because it Is through no aloof perfection 
that values achieve their incarnation in our world 1 s life, 
but through pain and loss unmerited and unexpected; and 
it is through these that failure is made good , disgrace 
redeemed and wrong atoned. It is only in the comradeship 
of vicarious devotion and ingratitude for vicarious 
sacrifice that the promise and hope and purpose of God 
within us may be made perfect.
To this point the argument has been induetire in 
character; we have tried whether by searching we might 
find out God* And it has sou&it to press its way along a 
single line of advance; we have followed Professor Pringle 
-Pattison in tracing a course through Nature to values, 
and then Professor Sorley in a further step from values to 
God* But we i uat now meet a two-fold query which comes to 
us from the thought of Professor Taylor or,more accurately 
from that of the late Baron Von Hugel through Professor 
Taylor. We have repeatedly urged that the inductive type of 
argument as employed by Nineteenth Century apologists 
failed, partly because It seldom carried men through to a 
living experience of God, but principally because it 
approached the whole task of apologetics wrong-end-to. It 
assumed the perspective of an earnest intellectual inquirer
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seeking to reassure his mind of the validity of a 
hypothesis* As we have said earlier, 'God becomes the
last term of an arduous and technical intellectual Inquiry
4
instead of the first fact of a vital religious experience? 
We must now face the question whether our own procedure, 
pursued in deference to prevailing canons of thought, has
not been ill-chosen*
But further reflection will Indicate,! think, that the
conception of reality which we have attributed to 
Professor Taylor is essentially harmonious with that of 
our own conclusion thus far t except that it is held from 
a different and truer perspective* We have conducted an
inductive argument from our familiar experience of the
more phenomneal world through our more obscure but.significant
experiences of value to the reality of God;but the 
argument has concluded with a conception of a realm of 
transcendent and eternal values. The alternative view 
would,so to speak, pursue the enquiry the other end to.. 
As we have said earlier,"It is the initial assumption of 
that perspective that in man's every contact wlthnreality, 
whether with Nature through eense-experience or with 
beauty through appreciation or with a divine Comforter 
through personal communion, he is in immediate contact 
with the Supernatural, with the living and active God. To
put the matter more accurately, it is assumed that man's•*«•••«•«•
4. See above * page 7»
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"awareness of reality and his desire to comprehend it is 
interpretable only as his response to the prior movement 
of the living divine spirit upon him. ...The first datum of 
all reflection as it Is assuredly the first faot of all 
experience Is the indubitable existence of that most 
certainly reel, most incomprehensibly mysterious, most 
persistently alluring Reality which Is the prius of all 
knowledge as of all human existence* The achievement of 
knowledge becones the painstaking,ever baffled but ever 
persistent,ever incomplete but ever more nearly complete, 
effort to discern and define the features of that Reality?
— •-•»
If the two views are put together,it will be seen that 
the final outcome of our enquiry is the recognition of a 
double fact- a transcendent and eternal Reality whose 
nature is glimpsed through the Order of Values and who is 
at once the primal fact in the universe and the prior 
ground of all our experience; and a cosmic process 
developing within the time -or .lei* toward a final consum­ 
mation which would be,In effect, the reproduction of the 
eternal order of values within the temporal world* 
In brief we have bean brought face to face with the 
reality of the transcendent God, and the immanent out­ 
working of his purpose within history.




But it is well, before leaving this point, 
to re-emphasise onoe more the practical limita­ 
tions of the inductive approach* It is not thus 
that the spiritual pathfinders of mankind and the 
race itself in the periods of its highest illumina­ 
tion have become certain of God. Certainty of Crod 
has been not so much a conclusion of a chain of reas­ 
oning as an awakening to the deeper significance of 
familiar experience* Its mood has been not Inquiry, 
but receptivity* Its outcome has been not a discovery 
by the mind but rather the obeisance of the whole 
spirit. Further t the avenues of commerce between the 
divine and ourselves are not one, but many. More 
important, the traffic of those avenues moves less 
as an upward yearning toward an obscure and impassive 
goal, than as the encompassing constraint of a freely 
given Presence. God touches our lives through 
Nature in sense-experience—as Order, as Law, as 
Power v as Mind, as Purpose. God touches our lives 
through every variant of the experience of the highest- 
through the structure of truth as Fidelity, through 
the gift of beauty as Loveliness, through the ideal of 
purity as Holiness, through the claim of the right as 
Excellence, through the grace of human comradeship as 
Love. And God touches our lives more immediately, 
more imperiously, more intimately through personal
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commerce—as Companion and as Crltlo and as 
Deliverer. It is not by seeking that we find out God, 
but in living that we are found of him. Certainty of 
G-od io less the achieving of a conviction of the
divine, than a welcome of the coercion of the
4b 
divine.
The Bafflement Finally we recognisa that this certainty, 
of Evil, even when it is truly c sne by, ia hold in the teeth
of often almost overpowering difficulty. We confront 
the baffleiaent of evil. Here our thought makes 
contact with that of Professor Baillle. We cannot 
agree with him tbat religious faith arises primarily, 
or even characteristically, in harrowing perplexity 
or e£ the frustration of life's hopes* We return 
again to the teotiioony from religion in childhood, 
the childhood of the race and of the individual. And 
we must insist that to the mature soul as well the 
divine may ooroe through every avenue of high exper­ 
ience, no less through fulfilment than through 
defeat, no less In laughter than in struggle* But 
we do agree with Professor Baillie that religious 
faith maintains itself moat triumphantly in the 
faoe of adversity,
T/e believe that reflection nay oast much light 
on the problem of evil, showing that the greater 
portion of it is due directly or indirectly to nan's
failure somev«here,but there will always remain an
. in this connection,see Professor H.H.Farmer*s
irable little book.Experience of God.espeo, pter £•
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unexplained residuum to baffle the ninds end harrow 
the souls of the more sensitive spirits. For that 
reason we here renture no justification of the fact 
of evil, but peas at onoe to confront what we 
believe to be the heart of the problem,
As we contemplate evil and seek to understand 
it, we are immediately arrested by a trao-fold 
paradox which stands at the vory heart of the problem; 
it is these paradoxes T&ich constitute the most 
significant facts about evil* First* while reflection 
oan explain in general terms the presence of evil, 
pointing to its inevitalOity in a world ushere the 
triumph of good we.its upon the free devotion of nenj 
it can never justify the incidence of evil upon 
individual lives, showing why this and that person 
should endure undeserved tragedy; but—it is 
precisely in the individual life and nowhere else 
that evil exists as a living problem, not of 
speculation but of intense personal experience. 
Reflection fails just where it is most needed, 
Seoondt it is tJxe facts of evil which create faith f s 
most harrowi^ difficulties; but-*it is precisely 
in circuwstdiices of unreasonable adversity when 
reflection is of least avail that faith rises in 
supreue triumph, ^Vhen faith should be put to 
confusion, fcen is it most secure. It is the 
extraordinary character of these paradoxes which
576,
lends weight to I^ofeeeor Baillie's interpretation of 
religion wholly In tenne of faith's defiance of Nature 
and of fate* For it is in the throes of these 
paradoxes that religion most characteristically 
defies logic and cowardice and caution with its 
cry, "Though he slay we, yet will I trust him!" 
For this reason the evidence here has unique 
Importance. And the witness of that evidence is that f 
in the hour when the soul finds itself most oppressed 
by life*s injustice or mankind's cruelty or fate's 
frus tret ion, it finds strength p:iven to It from a 
Companionship which does not explain but confirms* 
Then is It most sure of Ood. Here is the ever- 
present reminder that religious faith, if not 
irrational, is Inherently more-than»ratlonal. For 
its iwst persuasive corjrjendation to those who have 
never experienced it, religion relies upon the 
TTltncss of the inner life of those who in its 
strength have triumphed. But for the ultiioate 
interior confirmation tfhlch alone can render its 
certainties fully secure, religion must wait upon 
each man's venture of faith through which the 










What further implications follow from the conception 
of Oo«i in whioh such an interpretation would issue ?, 
it way be isked, Here we B*>y indicate our conclusions 
in a series of propositions, bearing in mind especially 
the perplexities in the ordinary layman's thought of
Sod which furnished the burden of our concern in the
5
opening chapter*
1* Of first importance is the recognition that, 
Just as we think of the Reality made known to us in 
our rich varied human experience in terms of levels 
or types of reality, so the relationship of God to eafc 
type and to us through each type nust be conceived 
differently. Reality as we know it is a unity, 
but it is not all of a piece. Moreover we 
not simply two sharply contrasted types of
5*See,especlally}pp,2-14*
In this and the preceding sections, the sources which have been most heavily drawn upon, in addition to the 
works examined above, have been:-
In the Interpretationof Nature*- the writings of Profs. Thomson, Whltehe ad ,Eddington, Jeans , Lloyd. Morgan, Haldane, and Alexander, especially C.Lloyd Morgan •Emergent gyol** ution and Life.^ind and Spiritj and J,S,IIaldane« The Sciences and ^hllosoph* Also B ,H .Streeter , Reality;and C *E .Raven, The Crae tor Spirit •
In the Interpretation of Values—the writings of Prof*
W;E. Hooking and the books listed on p.362n.
On the conception of The Divine Constraint^- the writingsof the late Baron Von Hugel; of Prof* II. R. Mackintosh;
and H>H«Farmer Experience of Gpd*
On the oonoeption of God— v»\H,il Sat thews. God in ChristianThought and Experience, especially* Also \ r , A. Brown,Beliefs That MM tter *e to •
See fuller bibliographical references at end of chapter*
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reality,as in the familiar dualisms of matter and mind,
or of facts and values. Reality presents itself to us in 
experience in a number of different forms ,each exhibiting 
distinctive characteristics, no one fully resolvable into 
any of the others; these different forms may be viewed as 
a graded heierarohy of ascending complexity and signifi- 
camce. This is the pith of the doctrine of levels or emer­ 
gent evolution. And,Just as we change our practice when 
the type of reality with which we are dealing changes, so 
should we change our thought of God in his relationship to 
different orders of reality. It is as false to reduce God's 
ways of dealing with his creation to a single uniform prin­ 
ciple as it is to try to reduce the rich stuff of that 
creation to a single basic factor. This conclusion should 
be our first guide in our thought of God.
Observe how the recognition of this principle will 
affect our attitude on the difficult problems of prayer. 
(And we have agreed,be it remembered, that 'men's working
belief in prayer is,generally speaking,the most sensitive
6
touchstone of vital personal religion'.) What may be expec­ 
ted from God through prayer will be determined in part by 
the type of reality with which our prayers are concerned. 
I should expect God to act toward and through the phenomena 
of matter according to the dependable and uniform laws of 
the material realm and within the limitations Implicit in 
a fixed and immutable order. But I should expect him to 
deal with and through bodies in terms of the living, 
growing, variable,organic structures which distinguish life, 
6.Sge above,p.4.
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And I should expect his traffic with human minds to
proceed after the manner of those far more delicate and 
unanalysable ways by which one human spirit communicates 
with and influences another. In response to my prayer, 
I should not expect God to mend a broken table as he 
might heal a broken limb. And I should not expect him 
to stop bacilli from spreading disease as I shoulqhope 
he might influence men from spreading the plague of war. 
If I Jump from a window I should hardly esxpect him to sus­ 
pend the law of gravitation in my behalf, however imperious 
my petition. But,if I am ill, I might not; be deceived in
the hope that he would bring powers of healing not fully
i 
available through my own body s strength or the skill of
others. If I seek light on a puzzling decision,or truth 
in a difficult problem,or courage for a tedious task,am 
I altogether mistaken in the hope that he might bring the 
needed aid—at least along the lines and to the degree 
which might be expected from a wise and kindly human com­ 
rade? And,when my prayer moves on to those yet higher 
levels where its desire is no longer for things of for 
specific gifts of strength but rather for those fuller and 
more ultimate communions for which every spirit in its 
higher aspiration longs, shall I not expect that there may 
come a gift of comradeship as certain,as ennobling,as 
satisfying as human fellowships at their richest may offer— 
and more, in the ratio of God's love to a f riendf s love?
We a.re traversing admittedly precarious ground; no 
two minds will find easy agreement. Our concern is not to 
define prayer and its possibilities; but rather to hint at
3*0.
limits within which our practice of prayer might well 
move—to be tried and tested,verified or rejected. The 
burden of our thought is two-fold. It is to urge that 
the use of prayer in recent years has been strangled 
by the fact that,in the practical f* ith of the plain man 
of today, his thought of God is likely to be controlled 
by concepts of law taken over bodily from the physical 
sciences. The concept of law is sound within its proper 
sphere but it is quite inadequate,both intellectually and 
practically,to suggest God's relation to human life. It is 
inadequate intellectually because it conceives thw working 
of God's spirit in terms drawn from the lower rather than 
the higher levels of experienced reality, on the analogy 
of the relation of matter to matter rather than the relation 
of life with life end spirit with spirit. It is inadequate 
practically because living religion requires that man's 
fellowship with God shall be as free,as personal,as intimate, 
as his comradeship with the best of men—and far more. In 
our thought of God's relation to us,concepts of law need to 
be replaced by concepts of personal fellowship,concepts of 
friendship, friendship has its laws or principles as surely 
as do atoms and ether,but they are of an utterly different 
kind. The man who sought to come to know a friend as he 
seeks to establish effective relation to the law of gravi­ 
tation will not advance far beyond the threshold of acquain­ 
tance. This is the positive burden of our thought—to urge 
that,whenever our thought turns to God in his relation to 
our minds and spirits, we must train ourselves to think of
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him in the confidences,the intimacies,the expectations of 
personal comradeship. For the recovery of the conviction 
of a living (iod depends iu no small measure upon an increas­ 
ing control of our idea of God by concepts of personal 
relationship and upon a further exploration,in both thought 
and experience,of what it means to call God "Father", We 
are thus brought to a second guiding principle*
God as Personal. 2.In his relations with the realm of values or the
level of 'spirit*, God should be thought of as pereonal. 
With the single exception of the beauty of Nature, we know 
no values save as they are recognised by persons and as they 
are themselves the expression of the life and vision and 
intent of persons. To say that a thing has worth is to say 
that someone has valued it; it requires a mind sensitive to 
delicate meanings to place a valuation upon it. And, with 
the one exception Jsut noted , it is also to imply that its 
worth proceeds from the creative effort of someone ;it 
represents the concern of a sensitive spirit. Then t the 
Source and Purposer of the cosmic process in which our 
values appear irust be thought of as personal.
So to conceive of Ood is at once to court the charge
of anthropomorphism. We do so deliberately and v/ithout
6a 
apology. For there are two quite different meanings of
anthropomorphism. Finding certain features always charac­ 
teristic of human life at its highest we may conclude , 
"God must be at least like that",and ascribe the same at­ 
tributes to him in higher measure. This is,quite literally,
6a7~! am glad to see that Professors Sorley.Taylor and
Pringle-Pattison all vigorously defend the inevitability 
and legitimacy of anthropomorphism in the idea of God.
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to fashion God after man's image; it is not an altogether
illegitimate procedure t but it is not what we have in mind. 
On the other hand, discovering in our experience of the ' 
reality behind our world certain qualities akin to those 
invariably associated with persons (such as solicitude 
for the triumph of values) f we may think of that reality 
in concepts drawn from personality,as the least inadequate 
concepts thought can conceive. This is legitimate,indeed 
inevitable,anthropomorphism. It amounts to little more than
a recognition that,since man is human,all his concepts must
7 
be taken from hunian experience. In fact,the plain man's
mind ,untrammelled by sophistication, finds little difficulty 
in this procedure,
"The ordinary man,when asked if he believed that 
God was personal,would probably reply that he could 
not see why anyone should trouble themselves about an 
impersonal Deity, but would immediately go on to 
qualify his answer by saying that,of course,God cannot 
be personal in precisely the same sense as we are per­ 
sonal, . ..tfe shall find reason to believe that the plain 
man is right in this question of the divine personality, 
His conviction that God must be personal is based upon 
his own religious life and what he has gathered of the 
religious experience of others; but his suspicion that 
God must be personal in a mode different from that of 
human personality is also based partly on some noments 
of religious feeling as well as the vague reflection 
that the divine nature must be very different from 
ours." 8
Here is indicated not only the inevitability and 
propriety of anthropomorphism, but the way in which it 
should be guarded and corrected. We are right in thinking 
of God as personal; but we should never forget that he is 
very much more than personal and,in certain aspects,some­ 
thing very unlike a person. Our thought of God as Comrade,
7."It is sufficiently evident that he who seeks to employ
categories or ideals which are not human must first ceaso to be a man. 1* W.R.Matthews.God in Christian Thought and 
Experi enc e • p • 12 , o. up. GIT:. ,p.±oy. ""
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Guide^Helper,Father, One who may be known somewhat after 
the manner of our knowledge of'a friend,needs ever to be 
supplemented by the reminder that, in some sense,we can 
never know hin. The God of personal fellowship is also the 
God of the universe, of the immensities and the eternities. 
He who is 'closer than breathing,nearer than hands and feet 1 
is also the Wholly Other, he whom no concepts en portray 
and no human reach grasp. I suggest that in the truest 
religious experience,one's thought moves constantly between 
these two poles by a process of alternation. And the recog­ 
nition of the double character of our experience of reality 
as an experience of Nature and of values aids our imagina­ 
tions in keeping flexible and our thoughtlbalanced and 
rounded. Noone who comprehends the dimensions of his cosmic 
home will bo too easily familiar with its Author and Sus- 
tainer. Noons who lives deeply amid the richer of life's 
experiences and accepts their fullest impress i:pon him will 
doubt that God is also in some grand sense akin to himself. 
The solution of the dilemma would seem to come just here— 
when thinking of God ia relation to his cosmos, be careful 
to recall the raystery,the incomprehensibility,the imperson­ 
ality of God;when thinking of God in his traffic with human 
life and those things which human life holds most dear,be 
bold to call him "Father" and to fill the soul with all 
the meaning which that suggests.
To summarise our conclusions in this matter, God is 
to be thought of as personal,not because that is a wholly 
accurate and certainly not an adequate designation, but
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because it is truer than any other ftnought can provide and 
therefore better than any alternative designation wnich 
might be proposed.To paraphrase another,"If we err in 
speaking of God as personal, we err not that we say too 
much but that we siy too little; and if we err in calling 
him 'Father 1 , wo judge that we «rr less grievously than if 
we called him anything else."
The Divine 3.We must accept the implications of such a concep- 
Salf-limitation, tion fearlessly. This Christian theology has usually been
unwilling to do. With one breath it has affirmed hurcan free­ 
dom, but with tiie next the unqualified omnipotence of God 
and the invariable triumph of his will. It has declared that 
man's strugglesjto create a more noble life are peal—not 
an automaton's enactment of a predetermined role—and our 
world's advance still to some degree in the making; but that 
God knows all which shall happen. It has sometimes held that 
God is desperately solicitous for the triumph of his Kingdom; 
but that it is unthinkable that he should experience suf» 
fering. IJQw f to the plain man all this is quite incompre­ 
hensible. He knows nothing of genuinely free persons who 
fulfill a predetermined plan; or of the achievement of a 
future which is already foreknown;or of genuine concern 
without inescapable suffering. The plain man is right once 
more. To employ a very homely LiBtaphor, it is true in 
matters of thought as in practical life that one cannot have 
one's cake and eat it too. Our inability to see through the 
familiar dilemmas of theology ma,- be attributed to the
fc of Dflan V;.R. 
Christian Though to
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inherent limitations of a finite perspective; but here,
as in ascribing personality to God,we must accept those 
limitations gladly. If we are to think at all, we must employ 
the limited powers which have btten given us; and if we are 
to think usefully we must think definitely,not Jesuiatically 
with slioiOLtaueou3 affirmation of two irrec6ncliable state­ 
ments. This cieans that we must think of the realisation 
of the divine purpose as limited, and in at least three ways.
a. First and no at obviously,by the fundamental 
structure of Nature,the fixed background of our huraen dram. • 
To be sure Nature should, be thought of as God's creation 
and so embraced within his wider purpose. But it is not a 
perfect creation in any obvious sense. It does not mete out
r
eveiihe.nded justice j the incidence of its favours and its 
hardships bears no relation to divine approval or divine 
discipline. To be sure that ie precisely the kind of betting 
for human life which wo would desire. In the words of ^wo 
of the writers of our study:*
"Are we justified in sayinc that the imperfect and 
puzzling world that surrounds us is an unfit medium for 
the moral lifu— if by the moral life we me an the triumph 
of spirit?" 9
"Nature on the large scale of hit tory may be re­ 
garded as tho inptnuiiont of man's wornl and intellectual 
education; but that does not mean that we are bound to 
take each of nature's hf-ppenings as the exponent of a 
particular moral purpose. Contingency is written across 
tho fe.ce of Nature*•••Just such a world is better fitted 
to be a nurse of what is greatest in human character IQ 
than any carefully adjusted scheme of moral discipline*.
But this meanc that the realisation of God's ultimate pur­ 
pose for the world moves within limitations in Nature not**
always immediately favorable to that purpose. 
i. Sorley • iuoral Values and the Idea of God. p.346. 
10. Pringle-Pattison.The Idea of God.p.415.
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b.Secondly,it is necessary to think of the divine
purpose as definitoly United by the reality of human free­ 
dom. Tt|ere is no way of escape from this conclusion. If 
freedom means anything beyontf a phenomenal appearance which 
is really a cruel deception of man,it means genuine power 
to turn the course of events, to thwart the ideal outcome. 
There ic riot implied a final thwarting of the divine Inten­ 
tion; we would wish to maintain that human freedom is real 
but that it rioves v?ithin veyy definite limitations which 
represent God's will for the world. For individual and race 
alike the wagon of sin is death. A too wilfull wandering 
froEfche summons of the higher way brings destruction. The 
offender,whether individual or nation or civilisation, is 
swept aside; the current of the larger purpose of God in 
which he would not join sweeps past and on to its ultimate 
fulfillment. But in the personal life and in ^hc evonts of 
the cosmic drams here and now,God's power must be thought 
of as limited in some measure by man's power to choose. It 
is not without significance that the figure for the divine 
u£on which recent thought rests more happily than upon any
other is that of One who stands at the door of human life
11 
and knocks,but who declines to force an entrance.
o.And|by the same token,God must be thought of as 
limited not merely in the immediate realisation of his pur­ 
poses but also in his knowledge of the future. As we have 
said earlier,'If man be even in limited measure the maker 
of his own decisions and the determiner of his own destiny 
so that his future is from the human perspective unpre- 
11. So,for example, Sorley and Pringle-Pattison. Above, pp.
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dlotable, then that future must be thought of as also In
some degree unknowable by the divine mind conceived as it
12 
lies within our power to imagine itft . For him only less
than for us,the future is still partially in the making. 
Here again it may be held that the ultimate destinies are 
predetermined and foreknown; but if numan |be real and our
i
human travail not a farce> God does not forsee every turn 
of the path ahead. The figure of a master chess-player has 
been suggested. From a greater knowledge of the game and 
all possible moves t he is assured of final victory over the 
novice; but he cannot forsee what every move will be. The 
figure is not altogether happy,for it suggests competition 
and the artifice of opposed wills. But it may give a hint 
of the way in which the ultimate control of God over the 
destiny of thw world may be reconcilable with the reality 
of human liberty. And,if there be any wisdom in the analogy ,1 
it is perhaps worth pointing out that the more inexpert the
novice,the more unpredictable are his individual ohpioes; 
although,by the same token,the more sure the final victory
of the greater wisdom*
In the aanii; way, a God who is personal and sharer in 
our hopes und aspirations must also be a participant in the 
experience of suffering. And surely a religion whose supreme
symbol is i. figure on a cross has deserted its centre! in-
13 
sight if it refuse to assert the suffering of God.
Significance 4. Ths particular the is tic approach which we have
Jesus. proposed involves one other corrolary. It suggests where
12. See above,p.55^.
13. This is a serious weakness in the thought of Yon Hugel.
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to seek the most important insights as to God's nature*
If the world-process is to be thought of as a single 
organic cosmic structure progressively realising an
divine Purpose, then it is in the factor most
transoenden uly eirargcsnt frcti the process— it is there and 
there alone that that one would expect to find fullest 
light on its t;ourco and Purposer. .Lt the top rather than 
tit the bottom or BOLUS vli ore; along the path of ascent, in 
the highest rather than in the lowest, through the culmina­ 
tion rath&r tiu.n through the primitive constituents, is 
disclosed the truest representation of the Creator of the
whole* Within our ken, then means man; among men, it means
14 
the best of mon. It is these considerations which vindicate
religion's unfailing concentration upon the value-elements 
in huran experience; -,nd not merely upon them, but upon our 
experience of value a as it comes to itc richest and most 
personal fruition in the intimacies of cpiritual fellow­ 
ship* Here is further justification for thinking of God as 
personal, for receiving with special authority the witness 
of religious communion, and for picturing the outlines of 
the Divine Countenance Uirou^ht its mirroring s in the feat­ 
ures of the noblest human life. God has not revealed himseQ 
solely through cur humanity, but hcJhaspevealed himself there 
supremely; God icjnct to b& knov.n solely through Jesus of 
Nazareth, but he iany be discovered there preeminently. Here 
is philosophical reason why we may believe that in that 
single huuau Figure is disclosed to us the supreme portrail
14. An interesting development of this point of view will 
be found in iJ.Mlall Edwards' contribution to the sym­ 
posium, Se^Lord^ofJLjjfjo, on a christology for today.
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of the Eternal God. ^nd in the practical embracing of
this philosophical truth is our safeguard against the 
sterility of an impersonal religion as well as our 
way of entrance into true religion's holy of holies.
I'Tom this dilemma of pa^cOi thought , this poison of faith t 
Man-soul made glad escape in the worship of Christ; 
tor his humanity is God's Personality, 
and communion with him is the life of the soul.
*•••«.
Our happiest earthly comradeships hold a foretaste 
of the fc&st of salvation aiki by thatt virtue in them 
provoke desire beyond them to out-reach and surmount 
their humanity in some superhuiu&ni ty 
and ultimat perfection: which,howe'er 'tis found 
or strangely imgin'd, answereth to the nedd of each 
and pulleth him instinctively as to a final cause. 
Thus unto all v&c hav found their high ideal in Chsist, 
Christ is to them the essence discern 1 d or undiscern'd 
of all their human friendships; and each lover of him 
and of his beauty must be as a bud on thd Vine 
end hav participation in him; for Coddes love 
is unescapable as nature's environment, 
which if a i^tui ignore or uUirik to thrust it off 
he is the ill-natured fool that runneth blindly on death.
This is thatt excelent way whereon if we wil walk jred
all things shall be added, unto us—tlit/ct Love which InspTj
the wayward Visionary in his doctrinal ode
to the three Christian C-racea,tlie Church's first hymn
and only deathless athanasian creed,—the which
•except a man believe he cannot be saved'.
in the fellowship of tint friendship of Christ
God is seen as the very self -essence of love,
Creator and mover of t*ll HL; activ Lover of all. (15)
The Self-reveal- 5«The God to whom our thought has been led is inevi- 
ing and the tably one who is ^ontinuouaLy self -re veal ing, and not alone 
Redeeming Cod. or even primarily to man's intellect but rather to his whole
nature, ^s we h-we alreedjt suggested, "The hold which value 
in each of its forms (and, supremely, as love) takes upon our 
life, prompting us to seek to find it, to understand it, to 
create it, to possess it, to be fully possessed by it— this
o:f v^lu© upon our deepest selves is itself the 
15. Robert Bridges. The Testament of beauty. Part IV, the end.
390.
touch of the Living God upon our lives, V/e would not seek
16 
him if we had not already known him."
But he is more than self-revealing. The purpose of 
God has as one of its objects—its supreme object,as far 
as we know—the winning of men to their high vocation and 
only true destiny, the sharing with God in the creation of 
a finer world-life. Thus,God is man's redeemer, the Winner 
of men from futility to destiny,from isolation to strong 
comradeship in high endeavor. And so he is most truly repre­ 
sented. T^e method of his redemption is the influence of 
unwearying love making its way within the limitations of 
man's freedom. He is one who forever stands at the door and 
knocks. He does not force entrance,but he does knock. And 
where admission is freely offered,he enters to redeem.
So religion finds God to be. For the experience of 
religion is the response of one who fuels himself called 
and persuaded and compelled by a Personality of Love—by 
one from whom all that is best within him comes,to whom 
his purest longings reach forth for reassurance an* for 
communion,by whom he is changed into something of the like­ 
ness of that Love. The study of Nature pictures God as 
Creator; but the insight derived through our own inner ex­ 
perience of values portrays God as Redeemer. "For a meta- 
physic which has emancipated itself from physical categories, 
the ultimate conception of God is not that of a preexistent 
Creator but,as it is for religion,that of the Eternal Re­ 
deemer of the world." 17
16. See above,p.9(Jand p.175.
17. A.S.Pringle-Pattison,The Idea of God, p.412.
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The Moral Pre- 6. One further word remains to be added. I3ut to us 
requisite of it seems to be the most important word by far. We began our 
Faith. study by pointing out that the inadequacy of the contemporary
layman's religion has a two-fold rootage— in a false philo­ 
sophy,and in a kind of personal and corporate life which has
lulled men into an indifference to religion and to th» values
18 
and responsibilities implicit in it. Our enquiry has been
directed almost entirely to the intellectual problem. But 
here at the end we are again brought sharply back to the 
practical roots of unbelief—the effect of moral indifference 
upon religious faith.
Our thought has found a center of reference in the 
conception of a world-process. But it is a process which,like 
the human agents to whom it gives birth, is characterised by 
vitality,movement f strugc3le i above all the striving toward 
progress. It is a process in which great stakes are always 
at issue and supreme values forever imperilled—honesty, 
justice,freedom,opportunity,love, progress itself—all those 
things of highest worth which man at his best holds dear. 
Such a living,throbbing,endangered locus of values is a world
in which the attitude of casual indifference can have no
19 
place; it is equivalent to enmity to the highest. If this be
a true reading of the matter,there are involved important 
implications about the Source and Ground of that world and 
about the way by which men may become sure of him.
It is not essentially a mystery to be solved,this 
world of ours,but a task to be undertaken and shared. The
18. See above f pp.!4ff .
19. See "Moral Earnestness", Cht.VI in In ^ueet of Lifers 
Meaning.
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Power behind it is properly conceived as a Thinker,but not 
primarily as a Thinker; primarily he is a Creator,a Do-er, 
The God whose very nature it is to love all manklnd—great 
and low,wise and simple—and to win them into comradeship 
with himself and partnership in his high concerns cannot 
have made the intellect the principal pathway to himself, or 
truth the prerogative of the intelligent* He must be immedia­ 
tely and surely discoverable throu^i all of man's experience, 
or more accurately through that part of his experience which 
is man at his best,The principal pathway to God,then,must be 
through a life—a full,rich,creative and dedicated life. And 
the way to the fullest understanding of God is through creative 
effort,
We may 30 one further step. If our idea of God be 
sound, a God who summons men to Join with him in the perfecting 
of a fairer world,then only those who respond to that summons 
and are themselves participants in the creative task can be 
certain of God or comprehend him at all truly. For God is not 
a problem to be solved,but a Toiler to be joined. Knowledge 
of God is not a conclusion of the intellect,but the attunement 
of the spirit. This is the truth in Jesus* great word,"Blessed 
are the pure in heart for they shall see God M --an intuition 
of spiritual vision for which we now find philosophic confir­ 
mation,"For whatever ^Ise hft may be,God is supremely a working 
God; that is what is meant by a living God, Further, it is 
a nature of love which we have discovered him to be,and love 
is never indifferent jit cares end cares enormously. He is 
desperately in earnest about life and about the transformation
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of our world-life. Where shall we most surely find him save
in his workshop,in the toil r.nd struggle of making this 
world into the image of his Kingdoms bo many and many a 
modern nan and woman have found him.•••—wherever one can be 
sure the concern of God is enlisted,and feel the press of 
the hand of God with his own, the mingling of the tears of God 
in his sympathy,the Joining of the exultation of God to his 
victory* Fellowship with God,then,is not a social relation­ 
ship to be enjoyed mutually,but a great task to be undertaken 
unitedly. It is an experience of partnership. I suspect this 
is what Jesus meant when he said,"Take my yoke upon you." Take 
upon your shoulder some part of the burden under which his
shoulder ceaselessly toils and you will find him as the Great
20
Companion of life." The final emphasis falls upon the embod­ 
iment of his love in the actual world-process,upon the divine
purpose; and upon the necessity for human enlistment in that
21 
purpose.
It is for that reason that the silent evidence of one 
human life may give clearer knowledge of truth than the specu­ 
lations of the philosophers. 'The saint is the soundest theo­ 
logian. 1 And it is for that reason,supremely,that the life 
and thought and work and death and continuing influence of 
Jesus of Nazareth may well be our surest guide to our certain­ 
ty of God and the way for our own lives. '"He that hath seen 
him hath seen the father.* This has been the conviction of the 
greatest religious spirits down the centuries—that the way 
to the knowledge of God and the understanding of life was not
20. From my In w,uest of Life's Meaning. »p«66.87 •
21. VYe have used these phrases in sum arising Prof .Sorley 1 s 
conclusions.
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through tho brilliance of one's mind, but through the quality 
of one's life arid the depth of one's devotion, e see why it 
must be true,that "He who wills to do God's will shall know."
And may it not be that in our own day the rebirth 
of vital religion for which we yearn waits until faith and 
courage lead forth the way to fresh discoveries? Then,as 
always,shall theology follow,with lagging footsteps*
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